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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between counterterrorism and human rights.  
Its primary contention is that the promotion of the ideal of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism has undermined rather than strengthened human rights.  Drawing on 
fieldwork-based case studies in the Philippines and Indonesia, the thesis demonstrates that 
greater recognition for the role of human rights in achieving security has not prompted a 
positive transformation of counterterrorism practices.  Instead, proponents of 
counterterrorist action have been able to frame their action as a necessary, human rights-
sensitive, and rational response to unnecessary, human rights-insensitive and irrational 
political violence.  The challenge therefore is how to devise strategies to resist human 
rights abuses in the name of counterterrorism that do not entangle human rights in the 
perpetuation and legitimation of the counterterrorism agenda. 
 
The thesis proceeds in eight chapters besides the Introduction.  Chapter 1 sets the 
stage for analysis, introducing the normative discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism at the international level, and proposing a theoretical framework for 
analysing this discourse that draws from the insights of Critical Terrorism Studies and 
critical approaches to international law and human rights.  Utilising this theoretical 
framework, I examine the extent to which counterterrorism practices undermined rather 
than advanced human rights in two case studies: the Philippines and Indonesia.   Chapters 
2, 3 and 4 develop the Philippine case study.  Chapter 2 presents the local counterterrorism 
discourse during the government’s alignment with the United States’ “War on Terror”, 
showing that the government characterised complex armed struggles as “terrorism” with 
devastating consequences for human rights.  Chapter 3 analyses the responses of local 
human rights advocates to this counterterrorism discourse, describing how their resistance 
strategies cannot be reduced to a clamour for human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  
Chapter 4 shows how official policies have incorporated human rights-friendly rhetoric; and 
why despite this, they are failing to transform the practices of security forces that lead to 
extrajudicial killings and other serious abuses.   
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 develop the Indonesian case study.  Chapter 5 reviews the local 
counterterrorism discourse developed during the Suharto regime, showing that the threat 
of Islamic “terrorism” was likely fostered by it, benefiting the regime at the expense of 
human rights.  Chapter 6 shows how, after the Bali bombing of 2002, Indonesia’s approach 
to counterterrorism has incorporated human rights, much more than in the Philippines, 
and how local human rights advocates have accordingly adjusted their perception of the 
Islamic “terrorist” threat and the acceptability of counterterrorism.  Chapter 7 analyses 
how Densus 88, the main counterterrorism actor, enjoys impunity for extrajudicial killings, 
demonstrating that the legal framework has failed to restrain serious abuses and in fact 
inoculated the counterterrorism agenda from further scrutiny.  Chapter 8, the concluding 
chapter, brings together the main findings of the thesis and emphasises the need for more 
critical human rights scholarship and advocacy that are disentangled from the 
counterterrorism agenda. 
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Preface 
 
When I was still a lawyer at the non-government law office Public Interest Law Center, our 
organisation provided legal assistance to a group of 26 Muslim men who were accused by 
police of bombing a cinema in SM Megamall in Mandaluyong City on May 21, 2000.  It was 
my first brush with counterterrorism.  The police had arrested the men following a raid of 
the empoverished Muslim enclave of Maharlika village, Taguig City where they had resided.  
Police officials claimed the men were operatives of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) trained in MILF camps in Mindanao.  They were supposedly hiding in safe houses in 
Metro Manila and implementing secret orders from the MILF leadership to retaliate against 
the Manila government’s overrunning of their base camp in Mindanao by bombing targets 
in Metro Manila.   
The relatives and neighbours of the accused disputed this accusation, arguing that 
the men had been ordinary villagers unjustly framed by police, and that the raid defamed 
their community.  Leaders of civil society organisations warned that rash accusations 
tended to arouse prejudice against the already marginalised Muslims in Metro Manila.  In 
the ensuing legal proceedings, the police could not produce sufficient evidence to support 
their theory.  Indeed, there was only one witness, a security guard, who identified only one 
of the 26 men as being in the vicinity of the site of the bombing at the time.  Moreover, this 
witness gave a physical description that did not fit the suspect.  Because the police’s 
evidence had not been strong, we were able to obtain bail for the accused.  The case was 
eventually dismissed by the court. 
After SM Megamall, however, more bombings rocked Metro Manila and other 
parts of the country.  The government claimed that these were terrorist events, though the 
cause or causes of these bombings have never been independently and credibly 
ascertained.  The debunking of the police’s theory in the SM Megamall bombing did not 
seem to matter.  The civil society organisations that our law office worked with continued 
to caution against misusing the spectre of terrorism to advance government agendas that 
promoted war.  But with every new bombing, especially after 9/11, the space for 
questioning the reality of terrorism seems to shrink more and more.   
It was at this juncture that international human rights advocates began crafting 
arguments that states must respect human rights while countering terrorism.  These 
arguments were designed to allow the continued promotion of human rights within an 
environment where counterterrorism appeared necessary.  On the one hand, it secured a 
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space for human rights promotion within the context of counterterrorism.  On the other 
hand, it tended to affirm a narrative of a world gripped by international terrorism that 
made counterterrorism an unquestioned imperative.   
I began to reflect on the implications these ideas might have for places like the 
Philippines.  How could the energy of the “War on Terror” be channelled into the beneficial 
promotion of human rights?  How could the idea of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism have more relevance than as a sand castle, beautiful to behold but built 
so close to the water that erodes it?  This thesis represents my attempt to grapple with 
these questions. 
 
 
 
  
 3 
Introduction 
 
Can there be human rights-compliant counterterrorism?  This question preoccupies many 
international lawyers and human rights advocates.  Concerned by the scale of human rights 
abuses that have been perpetrated by counterterrorist operations in the pursuit of the 
‘War on Terror’, they assert that counterterrorism activities can and should comply with 
international human rights law.1  Through their advocacy, international lawyers and human 
rights activists have prompted judicial authorities to demand, and world leaders to pledge, 
that counterterrorist operations can be conducted in a more principled way.2   
The proposition that counterterrorism should respect human rights is now so 
widely accepted that it is almost considered to be a matter of common sense.  In 2006 the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted “The United Nations Global Counterterrorism 
Strategy”,3 which seeks to articulate a global consensus on a human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism.  The document dedicated one of the four pillars of its Plan of Action to 
"Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the 
fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism".4  Both the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council regularly issue resolutions “concerning fighting terrorism in a manner 
consistent with human rights” of such a character that an argument has been made that “a 
general obligation to protect human rights in the context of counter-terrorism” is now “an 
                                                                 
1 For example, Commission on Human Rights, ‘Human Rights: A Unifying Framework: Report of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on 
Human Rights ’ <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G02/110/21/PDF/G0211021.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 16 July 2014; 
Committee of Ministers of the Council  of Europe, ‘Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against 
Terrorism’ 
<https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/HR%20and%20the%20fight%20against%20terrorism.pd
f> accessed 20 April  2016; Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Human Rights in the Wake of Terrorism’ (2003) 82 
Australian Law Reform Commission Reform Journal 26-29; Human Rights Watch, ‘Hear No Evil, See 
No Evil: The UN Security Council ’s Approach to Human Rights Violations in the Global Counter-
Terrorism Project (Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper)’ 
<http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/un/2004/un0804/un0804.pdf> accessed 12 July 2012; 
Paul Hoffman, ‘Human Rights and Terrorism’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 932-955; Kofi 
Annan, ‘A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism (Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary) ’ (2005) 
<http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/site/documents/?d=268> accessed 7 January 2016.  
2 For example, Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Request for Precautionary Measures, IACHR 
(2002), 41 ILM 532; Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Territories [2004] ICJ Rep 136; Saadi v Italy, App No 37201/06, [2008] ECHR 179 
(involvement in terrorism did not affect an individual's absolute rights under Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights against return or extradition to states in which the individual 
faced a "real risk" of torture, inhuman or degradi ng treatment). 
3 UNGA Res 60/288 ‘The United Nations Global Counter -Terrorism Strategy’ (8 September 2006) UN 
Doc A/RES/60/288. 
4 ibid., Annex IV.  
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emerging rule of customary international law” which binds states whether or not they are 
signatories to the relevant treaties.5  A typical statement of a UN agency working in the 
thematic area that has been called “promotion and protection of human rights while 
countering terrorism” declares: 
The Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODC believes that to effectively combat 
terrorism while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is not only 
possible but also necessary.  Indeed, effective counter-terrorism measures [on the one 
hand] and respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms [on 
the other hand] are complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives which must 
be pursued together as part of States' duty to protect indivi duals within their 
jurisdiction.6   
The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee has adopted a “pro-active policy on 
human rights” which entails that its Executive Directorate should take into account 
relevant human rights concerns in all of its activities.7  The consistency between 
counterterrorism measures and states’ obligations under international law, particularly 
human rights law, is said to be “an essential part of a successful counter-terrorism effort”8 
                                                                 
5 Joseph Isanga, ‘Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Emergence of a Rule of Customary 
International Law from UN Resolutions’ (2008) 37 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 
233-257, 233. See, e.g., UNGA Res 56/160 ‘Human Rights and Terrorism’ (13 February 2002) UN Doc 
A/RES/56/160, para 6 (call ing upon States to "take all  necessary and effective measures, in 
accordance with relevant provisions of international law, including international human rights 
standards, to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism ... and ... strengthen, where appropriate, 
their legislation to combat terrorism"); UNGA Res. 57/219 ‘Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism’ (27 February 2003) UN Doc A/RES/57/219, 
para 1 (affirming that "States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies 
with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights"); UNGA Res. 
59/191 ‘Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Encountering Terrorism’ (10 
March 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/191;  UNSC Res. 1535 (26 March 2004) UN Doc S/RES 1535 (stating 
that States "must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all  their 
obligations under international law and should adopt such measures in accordance with 
international law, in particular international human rights"); UNSC Res. 1566 (8 October 2004) U.N. 
Doc S/RES/1566 (reiterating much of UNSC Res. 1535); UNSC Res. 1624 (14 September 2005) U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1624. 
6 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Promoting and Protecting Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism’ 
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/news -and-events/human-rights-while-countering-
terrorism.html> accessed 11 November 2015.  The UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights has also appointed a “Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism” since 2005. 
7 UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee, ‘Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/rights.html> accessed 12 January 2016. 
8 UNSC Res. 1963 (20 December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1963, para 10. 
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and its importance is underlined in a number of Security Council resolutions and in the 
reports of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.9   
The rhetoric of both counterterrorism and human rights institutions therefore 
suggests that the discourses of human rights and counterterrorism have begun to 
intersect.  This thesis examines the extent to which this normative rhetoric surrounding 
human rights-compliant counterterrorism reflects reality.  Instead of simply affirming that 
a human rights-compliant counterterrorism is necessary and possible, i t poses an 
empirical question: what actually happens on the ground when human rights language is 
attached to counterterrorism?  Does the rhetorical convergence of the human rights and 
counterterrorism agendas lead to a transformation in the practice of pursuing security so 
that counterterrorism is conducted in a more principled way?  Or does this convergence 
trigger a diversity of effects, with some fitting the story of constructive transformation 
while others do not?  To what extent does the rhetoric of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism produce negative consequences for the protection of human rights?  
To examine these questions, I study counterterrorism and human rights in two specific 
locations, the Philippines and Indonesia.  I look at how the governments in these countries 
developed discourses about countering the threat of terrorism, how local human rights 
advocates reacted, and how laws and policies changed to incorporate human rights 
concerns into counterterrorism measures.  I then examine the effect of changes on 
counterterrorism practices.   
1.  Thesis objectives 
 
The thesis has three research objectives: 
(1) To re-evaluate the local counterterrorism discourses in the Philippines and Indonesia; 
(2) To analyse local human rights’ advocates’ initiatives addressing the effects of 
counterterrorism measures, and elucidate their views on counterterrorism; and 
(3) To evaluate Philippine and Indonesian counterterrorism or (broader) security policies 
that incorporate human rights language. 
                                                                 
9 UNSC Res. 1624 (n 4); UNSC Res. 1805 (20 March 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1805; UNSC Res. 1963 (20 
December 2010) S/RES/1963;  UNSC ‘Report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security 
Council  for its consideration as part of its comprehensive review of the Counter -Terrorism 
Committee Executive Directorate’ (16 December 2005) UN Doc S/2005/200, Annex, para 13; UNSC 
‘Report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security Council  for its consideration as part of 
its comprehensive review of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate’ (18 December 
2006) UN Doc S/2006/989, Annex, para 26, 27. 
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I decided to study two countries in order to generate a diversity of empirical 
observations and insights.  I chose the Philippines and Indonesia because these are both 
conflict-prone countries with distinct local understandings of who or what groups are 
referred to by the term “terrorists” who should be countered.  In both countries, local 
human rights advocates have addressed, in varying ways, violations arising from 
counterterrorism.  The governments in these two countries have also developed a legal and 
human rights language to regulate their counterterrorism activities.    
In this thesis, I provide a critical understanding of local counterterrorism discourses 
as anchored on political calculations that bring advantages to the state and marginalise its 
adversaries.  This understanding re-adjusts attention from the violent activities of the 
alleged terrorists to the larger political and historical context in which the violence of the 
state and its adversaries are both located.   
The thesis also examines local human rights initiatives and views about 
counterterrorism.  In the Philippines, fieldwork research uncovered extensive information 
on several local human rights campaigns that addressed the effects of the “War on Terror”.  
Four different campaigns by Filipino human rights advocates are analysed in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4.  In Chapter 3, three of these campaigns are analysed, focusing on the 
campaigners’ underlying attitudes towards the local discourse of counterterrorism.   In 
Indonesia, fieldwork research obtained information on the views of mainstream human 
rights organisations as well as Muslim lawyers on counterterrorism (Chapter 6); as well as 
the investigations of the Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (KomnasHAM) or the 
Indonesian National Human Rights Commission dealing with violations in the course of 
counterterrorism operations by police (Chapter 7).   
I examine how a human rights language has been attached to counterterrorism in 
the Philippines and Indonesia.  In fact, the intersection of human rights and 
counterterrorism discourses has taken place at different times in the two countries, 
occurring earlier in Indonesia (with the adoption of a legal framework for counterterrorism 
immediately after the Bali bombing of 2002) than in the Philippines (with a series of legal 
and policy developments taking place after 2006).  It is possible to draw lessons from the 
two countries’ contrasting situations during the time gap between Indonesia’s and the 
Philippines’ adoption of a human rights language for counterterrorism and security, but the 
main goal of the study isn’t to illustrate causal relationships as such ( for example, having a 
legal framework leads to x; lack of legal framework leads to y).  Although the thesis does 
draw some comparative insights between the two cases, it is not primarily a comparative 
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study.  Rather, the two countries’ experiences are compared with the ideal or normative 
project of countering terrorism while respecting human rights.  In particular, I evaluate the 
effect of the official incorporation of human rights language into the counterterrorism or 
security policies of the Philippines and Indonesia on the practice of military (Philippines) 
and police (Indonesia), the main counterterrorism actors in those countries. 
 
2.  The Central Argument 
 
The central argument of this thesis is that efforts to promote human rights-
compliant counterterrorism often serve to undermine rather than strengthen the 
protection of human rights.  Advocacy for human rights-compliant counterterrorism 
involves human rights advocates in improving counterterrorism so that it is acceptable 
from a human rights perspective.  The danger is that counterterrorism measures can work 
to simplify how conflict is seen and dealt with in places where the characterisation of sub-
state violence as “terrorism” and the state’s actions as “counterterrorism” should be 
challenged precisely for being superficial.  That is to say, human rights advocates risk 
entrenching particular ways of characterising and responding to political violence that are 
assimilated under the rubric of “counterterrorism”.  At the same time, the promise that the 
attachment of a human rights language to counterterrorism can transform its practice may 
not be realised in any significant way.   
Scott Poynting and David Whyte, writing within a critical tradition in terrorism 
studies, have described the way that counterterrorism aims to depoliticise political violence 
by distancing violence from its socio-economic context as well as from any background 
political and ideological conflict.  What is “depoliticised” is not merely the violence of non -
state actors deemed to be “terrorists”, but also the violence of the state.  Within the logic 
of counterterrorism, terrorist opponents of the state are “ideologically irrational and driven 
by fanaticism” whereas the state’s own violent response to terrorism is “defensive, 
responsible, rational and unavoidable”.   The political calculation or ideological bias behind 
the state’s violent response to “terrorists” are left hidden from view .10  Following the lead 
of Critical Terrorism Studies scholars, this thesis examines how human rights can  facilitate 
the process of depoliticising counterterrorism.  If the proponents of counterterrorist action 
can make a convincing claim that their actions are essentially respectful of human rights 
                                                                 
10 Scott Poynting and David Whyte, Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The ‘War on 
Terror’ as Terror (Routledge 2012) 9. 
 8 
and therefore rational, then this enables them to frame their counterterrorist action as a 
necessary, human rights sensitive and rational response to unnecessary, human rights 
insensitive, irrational political violence.  Moreover, this permits them to portray any human 
rights abuses perpetrated in the course of counterterrorist operations as unfortunate 
excesses rather than intentional consequences, by contrast with the consequences of 
terrorist acts, for which terrorists must be held fully accountable. 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
3.1.  Research question and sub-questions 
 
The primary research question that this thesis examines is:  What are the 
consequences of attaching a human rights language to counterterrorism in the Philippines 
and Indonesia?  The question explores the normative project’s actual pursuit in two 
different contexts, ascertaining the existence and nature of transformations that it enables 
or triggers.  
I ask three secondary questions that relate to the three research objectives. The 
first secondary research question is:  What political decisions or calculations are naturalised 
and what resulting abuses are glossed over in local counterterrorism discourses?  I explore 
this question in Chapter 2 in relation to the Philippines and Chapter 5 in relation to 
Indonesia.  In particular, I review the local sub-state actors whom government labelled 
“terrorists” and those actors’ actions denounced by governments as “terrorism”.  This is a 
necessary preliminary task. 
At the international level, resistance to abuses in the name of counterterrorism led 
to an engagement with the counterterrorism agenda that sought its transformation 
through the incorporation of human rights.  (I discuss human rights advocates’ engagement 
with the counterterrorism agenda in the international level in Chapter 1, Section 1.)  The 
second secondary research question is:  At the local level, how did human rights advocates 
resist abuses in the name of counterterrorism?  Did resistance to abuses equate with or 
lead to accommodation of the counterterrorism discourse as in the international level?  I 
discuss local advocates’ initiatives and views in Chapters 3 and 4 (first section) in relation to 
the Philippines Chapters 6 and 7 in relation to Indonesia. 
The third and final secondary research question is:  How have governments 
incorporated human rights language in their counterterrorism and security initiatives and 
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what impact has this had on their counterterrorism practices? I discuss this question in 
Chapter 4 (second and third sections) in relation to the Philippines, and Chapter 6 (first 
section) and Chapter 7, in relation to Indonesia.   
 
3.2.  Empirical case studies and normative ideals 
 
In “The Normative Case Study”, David Thacher explains that the two main uses to 
which case studies are put in the social sciences are to help identify causal relationships 
and mechanisms (“causal case study”) or to understand the worldview of people being 
studied (“interpretive case study”).11  He has also argued, however, that case studies 
contribute towards illuminating, clarifying or critiquing “ideals we should pursue and 
obligations we should accept” (“normative case study”).  Case study methodology can 
contribute to normative theory by identifying, through description of and reflection on 
aspects of reality, an ideal we have not named before, or which we were only dimly aware 
of and pursued at best inadvertently.12  Case studies can also lead to a critique of a 
normative theory that we have taken for granted by generating dissonant observations and 
reflections, and so pave the way for its modification or replacement.13    
The rationale for the normative case study lies in a view of knowledge, both 
scientific (knowledge about the world) and moral (knowledge of right and wrong), as 
forming, in the words of W.V.O. Quine, a “web” or “fabric” of beliefs or judgments.14  
Within this web or fabric are beliefs or judgments of varying levels of abstraction.  Each 
belief or judgment are always being tested against each other and against experience, and 
are revisable no matter their level of abstraction.15  Beliefs or judgments at every level of 
abstraction would have implications for beliefs and judgments at other levels.  This means 
not only that our normative understandings (beliefs and judgements at an abstract level) 
entail beliefs or judgements in particular cases, but also that judgements about particular 
                                                                 
11 David Thacher, ‘The Normative Case Study’ (2006) 111 American Journal of Sociology 1631 -1676, 
1631–1632.  
12 ibid 1647 (commenting on Jacobs’ study of the vitality of cities ). 
13 ibid 1645–1646 (commenting on Selznick’s study of management’s role debunking the view that it 
is primarily a technical activity). 
14 Willard van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View (2nd edn, Harper Torchbooks 1961) 42, 46.  
15 In the words of Rawls, “By dropping and revising some [beliefs or judgments], by reformulating 
and expanding others, one supposes that a systematic organization can be found [among our beliefs 
or judgments].  Although in order to get started various judgments are viewed as firm enough to be 
taken provisionally as fixed points, there are no judgments on any level of generality that are in 
principle immune to revision.” John Rawls, ‘The Independence of Moral Theory’ in Samuel Freeman 
(ed), Collected Papers (Harvard University Press 1999) 289. 
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cases can expand normative understanding.  This happens when judgments about 
particular cases are dissonant with our pre-existing normative understandings and thus 
create a disequilibrium that forces us to reconsider and possibly adjust our normative 
understandings. 
This thesis aims to generate such creative moral tension and reflective 
disequilibrium by juxtaposing an established normative view (countering terrorism while 
respecting human rights) with dissonant cases.  The presentation of the Philippines and 
Indonesia cases represent dissonant cases, which are contrasted with that established 
normative view. 
 
3.3.  Fieldwork 
 
Fieldwork was undertaken in Indonesia and the Philippines in order to collect 
empirical data to examine the primary and secondary research questions.  The thesis draws 
on interviews conducted with and documents obtained from human rights organisations 
and other actors pertaining to counterterrorism policy and operations during fieldwork in 
Indonesia and the Philippines.  Prior to conducting fieldwork, ethics approval was obtained 
from the ANU.16  The appendices contain the basic questionnaire I used for the interviews 
as well as a list of all interviews.   
Indonesian fieldwork was undertaken from June to August 2013 and in September 
2015.  This fieldwork took place primarily in the metropolitan area of Jakarta, although a 
brief trip was also made to Surabaya to gather data on the Tulungagung case .  An 
Indonesian respondent was also interviewed in Melbourne.  The Philippines fieldwork was 
undertaken in Manila and various cities in Mindanao from February to March 2014, in 
order to obtain the perspectives of human rights advocates from the national capital region 
and from a more peripheral area closer to the sites of armed conflict.   
The fieldwork generated data that underpins analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 for the 
Philippines and Chapters 6 and 7 for Indonesia.  Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 3, pertaining to 
campaigns launched by human rights advocates in Basilan island and in Mindanao, were 
informed by interviews and rare documents produced by local actors in Mindanao.  In 
Chapter 4, I make use of interviews to inform the discussion of judicial and policy changes 
after 2006.   In Chapter 6, I report the divergent views of mainstream human rights 
                                                                 
16 ‘Abuses and Uses of Human Rights in the Context of Global Counter -Terrorism: Activist 
Perspectives from the Philippines and Indonesia’ (Protocol 2013/117). 
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advocates and Muslim lawyers, which form the findings of my Indonesia fieldwork in 2013.  
In Chapter 7, on the investigations by KomnasHAM, I make use of fieldwork data obtained 
in 2015.    
 
4.  Overview 
 
Following the Introduction, this thesis is presented in eight chapters.  
Chapter 1 (“Theoretical Framework”) reviews how international lawyers and 
human rights advocates have engaged with the “War on Terror” at the international level 
and how this engagement resulted in the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism at the United Nations (UN).  I then draw on the insights of the theoretical 
literature of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) in the International Relations subfield of 
Terrorism Studies, as well as contemporary critical approaches to international law and 
human rights, in order to construct a theoretical framework to critically evaluate the theory 
and practice of human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  On the one hand, CTS questions 
assumptions about counterterrorism.17 These assumptions remained unchallenged in the 
quest by international lawyers to ameliorate counterterrorism abuses.  However, CTS 
scholars have not paid attention to international law and the use that human rights 
advocates have made of it in response to the “War on Terror”.  On the other hand, critical 
approaches to international law and human rights,18 specifically Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL),19 suggest that international law and human rights can actually 
mask injustice and abuse.  TWAIL scholars have focused on the ways that the “War on 
Terror” is altering fundamental international law norms like sovereignty and non-use of 
                                                                 
17 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism 
(Manchester University Press 2005); Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning (eds), 
Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda  (1st edn, Routledge 2009); Poynting and Whyte 
(n 8). 
18 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights?: Reflections on the European 
Convention (Cambridge University Press 2006); Neil  Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements 
(Pluto Press 2009). 
19 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2007); Antony Anghie and BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law 
and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 77 -
103; Makau Mutua and Antony Anghie, ‘What Is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Proceedings of the Annua l  
Meeting (American Society of International Law) 31-40; Makau Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and 
Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 42 Harvard International Law Journal 201 -245; 
Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (University of Pennsylvania Press 
2002). 
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force in furtherance of a more explicit form of imperialism.20  However, TWAIL scholars 
have not examined whether human rights-compliant counterterrorism is reconfiguring the 
“War on Terror” into a benign or neutral project.  Even though both CTS and TWAIL 
scholars approach the “War on Terror” critically, they have worked independently of each 
other.  The chapter develops a critical approach to the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism that combine the insights of CTS and TWAIL, filling a gap in both 
literatures’ understanding of the role of international law and human rights in perpetuating 
as well as resisting the injustice of the “War on Terror”.  The sceptical or critical attitude 
towards the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism articulated in Chapter 1 
can be opposed to the orthodox position, which is well stated in both constructivist 
International Relations and liberal legal scholarship.  While the orthodox position 
celebrates the human rights turn in counterterrorism, hopeful of a transformation of 
counterterrorism practices, the sceptical position cautions that the human rights turn may 
simply serve as a veneer, making resistance to abuses harder to resist as the terrorism 
discourse is further entrenched. 
The Philippine case study is developed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  Chapter 2 
(“Philippine Counterterrorism Discourse: the ‘War on Terror’ and Counterinsurgency”) 
explores the local meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism in the Philippines.  It argues 
that terrorism does not represent a new problem and counterterrorism a new solution.  
Instead, the deployment of “terrorism” label primarily serves to reframe old foes of the 
state previously regarded as “insurgents” into “terrorists”.  This has the consequence of 
intensifying abusive counterinsurgency practices.  The problematic character of the original 
application of the “terrorist” label to the Abu Sayyaf group is also examined.  The 
counterterrorism discourse expanded to cover the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
and the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) as well.  This 
development was facilitated by the international advocacy for counterterrorism associated 
with the United States-led “War on Terror”, even though the characterisation of these 
groups as terrorist was even more debatable than in the case of the Abu Sayyaf .  The 
chapter presents the Philippines as a site in which the articulation of the counterterrorism 
                                                                 
20 Anghie (n 16) 273; Obiara Chinedu Okafor, ‘Globalism, Memory and 9/11: A Critical Third World 
Perspective’ in Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja (eds), Events: The Force of 
International Law (Taylor & Francis 2010); Obiara Chinedu Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and 
International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall  Law Journal 
171-191, 172–173; Makau Mutua, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights: Power, Culture, and Subordination’ 
(2002) 8 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 1-13, 1. 
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discourse directly correlates with escalation of serious human rights abuses, namely, 
extrajudicial killings and disappearances. 
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse four advocacy campaigns pursued by Filipino human 
rights advocates and campaigners to address the expansion of terrorism discourse from 
Abu Sayyaf to MILF, the CPP-NPA and other leftist legal organisations and activists.  Chapter 
3 (“Promoting Human Rights While Rejecting Counterterrorism: Three Filipino Campaigns”) 
discusses how local advocates resisted abuses in the name of counterterrorism by rejecting 
the entrenchment of the counterterrorism discourse.  Whereas the international 
organisation Human Rights Watch sought measures to improve counterterrorism in 
Mindanao, campaigners in Basilan island (addressing the impact of joint US-Philippine 
military exercises against the Abu Sayyaf) and mainland Mindanao (addressing “mysterious 
bombings” in Mindanao) have pursued a strategy of promoting respect for human rights 
while rejecting counterterrorism. Campaigners in Basilan and Mindanao focused on truth-
seeking, thus gathering evidence that discredited the characterisation of local actors and 
acts as “terrorists” or “terrorism”.  On the political front, campaigners defending CPP 
founder Jose Maria Sison employed a similar strategy.  However, in an interesting twist, in 
their European litigation to remove Jose Maria Sison from the European Union's terrorist 
list, legal advocates encountered and made good use of a judicial terrain (the European 
Court of First Instance) already attuned to the international discourse of human rights-
compliant counterterrorism.  The Sison case thus reflected a pragmatic, ends-based 
advocacy campaign that rejected the counterterrorism discourse locally, whilst using it to 
its advantage internationally.   
Chapter 4 (“The Extrajudicial Killings Campaign and the State’s Response: Failed 
Remedy, Changed Rhetoric, Continuing Practice”) discusses the campaign against 
extrajudicial killings of leftist activists, as well as the post-2006 legal developments 
instituted by the Philippine state in response to this campaign.  Mediated by mainstream 
international human rights actors, most importantly the UN special rapporteur on 
extrajudicial killings Philip Alston, the campaign changed official Philippine policy to 
espouse human rights-compliant counterinsurgency and security more broadly.  New 
judicial remedies (the writs of amparo and habeas data); the anti-terrorism law (the 
Human Security Act); specific legislation against enforced disappearances, torture and 
violations of international humanitarian law; and the new national security policy all 
intended to ameliorate abuses.  They also resulted in greater recognition for the role of law 
and rights protection in the security context.  However, they have been of very limited 
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actual benefit to victims of abuse. The chapter focuses on the experience of advocates with 
the amparo remedy and the impact of the new security strategy on civil society.  It 
concludes, with respect to the amparo remedy, that the extent of complicity of the military 
and law enforcement in killings and disappearances is greater than has been imagined by 
the Supreme Court which crafted it.  With respect to the new national security policy, it 
does not stop the targeting of “front” organisations and mass bases, which accounts for 
extrajudicial killings and disappearances.  The new human rights rhetoric is best 
understood not as a harbinger of transformation of security but a substitute for genuine 
reforms.  
The Indonesian case study is developed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  Chapter 5 
(“Indonesian Counterterrorism Discourse from Suharto to Bali”) examines the local 
meaning of terrorism and counterterrorism in Indonesia.  The local counterterrorism 
discourse has a history that predates the “War on Terror”, thus the review undertaken in 
this chapter covers a broader temporal sweep than in Chapter 2.  However, the aim of both 
chapters is similar, namely, to expose that counterterrorism is not a purely rational and 
technical endeavour against irrational violence.  Parallel to the claim in Chapter 2 that 
counterinsurgency goals underpin the extension of the “War on Terror” and its rhetoric in 
the Philippines, I argue in this chapter that counterterrorism in Indonesia is related to the 
suppression of the Islamist project.  The spectre of a revival of an Islamist challenge to the 
pluralist state that is raised in the staging of terrorist attacks blamed solely on networks of 
extremist or violent radical Islamists has historically been “useful” to the Indonesian 
government.  This chapter recalls the history of repression of Islamism in Indonesia and 
emphasises the continuity of that history after the fall of Suharto.  It argues that a revival of 
a radical Islamist challenge to the state is largely a self-serving fantasy of both extremists – 
who look to extreme violence to mask their emaciation - and proponents of 
counterterrorism.   
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on contemporary counterterrorism in Indonesia and human 
rights’ entanglement with it.  While Indonesia’s law-enforcement approach to 
counterterrorism shows greater recognition for the role of law and human rights in 
counterterrorism than in the Philippines’ rhetorically revamped but essentially war-like 
approach, the most serious human rights violations, killings and torture, are also part of the 
repertoire of counterterrorism in Indonesia.  Chapter 6 (“Indonesia’s Legalised 
Counterterrorism: Divergent Domestic Reactions”) traces the development of Indonesia’s 
legal framework on counterterrorism and the ascendance of the police-led or law-
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enforcement model of counterterrorism.  It also presents the main themes that emerged 
from fieldwork interviews pertaining to the divergent views of mainstream human rights 
advocates and Muslim legal advocates.  Just as the Indonesian government arrived at its 
own legalised approach to counterterrorism, in which a human rights language was 
prominent, mainstream human rights advocates also accommodated the counterterrorism 
discourse, particularly as applied to Muslim extremists. The views of mainstream human 
rights advocates contrasted sharply with those of Muslim lawyers, identified with advocacy 
for Muslim terrorist suspects, who hark back to a critique of the counterterrorism discourse 
already in evidence prior to the Bali bombing of 2002.  I argue that accommodation of the 
counterterrorism discourse reflects the perception that the state has already arrived at the 
appropriate, legalised approach to counterterrorism which must be supported and 
promoted.  This neutralises pressure for significant reforms in this area.  It also marginalises 
advocacy against abuses towards suspected Muslim terrorists. 
Chapter 7 (“Densus 88: Impunity for Extrajudicial Killings”) explores human rights 
violations by the special anti-terrorism unit of the Indonesian police Densus 88.  Drawing 
on KomnasHAM’s special reports released in 2010 and 2011 on the topic of human rights 
violations in the course of police counterterrorism operations, and interviews with 
advocates in two incidents which were investigated subsequently (the Tanah Runtuh and 
Tulungagung cases), the chapter illustrates the gravity of violations committed by police.  
Impunity for serious violations, including killings and torture, is clearly exhibited by the lack 
of any significant response by the police or the government to the investigations.  I analyse 
the killings and torture in the course of police operations by asking whether these can be 
plausibly interpreted within the accommodationist frame of mainstream human rights 
actors or whether in fact the marginalised rejectionist stance has better resonance. 
 In Chapter 8 (“Conclusion: Towards a More Effective Human Rights Advocacy in the 
Face of Counterterrorism”), I recapitulate the key findings of the  two case studies.  I 
conclude that a more effective human rights advocacy will have to disentangle human 
rights from the perpetuation and legitimisation of the counterterrorism agenda.  I offer 
some ideas as starting points for imagining what such a disentangled advocacy might look 
like. 
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Chapter 1 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Governments and non-governmental actors alike have converged on a consensus that 
counterterrorism and human rights must be pursued together.  In this chapter, I introduce 
what I call the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism which has gained 
currency in both counterterrorism and human rights circles at the international level.  The 
discourse arose in reaction to the assertion during the “War on Terror” that 
counterterrorism objectives should not be undermined by international human rights law 
standards.  The activism of international lawyers and human rights advocates was 
instrumental in raising awareness concerning the potentially devastating impact of 
counterterrorism on human rights.  Their efforts and successes in convincing world leaders 
to synthesise human rights and counterterrorism norms have been theorised as 
demonstrating the “resilience” and “robustness” of human rights norms and institutions,1 
and as negating “the Schmittian-inspired claim” that the war on terror exposed the 
inherent bankruptcy of liberal legal ideas.2  Yet, as I show below, the fusion of 
counterterrorism and human rights discourses in the rhetoric that affirms the necessity of 
“countering terrorism while respecting human rights” also invites scrutiny.  From 
theoretical vantage points critical towards counterterrorism as well as human rights, one 
can raise the question:  Does the synthesis of the counterterrorism and human rights 
discourses transform counterterrorism, or does it serve to promote the counterterrorism 
agenda at the expense of human rights?   
In the first section of this chapter I trace the development of the discourse of 
human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  I also describe how its significance has been 
underscored by authors of a constructivist or liberal bent.  I then develop a critical appraisal 
of this discourse, drawing on the theoretical perspectives of Critical Terrorism Studies 
(Section 2) and certain critical approaches to human rights and international law (Section 
3).  Finally, I formulate a theoretical framework for critically evaluating the discourse of 
                                                                 
1 Rosemary Foot, ‘The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights: Institutional 
Adaptation and Embedded Ideas’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 489 -514, 489, 490; Fiona de 
Londras, Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (Cambridge University 
Press 2011) 6, 166–7, 212–3, 176. 
2 Jason Ralph, America’s War on Terror: The State of the 9/11 Exception from Bush to Obama  (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 14. 
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human rights-compliant counterterrorism and explain the role played by the case studies in 
the critical examination I undertake in the thesis.    
 
1.  Defining the Discourse of Human Rights-Compliant Counterterrorism: “Countering 
Terrorism While Respecting Human Rights”  
 
“Upholding human rights is not merely compatible with successful counter-terrorism 
strategy. It is an essential element.”3  
 
The discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism emerged in the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, as a shocked Bush Administration responded to what it perceived as an attack 
against the United States by declaring “War on Terror”.  In order to wage this new war the 
U.S. administration pursued a strategy of taking forceful action against suspected terrorists 
affiliated with Al Qaeda and engineering swift acceptance and institutionalisation of its 
counterterrorism agenda domestically and internationally.  As the counterterrorism 
measures that were adopted challenged or eschewed reference to human rights, 
international lawyers defended the continuing relevance and applicability of human rights 
law in the “War on Terror”.  Among other things, their efforts led to  the mainstreaming of 
human rights in the work of counterterrorism bodies.  As human rights advocates became 
more confident in asserting their alternative vision of security against terrorism, they also 
elaborated a global “counterterrorism strategy” at the UN level based on ideas linking 
human rights and security. 
 
1.1.  Institutionalisation of the counterterrorism agenda 
 
In the years immediately following the declaration of the “War on Terror” by 
United States President George W Bush in 2001, counterterrorism was decisively and 
speedily placed on the political and legal agendas of diverse countries and the international 
community as a whole.4  The “War on Terror” entailed actual deployment of military forces 
                                                                 
3 Kofi Annan, ‘A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism (Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary)’ 
(2005) 7 <http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/site/documents/?d=268> accessed 7 January 2016. 
4 Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge University Press 2011); 
Marieke De Goede, ‘The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe’ (2008) 14 
European Journal of International Relations 161-185 (European leadership in preemptive 
counterterrorism); Rosemary Foot, ‘Collateral Damage: Human Rights Consequences of 
 19 
of the US and allied governments in theatres of conflict.5  Just as importantly, it also 
required the mobilisation of legislatures and lawyers in the design and justification of a raft 
of laws and regulations for the purpose of combatting terrorism.6  A broad range of non-
legal institutions and actors, from the diplomatic to the financial, were also recruited to 
promote and enforce counterterrorist regulations on such matters as civil aviation, 
maritime transportation, customs and border controls, financial transactions, immigration, 
the use of the internet, police and judicial cooperation, weapons and materials associated 
with the production of weapons of mass destruction.7   
Although it would subsequently attract criticism for its “unilateralism” in the 2003 
Iraq war, immediately after the September 11 2001 attacks the US successfully mobilised 
existing multilateral institutions – most notably, the United Nations Security Council acting 
as a quasi-legislator  - to advance its counterterrorism agenda globally.  Barely two weeks 
after 9/11, the UN Security Council enacted Resolution 1373 (2001) which required states 
to implement a wide range of measures to combat terrorism such as asset freezing 
(paragraph 1), immigration restrictions and border control (paragraphs 2 (c), (d), (g), 3(f), 
(g)), cooperation in intelligence, law enforcement and extradition (paragraphs 2 (b), (f); 
3(a), (b), (g)), and establishment of terrorist acts as serious criminal offenses in domestic 
law and regulations (paragraph 2 (e)).   
The content of many of these obligations were spelled out in international 
conventions on the subject of terrorism previously adopted under the auspices of the 
General Assembly, previously, the chief forum for discussing this topic within the UN.8  But 
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(2010) 36 Review of International Studies 591-613 (role of multilateral institutions). 
5 Alex Conte, Security in the 21st Century: The United Nations, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Ashgate 2005); 
Tom Lansford, Robert P Watson and Jack Covarrubias (eds), America’s War on Terror (2nd edn, 
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd 2013). 
6 Roach (n 4); Whitaker (n 4). 
7 Louise Amoore and Marieke De Goede, ‘Governance, Risk and Dataveil lance in the War on Terror’ 
(2005) 43 Crime, Law and Social Change 149-173; Iain Cameron, ‘European Union Anti -Terrorist 
Blacklisting’ (2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review 225-256; Yee-Kuang Heng and Ken McDonagh, ‘The 
Other War on Terror Revealed: Global Governmentality and the Financial Action Task Force’s 
Campaign against Terrorist Financing’ (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 553 -573; Penelope 
Mathew, ‘Resolution 1373-A Call  to Pre-Empt Asylum Seekers’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Forced 
Migration, Human Rights and Security (Hart Publishing 2008). 
8 There were twelve (12) such pre-existing conventions, namely, Convention on Offences and Certain 
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (signed 14 September 1963, entered into force 4 December 
1969) 704 UNTS 10106; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (signed 16 
December 1970, entered into force 14 October 1971) 860 UNTS 12325; Convention for the 
 20 
Resolution 1373 did not merely restate pre-9/11 obligations under existing conventions. 
Instead, Resolution 1373, having been adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, intended that counter-terrorism in its various modes outlined in the 
resolution become mandatory upon all member states whether or not they accepted the 
relevant conventions.  Thus, operative paragraph 3 (d) of Resolution 1373 ordered UN 
member states to become parties to these conventions, speeding up the ratification 
process, and forcing accession by non-parties to these conventions.  With respect to the 
1999 Convention on the Financing of Terrorism (CTF), the convention has not yet entered 
into force by the time Resolution 1373 was issued.  But Resolution 1373 has already made 
the obligation thereunder binding on all states.9   
Furthermore, Resolution 1373 radically broadened the core obligation in the 
various terrorism conventions which commonly spoke of the obligation to “prosecute or 
extradite”.  Resolution 1373 not only called on states to fully implement the relevant 
conventions, but pronounced that “additional measures” were needed “to complement 
international cooperation” (eighth preambular paragraph).  The obligations to suppress 
recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminate supply of weapons to terrorists 
(paragraph 2 (a)) and to institute effective border control strategies (paragraph 2 (g)), for 
                                                                 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil  Aviation (signed 23 September  1971, entered 
into force 26 January 1973) 974 UNTS 14118; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (adopted 14 
December 1973, entered into force 20 February 1977) 1035 UNTS 15410; International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages (adopted 17 December 1979, entered into force 3 June 1983) 1316 
UNTS 205; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (signed 3 March 1980, entered 
into force 8 February 1987) 1456 UNTS 24631; Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil  Aviation (signed 24 February 1988, entered 
into force 6 August 1989) 1990 UNTS 474;  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (done 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 1992 
UNTS 222; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf (signed 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 1992 
UNTS 304; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted 15 
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9 UNSC Res 1373, paras 1, 3 (d). 
 21 
example, sought to supplement the said core obligation with extra-judicial, more 
administrative or executive-focused measures.   
Finally, the Counter-Terrorism Committee was also established to monitor the 
implementation by states of the terms of the resolution.   Boyle and Chinkin note that 
Resolution 1373 provided for “quick, universal and immediately binding obligations in a 
manner that no treaty negotiations or General Assembly resolution could replicate”.10  In 
the same vein, Byrnes remarked that compared with treaties, “‘executive’, ‘Great Power’ 
law-making through the UN Security Council” was a “more important” source of 
international law in this area.11  Given its origin in Security Council quasi-legislation, the 
ensuing complex of international counterterrorism regulations is an “imposed” order, as 
opposed to “consensual” or “spontaneous”.12 
Action by the European Union implementing the obligations under Resolution 1373 
soon followed.  Resolution 1373, paragraph 1 required states to freeze assets of terrorists 
but did not provide a list of organisations and individuals who were considered terrorists 
under the terms of the resolution.  To effect the directive, the Council of the European 
Union, which represents the executive governments of the EU member states, adopted on 
December 27, 2001Council Common Position No. 2001/930/CFSP and Common Position 
No. 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism.  The 
former is a general measure on combating terrorism, while the latter was focused on asset 
freezing and provided an Annex in which was listed entities and individuals the Council 
considered subject to asset freezing pursuant to Resolution 1373, paragraph 1.  The list is 
to be reviewed every six months and has been regularly amended by Council decision.13      
 
1.2.  Reaction of human rights lawyers 
 
In political rhetoric, the counterterrorism agenda pursued as part of the “War on 
Terror” was presented as a matter of safeguarding and promoting “freedom” against 
irrational forces.  However, the counterterrorism measures that were approved and 
undertaken in this period posed a direct challenge to the idea of human rights.  Many 
                                                                 
10 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 
113. 
11 Andrew Byrnes, ‘More Law or Less Law? The Resil ience of Human Rights La w and Institutions in 
the “War on Terror”’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (eds), Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on 
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practices employed by the United States and its supporters in the name of 
counterterrorism constituted encroachments on protected freedoms and would have 
previously been illegal.  These included “enhanced interrogation techniques” against 
suspects which amounted to torture; “extraordinary rendition” which involves the capture 
of suspects, their transfer inter-state and detention in secret detention places; as well as 
“shoot-to-kill” orders.  Practices such as the “extraordinary rendition” program and “secret 
detention centres” operated by intelligence services were previously not acknowledged 
and concealed from both the public and political institutions.14  When the existence of the 
abusive practices were not simply denied, proponents of the counterterrorism agenda 
often justified them through “extreme or distorted interpretations of law”,15 which 
included assertions that established human rights standards were inapplicable or should be 
reformed.16  Furthermore, the new counterterrorism regulations, e.g., those on asset-
freezing to combat terrorist financing, initially did not include references to human rights 
safeguards.17   
This situation provoked a swift, concerted and defensive response from 
international lawyers and human rights advocates.  International legal scholars catalogued 
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terrorist funds under UN Res 1373.  In contrast, the asset-freezing regime established under UNSC 
Res 1267 targeted at Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban incorporates a humanitarian 
exception to the freezing directive that allows the release of frozen funds necessary to pay for  basic 
needs such as foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines, etc.  UNSC Res 1452 (20 December 2002) UN 
Doc S/RES/1452.  Moreover, a delisting procedure has been established for the 1267 asset-freezing 
regime.  UNSC Res 1730 (19 December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1730.  
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and critiqued the numerous challenges posed by the War on Terror’s counterterrorism 
policies and practices, pronouncing them to be illegal under international law in general 
and particularly under human rights law.  The most commonly criticised practices 
associated with the US during this time pertained to the capture, detention, and treatment 
of suspected terrorists such as in Guantanamo prison.  These abuses became the defining 
features of the “War on Terror” itself in the eyes of legal critics.    
Some analysts argued that the classification of persons captured in the course of 
military counter-terrorism operations as “enemy combatants” violated international 
humanitarian law (IHL).18  Others asserted that secret and “pre-emptive” detention of 
terrorism suspects violated human rights law.19  Scholars argued that coercive interrogation 
practices involving “water boarding”, stress positions and the like constitute torture 20  
while “extraordinary rendition” violated the non-refoulement principle in refugee law21.  
Others argued that certain intelligence gathering and policing techniques (“terrorist 
profiling”) could violate the racial discrimination principle in human rights law .22  Some 
analysts opined that the use of lethal force, e.g., the killing of Osama bin Laden by US 
forces on May 1, 2011, could violate the right to life-based protections within international 
humanitarian law or rules of engagement governing law enforcement.23  Regarding trials 
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before military tribunals, scholars asserted that this fell short of the right to due process or 
fair trial in human rights law.24  Similarly, other analysts argued that the abbreviated 
application of immigration law measures such as exclusion or expulsion in “national 
security” cases violated procedural safeguards under human rights and refugee laws ;25 and 
so on.  Issues pertaining to matters besides the personal freedom or bodily integrity of 
terrorism suspects also gained attention.  Scholars criticised the ‘financial war on terror’26 
or the freezing of assets and properties consequent to the executive proscription or 
labelling of foreign organisations as ‘terrorists’ as violating the right to fair trial.27 
For their part, proponents of forceful counterterrorism measures claimed that 
established human rights law was not an appropriate measure of their validity.  In what 
Byrnes (2008) termed their “distorted legalism”28, advocates of the new measures on the 
one hand disregarded established law and authoritative interpretations, whilst on the other 
creating elaborate justifications for why such extreme counterterrorist action was legally 
justifiable.  Central to the arguments justifying these measures was the representation of 
the situation after 9/11 as an armed conflict that was unprecedented or epochal in 
character.  In particular, terrorists, principally Al Qaeda operatives, were presented as a 
new kind of threat by virtue of their decentralised and flexible structure, the possibility of 
their access to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and their extraordinary 
(religious and suicidal) zeal in pursuit of their destructive aims.  On this basis, for example, 
the US argued that those detained as a result of its action in the “War on Terror” were 
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detained during an armed conflict; that IHL provided the lex specialis in that context; and 
that human rights law thus did not apply.29  This provided the US with the justification or 
excuse to detain terrorism suspects practically indefinite ly as long the “War on Terror” 
hasn’t been won or lost.30   
The United Kingdom employed a slightly different strategy to justify its 
counterterrorism policies and practice.  It maintained that constraints on state action under 
human rights law should be relaxed and more liberal interpretations accepted.   For 
example, in a case involving the extradition of a suspected terrorist convicted in absentia in 
Tunisia, the UK in a third-party intervention argued that the right against refoulement 
under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as previously interpreted in 
Chalal v UK should be “altered and clarified”, with the result that states should be 
permitted to weigh individual rights against the right of the state to be secure against 
terrorism.31   
In response, the international law mainstream argued that established human 
rights law continued to be relevant even in the situation described by “War on Terror” 
proponents.   In many different fora, a debate ensued over the applicability of human rights 
in the context of counterterrorism, and the mainstream position prevailed. International 
courts and human rights treaty bodies, perhaps unsurprisingly, reinforced the continuing 
relevance and applicability of human rights law and their previous interpretations and 
rulings.  In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Territories32, for example, the International Court of Justice reaffirmed its 
dictum in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons33 
that human rights law applied in both peacetime and during armed conflict, with the result 
that human rights law was declared to be relevant and applicable to the situation of 
extreme threat posed by terrorism.  When the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights considered the detention of suspects in Guantanamo, the commission reiterated its 
earlier jurisprudence to reach a similar conclusion that “in situation of armed conflict, the 
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protections under international human rights and humanitarian law may complement and 
reinforce each other”.34 
Human rights advocates eventually managed to convince the UN Security Council 
that counterterrorism activities should not violate human rights.  Even during the 
deliberation on Resolution 1373, according to Foot, human rights NGOs vigorously pushed 
for the inclusion in Resolution 1373 of “a paragraph which stated that governments had to 
make sure that their anti-terrorist actions were in compliance with international 
humanitarian and human rights law”, but they were “rebuffed”.35  The absence of specific 
reference to human rights law signalled to critics that the Council was giving “currency to 
the notion that the price of winning the global struggle against terrorism might require 
sacrificing fundamental rights and freedoms”.36  In an effort to defend the Counter-
Terrorism Committee’s (CTC) silence on human rights, its first chairman Jeremy Greenstock 
said testing whether state action complied with human rights was “outside the scope of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee’s mandate”, although other organisations could “study 
States’ reports and take up their content in other forums”, including other UN bodies with 
human rights expertise.37  This led UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to remark in a January 
2002 speech to the Security Council that while the Council need not duplicate the role of 
human rights bodies, it should make sure the measures it promoted did not lead to the 
abuse of human rights by states.  For Annan, there was no trade-off to be had between 
“effective action against terrorism and the protection of human rights.  On the contrary… in 
the long term, we shall find that human rights, along with democracy and social justice, are 
one of the best prophylactics against terrorism.”38  These remarks were followed by 
briefings, statements and other activities by which a working group formed by Annan and 
UN human rights bodies including the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
and the Human Rights Committee pressed the CTC to include a human rights component to 
its work.   
In January 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1456 which provided that 
states had to make sure that the counterterrorism measures they were taking complied 
with international law, “in particular international human rights law, refugee, and 
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humanitarian law.”39  This language was repeated in Resolution 1566 passed after the 
Beslan massacre in North Ossetia on September 1, 200440 and Resolution 1624 passed after 
the July 7, 2007 bombings in London41.  By 2004, the appointment of a human rights expert 
to the body (Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate) that assisted the CTC’s monitoring 
work was approved.42    In 2005 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights also 
decided to appoint a special rapporteur “on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism”, reflecting the emergence of a new 
theme in the work of the human rights body.  The Special Rapporteur has since produced 
valuable reports including “Ten areas of  best practices in countering terrorism”, which was 
meant as “10 concrete models for wider adoption and implementation by Member 
States”.43  
 
1.3.  Global Counterterrorism Strategy 
 
As can be seen in the speeches and reports of Kofi Annan, Mary Robinson and 
others during this period,44 the mainstreaming of human rights in the work of the CTC 
simultaneously involved the articulation of certain broader ideas about the importance of 
respecting human rights for the attainment of a better overall level of security against 
terrorists.  Not only was it argued that human rights law continued to apply during the 
“War on Terror”, it was asserted furthermore that human rights was a necessary part of 
winning that war.  This was because violating rights provided fodder for terrorists by 
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creating grievances that could be exploited for recruitment and mobilisation.  According to 
Annan: 
[C]ompromising human rights cannot serve the struggle against terrorism. On the 
contrary, it facilitates achievement of the terrorist’s objective – by ceding to him the 
moral high ground, and provoking tension, hatred and mistrust of government among 
precisely those parts of the population where he is most likely to find recruits .45 
 
At the very least, therefore, Annan theorised, maintaining respect for human rights served 
to undercut terrorist recruitment by “dissuading disaffected groups from choosing 
terrorism as a tactic”.46  Already in 2002, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Mary Robinson argued, “[a]n effective international strategy to counter terrorism should 
use human rights as its unifying framework.”47  Firstly, she said, “terrorism is a threat to the 
most fundamental right, the right to life”48 and must therefore be countered effectively.  
Secondly, in addressing the threat of terrorism, the promotion and protection of human 
rights play a central role.  Robinson explicitly referred to the notion of security developed in 
the UN called “human security” which entailed “freedom from pervasive threats to 
rights”.49   
Robinson and Annan went on to outline a “counterterrorism strategy” in which 
human rights were prominently incorporated.  In “Uniting against terrorism: 
recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy”, Annan laid down five elements 
of this strategy, namely: 
(1) Dissuading groups from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; 
(2) Denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack; 
(3) Deterring States from supporting terrorist groups; 
(4) Developing State capacity to prevent terrorism; and 
(5) Defending human rights in the context of terrorism and counter-terrorism. 
Not only is the defence of human rights a substantive element of the strategy, Annan said 
“the defence of human rights is essential to the fulfilment of all aspects of a counter-
terrorism strategy”.50 
Romanuik has observed that in substance, the new global counterterrorism 
strategy that Annan proposed to the General Assembly was “generally repetitive of 
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pronouncements in other UN fora”51 including the Security Council.  For example, the 
second and third elements of the strategy basically consisted of the measures already 
promoted in Resolution 1373.  Robinson called these measures “operational responses” to 
terrorism that were necessary but inadequate.  What was new in the new global strategy 
was the emphasis on “structural responses”52 that she argued addressed the “root causes” 
of insecurity.  These “structural responses” resembled the development and socio-
economic measures that various bodies within the UN from the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to the United Nations Development 
Program were already undertaking.  Rosand, Millar and Ipe commented:  
By enumerating a holistic approach to addressing terrorism, the Strategy represents a 
convergence of the global North’s post–11 September counterterrorism priorities with 
the development and socioeconomic agenda of the global South.53  
 
In the discussion of Annan’s proposal, the General Assembly fought over political 
issues that have also visited the discussion in the UN on a comprehensive definition of 
terrorism and that have been preventing UN member states from reaching an agreement.  
Negotiation on a comprehensive terrorism convention has been deadlocked over the 
definition of terrorism.  On the one hand, member states from the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) consistently insisted against Western states that there should be a 
distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters so that “national liberation 
movements” resisting foreign occupation wouldn’t be covered by the definition of 
terrorism.  On the other hand, Western states insist that states be exempt from the 
coverage of the definition of terrorism.54  In the discussion of Annan’s proposal , many 
global South countries sought to add recognition of foreign occupation among the “root 
causes” of terrorism, to which developed countries had objected.55   
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Annan has also recommended that the UNDP’s programs for building democratic 
governance capacities in member states incorporate concerns about terrorism.56  However, 
some member states resisted this suggestion, fearing this might politicise the UNDP’s 
programs on development.57  Paragraph 8 of the resulting document recognised that 
member States disagreed “about whether terrorism can be traced to certain so-called ‘root 
causes’”.  In order to transcend differences of views on this matter, Annan pragmatically 
dropped reference to “root causes” of terrorism, and used instead the phrase “conditions 
conducive to exploitation by terrorists”.  The phrase reemphasised member states 
agreement that terrorism was not justifiable under any circumstances but also recognised 
that terrorism did not occur “in a social or political vacuum” either.58  The resulting General 
Assembly resolution restyled but essentially preserved Annan’s “elements”.  Thus, with 
only some modifications, the General Assembly accepted Annan’s proposal in a unanimous 
resolution in 2006 simply entitled “The United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy”.59   
All of the aforementioned developments serve to underscore that counterterrorism and 
human rights are compatible.  As I illustrated, international lawyers and human rights 
advocates have argued for the notion or ideal of human rights-compliant counterterrorism 
in both legal and political fora.  The convergence between counterterrorism and human 
rights is articulated in court decisions, and opinions of human rights bodies,60 as well as in 
speeches and reports and resolutions, particularly in the new “global counterterrorism 
strategy” promoted by the UN.   
In fact, so regular is the production of this sort of rhetoric at the UN that it has 
inspired the claim that a new law has been created.  For example, Isanga argued that a 
“general obligation to protect human rights in the context of counter-terrorism” is now “an 
emerging rule of customary international law” which bind states whether or not they are 
signatories to the relevant treaties.61  He analyzed the tone and voting patterns of both the 
UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions “concerning fighting terrorism in a 
manner consistent with human rights”.   He concluded that the resolutions “support a 
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finding of opinio juris”, that is, the belief by states that a course of action is legally 
obligatory.  
[T]he language is of a strong, norm-creating character.  Moreover, voting patterns 
show consistent support of a majority of States which cuts across both the Western 
democracies waging the ‘War on Terror,’ many of whom have approved of the 
language in one or more resolution, and the developing countries on the front lines.62  
 
1.4.  “Resilience” of human rights 
 
What is the significance of the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism?  From the point-of-view of its advocates, the discourse provides 
important recognition that counterterrorism activities must not violate human rights law.  
As it had previously been asserted aggressively that effective counterterrorism should not 
be hindered by human rights law, this recognition was seen as necessary and welcome.  
“Countering terrorism while respecting human rights” is understood as a (possibly 
gradual63) reversal of what came before; in the words of Martin Scheinin, “the pendulum is 
already coming back”.64  
Foot argues that this demonstrates that human rights norms are “resilient”.65  
Human rights institutions, particularly at the UN level, have shown a degree of 
“autonomy”, i.e., that they “do not solely reflect the preferences of major states”. 66  This 
claim is significant in the context of International Relations (IR) theory.  Social 
constructivists in IR oppose the realist claim that international law is epiphenomenal and 
international institutions do not exert any independent influence apart from powerful 
states.  In the 1990s, social constructivists produced empirical works which sought to show 
that ideational factors and non-state actors mobilising transnationally had an impact.67  
                                                                 
62ibid 248. 
63 “If it took ten years to turn the clock back by 60 or 200 years, it may take 30 years to repair the 
damage and to reach a situation where the commitment to respect the human rights of each and 
every human person is any situation is again universally accepted.  But once that is achieved, we will  
not be in the same situation as before 9/11.  We will  be wiser than then, and conscious of the fact 
that much of the seeming universal acceptance of human rights was mere l ip service.” Martin 
Scheinin, ‘Terrorism’ in Daniel Moeckli  and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2014) 565. 
64 ibid; Martin Scheinin, ‘Combating terrorism while protecting human rights’ (10 November 2008) 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/menneskerettigheter/combatin
g_terrorism.html?id=535383> accessed 15 August 2014. 
65 Foot, ‘The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights’ (n 1) 489; Byrnes (n 11).  
66 Foot, ‘The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights’ (n 1) 491. 
67 See, e.g., Audie Klotz, ‘Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions 
Against South Africa’ (1995) 49 International Organization 451 -478; Audie Klotz, Norms in 
International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Cornell  University Press 1999); Audie Klotz, 
‘Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti -Apartheid and Abolitionist 
 32 
Sinclair characterised these works as “upbeat accounts of how groups of individuals have 
managed to rearticulate social norms and out-manoeuvre significantly more powerful 
opponents.”68 In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink developed a theoretical framework (the so-called “spiral model”) 
explaining how international human rights norms affect state behaviour through a cascade 
of processes that begin with instrumental bargaining through to identity transformation.69  
The process of change is envisioned as proceeding in five sequential stages: (1) repression; 
(2) denial; (3) tactical concession; (4) prescriptive status; and (5) institutionalised rule-
consistent behaviour. It is driven by three kinds of mechanisms: (a) instrumental adaptation 
to pressure/strategic bargaining; (b) argumentation/dialogue/persuasion; and (c) 
institutionalisation/habituation. At first, repressive states when confronted by domestic 
opposition engage in denial, but denial in turn creates a ‘boomerang effect’ whereby 
domestic actors are led to seek linkages with international actors. The transnational 
networks that they form exert pressure through naming and shaming, sometimes causing 
states to make tactical concessions in order to buy the appearance of international 
legitimacy. Gradually, governments get caught up in their own rhetoric by the logic of 
argumentation, and human rights norms begin to have binding effect. Finally, norms gain 
prescriptive status, penetrate institutions and guide routine behavior. The spiral model 
underlines the gradual nature of change, the role of discourse, and the importance of 
transnational networks of activists.70 
The advent of the “War on Terror” seems to have vindicated realism over 
constructivist readings of the relationship of power and norms, particularly since human 
rights norms which had been painstakingly developed were threatened by the most 
powerful states.  Post-9/11 developments in human rights has provoked attempts to 
amend constructivist explanations of human rights change, but the resulting revisions have 
taken out the “upbeat” character from the new constructivist accounts.  For example, the 
challenge to the highly legalised norm against torture put up by the Bush administration in 
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both practice and rhetoric has forced McKeown to revise the models of Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink.71  McKeown simply added his own three-stage ‘norm death series’ to the model in 
order to account for how norms, like the norm against torture, which have previously been 
institutionalised and internalised become de-internalised.  The trouble with the “spiral 
model” as constructivists themselves now acknowledge is that it did not foresee that 
human rights change is reversible, i.e., that “norm regress” was possible.  Key to 
McKeown’s account of “norm regress” is the role of “norm revisionists” who are certain 
elements of powerful liberal states who challenge internalised norms by changing 
understandings about the salience of the norm.72  Jetschke’s comparative study of human 
rights in Indonesia and the Philippines also emphasise the ability of states to justify human 
rights violations and mobilise and persuade an international audience using the competing 
norm of state security. Also eschewing the implicit evolutionary progressivism in the 
“spiral” model, in Jetschke’s account, what is emphasised is the indeterminacy of 
outcomes.  There is a competition between norms, namely, between “human rights” and 
“state security”; and which norm prevails is determined by a transnational audience in a 
path-dependent process.73  
Despite this, Foot argues that human rights while embattled by the new emphasis 
on a reputation for effectiveness, and even ruthlessness, in counterterrorism, have been 
resistant and robust, at least at the international level.74  International law and institutions, 
in which human rights norms had become “embedded” prior to 9/11, continue to matter 
because they “clearly make a difference as to whether the human rights norms  retain an 
ability to constrain.”75  
Only where human rights issues had established a reasonably firm domestic and 
international institutional foothold before September 11, 2001, does reputation built 
on concern for the protection of human rights retain an ability to constrain certain of 
the illiberal trends associated with the counterterrorist agenda.76  
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De Londras underscores that “classical realist predictions” that international 
human rights law would be shaped into the desired form by the most powerful 
governments in the aftermath of 9/11 did not materialise.  “Rather than bend entirely to 
the will of the hegemon, international human rights law has shown a significant degree of 
normative resilience to these projections of panic.”77  She explains that “normative 
resilience” seems to be greater in international institutions than in the executive and 
legislative spheres of the US and the UK because international institutions are “relatively 
insulated” from panic. De Londras points out “four insulating factors” that account for this, 
namely,  (1) structural, that is, international law-making institutions are relatively slow 
moving; (2) situational, that is, “most international actors enjoy a cognitive distance from 
the site of the trauma that gave rise to the panic”; (3) constitutive, that is, “the potent 
impact of the ballot box is felt less keenly” by international lawmakers; and (4) 
constitutionalist, that is, deference to the political branches is less prominent in 
international law, and derogation from rights protection are more evidence-based than in 
the domestic system.78          
Foot’s and De Londras’ affirmations of the “normative resilience” of international 
human rights law find echoes in Ralph’s appraisal of the counterterrorism policies of US 
President Barack Obama.79  Although Ralph’s main finding is that the war-like approach to 
Al Qaeda et.al. that arose in the War on Terror persists in the Obama administration’s 
policies, Ralph also emphasises the resistance to this approach put up by advocates of 
human rights law.  Ralph rejects what he terms a “Schmittian-inspired critique” of 
international law that has emphasised that the permanency of the “state of exception” 
embodied by the “War on Terror” renders international law norms illusory.  Liberal theory, 
particularly John Locke’s idea of ‘prerogative power’, allows that  there may be situations in 
which a sovereign power may act to secure the common good without seeking prior legal 
permission, such as in emergencies threatening the survival of the state.80  An emergency 
of this kind is a “state of exception”.  In a “state of exception”, the sovereign’s action , 
though it departs from legality in ordinary times, is understood not to be abandoning law.  
On the contrary, insofar as such action ‘is directed at re-establishing or defending the 
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existing order’, it is understood to be legal.81  In essence, Carl Schmitt’s critique of 
international law holds that the “state of exception” in liberal theory82  
 
exposes the superficiality of the norm.  Law can never truly rule because it is always 
contingent on the political.  The ever present possibility that ‘friends’ will act in 
expedient ways towards their ‘enemies’ means human relations are in a permanent 
state of exception.83    
 
For some authors inspired by Schmitt,84 the “War on Terror” illustrates a permanent state 
of exception in our time that allows the perpetual suspension of legal restraints on the 
global hegemon.  Thus, the situation in which we live in today is essentially lawless and 
thoroughly governed by the global hegemon rather than by and through law.  Ralph 
contended, however, that there was a “liberal alternative” which was “inclusionary to the 
extent it included terrorist suspects in the international legal regimes without 
characterizing them as friends”.85  Ralph emphasised that liberals resisted Bush’s 
counterterrorism policies and rejected the characterisation of the conflict between the US 
and Al Qaeda as a “war”.  He concludes: 
 
This belies the Schmittian-inspired claim that the war on terror was a quintessential 
liberal cosmopolitan war and it indicates, in theory at least, that an alternative 
approach to post-9/11 security is imminent in American liberalism.86  
 
Hence, for Ralph, as for Foot and De Londras, human rights is seen as enabling resistance to 
abuses and providing an alternative approach to counterterrorism.   
 
2.  Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS): questioning assumptions about counterterrorism 
 
In this section and the next, I articulate the opposite position to that expounded in 
the preceding section, namely that the fusion of counterterrorism and human rights 
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discourses engineered by international lawyers may not necessarily represent a reversal of 
what came before.  While a halt and reversal of the downward recalibration of human 
rights are the aims of the discourse of human rights compliant counterterrorism, the result 
may be that the counterterrorism agenda is simply given a more respectable legal 
framework even as the practices remain essentially unchanged.  Undoubtedly, mainstream 
legal scholars and advocates deploy international law to criticise and delegitimise a wide 
range of practices associated with the War on Terror, and to press for alternative 
approaches.  But their efforts to secure the primacy of human rights may in fact lead to 
unintended consequences.   In the present section, I develop the view that mainstream 
human rights law’s engagement with counterterrorism does not go deep enough because it 
takes for granted many questionable assumptions about counterterrorism. In this regard, I 
consider some key themes from the academic movement called Critical Terrorism Studies 
(CTS), which represents another way of examining counterterrorism.  In contrast to 
mainstream international human rights law, whose aspirations towards counterterrorism 
are limited to trying to ameliorate its excesses, CTS attempts to deconstruct the very 
concept of counterterrorism. 
The study of terrorism, or more broadly, political violence, has been a relatively 
minor subfield within International Relations and Security Studies since the 1970s.  
Terrorism scholars have focused their attention on the causes of episodic outbreaks of 
terrorist violence against the state;87 the history and organisational dynamics of non-state 
groups implicated in violence;88 and appropriate state responses89.  Common themes in the 
early scholarship are an almost exclusive focus on non-state terrorists, the view that 
terrorism is essentially a strategy of the weak against the strong, and that (state) counter-
terrorism is fundamentally distinct from (non-state) terrorism.90  An important exception to 
this tendency is the work of Michael Stohl and his associates George Lopez, Christopher 
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Mitchell, and David Carleton in the 1980s, which dealt squarely with state terrorism.91  
Duvall and Stohl argued convincingly that strength rather than weakness could spur 
terrorism, i.e., the belief in one’s own strength and capacity and the vulnerability of one’s 
enemies causes powerful states to engage in terrorism.92  Their so-named “expected 
utility” model states that “states employ terrorism under two broad conditions: (a) when 
they calculate that it will achieve their goals more effectively than other policies – it has 
lower production costs than the alternatives; and (2) when they anticipate that the 
response costs of using terrorism will be lower than the costs of other strategies”. 93   
Powerful states may directly utilise terrorist tactics or indirectly through proxies.  Their use 
of terrorist methods could either be a one-off operation, or so extensive that terrorism 
becomes a means of governance.94  Terrorist methods could be used both within and 
outside their own borders.  In the international plane, Stohl identified three broad forms of 
state terrorist behaviour, namely, (1) terrorist coercive diplomacy; (2) covert state 
terrorism; and (3) state-sponsored terrorism.95   
The onset of the “War on Terror” prompted a proliferation of “terrorism” 
discourses in politics, society and the academy, investing terrorism research with a new 
urgency.  CTS emerged at this juncture as a revolt against a climate of obsession with the 
spectre of terrorism against Western states, characterised by biased conceptions of 
terrorism that authorise state violence.  Traditional terrorism studies were regarded as 
complementing the War on Terror milieu by virtue of its orthodox views and its 
institutional connections with counterterrorism. When these terrorism researchers did pay 
attention to state terrorism, they focused exclusively on weak states as breeding grounds 
of non-state terrorism, or on states antagonistic to the West as sponsors of terrorism.  CTS’ 
critique of traditional terrorism studies was also embedded in a wider “third debate” in 
International Relations and Security Studies, in which proponents of post-modern and 
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critical theories and methodologies launched an assault against the “positivism” of the 
discipline.96 
A key proposition of CTS is that “terrorism” is socially constructed, i.e, that it is not 
a free-standing phenomenon or an objective truth, but a linguistic construction embedded 
in a discourse that serves specific political purposes.  Richard Jackson expounds upon this 
thesis in his influential book Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-
terrorism, in which he appeals for scholars to pay attention to the language and rhetorical 
techniques of “War on Terror” proponents and practitioners.  “[T]he language of the ‘war 
on terrorism’ is not simply an objective or neutral reflection of reality,” says Jackson, but a 
“carefully constructed discourse”97 that tends to induce societal acceptance of state 
violence against specific groups, immunise state authorities from criticism, enforce national 
unity and marginalise dissent.  He goes on to argue that: 
At the most basic level, the practice of counter-terrorism is predicated on and 
determined by the language of counter-terrorism.  The language of counter-terrorism 
incorporates a series of assumptions, beliefs and knowledge about the nature of 
terrorism and terrorists. These beliefs then determine what kinds of counter-terrorism 
practices are reasonable or unreasonable, appropriate or inappropriate: if terrorists 
are assumed to be inherently evil, for example, then eradicating them appears 
apposite while negotiating with them appears absurd.  The actual practice of counter-
terrorism gives concrete expression to the language of counter-terrorism – in effect, 
it turns the initial words into reality.98  
In short, the language of counterterrorism is important because it does not merely describe 
the reality of terrorism, but it creates the specific social realities or practices. The turn to 
discourse analysis also illustrates the kind of “post-positivist” methodological innovations 
that CTS urges terrorism researchers to adopt.  In an earlier work, Zulaika and Douglas 
railed against the language of counter-terrorism as well, its looseness and circularity 
(terrorists are irrational, and therefore counterterrorism is the only way to deal with them).   
In terms of methodology, they propose that terrorism researchers should engage in more 
ethnography of violent political groups (knowing them firsthand rather than assuming they 
are unknowable or that all we need to know about them is their irrationality) , breaking the 
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taboo against talking or interacting with those labeled “terrorists”, in order to go beyond 
the referential circularity of counter-terrorism discourse.99 
Another important critical move is to challenge the dichotomy between terrorism 
and counterterrorism. Researching state terrorism, as well as the connection between state 
counter-terrorism and non-state terrorism, contributes towards this end.  From the 
beginning, CTS defended the concept of “state terrorism”.  The essential argument is that 
the term “terrorism” pertains to acts, with the actor or his status being unimportant.  As 
long as the act is violent and instrumentalises the victim of violence in order to 
communicate a political message to another party, the act should be 
described/condemned as “terrorism”.  Terrorism is not dependent on publicity; the 
message need only be communicated to the intended audience.  For example, enforced 
disappearances committed by state agents are usually not publicised and in fact officially 
denied because another set of audiences, that is, the international community or liberal 
domestic supporters of the regime would not countenance them. Nevertheless CTS 
scholars would consider enforced disappearances terrorism if they communicate to the 
intended audience, that is, the terrorised enemies or domestic public the power of the 
state and the futility of resistance.100  
In fact, terrorist acts defined in such manner are often perpetrated by state agents; 
and state terrorism, particularly Western state terrorism, has historically been more lethal 
than non-state terrorism.101  CTS therefore committed itself to further researching and 
theorizing the aims, nature, causes and consequences of state terrorism alongside non-
state terrorism.  The volume on contemporary state terrorism edited by Richard Jackson, 
Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting (2010) featured post-9/11 case studies that further 
substantiate Stohl et.al.’s “expected utility” model of the causes of state terrorism .  The 
editors also suggested practical ways of addressing state terrorism, such as the updating of 
the “Political Terror Scale” project.  The “Political Terror Scale” is a ranking (from 5 to 1) 
which allows a semblance of measurement of the extent of state terrorism ex perienced 
across countries and years based on data obtained from yearly country reports by Amnesty 
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International and the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.102  
They also suggested the creation of a database of state terrorism similar to the US 
Department of State’s annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” reports.103  Thus, it seems that 
CTS scholars hoped to use the same labelling or stigmatisation techniques utilised by “War 
on Terror” proponents to counter or at least reduce state terrorism. 
Besides drawing attention to the terrorism of the state, CTS questions whether 
counterterrorism should only be thought of as a response to terrorism, and therefore as 
occupying a different moral plane from that of terrorism.  Scholars have already noted that 
forcible state actions have often preceded and not merely followed non-state terrorism; 
and that counterterrorism and terrorism can be linked in a mutual causal loop, in a “cycle 
of violence”.104  In the “War on Terror”, military counterterrorism measures have been 
criticised as spurring rather than reducing non-state terrorism.105  Poynting and Whyte 
further ask an almost taboo question even in critical studies of counterterrorism: can we 
take measures labelled as “counterterrorism” at face value, i.e., that their purpose is only 
and always to eliminate or mitigate terrorism?  “[W]e might question,” say Poynting and 
Whyte, “whether state terror rather than being some kind of unintended consequence of 
counterterrorism, might indeed be its originary purpose.”106  Thus, in an edited volume 
Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The ‘War on Terror’ as Terror, CTS scholars 
examine forceful counterterrorism practices in the “War on Terror” itself as forms of state 
terrorism.  In that volume, Poynting and Whyte also argue that contemporary 
counterterrorism policies aid state terrorism.  These policies do so by presenting acts of 
violence as abstracted from their socio-economic context, as well as from any political or 
ideological struggle.  What is “depoliticised” is not merely the violence of non-state actors 
deemed ‘terrorism’, but also the violence of the state: 
In this logic, sub-state political violence in opposition to the state appears ideologically 
irrational and driven by fanaticism.  State political violence is presented as defensive, 
responsible, rational and unavoidable, rather than being motivated by a particular 
ideological bias or political choice.107  
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Therefore, CTS leads to a deep questioning of counterterrorism policy’s self-presentation in 
almost Manichean moral terms (as an affirmation of good over evil) and also as technical 
and technocratic.  Counterterrorism is unseated from its moral high ground and subjected 
to the same interrogation as terrorism.  
The role of international human rights law and institutions in counterterrorism has 
largely avoided CTS’ scrutiny.  This isn’t surprising since in the mainstream of the 
International Relations (IR) discipline, the social constructivist school being the exception, 
law tends to be regarded as peripheral, particularly to issues involving national security. 108  
A typical view of law in IR is expressed by Burke in these words:  
“The practices of secrecy, intervention and executive power at work in these realms 
demonstrates that an enormous freedom of executive action is the rule (not the 
exception), a freedom that is legitimated only in the thinnest way by law and is rarely 
limited by it.”109 
 
Nevertheless, the target of CTS’ critique, viz., state-centred counterterrorism 
expertise/knowledge produced by “terrorism experts”, shares similarities with the 
response of mainstream international law to counterterrorism.  The discourse of human 
rights-compliant counterterrorism is largely state-centric in the sense criticised by CTS.  The 
discourse assumes that “terrorism” is a threat to which states merely respond; there is, for 
example, no recognition of “state terrorism”.  There may be “excesses” in the form of 
human rights abuses in the course of counterterrorism; these excesses are recognised as 
“counter-productive”, which is to say that they detract from the purpose of 
counterterrorism policy.  But there is no recognition that counterterrorism policy’s purpose 
may actually be to terrorise, which in turn may invite or produce additional acts of 
terrorism.  The divide between terrorism and counterterrorism is neatly preserved in the 
discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism.      
Moreover, human rights law is also an expert technical activity.  The utilisation of 
human rights law to improve counterterrorism policy may thus represent an increased 
“depoliticisation”110 of counterterrorism.   This is especially so when law is viewed as 
separate from or above politics.  Law can therefore provide the camouflage needed to 
present counterterrorism as truly “defensive, responsible, rational and unavoidable”111.  In 
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Orwellian fashion, the incorporation of human rights protections into counterterrorism law 
and policy can permit technical counterterrorism experts to claim that proposed 
counterterrorism measures are “human rights-compliant”, hence inoculating them from 
further scrutiny.112  
Unlike international law, CTS is largely deconstructive and appears to have no 
reform agenda of its own.  Some of its proponents appear to support advanci ng a broad 
program of vanishing sub-state terrorism premised on ending (Western) state terrorism.  
“To end terrorism, end state terrorism” is an apt slogan that captures this sentiment. 113  For 
Ken Booth, the rationale for CTS is the interpretation, marginalisation, delegitimisation, and 
elimination of acts of terror from the strategic toolkit of states and non-state actors 
alike.114  Some CTS scholars advocate specific forms of policy interventions such as 
developing tools (databases, scales) for state terrorism monitoring to “accompany” the 
existing tools intended for non-state terrorism developed by the traditional counter-
terrorism “experts” they criticise.  Another significant CTS contribution is the exploration of 
“talking” with non-state terrorists in the post-9/11 climate as an alternative to terrorist 
blacklisting and military action.115  These specific CTS projects converge with “respecting 
human rights” and  “addressing root causes of terrorism” (code for conflict resolution and 
transformation, and long-term “development”), which are prominent elements of 
international institutions’ counterterrorism strategy.  Because there is little examination in 
CTS of the role of international law and institutions, CTS largely misses how their 
“alternatives” are also problematic.  In the next section, I therefore turn to a critical  
examination of international law and human rights. 
3.  Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): questioning assumptions about 
human rights and international law  
Critiques of human rights provide additional conceptual resources for critically 
evaluating the potential of human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  Human rights 
                                                                 
112 See, for a parallel argument regarding the use of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom to 
inoculate Canada’s Anti -Terrorism Act from political scrutiny, W Wesley Pue, ‘Protecting 
Constitutionalism in Treacherous Times: Why “Rights” Don’t Matter’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope 
Mathew (eds), Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror’ (Australian National University E Press 
2008) 65–83, 57. 
113 Fischer Dietrich and Johan Galtung, ‘To End Terrorism, End State Terrorism’ (2002) 7 Journal of 
Futures Studies 151-154. 
114 Ken Booth, ‘The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking-Glass’ (2008) 1 Critical 
Studies on Terrorism 65-79, 68. 
115 Harmonie Toros, Terrorism, Talking and Transformation : A Critical Approach (Routledge 2012). 
 43 
discourse has been critiqued from various theoretical and disciplinary perspectives, 
including Marxism,116 feminism,117 cultural relativism in Anthropology,118 and 
utilitarianism.119  According to Dembour, critiques have accompanied human rights since at 
least the eighteenth century with the emergence of the French Declarations of the Rights 
of Man.  Critiques of human rights typically expose a gap between what human rights say 
and what they actually do, but vary in their assessments of whether this gap can be 
bridged.120  “Practical critiques” explain the gap between human rights rhetoric and 
practice by pointing to practical impediments, such as the existence of a double standard, 
or the real challenges of poverty and environmental degradation.  These critiques believe 
the gap can and must be bridged.  In contrast, “conceptual critiques” doubt that such a gap 
can ever be bridged, and thus reject the idea of human rights as fundamentally flawed.  For 
example, some critics argue that human rights cannot address issues of justice and equality 
because they “directly participate in sustaining power relationships”.121           
In this section, I explore an area of scholarship that has come to be known as “Third 
World Approaches to International Law” (TWAIL).  TWAIL scholars focus on the 
consequences of the colonial logic of international law, including human rights.  The 
dominant theme of TWAIL scholarship is how this deeply entrenched logic of international 
law renders it an unlikely medium for articulating and realizing the aspirations of 
developing countries and peoples.  The critical insights and methods of TWAIL provide a 
helpful foundation for developing a critique of the counterterrorism agenda that does not 
ignore or gloss over the shortcomings of human rights.  
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TWAIL represents a postcolonial sub-culture within the International Law discipline, 
as its primary concern is to document and deconstruct the consequences of Western 
colonialism for present-day international law.  Like postcolonialism, TWAIL emphasises 
colonialism’s epistemological consequences, which are often more insidious than its 
outward manifestations, such as military occupation, which may eventually cease without 
essentially changing the underlying relationship of subordination.  The epistemological, 
social, political and economic legacies of colonialism are conceived as intertwined.  A key 
TWAIL preoccupation is to identify how the logic of colonialism persists in the 
contemporary doctrines and institutions of international law.  TWAIL scholarship 
interrogates how international law’s key concepts, such as the “sovereign state” and 
“sovereign equality”, were shaped by Western colonial power and how this power 
continues to be exercised upon the world through their application.  TWAIL is not only a 
historical investigation that reveals the colonial origins of modern international law.  More 
importantly, it is an account of how international law and institutions reproduce colonial 
relationships and consequences in the present day.  As Gathii explains, “The rules of 
international law … create a social and political entity: the post-colonial state.., the rules 
are constitutive of this entity; and not only, or merely, a reflection of Eurocentricity”.122 
Although the term “TWAIL” dates from the 1990s123, some legal scholars have long 
questioned the fairness of international law and sought to make international law more 
responsive to the interests of Third World states.124  According to Anghie and Chimni, the 
early progenitors of TWAIL produced a scholarship with the following characteristics: (1) it 
criticised colonial international law for justifying the subjugation and oppression of non-
European peoples by Western states; (2) it exhibited that pre-colonial non-Europeans had 
their own sophisticated understandings of international law, and that post-colonial states 
have distinctive contributions to make towards a truly international legal system; (3) it had 
faith in modern international law and institutions, particularly the UN, as vehicles for 
ushering a just world order through the collective diplomatic initiatives of post-colonial 
states; (4) it emphasised sovereign equality and non-intervention; and (5) it argued for a 
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New International Economic Order (NIEO) in order to complete the liberation of newly 
independent states.125   
TWAIL scholars share with their predecessors the idea of the systematic unfairness 
of international law rules, but they have gone beyond their predecessors’ assumptions.  A 
crucial difference is the theoretical critique of modern international law126, according to 
which colonialism is not seen merely as a historical circumstance external to international 
law and already overcome through its instrumentality, but rather as central to its formation 
and thus as carried forward into the present.  In Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making 
of International Law, Anthony Anghie rejects the view that modern international law is the 
attempt to create order among sovereign states.  Rather, he views the development of 
international law and institutions as “generated by problems relating to colonial order”.127  
He argues that what drives international law is a “civilizing mission”, a dynamic based on 
cultural difference (“dynamic of difference”), whereby two cultures are posited as dif ferent 
(on the basis of “civilisation”, race, economic development, or predisposition to violence), 
one being regarded as “universal” and the other as “particular”.  Doctrines and techniques 
are then developed in order to “normalise” the aberrant culture and incorporate it into an 
order based on the “universal” culture’s principles and norms.  For example, the mandate 
system of the League of Nations and the trusteeship system of the United Nations were 
devices that constructed “sovereignty” in states that were regarded as “backward” and not 
yet capable of membership in international society.  Thus, in this example, post-colonial 
state sovereignty fundamentally differs from Western state sovereignty, because whereas 
the latter is conceived as already perfected, the former needed to be fabricated through 
extensive interventions that, moreover, ensured their continued subordination for the 
foreseeable future.  The “endless process of creating a gap between two cultures”128 and 
then seeking to bridge that gap through legal doctrines, techniques, and apparatuses in 
order to create a single “universal” order, means that international law reproduces the 
inequalities and violence of the colonial project’s “civilizing mission” notwithstanding 
formal guarantees of state equality. 
TWAIL research is therefore more critical of the claim to universalism of 
international law and institutions, as well as of the possibilities of the post-colonial state, 
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than earlier writers.  The discourses and institutions of “development”129, the use of force 
and humanitarian law, “good governance” and democratisation,130 and human rights 
promotion131 stand out as objects of TWAIL criticism because they all imply some kind of 
“benevolent” intervention in the Third World.  Moreover, TWAIL scholars identify less 
exclusively with the interests and agendas of Third World states in international fora and 
instead pay more attention to Third World peoples. This allows them to problematise Third 
World states’ undemocratic dealings with their own peoples while simultaneously tackling 
the unequal relationship between the Third World and the West.132  It also directs attention 
to “social movements” as vehicles for the (re)construction of international legal order from 
below, and a (re)conceptualisation of the making of international law as an interactive 
process involving not merely governance but resistance.133  
What is distinctive about TWAIL’s critique of human rights is the attention to how 
colonial relations are reproduced in Western human rights practice.  In Makau Mutua’s 
2001 essay “Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights”, the practices 
and techniques of the human rights regime centred on the United Nations, Western 
governments administering human rights as foreign policy, and international non-
government organisations based in the West, are analysed as constituting a “civilizing 
mission”.  Mutua notes that human rights discourse and practice normally target Third 
World countries for cultural and political change directed from the outside.  While no 
country is free of human rights violations, Third World human rights problems are set out 
as more urgent or grave than in the West.  These problems are more thoroughly 
documented, identified as characteristic of the cultures of Third World societies, and 
“corrected” through coercive techniques that essentially rely on the economic and military 
inequality between the West and the Third World.  At the same time, the violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights that result from global capitalism and the structural 
inequalities between the West and the Third World are overlooked or ignored.  Mutua’s 
analysis shares with the cultural relativist critique the idea that human rights discourse, as 
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revealed in practice, is code for a particular Western vision of social and political order (viz., 
Western liberal democracy) dressed up as “universal” standards for all humankind.  Human 
rights culture in the West is the horizon towards which the whole world should be made to 
converge.  The messianic ethos in human rights echoes colonial discourses that justified the 
colonial project as saving the masses of helpless peoples in faraway lands from the 
barbarities of their own benighted cultures.   
TWAIL’s new focus on “social movements” impacts its investigation of human 
rights practice.   Going beyond critique, TWAIL writers have engaged in sociological or 
ethnographic studies of the human rights practice of community-based groups in the Third 
World.  These studies emphasise how counter-hegemonic human rights practice selectively 
uses, reconstitutes and/or recombines human rights concepts with other normative 
languages or practices to improve Third World peoples’ l ives.134  TWAIL is rediscovering and 
giving new meanings to “legal pluralism” and human rights as social movement concepts, 
or as concepts shaped through people’s struggles.135 
TWAIL scholars have also focused their critical attention on the “War on Terror”.136  
The “War on Terror” appears to revise important international legal doctrines, including 
“self-defense”, on the basis of an encounter with an “other”, viz., the terrorist.  This figure 
is identified with non-Western states and peoples, and therefore fits the argument of a 
“dynamic of difference” driving international legal change.  But unlike TWAIL scholarship on 
development and human rights, which aimed to reveal how seemingly neutral international 
institutions and regimes perpetuate colonial order, the object of TWAIL writings on the War 
on Terror is the agenda of the single superpower state that appears bent on marginalizing 
international institutions and altering fundamental international law norms.137  Anghie 
summarises the “War on Terror” paradigm in terms of three concepts, namely (1) 
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preemptive self-defense; (2) “rogue states”; and (3) democracy promotion to transform 
“rogue states”.138  According to Anghie, the “War on Terror” introduces a new kind of 
“defensive imperialism”139, which employs the language of “self-defense” and “national 
security”.  The “other” is not merely “uncivilised” (as in 18th century International Law) or 
“underdeveloped” (as in the post-WWII International Law), but also dangerous, terroristic, 
posing a threat to the national security of the United States and other states.   
In this “defensive imperialism”, Anghie explains, the established doctrine of self-
defence is not merely radically expanded to allow pre-emptive strikes against terrorists.  It 
also justifies, in tandem with doctrines and principles of human rights, humanitarian 
intervention and democracy, the neutralisation of states that support or harbour them and 
the transformation of states that promote certain forms of Islam that are considered 
dangerous.140  “Democracy plays a crucial dual role in this process: it liberates the 
oppressed people of Islamic states and it creates law-abiding societies that would be allies 
rather than threats to the United States.”141  In constructing these new states and societies, 
the US essentially makes use of old imperialist techniques that is seen in the trusteeship 
system and that the US has employed in the Philippines and Puerto Rico to develop these 
countries’ capacity for “self-government”.142 
Anghie’s conception has similarities and differences from the mainstream 
conceptualisation.  Like the mainstream, Anghie sees the “War on Terror” as departing 
from established international law, extending or violating its established principles, and 
aiming to displace or transform international law.  However, unlike the mainstream, Anghie 
directs attention to the constant neo-colonial logic of international law and sees the new 
imperialism that the “War on Terror” aims to bring about as continuous with past practices.  
There is not merely a questioning of the “War on Terror” using established international 
law as a critical lens, but a simultaneous questioning of international law.   
4.  Critically Evaluating the Discourse of Human Rights-Compliant Counterterrorism  
For liberal scholars, the development of the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism shows that the UN system - particularly, international human rights law 
and institutions - has been able to resist being distorted by the “War on Terror” agenda of 
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the hegemonic state.  They present human rights-compliant counterterrorism as the 
alternative mode of pursuing counterterrorism that every state should support. 
These propositions might imply that Anghie’s prediction of a new imperialism 
should be tempered. Anghie himself appeared to have considered that international law 
and the UN system could resist this tendency.  Towards the end of his chapter on the “War 
on Terror”, Anghie remarked: “The crucial question remains, then, of whether international 
law and the UN system can resist this drive towards a new imperialism even while adapting 
to the new challenges facing the international community.”143  True, Anghie already noted 
that defensive imperialism may adopt a language that includes human rights.  For example, 
he anticipated that the principles of human rights, combined with humanitarian 
intervention and democracy, could legitimise invasion and continuing intervention in 
“rogue states” to transform them into acceptable democracies.144  But as with other TWAIL 
scholars, the focus of his concern was on how the “War on Terror” is altering international 
law, in particular, the fundamental norms of sovereignty and non-use of force.  TWAIL 
scholars have so far failed to consider that the “War on Terror” might itself be transforming 
through its engagement with international law, particularly human rights.   
In fact, the rhetoric of war in the context of counterterrorism has been scaled back, 
so that the very expression “War on Terror” has fallen out of fashion .  This was prompted 
by the end of President George W. Bush’s second term in 2009 and the election of 
President Barack Obama on a platform that included promises of reversing Bush’s foreign 
policies.  Already on July 7, 2005, when bombs were detonated aboard subway trains and a 
bus in Central London, the United Kingdom, a major supporter of the Presi dent GW Bush’s 
Coalition of the Willing, avoided characterising the incident as an act of war.  The UK’s 
Director of Public Prosecutions denied that Britain was engaged in a “War on Terror”, 
declaring that the attackers were better regarded not as warriors or soldiers but as 
ordinary criminals.145  In the US, the term “War on Terror” has fallen out of favour among 
officials since Obama came to power.146  In 2013, Obama promised an end to the indefinite 
mandate for the use of force.147  However, analysts consider Obama to have continued 
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Bush’s policies though some differences are notable.  Klaidman called Obama’s approach to 
counterterrorism a “hybrid” between Bush’s war model and a law enforcement model. 148  
Ralph emphasised that the US under Obama continued to argue that it was at war or in an 
armed conflict with terrorists.  But he also noted that his 2010 National Security Strategy 
adopted a more cautious approach towards democracy promotion and a different 
approach towards international institutions as compared w ith Bush’s.149  Does international 
law’s engagement with the counterterrorism agenda indicate that the new imperialism that 
Anghie refers to has come to a dead-end, or at least encountered a serious road block?  
This is an important question to ask as it updates our understanding of the legacy of the 
“War on Terror” and its meaning for our time.  
This thesis draws upon the insights of CTS and TWAIL scholars to construct a 
theoretical framework for critically evaluating the concept and consequences of human 
rights-compliant counterterrorism.  As CTS scholars have argued, we should question the 
discourse of terrorism and we should problematise the presentation of state 
counterterrorism as occupying a different moral plane from sub-state terrorism.  Not to do 
so risks treating human rights abuses by the state as less important than human rights 
abuses by non-state actors whom states condemn as terrorists.  However, the discourse of 
human rights-compliant counterterrorism posits an alternative model of counterterrorism.  
The question that arises is whether human rights-compliant counterterrorism is truly an 
alternative.  Even though it arose in resistance to the “War on Terror”, the discourse of 
human rights-compliant counterterrorism may not really avoid the pitfalls of the “War on 
Terror” rhetoric that CTS scholars have pointed out.  Firstly, it perpetuates the use of the 
label “terrorist”, and applies the same only against opponents of the state.  It confirms the 
right of the state to use deadly force against its enemies if needed, but denies the same 
against the latter.  Secondly, it preserves the state’s ability to present its violence as a 
necessary response to terrorism.  This is because “counterterrorism” policies and measures 
are taken at face value, that is, that they are meant to address the threat of terrorism.  The 
original wrong always emanates from terrorists.  Counterterrorism is a response to that 
original wrong, and therefore its motivation is always regarded as beyond question, even 
though in the pursuit of counterterrorism, wrongs may also be committed.   
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Attaching the qualification “human rights-compliant” to “counterterrorism” may 
appear to limit the state’s choices as to methods that can be legitimately employed in 
responding to terrorism, directing them to choose those that are human rights-friendly and 
that do not foment or cause further terrorism.  In this manner, states can minimise human 
rights violations in the pursuit of counterterrorism.  Amelioration of abuses in the pursuit of 
state security may or may not actually result from the state’s adoption of the discourse of 
human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  But, the discourse provides the state added 
means to present counterterrorism operations as conceptually and causally distinct from 
terrorist attacks.  In this sense, human rights-compliant counterterrorism reinforces rather 
than challenges the notion of counterterrorism as reactive or secondary to terrorism.   It 
contributes to the entrenchment of the problematic state-centric and dichotomous 
discourse of terrorism and counterterrorism.  
Reflecting on “resistance in the age of empire”, Nesiah lamented that international 
law and human rights vocabularies of resistance in the post-9/11 period “contribute to the 
production of legitimacy” for imperialist practices, even as they are deployed “to curb its 
excesses”.150  Her analysis of the result of engagement with President GW Bush’s “regime 
change” policy though international law is instructive.151  Nesiah notes that critics of 
“regime change” relied on international law principles such as sovereignty and human 
rights to show that the policy was so blunt, excessive and simplistic that it could lead to 
greater tragedies.  Rather than discounting “regime change” altogether, however, 
objections coached in the language of international law, “turn back on themselves” and 
result in the reworking, refinement and perfection of “regime change”. 152  Because “regime 
change” policy was too indiscriminate, then “regime change” should be clarified in such a 
way that only truly illegitimate regimes are subjected to it.  Reisman, who initially set out to 
criticise “regime change”, concluded that “regime change” can be reconciled with the 
principle of sovereignty if it was aimed at regimes “so despotic, violent, and vicious that 
those suffering under it cannot shake it off” and even if they pose no threat to the US. 153  If 
“regime change” doctrine relies too heavily on unilateral action by the lone superpower, 
then international lawyers ought to develop guidelines regarding its exercise “in 
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accordance with the venerable policies of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination”. 154  
Starting out as critique of “regime change” as adventurist, the international law objections 
end up redeeming “regime change”, and allowing invasion and intervention to be packaged 
as the morally responsible thing to do.155   
The discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism is also a case in which a 
language of human rights was used to resist or temper abusive state practices.  It could be 
critically examined by investigating the trajectory that this resistance or protest makes.  At 
least two trajectories or paths can be conceived, corresponding to two main hypotheses 
examined in the thesis.  In the first case, the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism affords a meaningful resistance to abuses, and it effects a significant 
transformation in the way counterterrorism is conducted.  In the second case, the 
discourse might signal resistance or protest at abuses but no transformation of state 
practice is forthcoming.  It can then be examined if the lack of transformation is aided in 
some way by the discourse.   
The critical evaluation that I undertake here analyses actual experience in two 
developing countries, the Philippine and Indonesia.  The case studies provide, firstly, a 
necessary review or re-evaluation of the local counterterrorism discourse in these two 
countries.  When we speak of countering terrorism in the Philippines and Indonesia, 
including human rights-compliant counterterrorism, we assume that terrorism is an 
objective phenomenon in these two countries.  I investigate the basis of this assumption.  
How did local counterterrorism discourses develop and what function do these discourses 
serve?  What does the entrenchment of state-centric and dichotomous discourses of 
terrorism and counterterrorism actually entail in these two countries? 
Secondly, the case studies take into consideration the resonance of the discourse 
of human rights-compliant counterterrorism with local human rights initiatives and views.  
In the Philippine case study, I explore the possibility that local advocates’ strategies of 
resisting abuses in the name of counterterrorism may be different from the strategy 
adopted by international human rights advocates.  Local advocates may have resisted the 
state’s move to depoliticise conflict as much as the violations of individual rights that result 
from the deployment of the discourse of terrorism.156  By describing resistance strategies 
                                                                 
154 W Michael  Reisman, ‘Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War’ (2003) 97 American Journal of 
International Law 82-90, 90. 
155 Nesiah (n 149) 912. 
156 The distinction here employed between local and international human rights strategies is absent 
from the analysis of the US examples in Nesiah’s essay.  Nesiah (n 149).  Nesiah dealt with three 
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that did not accommodate depoliticisation, the thesis reveals the service rendered by the 
discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism to the state.  It also illustrates that 
accommodation to state-centric terrorism discourses was not the only way by which to 
resist the “War on Terror”.  As the international approach displaces local strategies of this 
kind, the effect then is increased depoliticisation. 
In the Indonesian case study, the contrast I describe is not between local and 
international but between mainstream and Islamic advocates’ approaches and attitudes 
towards the local discourse of terrorism.  I explore the possibility that criticism of 
counterterrorism policy only goes to a certain extent because, while Islamic legal advocates 
reject official counterterrorism policy, it is perceived by mainstream advocates as human 
rights-compliant.  As a result, pressure for reforms to address violations of human rights in 
the name of counterterrorism may be diffused or blocked.  Questioning the announced 
goal of counterterrorism is simply beyond the pale, and human rights abuses against 
alleged terrorists are less pressing.  This inquiry then illustrates an inoculating effect of the 
attachment of human rights language to counterterrorism.   
Thirdly, the case studies investigate the impact of Philippine and Indonesian 
counterterrorism or broader security policies that incorporate human rights language.  In 
the Indonesian case, the anti-terrorism law contains provisions expressly requiring the 
state to comply with human rights obligations while pursuing counterterrorism.  In the 
Philippine case, the policies that articulate human rights-compliant counterterrorism are 
dispersed in new Supreme Court-issued rules and President Benigno Aquino III’s Internal 
Peace and Security Plan, among other documents.  I examine whether the most serious 
human rights violations, namely, extrajudicial killings and torture, in the security context 
have been stemmed in any significant way in these countries.  The investigation will 
therefore show whether the promise of human rights-compliant counterterrorism has 
materialised or on the contrary a transformation in state practice cannot be realistically 
expected.  
 
 
 
                                                                 
examples of uses of international law and human rights to resist or protest intervention and 
occupation, namely, the exposure of torture at Abu Ghraib in the US; criticism of/ engagement with 
“regime change” doctrine also in the US; and invocations of self-determination in contesting Israel’s 
construction of a wall in the Occupied Territories at the International Court of Justice. 
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Chapter 2 
Philippine Counterterrorism Discourse: 
Counterinsurgency and the “War on Terror” in the Philippines 
 
 
In 2010, the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice engaged a team of researchers to 
identify and study “counter-terrorism strategies” in three diverse non-Western countries, 
viz., Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia.  The researchers immediately confronted 
difficulties.  “Counterterrorism strategies” supposedly aim to prevent or curtail 
“terrorism”.1  The UN General Assembly defines “terrorism” as “criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or 
particular persons for political purposes”.2  This definition seems neutral and objective.  
However, the Dutch research team observed that many countries have counterterrorism 
strategies that are “highly ideologically charged” and “closely tied up with the interest of 
the state”.3  The label “terrorist” can be employed against state adversaries and critics with 
little regard for whether their violent activities are correctly categorised as terrorism 
defined in more neutral terms.  In many instances the violent activities of such actors injure 
or kill innocent civilians, but the main target is the state.  “[T]he state will then define itself 
as the defender of the general welfare, smearing all opponents with the brush of 
terrorism.”4  In such cases, the strategies that are developed to combat terrorism are 
bound up with local understandings of terrorism. 
Indeed, just as terrorism is defined differently in different contexts, 
“counterterrorism” is pursued and promoted in a wide variety of ways.   We must, 
therefore, begin our investigation into “human rights violations in the context of 
counterterrorism” by seeking to understand the local meaning of  “counterterrorism”.  
                                                                 
1 In the European Union’s so-called 3PR model, “counterterrorism strategies” are classified as aiming 
to “prevent (individuals from turning to terrorism), protect (citizens and infrastructure by reducing 
vulnerability to attack), pursue (investigate terrorists and disrupt support networks) and respond 
(manage and minimize the consequences of an attack)” to “terrorism”.  Roel Meijer, ‘Introduction’ in 
Roel Meijer (ed), Counter Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia  (Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 2012) 4 <http://english.wodc.nl/images/1806 -
volledige-tekst_tcm45-435986.pdf> accessed 4 June 2014. 
2 UNGA Res 49/60 ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism’ (9 December 1994) UN Doc 
A/RES/49/60, para 3.  
3 Meijer (n 1) 7. 
4 ibid. 
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In this chapter, I argue that counterterrorism in the Philippines cannot be 
understood without reference to counterinsurgency, as counterterrorism renews pre -
existing and well-established counterinsurgency.   Rather than representing a reaction to 
terrorism, Philippine counterterrorism developed in response to material and political 
opportunities offered by international partnership with the United States in its global “War 
on Terror”.  McCoy observes, “President Arroyo was the first Asian leader to enlist in 
America’s Coalition of the Willing and Washington reciprocated by making the Philippines 
its ‘second front’ in the global war on terror”.5  In a sense, counterterrorism therefore 
preceded terrorism, meaning that terrorists were not merely discovered or exposed but 
had to be created.  This chapter describes how this was accomplished.  At first, a small 
bandit group conveniently styled as “terrorists” served to justify counterterrorism 
operations with US troop involvement in the southwestern region of Mindanao.  As 
Jetschke notes, the success of this experiment led the Philippine government to reframe 
old foes of the state, the Moro and communist “insurgents”, as “terrorists” as well in the 
hope of boosting its efforts to achieve decisive military victory over them.6  Philippine 
counterinsurgency operations thus received a shot in the arm from the US response to 
9/11.  And as a result, human rights violations previously associated with 
counterinsurgency have also intensified.  A clear case in point is the rise of extrajudicial 
executions in the Philippines from 2001-2006.  Human rights organisations have carefully 
documented this phenomenon, which coincide with the Philippine government’s response 
to then US President George W. Bush’s call for a global “War on Terror”.   
If the government’s deployment of the terrorism frame against the MILF and the 
CPP-NPA has no compelling justification, then the resulting human rights violations cannot 
be said to be only unfortunate excesses or mistakes traceable to the idiosyncrasies of 
particular officials.  Within the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism, 
advocates caution the state against responding in an unprincipled manner, but take for 
granted that the threat of terrorism exists.  It assumes that counterterrorism policy is only 
a response to terrorism.  However, deploying the terrorism frame may be a strategic move 
on the part of the state because it opens channels to resources against adversaries.  It also 
prevents further scrutiny of the causes and dynamics of the conflict.  Once the state’s 
                                                                 
5 Alfred W McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the 
Surveillance State (Ateneo de Manila University Press 2011) 499. 
6 Anja Jetschke, Human Rights and State Security: Indonesia and the Philippines (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2011) 232–233.  
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ability to present its violence as counterterrorism is confirmed, possibilities of addressing 
human rights violation will already have been hindered.        
The argument in the chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I present the wave of 
extrajudicial killings targeting left-wing activists that swept the Philippines after 2001 under 
the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.  This wave of killings is a 
compelling example of the violations that followed counterinsurgency policy “innovations”7 
or “renewed counterinsurgency operations”8.  These violations took place in the period 
when the Philippines participated in the US-led “War on Terror”.  The rest of the chapter is 
devoted to showing that the renewal of counterinsurgency in this period was not 
coincidental.    
In the second section, I examine the impact of the Philippine participation in the 
“War on Terror” on counterinsurgency practices, first against the MILF, then against the 
CPP-NPA.  Hence, I trace the development of counterterrorism in the Philippines, 
particularly the reframing of the state’s conflict with “insurgents” in terms of “terrorism” 
and “counterterrorism”.  In this exercise, I closely follow and revise the useful account 
made by Anja Jetschke of a “gradual expansion of counter-terrorism policies to legal 
political organizations”.9  Like Jetschke’s account, I explore the role of the Abu Sayyaf, the 
initial and main excuse for introducing the discourse of “terrorism”/ “counterterrorism” to 
the Philippines.  Described as a “convenient enigma” because of its obscure origins and 
continuing utility for the counterterrorism project, the Abu Sayyaf, unlike the “insurgent” 
Moro and communist-led national democratic movements, is a small group engaged 
primarily in profitable crimes.  The MILF has been accused of terrorism due to its links with 
the Abu Sayyaf and other similar gangs.  But the Abu Sayyaf barely rates a mention in the 
reframing of the CPP-NPA as a “communist terrorist” movement.  This renders the terrorist 
tagging of the CPP-NPA as needing explanation.  In this regard, I contend that the reframing 
of the communists from “insurgents” to “terrorists” was even less plausible than 
accusations of terrorism against the MILF.  Jetschke emphasised that in convincing others 
that the CPP-NPA were “terrorists”, the government relied on “confirming events”, that is, 
violent acts of the CPP-NPA such as the assassination of former comrades that confirmed 
the government’s narrative.  In contrast to Jetschke’s account, I emphasise the importance 
                                                                 
7 Philip Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Addendum, Mission to the Philippines’ (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/3/Add.2 11. 
8 Amnesty International, ‘Phil ippines: Political Killings, Human Rights and the Peace Process’ (2006) 
28. 
9 Jetschke (n 6) 233. 
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and persistence of Cold War legacies in explaining the reframing of the communist 
movement in terms of terrorism.   
Thus, I present the extension of the government’s counterterrorism policy f rom the 
Abu Sayyaf to the MILF and then the CPP-NPA as less and less plausible.  Therefore, the 
chapter shows that there is no compelling justification for Philippine counterterrorism 
policy that developed during the Arroyo administration.  This puts some of the most serious 
human rights violations of this period in proper perspective, as arising from decisions to 
deploy the terrorism frame against adversaries. 
 
1. Extrajudicial Killings of Leftist Activists 2001-2006 
 
On April 16, 2008, Philip Alston, the United Nations special rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions issued a report on extrajudicial killings in 
the Philippines.  Within the five-year period that the report covered, local human rights 
organisations recorded over 800 cases of killings of members of mass-based organisations 
including workers’ unions, peasant organisations, political parties of marginalised sectors 
(called party list groups) and other groups which belong to the Left of the political 
spectrum.10  As the killings intensified, the phenomenon attracted the attention initially of 
                                                                 
10 In assessing the scale of the extrajudicial kil lings of leftist activists in this period, Amnesty 
International and Alston referred to and analysed a var iety of sources.  The local human rights 
organisation Karapatan had the longest l ist of victims (783 names as of 14 November 2006). Another 
local human rights organisation Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) also maintained its 
own list of victims – 89 names as of 20 December 2006, 46 of which coincided with that of 
Karapatan. Alston (n 7) 30. Karapatan’s and TFDP’s l ists are not contradictory but rather reflect the 
respective organisation’s focus on different geographical areas and mass organisations.  Karapatan 
and TFDP are associated with (now) rival networks of left-wing organisations which have a shared 
history.  In the Karapatan list, where indicated, the political or organisational affi liation of victims i s 
with any of the member organisations of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN, New Patriotic 
All iance).  ibid 29.  On the other hand, victims from Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya  (KPD, 
Movement for National Democracy), a rival network to BAYAN, figure in TFDP’s l ist. Amnesty 
International (n 8) 14.  Hence, where they don’t overlap, Karapatan’s and TFDP’s numbers must be 
added together.   
The government acknowledged 122 kil l ings as of May 2006 when it announced the creation 
of Task Force Usig, a body tasked to investigate the kil l ings. ibid 18.  The government’s l ist makes use 
of apparently more l imited set of criteria (“slain party l ist members/militants”) which hasn’t been 
made transparent.  According to Alston, a huge chunk of Karapatan’s l ist (461 names out of 783 
names in the Karapatan list as of 14 November 2006) were considered by Task Force Usig as fall ing 
outside of their remit or not involving a crime, i .e., considered by them as having “died in legitimate 
encounters between the NPA and the AFP and PNP”, while it was sti l l  then considering whether to 
acknowledge some 200 names in Karapatan’s l ist.    
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local and national groups,11 which then alerted international observers.  A number of 
international fact-finding missions conducted in various parts of the country confirmed the 
reports by local organisations, making it harder for the government to deny that there was 
a strategy of extrajudicial killings.12  By 2006, Amnesty International took up the issue of 
“political killings” in the Philippines, and in February 2007, following some controversy, 
Philip Alston visited the Philippines to conduct his investigations.     
The killings were particularly alarming because unarmed civilians engaged in 
parliamentary struggle or open democratic politics were evidently “carefully selected and 
intentionally targeted”.13  As Alston put it, not only did the killings eliminate hundreds, they 
also “intimidated a vast number of civil society actors, and narrowed the country’s political 
discourse”,14 thus seriously curtailing Philippine democracy.  “The aim has been to 
intimidate a much larger number of civil society actors, many of whom have, as a result, 
been placed on notice that the same fate awaits them if they continue their activism.”15 
 
1.1.  Departure from acknowledgment of distinction between legal and illegal leftist 
organisations  
 
In explaining the killings, both Amnesty International and Alston underscore the 
government’s departure from an acknowledgement of a distinction between legal and 
illegal organisations and forms of struggle.  The Philippine government, through its Armed 
                                                                 
11 Besides Karapatan and TFDP, the Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights (CHR), the Integrated 
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines have expressed 
concerns about the kil l ings. Amnesty International (n 8) 1.   
12 These included fact-finding missions by the Dutch Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation; the World 
Council  of Churches (WCC) and the Christian Conference of Asia (CCA); Human Rights Now (Japan); 
the Philippines-Canada Task Force on Human Rights; a delegation of peasants and right to food 
campaigning organisations including La Via Campesina; and a Hong Kong-based campaign 
participated in by the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) and the Hong Kong Bar Association. 
Dutch Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation, ‘Facts to Action: Report on  the Attacks against Fi l ipino 
Lawyers and Judges’ (2006); Pastoral Ecumenical Delegation to the Philippines, ‘Report of the 
Pastoral Ecumenical Delegation Visit to Eastern Visayas, July 15 to 18, 2005’ (20 July 2005); Fact 
Finding Mission of Human Rights Now to Phil ippines, ‘Report on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced 
Disappearances in the Philippines’ (Human Rights Now 2008); Hong Kong Mission for Human Rights 
and Peace in the Philippines, July 23-28, 2006, ‘Mission Report on Extrajudicial Killings and Other 
Human Rights Abuses in the Philippines’ (2006); International Fact-Finding Mission, ‘Running Amok: 
Landlord Lawlessness and Impunity in the Philippines. Final Report of the 2 -15 June 2006 
International Fact-Finding Mission on Agrarian Reform Related Violations of Human Rights in the 
Philippines’ (2006); David Gibson, ‘Report on Attacks against Advocates in the Philippines’ (Lawyers’ 
Rights Watch Canada 2006). 
13 Alston (n 7) 6. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
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Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP), has been battling the 
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front 
(CPP/NPA/NDF), an underground movement waging a guerrilla war under the banner of 
“national democracy”, since the 1970s. Prior to 2001, the Philippine government instituted 
policies that created political space within the state for left-wing activist organisations 
sharing the “national democratic” ideology and program of reforms of the National 
Democratic Front (NDF) led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).  On 
September 22, 1992, in an effort to revive negotiations for a peaceful settlement of armed 
conflict with the CPP-NPA and in keeping with an announced policy of “national 
reconciliation” under President Fidel Ramos (1992-98), Congress repealed the Anti-
Subversion Act which previously made membership in the CPP illegal. 16  In 1995, the Party 
List System Act was enacted implementing the provisions of the 1987 Constitution that 20 
percent of the seats of the House of Representatives be allocated to representatives of 
marginalised sectors such as labour, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, 
women, and the youth.17  These moves were intended to attract participation by leftist 
critics of government in parliamentary struggle and open democratic politics and away 
from armed struggle.18 This period also coincided with a dramatic decline in casualties 
related to counterinsurgency operations against the New People’s Army,19 although human 
rights violations in the form of torture, disappearances and extrajudicial executions were 
still observed in militarised zones.20 
By 2001, the government’s position on these state policies appeared to change, as 
a new emphasis on counterinsurgency gained ascendancy.  Instead of encouraging the 
participation of left-wing organisations in parliamentary struggle and open democratic 
                                                                 
16 Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti -Subversion Act); Republic Act No. 7636 (repealing the Anti -Subversion 
Act). 
17 Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act). 
18 The party l ist organisation Akbayan Citizens’ Action Party, an umbrella coalition involving 
prominent former CPP and NDF leaders that rejected the leadership of CPP founder Jose Maria 
Sison, joined in the 1998 elections.  By 2001, Bayan Muna (Country First), the first party-list 
organisation supported by “national democratic” BAYAN member organisations, joined as well, 
winning three seats, the maximum allowed to a party l ist group under the law.  Over time, national 
democrats formed seven more party l ist groups representing organisations of workers, peasants, 
women, teachers, youth, migrant workers, and Moro people respectively. 
19 According to the Human Development Network’s “Philippine Human Development Report 2005”, 
the number of combatants kil led in armed encounters from 1986-2004 (by administration) were as 
follows:  “President Corazon Aquino (1986-92) AFP – 735, NPA – 828; President Fidel Ramos (1992-
98) AFP – 2, NPA – 2; President Joseph Estrada (1999-2001) AFP – 130; NPA – 90; and President 
Gloria Arroyo (2001- [2005]) AFP – 494, NPA – 484.” Cited in Amnesty International (n 8) 16, n 68. 
20 ibid 6. 
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politics, the government rejected them as illegitimate.  It publicly identified these 
organisations as “fronts” of the New People’s Army, the “political infrastructure” of the 
insurgency in the countryside, hence “enemies of the state”, and “legitimate targets” for 
“neutralisation”.21  From the viewpoint of counterinsurgency strategy, no line separated 
legal, above-ground organisations from armed, underground groups challenging the 
government.  While not announced as formal policy in the form of statute, this policy shift 
against the legal Left can be discerned from documents of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines22 and public pronouncements of military commanders and high-level civilian 
officials.  A 2005 AFP treatise characterised the CPP/NPA/NDF’s armed struggle and left-
wing groups’ parliamentary struggle as “complementary, interrelated and interactive”23 
and called for a counterinsurgency response that took this into account.  Major General 
Jovito Palparan, the most vociferous of the military commanders, for example, described 
Bayan Muna as an “NPA front”, Karapatan and the women’s group Gabriela as “NPA 
recruiters”, and certain non-governmental organisations as “infiltrated and controlled by 
the CPP” and providing materials and shelter to the NPA.24  In March 2006, echoing 
pronouncements by military commanders, National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales 
declared a crackdown on “communist fronts” aiming at the destruction of the CPP -NPA by 
2010.  In her June 24, 2006 State of the Nation Address, President Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo 
herself applauded the efforts of the controversial Major General Palparan. 25  
 
  
                                                                 
21 Amnesty International called this state of affairs the “resurgence of ‘red-labell ing’”, referring to a 
counterinsurgency practice already blamed for human rights violations in the Ferdinand Marcos and 
Corazon Aquino presidencies  from the 1970s to the 1990s . ibid 19. 
22 The AFP documents cited by both AI and Als ton were the Trinity of War – Book III: The Grand 
Design of the CPP/NPA/NDF (Northern Luzon Command, AFP, 2005) and Knowing the Enemy: Are we 
missing the point? (2005), a PowerPoint-based briefing presentation given by the AFP.  In both 
documents, BAYAN member organisations were characterised as controlled by the corresponding 
member organisations of the underground National Democratic Front (NDF) or the CPP Central 
Committee.  In addition, the AFP also draws up lists of names called “order of battle”, disc ussed 
further below. 
23 Amnesty International (n 8) 20 citing Trinity of War – Book III: The Grand Design of the 
CPP/NPA/NDF, Northern Luzon Command, AFP, 2005. 
24 ibid 20–21. 
25 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, ‘Sixth State of the Nation Address’ para 49 
<http://www.gov.ph/2006/07/24/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-sixth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-
24-2006/> accessed 25 January 2016. 
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1.2.  Civil society-focused counterinsurgency operations 
 
Alston argued that the Arroyo government’s counterinsurgency strategy focused 
on civil society, and this accounted for extrajudicial killings.  “[A] counterinsurgency focus 
on civil society leads to extrajudicial killings and tempts commanders to make such abuses 
routine and systematic”.26  A discussion of the “order of battle”, an important 
counterinsurgency tool that lists leaders and members of civil society organisations 
targeted for “neutralisation”, bears out this claim.   
An “order of battle” is essentially a military intelligence document.  It compiles 
names of individuals believed to be NPA fighters and the organisations and individual 
members actively supporting rebels as the “fronts” of the CPP-NPA in specific localities.  It 
is meant to guide the work of military units, and also the police, in counterinsurgency.27  
Alston noted that in Central Luzon, the preparation of these lists typically involve the 
military establishing their presence in the barangay28 or village.  Soldiers would conduct 
door-to-door census for the purpose of identifying members of civil society and former or 
suspected NPA fighters.  Sometimes the villagers would volunteer names to the military, 
but often, soldiers would use torture against those who were uncooperative, particularly 
those who were named by others.29   
When an “order of battle” is prepared, the military undertakes a campaign of 
vilification against the groups and individuals listed therein.  The military will hold a 
barangay assembly called “Know Your Enemies” seminar and will make known therein the  
identities of those who are listed in the “order of battle”. Military spokespersons will tell 
villagers that listed individuals should “surrender” to the military, or else grim 
consequences await them.30  In the provinces of Tarlac and Bohol and parts of the Southern 
Tagalog region, posters or leaflets branding them as “communist terrorists” will be publicly 
displayed or disseminated if they refuse surrendering.  Soldiers or paramilitary auxiliaries 
                                                                 
26 Alston (n 7) 10. 
27 An “order of battle” l ist that Alston has seen consisted of 110 pages and lists hundreds of groups 
and individuals.  It is co-signed by senior military and police officials with a directive to “all  members 
of the intell igence community … to adopt and be guided by this update to enhance a more 
comprehensive and concerted effort against the CPP/NPA/NDF”. ibid 9.  The “order of battle” also 
ranks enemies according to their importance. Dutch Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation (n 12) 18. 
28 The barangay is the term for the smallest political-administrative unit in the Philippines. 
29 Alston (n 7) 11. 
30 ibid. 
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will put their houses under surveillance, and if the person flees the village, the house may 
be burned. Finally, individuals will begin to get abducted and killed.31   
Many civil society leaders and active members, including lawyers, human rights 
workers and church people who were killed, were warned to stop worki ng for their legal 
organisations, or from pursuing their activities, or risk their lives.  Lawyer Juvy Magsino, for 
example, was told to stop working for Karapatan and from joining its fact-finding missions; 
while Expedito and Manuela Albarillo were told to stop campaigning for the party list 
Bayan Muna.32  The threats were sent through cell phone messages and calls, letters and 
parcels (for example, flowers for a funeral), or by being stalked by anonymous motorcycle-
riding men.33  The military will also sometimes use the local media, including local 
television, to make known that the person was subjected to surveillance.34   
A common feature of these extrajudicial killings is the use of anonymous assailants 
or death squads which result in official deniability.  Amnesty International reports that the 
“predominant method of attack” is “shootings by unidentified assailants, mostly riding 
tandem on a motorcycle, who often obscure their identity with ‘bonnet’ face masks or 
helmets”.35  Sometimes, the assailants are supported by other men riding in unmarked 
vehicles.36  Thus, the actual killers will not proclaim their identities as military or auxiliary 
(paramilitary) forces, providing the military plausible deniability concerning responsibility 
for the killings or links to the killers.37  While the identities of the assailants are hidden, the 
act of killing itself often would be put on display, consistent with the goal of communicating 
the message that grim consequences attend not “surrendering”.  In fact, the killers in  these 
cases will “strik[e] in broad daylight in public places”.38 
                                                                 
31 ibid.  In the case of lawyer Pergentino Deri -On, his two cars were burned. Dutch Lawyers for 
Lawyers Foundation (n 12) 23. 
32 Dutch Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation (n 12) 23; Fact Finding Mission of Human Rights Now to 
Phil ippines (n 12) 22–23.   
33 Dutch Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation (n 12) 23. 
34 ibid (case of lawyer Juvy Magsino). 
35 Amnesty International (n 8) 22. 
36 ibid. 
37 Alston declared that “[t]he military is in a state of denial” proffering to explain the kil l ings through 
a communist internal purge theory which he found “strikingly unconvincing”. Alston (n 7) 2.  
38 Amnesty International (n 8) 22.  “Given the ‘visibility’ of the kil l ings, the kil lers seem to be very 
self-confident in getting away with it.” Dutch Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation (n 12) 24.  Assailants 
escape unimpeded, even though there may have been police or military checkpoints or camps 
nearby or on the escape route.  In the case of Juvy Magsino, she was kil led only 500 meters away 
from a military camp. National Council of Churches in the Philippines, ‘Let the Stones Cry out: An 
Ecumenical Report on Human Rights in the Philippines a Call for Action’ (2007) 32.  
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Therefore, the killings are essentially only the culmination of concerted efforts to 
terrorise legal organisations and activists from functioning in the localities subject of these 
counterinsurgency operation.  The fear generated would cause threatened individuals to 
“surrender” or go in hiding and targeted local organisations to close shop. 39  The military 
would only leave barangays which have been “cleared” of leftist activists, for other 
barangays. But this also only after the military has organised from among villagers listening 
posts, often armed, called Barangay Defense System (BDS) in Central Luzon, to “hold” the 
barangay for them.  This includes regularly informing the military about the entry of 
strangers or visitors.40  
Hence, in this manner, extrajudicial killings of leftist activists and other forms of 
human rights violations such as torture and destruction of property are framed as part and 
parcel of military operations designed to counter armed rebels. 
 
2. The Development of Philippine Counterterrorism and its Interface with 
Counterinsurgency 
 
Why has counterinsurgency assumed ascendancy in the period 2001-2006, leading 
to the bloody consequences described above?  The answer lies in the US’ “War on Terror”, 
the new norms of counterterrorism and the opportunities these have created for a renewal 
of counterinsurgency.  Philippine participation in the US’ “War on Terror” started with the 
military campaign against the Abu Sayyaf group in southwestern Mindanao immediately 
after 9/11.  But Philippine counterterrorism has since expanded to overlap with 
counterinsurgency against more established armed movements, namely the Moro and 
communist-led national democratic movements.  Indeed, the Phil ippine government 
responded to opportunities offered by global counterterrorism by overlaying 
counterterrorism rhetoric on top of pre-existing counterinsurgency practices.  
Counterterrorism has thus provided a valuable vehicle for achieving the government’s 
counterinsurgency objectives. 
 
  
                                                                 
39 Alston (n 7) 11; Dutch Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation (n 12) 23. 
40 Alston (n 7) 11–12. 
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2.1. Jetschke: gradual expansion of counterterrorism policy 
 
In this regard, Jetschke offers a succinct argument that is useful as a starting point.  
According to Jetschke, Philippine counterterrorism policy gradually expanded from the Abu 
Sayyaf, a tiny bandit group, to cover the government’s protracted armed conflicts with the 
MILF and CPP-NPA, and eventually legal political organisations.  In 1999, the Estrada 
administration used international norms against terrorism to categorise the Abu Sayyaf 
group as a terrorist organisation.  This move allowed Estrada to access military equipment 
and expertise from the US to neutralise the Abu Sayyaf.  The experience with the Abu 
Sayyaf encouraged the expansion of the government’s counterterrorism policy:   
 
The very initial success of the political strategy used to recategorize military operations 
against this group [Abu Sayyaf] then encouraged the government to extend the same 
strategy to other organizations, like the MILF and the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP).41  
 
In her book, Human Rights and State Security: Indonesia and the Philippines ,42 
Jetschke argues that the state’s ability to successfully invoke international norms  pertaining 
to state security is important in accounting for the persistence of massive human rights 
violations.  Even as transnational campaigns draw international and domestic attention to a 
state’s human rights violations in a process of “social sanctioning”, states are “not helpless 
recipients of pressure based on norms”.   Instead, they are themselves capable of 
persuasively convincing audiences and deflecting responsibility for human rights violations 
by “invoking state security and by connecting this to internationally accepted standards”.43  
Both transnational human rights campaigns and states invoking state security norms target 
external audiences such as other states, international organisations and the public opinion 
in other countries.  These external audiences are crucial because their perception of the 
situation (whether the human rights violations are unjustifiable or represent unfortunate 
but necessary actions to defend the state) influences future state behaviour. In turn, events 
that tend to confirm or negate one or the other way of framing the situation are crucial 
because they influence the perception of external audiences.   
                                                                 
41 Jetschke (n 6) 233. 
42 Jetschke (n 6).  Chapter 8 of this book is devoted to the l ink between counterterrorism and human 
rights violations in the Philippines in the period from 1999-2008. 
43 ibid 4. 
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In Jetschke’s view, the patterns of human rights violations that took place in the 
Philippines in the period 1999-2008 (including, in particular, the extrajudicial killings) were 
facilitated by the new counterterrorism norms of this period.44  She argues that the 
Philippine government skilfully used these counterterrorism norms in constructing a 
domestic discourse on terrorism that framed its adversaries as terrorists or linked to 
terrorism.45  Aided by “confirming events”, the Philippine government successfully 
convinced the United States and other Western governments to extend it material and 
diplomatic support against its adversaries.46  Their supportive judgment, in turn, make it 
possible for human rights violations to continue.47      
In what follows, I examine the Philippine government’s deployment of 
counterterrorism rhetoric against the Abu Sayyaf, the MILF and the NPA after 9/11.  
Jetschke has emphasised the (at least temporary) fit between “international counter-
terrorism norms”, on the one hand, and the government’s actions against these 
organisations, on the other hand.  She has also pointed to “confirming events” that tended 
to convince external audiences to agree with the government’s characterisation of these 
organisations as terrorists, and to successfully deflect human rights pressures.  As I argue 
below, however, her account needs to be revised as it unrealistically reduces all external 
actors to the role of “audience” and overplays “confirming events”.  The lack of 
correspondence between the counterterrorism frame and facts are greater than is 
recognised in her account, and some external actors, particularly the United States have 
played a more active role in the events than would a member of the “audience”.  
 
2.2. The Abu Sayyaf group  
 
Jetschke follows most scholars in tracing the beginnings of Philippine 
counterterrorism to the government’s response to a smal l48 and enigmatic group called the 
                                                                 
44 ibid 232–233. 
45 ibid 233. 
46 ibid 234. 
47 ibid. 
48 According to background information on the group contained in the Statement of Reasons 
prepared by Australia’s Department of the Attorney General for the purpose of the re-l isting of the 
Abu Sayyaf as a terrorist organisation in 2013, the Abu Sayyaf’s number is approximately 400.  
Australian National Security, ‘Abu Sayyaf Group’ 
<http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/AbuSayyafGroup.aspx> 
accessed 26 January 2016. 
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Abu Sayyaf based in southern Philippines.49  The Abu Sayyaf group became prominent 
nationally in the 1990s when it was believed to have engaged in kidnappings and 
bombings, some of them quite sensational.50  Early observers of the Abu Sayyaf, relying on 
interviews with the group’s founder Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani and his small body of 
writings, pointed out that the Abu Sayyaf had an ideology or political agenda based on 
“radical Islam” or “jihadism”.51  While miniscule in size compared to the two established 
Moro armed groups MNLF and MILF, the Abu Sayyaf’s emergence and spectacular violence 
provided the Philippine government with a basis to argue that Islamic terrorism with global 
connections threatened southwestern Mindanao.   
In 2000, the Abu Sayyaf became internationally notorious after it launched 
kidnappings of European and Middle Eastern tourists and Malaysian staff in the resort 
island of Sipadan in Sabah, Malaysia who were taken across the border to the group’s 
hideouts in Sulu, southern Philippines.52  In May 2001, the Abu Sayyaf’s Dos Palmas 
kidnappings yielded three American victims, namely, the couple Gracia and Martin 
Burnham, as well as Guillermo Sobero, the last of whom was beheaded.  According to 
                                                                 
49 Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao  
(Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Institute for Popular Democracy 2000) 211, 219 –220 (on the 
origins of the Abu Sayyaf); Soliman M Santos and Octavio A Dinampo, ‘Abu Sayyaf Reloaded: Rebels, 
Agents, Bandits, Terrorists (Case Study)’ in Diana Rodriguez (ed), Primed and Purposeful: Armed 
Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (South-South Network for Non-State Armed 
Group Engagement and the Small Arms Survey 2010) 115–138; Charles O Frake, ‘Abu Sayyaf: 
Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities among Philippine Muslims’ (2008) 
100 American Anthropologist 41-54; Mark Turner, ‘Terrorism and Secession in the Southern 
Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf’ (1995) 17 Contemporary Southeast Asia 1 -19. 
50 For example, in 1993 the burning of the provincial capitol of Basilan was blamed by national media 
on a “terrorist attack” by the Abu Sayyaf, although local realities suggested otherwise.  See, Kit 
Collier, ‘“A Carnival of Crime”: The Enigma of the Abu Sayyaf’ in Patricio N Abinales and Nathan 
Gilbert Quimpo (eds), The US and the War on Terror in the Philippines (Anvil  Publishing 2008) 157f.  
The Abu Sayyaf was also blamed for the sensational April  4, 1995 sacking of Ipil  town in western 
Mindanao. 
51 A Muslim cleric educated in Saudi Arabia, Janjalani also claimed credential as a former mujahid in 
the Afghan war against Soviet occupation. (He is supposed to have named the Abu Sayyaf group 
after a legendary Afghan mujahid Abdul Rasul Sayyaf).  However, scholar Julkipli Wadi disputes 
Janjalani’s Afghan war experience, having found no evidence of this claimed credential.  Santos and 
Dinampo (n 49) 117. A leader of Abu Sayyaf, Abu Juhad justified kidnapping as “part of the 
revolution” or a form of jihad. Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, ‘Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: 
Who’s Afraid of an Islamic State?’ (1999) 3 Public Policy 38 -62, 50.  Applying a religious gloss on 
kidnappings, Abu Sayyaf leader Khadaffy Janjalani is  also supposed to have said: “Philosophically, if it 
is allowed to kil l  the enemy, why not allow to just kidnap him?  Religiously, no less than the Prophet 
of Islam gave the order to kidnap or seize the caravan of Abu Suffian.” Santos and Dinampo (n 49) 
128. 
52 Thomas Fuller, ‘20 Kidnapped From Malaysian Resort Island’ New York Times (25 April  2000) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/25/news/25iht-malay.2.t_3.html> accessed 4 January 2016; 
Terry McCarthy, ‘An Invasion of Paradise’ [2000] Time 
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,996834,00.html> accessed 4 January 2016. 
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Abuza, this kidnapping incident, coupled with allegations that the Abu Sayyaf was linked to 
al Qaeda, provided “the casus belli for the U.S. military to reengage in the Philippines 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks by al Qaeda”.53   
By 2001, when US President Bush announced to the world that he would pursue 
terrorists wherever they might be found, the existence and operation of the Abu Sayyaf in 
the southern Philippines presented an opportunity for US-Philippine alliance on 
counterterrorism. The Abu Sayyaf was used as a justification for making the area the 
“second front” of the “War on Terror”.54  Some 600 US forces were deployed to 
southwestern Mindanao in “joint military exercises” with Philippine troops in January 15, 
2002, for the express purpose of aiding the Philippine government to rout out the Abu 
Sayyaf in Basilan.55  Apart from US troops in “joint military exercises”, whose numbers are 
sometimes publicly disclosed at the launch of such exercises, undisclosed numbers of US 
Special Operations Forces (SOFs) have also been deployed, believed to have ranged from 
160 to 350 at any given time since 2002.56  The US government has called this campaign 
“Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines”, a name that alludes to the US and NATO 
military occupation in Afghanistan, which began in October 2001. 
 
2.2.1.  Implausibility of “terrorist” frame as applied to the Abu Sayyaf  
 
While it is undeniable that the Abu Sayyaf has committed horrendous acts of 
violence, its representation as a “terrorist threat” can be challenged from a local 
                                                                 
53 Zachary Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf (DIANE Publishing 2005) vii . 
54 Walden Bello, ‘A “Second Front” in the Philippines’ The Nation (18 March 2002) 18 
<http://www.tni.org/article/second-front-philippines> accessed 23 October 2013. 
55 George Radics, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Balikatan Exercises in the Philippines and the US “War 
against Terrorism”’ (2004) 4 Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 115 -127, 116; Herbert Docena, 
‘Unconventional Warfare: Are US Special Forces Engaged in an “Offensive War” in the Philippines?’ 
in Patricio N Abinales and Nathan Gilbert Quimpo (eds), The US and the War on Terror in the 
Philippines (Anvil  Publishing 2008) 46–83.  The number of US troops rose “from the initial l imit of 
600 to over 2,500, the largest deployment of military personnel ever sent to the tiny island of 
Basilan”. Roland Simbulan quoted in Radics 117.  
56 Docena (n 55) 49–51.  Because of constitutional restrictions on foreign military bases, troops and 
facil ities on Philippine soil, US troops  involvement in the military campaign against the Abu Sayyaf 
needed to be packaged as “joint military exercises” and “advise and training” instead of actual 
combat. However, evidence from US military personnel themselves who have deployed to the area 
as well as local witnesses show that US troop activities go beyond “advise and training” to at the 
very least providing aerial surveillance, defusing landmines, recovering casualties, and accompanying 
Philippine troops in ground action. 
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perspective.57  The Abu Sayyaf has been depicted as a well-defined organisation58 with a 
political agenda59 anchored on an interpretation of Islamic beliefs, almost solely on the 
basis of official and military sources that have seldom and only recently  been subjected to 
scrutiny.  These sources have furthermore alleged that the group has “links” to the 
organisations Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and al Qaeda.60  However, as Ugarte61 shows using key 
informants on the ground as well as written accounts of rescued vi ctims of kidnappings, the 
Abu Sayyaf is less a sophisticated organisation capable of singlehandedly pulling off 
operations, than it is a fearsome label.   
In his incisive investigation of the phenomenon of kidnappings in southern 
Mindanao, Ugarte claims that the kidnappings in the zone, which are routinely attributed 
to the Abu Sayyaf in the national media are in fact perpetrated by numerous groups, acting 
in cooperation with each other.62  Kidnapping operations in the zone thus constitute a 
much more complex phenomenon than is supposed.  Besides the Abu Sayyaf, politicians, 
“kidnap-for-ransom-syndicates”, military men, as well as members of the MNLF and MILF, 
have been involved in heterogeneous alliances created to raise money from a kidnapping.63  
Hence, smaller gangs of three to four kidnappers will bring their victims to other bands of 
30 to 40 men, such as the Abu Sayyaf or a rebel contingent, in order to receive immediate 
cash and relieve themselves of the costly responsibility of keeping the victims.  To make a 
profit, the Abu Sayyaf will then negotiate for a higher ransom.  The Abu Sayyaf is able to 
demand huge sums precisely because of its fearsome reputation.64  Local key informants 
                                                                 
57 For a similar emphasis on local perspective, see Collier (n 50). 
58 For an account of the Abu Sayyaf’s organisational structure and dynamics based on military 
sources, both written and informal, see, Rommel Banlaoi, ‘The Abu Sayyaf Group and Terrorism in 
the Southern Philippines: Threat and Response’ in Patricio N Abinales and Nathan Gilbert Quimpo 
(eds), The US and the War on Terror in the Philippines (Anvil  Publishing 2008) 113–149.  
59 The agenda is said to be the establishment of an “Islamic state” in Mindanao. Quimpo (n 51) 48–
49; Santos and Dinampo (n 49) 119. 
60 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia University Press 2002); 
Zachary Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network’ (2002) 24 Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 427-465; Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest 
Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (Free Press 2003). 
61 Eduardo F Ugarte, ‘“In a Wilderness of Mirrors”: The Use and Abuse of the “Abu Sayyaf” Label in 
the Philippines’ (2010) 18 South East Asia Research 373 -413. 
62 ibid. 
63 “[While they are] rivals [] competing for ‘legitimacy’ and a share of the islands’ spoils (i l legal 
logging, gun smuggling, etc.) … such players also become all ies, as they exploit their lateral l inkages 
with each other and their vertical l inkages with their own sponsors and subalterns to form 
temporary coalitions for specific ventures”. Eduardo F Ugarte, ‘The Phenomenon of Ki dnapping in 
the Southern Philippines An Overview’ (2008) 16 South East Asia Research 293 -341, 324.   
64 Eric Gutierrez memorably called the Abu Sayyaf “entrepreneurs of violence … who use their 
reputation and capacity for violence as capital to gain relative security, power, and control in a 
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believe that the kidnappers’ weapons are sourced directly from the military or via 
politicians.  Often, politicians will instigate the kidnapping operation in order to raise 
campaign funds for forthcoming elections.  Communications equipment such as satelli te 
phones has been sighted in the possession of kidnappers as well, but as Gracia Burnham’s 
written account of her own abduction attests, her Abu Sayyaf captors were technologically 
incompetent.  This indicates that equipment may have been simply supplied to them by 
more sophisticated syndicates who were more established in the business of kidnapping. 
Thus, with respect to kidnappings, the Abu Sayyaf’s capability is revealed to be dependent 
on other actors, including politicians, businessmen, and the military, i.e., the “strongmen” 
or the traditional wielders of power in the zone.  The “threat” that the Abu Sayyaf is able to 
project in the zone actually benefits, rather than displaces, these more established wielders 
of power. 
Especially following the death of its founder Abdurajak Janjalani in the late 1990s, 
the picture of the Abu Sayyaf as motivated by religious ideology has been widely 
discredited.  On this point, even scholars like Abuza, who makes extensive use of military 
sources, cannot avoid agreeing. “They (Abu Sayyaf) were a well-armed criminal gang, but 
not an ideologically motivated political-religious organisation. The label terrorism was 
applied to them by both the U.S. and Philippine governments, but that had more to do with 
their brutality than their political agenda.”65  Santos and Dinampo66  explain that individuals 
like Commander Robot and Nandi Uddih, with known association with local politicians as 
their henchmen, have managed to join the organisation and played prominent roles in 
representing the Abu Sayyaf in ransom negotiations.  First-hand accounts by former 
kidnapping victims bolster the conclusion that profit was its main motivation. 67  A Catholic 
priest once taken hostage said he initially thought “they were really fundamentalists” who 
“were serious about their faith and always prayed and talked about defending Islam” but 
soon realised “they were out only to make money.  They only used Islam as a front.  It was 
easy for them to recruit followers because they offered huge sums to entice people to join 
                                                                 
highly unstable area as well as the money, resources, and respect needed for self-perpetuation.”  
Quoted in Santos and Dinampo (n 49) 126. 
65 Abuza, Balik-Terrorism (n 53) 8. 
66 Santos and Dinampo (n 49) 125, 127. 
67 Jose Torres Jr., Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf (Claretian Publications 2001); 
Gracia Burnham and Dean Merril l , In the Presence of My Enemies (Tyndale House Publishers, Inc 
2003); Roberto Aventajado and Teodoro Montelibano, 140 Days of Terror: In the Clutches of the Abu 
Sayyaf (Anvil  Publishing 2004). 
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them.”68  Quite unlike a group that seeks publicity for its beliefs, the Abu Sayyaf has also 
converted opportunities to air their views through the media into straightforward fund-
raising activities.  In June 2008, for example, television journalist Ces Drilon, who sought to 
give the group opportunity to speak to media, was instead kidnapped along with two 
camera crew, and their guide Mindanao State University lecturer Octavio Dinampo in 
exchange for ransom.69 
Surprisingly, some Philippine scholars like Santos and Dinampo,70 following 
Abuza,71 still employ the label “terrorist”, usually in combination with “bandit”, to 
characterise the Abu Sayyaf.  This reflects a kind of analytical bias that privileges religious 
ideology as the real marker of the Abu Sayyaf.  Even when other exhibited features such as 
monetary motivation clearly predominate, it is maintained thought that religious ideology 
has simply been dormant or latent, waiting to be expressed given the right opportunity.  
For example, Abuza argues that after 2002, the group “return[ed] to their roots as a 
separatist organization”72 and “reenter[ed] the arena of terrorism”73 as reflected in a string 
of high-profile bombings and the targeting of Manila.74  His theory is that successful 
counterterrorism operations killed or captured Abu Sayyaf leaders who emphasised 
commercial ventures such as kidnappings, giving way to new developments in the 
organisation, including a new leadership that sought stronger relationship with the more 
clearly religious and ideological MILF and JI.  The argument is curious because the decline 
of the Abu Sayyaf and the very success of counterterrorism operations against its leaders 
are regarded as the cause of renewed terrorism (this time, in the form of bombings).  The 
main problem with this theory, however, is that the authorship of these bombings claimed 
by the Abu Sayyaf is bitterly disputed.  Disgruntled junior military officers, for example, 
                                                                 
68 Torres Jr. (n 67) 68 quoted in Santos and Di nampo 127.  Rene Ciria-Cruz incisively remarks that the 
Abu Sayyaf are “known for brutality but not suicidal sacrifice.” Quoted in Peter Sales, ‘If You Can 
Keep Your Head When All  About You are Losing Theirs! The Role of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the 
Campaign against Islamic Separatism in Mindanao’, Asia Reconstructed: Proceedings of the 16th 
Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, 2006  (Asian Studies Association of 
Australia (ASAA) Inc and the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Canberra 2006) 3 
<http://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/1630> accessed 28 December 2015. 
69 Ugarte (n 63) 330f; Santos and Dinampo (n 49) 133. 
70 Santos and Dinampo (n 49). 
71 Abuza, Balik-Terrorism (n 53). 
72 ibid 10. 
73 ibid 1. 
74 In this last claim of a return to terrorism, Abuza is aided by a string of bombings, including those of 
the Davao International Airport and Sasa Wharf in 2003 and the Superferry 14 passenger vessel in 
2004, as well as a number of arrests for possession of explosives supposedly meant for targets such 
as shopping malls in Manila and the US Embassy. 
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alleged that the bombings of the airport and wharf in Davao City in 2003 (claimed by the 
Abu Sayyaf, but officially blamed by the Philippine government on the MILF) were planned 
by President Arroyo herself (contained in the so-called “Oplan Greenbase” documents) and 
executed by security forces through special orders.75  While only circumstantial evidence 
could be produced to prove the charge, the suspicion was strong enough to compel the 
junior military officers to denounce the President in a mutiny.76    
 
2.3. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
 
This thesis does not provide a detailed discussion of the history and causes of the 
conflict between the Moros of southern Philippines and the Philippine state. 77  However, 
that the present Moro armed struggle is the starkest expression of this conflict, and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is now the “standard bearer” of the Moro cause 
against the Philippine government.  In this conflict, the government has been perceived as 
the main culprit for the Moros’ economic destitution, their political subordination to 
Christian settlers and the threat to their Moro and Islamic identity.78   
In 2008, the Armed Forces of the Philippines estimated MILF armed strength at 
11,769 fighters, making it the largest rebel army in the country.79  The MILF emerged from 
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1977 that originally envisioned an 
independent “democratic and modern” state for the Moros.80  Founded by then MNLF vice 
                                                                 
75 These allegations are further analysed in Chapter 3, section 2 on ‘mysterious bombings’ in 
Mindanao. 
76 Paul A Rodell, ‘The Philippines: Playing Out Long Conflicts’ in Chin Kin Wah and Daljit Singh (eds), 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2004 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2004) 185–204, 190. 
77 See, Michael Hawkins, Making Moros: Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the 
Philippines’ Muslim South (Northern Il l inois University Press 2013); Peter Gordon Gowing, Mandate 
in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920 (New Day Publishers 1988); 
Samuel K Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900-1972 (Fi l ipinas Foundation 1977); Thomas 
M McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern 
Philippines (University of California Press 1998); Patricio N Abinales, Orthodoxy and History in the 
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78 Mindanao academic Macapado Abaton Muslim identifies six key elements of the Moro problem 
as: economic marginalisation and destitution; political domination; physical insecurity; threatened 
Moro and Islamic identity; a perception that government is the principal culprit; and a perception of 
hopelessness under the present set-up.  Macapado Abanton Muslim, The Moro Armed Struggle in 
the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative (Office of the President and College of Public 
Affairs, Mindanao State University 1994) 52 f.  
79 Zachary Abuza, ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution’ (2005) 28  Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 453-479, 462; Abinales (n 77) 136, n 49.   
80 ‘1974 Manifesto of the Moro National Liberation Front [on the] Establishment of the Bangsamoro 
Republik’ reprinted in W Kadir Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and 
the Malays of Southern Thailand (Ateneo de Manila University Press 1974) 189–190. 
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chairman Hashim Salamat, the word “Islamic” in its name signalled that the new 
organisation wished to pursue a more religious rather than secular nation-state.81  The 
MNLF, led by its chairman Nur Misuari entered into a drawn out process of negotiations 
with the Philippine government beginning in 1976, even as the MILF slowly built its army 
and support from the Moro masses.  By 1996, Misuari signed a Final Peace Agreement with 
the Ramos administration and soon became governor of the newly established 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).   
However, with the peace agreement not yet fully implemented, Misuari thereafter 
suffered a reversal of fortune, losing the governorship of the ARMM in subsequent 
elections.  According to Santos, in 2001, criticisms over Misuari’s leadership style split the 
MNLF into four different factions, namely, Misuari; the Executive Committee-15 (EC 15) led 
by Cotabato City mayor Muslimin Sena; Alvarez Isnaji, who left the EC-15; and the Islamic 
Command Council.82    
 
2.3.1.  Peace negotiations with the MILF and counterterrorism 
 
Long overshadowed by the MNLF, the MILF started negotiations for a peaceful 
settlement of its conflict with the Philippine government in January 1997.  At the end of 
1999, with a ceasefire agreement in place, the newly-elected President Joseph Ejercito 
Estrada stunned observers by ordering the military to shell and overrun MILF’s bases, 
including its main base Camp Abubakar, causing massive internal displacement.83  In his 
State of the Nation Address of July 24, 2000, Estrada justified his reversal of his predecessor 
Fidel Ramos’ policy of peace negotiations with the MILF by invoking the principle of 
                                                                 
81 Other writers also point out that the two organisations have different ethnic allegiances 
(Maguindanaon for the MILF vs. Tausug for the MNLF) and leadership styles (consultative vs 
centralised).  Soliman M Santos, ‘War and Peace on the Moro Front: Three Standard Bearers, Three 
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territorial integrity.84  But it is also significant to note, as Jetschke does, that Estrada’s new 
policy of “all out war” was announced after a series of bombings in Zamboanga and in 
Davao in April and May 2000, attributed by the military to the Abu Sayyaf, as well as the 
Sipadan resort kidnapping of foreigners of June 2000.  The demonstrations of a threat from 
Muslim groups in the south provided Estrada a receptive public, one that might be willing 
to accept escalating the conflict with the MILF.85 
After Estrada, counterterrorism against the Abu Sayyaf threatened to engulf 
counterinsurgency against the MILF.  While Estrada’s successor Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo 
restored peace negotiations and the ceasefire agreement with the MILF, at key junctures 
she, like Estrada, also sought the defeat or weakening of the MILF through military 
offensives.  Her administration publicly accused the MILF of coddling or maintaining “links” 
with the Abu Sayyaf; the more obscure kidnap-for-ransom group called the Pentagon 
Gang86; Jemaah Islamiyah (JI); and by extension the al Qaeda as well.87  Especially in 2003, 
military attacks on the MILF were presented as logical extensions of operations against 
“terrorists and/or criminal elements”.   
Hence, counterterrorism played a key role in justifying military manoeuvres against 
the MILF, such as can clearly be observed in the multi-battalion attack on “Buliok Complex” 
of February 2003.  The Buliok operation and other attacks around that time interrupted 
and derailed the peace negotiations.  After the Philippine military overran Camp Abubakar 
in 2000, the MILF leadership settled in Buliok and surrounding barangays.  Called the 
“Buliok Complex” by the Philippine military, it was the MILF’s main base after Camp 
Abubakar fell in 2000.  The area is part of the Liguasan Marsh which lies within the 
provinces of Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato and Maguindanao in Central Mindanao, 
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87 International Crisis Group, ‘Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process’ 
(2004) <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/080-southern-
philippines-backgrounder-terrorism-and-the-peace-process.aspx> accessed 27 February 2015. 
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spanning some 220,000 hectares.88  In February 11, 2003 during the Muslim religious 
holiday of Eid al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice), Philippine military begun the attack on the 
“Buliok Complex” which lasted nearly a week.    
Philippine military and government officials initially justified the offensive as a hot 
pursuit operation against the Pentagon Gang and its leader Alonto Tahir.  They were 
alleged by the military to have made Buliok complex a “safe haven”.89  After denying that 
MILF was the target of the attack, the military a few days later admitted that the massive 
assault was indeed directed at the MILF.  The military said it was precipitated by “the 
massing of MILF forces” in the area which it considered a “hostile” act. 90  Indeed, the 
Pentagon Gang had only been a pretext as the operation did not secure the capture of 
Pentagon Gang members.91  Rather, the operation forced the MILF to abandon its position 
in the Buliok Complex, and caused massive internal displacement of local residents.92   
In August and October 2003, the AFP also used the manhunt for Fathur Rahman Al-
Ghozi, said to be an operative of JI, to justify conduct of military operations in MILF 
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Southeast Asian Affairs 2004 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2004) 205–222, 220; Jose Jowel 
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terrorist group or criminal syndicate.” Bantay Ceasefire, ‘Mindanao Grassroots Ceasefire Review and 
Assessment, January 6-12 & 18-19, 2003, Cotabato, Maguindanao, Lanao & Sultan Kudarat’ 4.   
91 This was the observation of the editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer of February 14, 2003.  
Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘Message Delivered’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (Manila, Phil ippines, 14 
February 2003) A8. See also Abuza, ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20’ (n 79) 456.  
92 Canuday (n 88) 23. 
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positions in the Lanao provinces.93  Al-Ghozi had escaped from a high-security cell at the 
Philippine National Police headquarters in Manila together with two alleged Abu Sayyaf 
members.  The escape, furthermore, took place in July 14, 2003 while Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard was in Manila to discuss international cooperation on combatting 
terrorism and international crimes, causing embarrassment to President Arroyo’s 
government.  “Much was made of the reported MILF links with Al -Ghozi, and by extension 
with the Jemaah Islamiyah terror network in southeast Asia,” remarked the civil society 
group Bantay Ceasefire (Ceasefire Monitor).94   
 
[Despite the formal ceasefire agreement,] there appears to be a new form of ‘warfare’ 
in Lanao … We refer to government’s all-out-support for the ‘counter-terrorism’ 
campaign of US President George Bush, which in Lanao took the form of old-style 
military operation with a new name – ‘counter-terrorism’.95   
 
Leaders of the MILF were also charged with Philippine criminal law violations in 
relation to key “terrorist events”, i.e., bombing incidents in 2003 and 2006, including the 
bombing of the airport and wharf in Davao City, which were concurrently blamed on the 
Abu Sayyaf and JI as well.96  The International Crisis Group, whose report in 2004 
systematically presented military allegations of MILF links to the Abu Sayyaf and JI, 
remarked that “the spectre of terrorism is haunting the southern Philippines peace 
process.”97 
 
2.3.2. The United States as a factor in counterterrorism and peace negotiations with the 
MILF 
 
After the United States gained a foothold in Mindanao in 2002 under the aegis of 
counterterrorism against the Abu Sayyaf, the US relationship clearly became a factor in the 
dynamics between the Philippine government and the MILF.98  By invoking the spectre of 
                                                                 
93 Perseus Echeminada, ‘Lawmaker Seeks Deeper Probe into Al -Ghozi Escape’ Philippine Star (31 
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escape> accessed 21 April  2016. 
94 Bantay Ceasefire, ‘The Hunt for Al -Ghozi: An “Anti -Terror” Campaign That Terrorized Lanao? 
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95 ibid 4. 
96 Abuza, Balik-Terrorism (n 53) 10; Salah Jubair, The Long Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace 
Process (1st edn, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies 2007) 222. 
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terrorism, the Philippine government sought to entangle the MILF in the global “War on 
Terror” as an adversary of the United States and, through this means, to pursue a decisive 
military defeat of the MILF.   In response, the MILF escalated its attempt to settle the 
conflict through peaceful negotiations.  Addressing the United States directly, the MILF 
professed renunciation of the Abu Sayyaf and JI (admitting previous contacts and non-
formal personal relations with them).99  The MILF also sought the support and involvement 
of the US in the peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF. 100  
The MILF believed that the Malaysian government, which played as host to the talks, could 
not really guarantee implementation of a lasting peaceful settlement, and that only the US 
could and had the incentive to do so.101  By directly approaching the US through these 
diplomatic manoeuvres, the MILF hoped to elude military defeat as well as advance a 
peaceful settlement. 
A clear measure of the relative success of the MILF in resisting counterterrorism 
rhetoric is that it was not officially tagged by the United States as a “terrorist organization”.  
In contrast, the US government designated the Abu Sayyaf and CPP-NPA as “foreign 
terrorist organizations” (FTOs).102  Consistent with MILF strategy, the MILF did not break off 
                                                                 
central Mindanao. Abuza, Balik-Terrorism (n 53) 472.  It was also alleged that Abu Sayyaf leader 
Khadaffy Janjalani and his men disembarked on MILF bases.  Abuza, ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation 
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International Crisis Group, ‘The Phil ippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao’ 
(2008) 10.    
99 Jubair (n 96) 58–62.  
100 MILF chairman Salamat Hashim wrote US President George W Bush on January 20, 2003 
explaining its position as a “national l iberation movement” and “inviti ng and giving you the 
opportunity to assist in resolving this predicament of the Bangsamoro people”. (The letter  and 
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“In view of the current global developments and regional secur ity concerns in Southeast 
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justice to use your good offices in rectifying the error that continues to negate and derogate 
the Bangsamoro People’s fundamental right to seek decolonization under the United Nations 
General  Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960. For this purpose, we are amenable to inviting 
and giving you the opportunity to assist in resolving this predicament of the Bangsamoro 
People.” 
Interviews with MILF officials revealed that Hashim’s letter to Bush was  prompted by President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s scheduled visit to the White House on May 17, 2003. Taya (n 83) 74–75. 
101 Abuza, ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20’ (n 79) 468. 
102 The US Secretary of State designates FTOs under the Anti -Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-132 (1996).  The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was designated as FTO on 
October 8, 1997; while the CPP-NPA on August 9, 2002.  See, United States Department of State, 
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peace negotiations with the Philippine government despite government attacks on its 
camps/positions such as Buliok.103  On the contrary, the MILF skilfully used the peace 
negotiations in order to deflect counterterrorism pressure away from it.  The ceasefire 
between the Philippine government and the MILF came to have a counterterrorism 
function under the rubric of “criminal interdiction”.104  Abuza claims, based on interviews 
with MILF leaders, that some leaders “saw the links to JI as a card to be played at the 
negotiating table, whether vis-à-vis the GRP [Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines] or as a means to get the United States involved in the peace process”.105   
An agreement between the MILF and the Philippine government gave the MILF the 
opportunity to demonstrate its capability and willingness to cooperate on 
counterterrorism.  The May 6, 2002 agreement on the Joint Interdiction of Unlawful 
Elements provided for a means that would allow the MILF and the Philippine military to 
cooperate and coordinate with each other in the “isolation and interdiction” of “lawless 
elements” within territories controlled by the MILF.  Follow ing the Buliok attack, the MILF 
made the implementation of this agreement a “cornerstone of their demands to resume 
the peace talks”.106  In January 2005, pursuant to the agreement, the Ad Hoc Joint Action 
Group (AHJAG) was created.107  During the mandate of the AHJAG, MILF chairman Ebrahim 
Al Haj Murad cooperated with the Philippine military in expelling Abu Sayyaf and JI leaders 
from MILF territory by not retaliating against AFP attacks in June 2005, and moreover, by 
sharing information about the exact location of Abu Sayyaf leader Kadaffy Janjalani.108   
Moreover, as sought by Hashim Salamat in his letter to President G.W. Bush of 
January 20, 2003, the United States did come to have a role in the peace negotiations 
through the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).  To show his interest towards the 
MILF’s overture, in May 2003, President Bush declared during President Arroyo’s state visit 
to the United States that “the United States [would] provide diplomatic and financial 
support to a renewed peace process” if the MILF were to “abandon the path of violence … 
                                                                 
‘Chapter 6 Foreign Terrorist Organizations’ (United States Department Of State 2015) 
<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239413.htm> accessed 28 January 2016.   
103 As in the Buliok attack, the eruption of fighting caused the suspension of formal negotiations, but 
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104 Santos (n 81) 79–80. 
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106 ibid 468. 
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and address its grievances through peaceful negotiations”.109  According to Martin and 
Tuminez, USIP was enlisted instead of an official US government agency to play a 
“facilitating role in the Mindanao peace process ‘in coordination with the Government of 
Malaysia’” because the State Department was initially “unsure of the MILF’s commitment 
to the peace process and wondered whether, at some future time, the group might have to 
be designated as a foreign terrorist organization.”110  An appropriation of $30 million “to 
further prospects of peace in Mindanao” was provided in the Emergency Wartime 
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003.111 USIP received $3 million from this fund.112   
From 2003-2007, the USIP, lacking an official status in the formal negotiations 
between the Philippine government and the MILF, and resisted by the Malaysian 
government that was mediating the talks, worked informally with the Philippine and MILF 
negotiators through workshops and trainings.  Workshops with international experts from 
such places as Canada and Bougainville on the “ancestral domain” issue were intended to 
“bring international knowledge and experience to bear on this key point in GRP -MILF 
negotiations.”113  USIP also worked to influence the media, national politicians, schools, 
NGOs which had been monitoring the ceasefire agreement, and religious leaders, and 
leaders of different Muslim ethnic groups.114   
Prior to the engagement of the USIP, the US had also already been providing the 
Philippine government with “development assistance” targeted at “conflict-affected areas 
of Mindanao”.  Most notably, the US Agency for International Development (USAID)”s 
“Growth with Equity in Mindanao” (GEM) project in the Autonomous Region of Muslim  
Mindanao (ARMM) is intended to bring about peace through infrastructure development 
(ranging from barangay-level road repairs to airport improvements), connecting high 
schools to the internet, and reintegration of former MNLF combatants, among other 
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6.html> accessed 28 January 2016. 
110 G Eugene Martin and Astrid S Tuminez, ‘Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines A Summary 
and Assessment of the USIP Phil ippine Facilitation Project, 2003–2007’ (United States Institute of 
Peace 2008) Special Report 202 4. 
111Public Law 108–11, 117 STAT 559, 575. 
112 In an apparent effort to provide material incentive to get the parties to an agreement, the 
remaining $27 mill ion was earmarked for anticipated “economic development activities in 
Mindanao” should a peace agreement be reached.  However, no peace agreement was reached 
before the expiry of the appropriations in September 2004, and so this amount went to the USAID. 
Martin and Tuminez (n 110) 4. 
113 ibid 6. 
114 ibid 2. 
 80 
operations. US Westpoint instructors Bodnar and Gwinn, calling them “monetary 
ammunition” in a counterinsurgency, remarked that “these sorts of projects most closely 
mirror those often developed and executed by military forces in a counterinsurgency or 
stability environment … similar projects have been and continue to be implemented by 
American forces around the globe.”115 
 
2.4. Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army 
 
The preceding discussion puts the terrorist tagging of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) in perspective.  After packaging the menace 
posed by the Abu Sayyaf as “terrorism”, the Philippine government then attempted to drag 
the MILF into the counterterrorism war against the Abu Sayyaf – a war in which the US 
participates.  The MILF has largely obviated this scenario, in part by involving the US 
instead in peace negotiations.  The situation of the CPP-NPA is different.  The US was 
already heavily invested in the Philippine government’s counterinsurgency war w ith the 
CPP-NPA long before 9/11, and counterterrorism rhetoric against it merely added “another 
thread to this skein of historical continuity”.116 
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was established in December 26, 
1968 and launched guerrilla warfare against the Philippine state in 1969 with the creation 
of the New People’s Army (NPA) under its control and direction.117  In 1973, the CPP led in 
the formation of the National Democratic Front (NDF) as a coalition of clandestine 
organisations opposed to “imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism” and aiming to 
win the majority of the population to seize state power and implement a program of 
reforms called “national democracy with a socialist perspective”.  During the period of 
authoritarian rule under President Ferdinand Marcos lasting from the proclamation of 
Martial Law in 1972 until his downfall in 1986, the CPP-NPA’s armed struggle for national 
democracy presented a viable and radical alternative to a generation of Filipinos deprived 
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of genuine political participation.  Starting with 60 fighters armed with 35 rifles in the 
1970s, it is believed that the NPA grew to a peak of 25,000 fighters in 1986.118  The change 
in government from Marcos to Corazon Aquino in 1986, which saw the return of formal 
democracy and the opening up of political space, caused a split in the CPP-NPA.  Internal 
organisational turmoil, coupled with the downfall of socialist regimes abroad, contributed 
to the CPP-NPA’s spectacular decline in the 1990s.119  In response, Jose Maria Sison, the 
founding chairman of the CPP, led a “rectification movement” within the CPP -NPA which 
claimed credit for reversing this trend, steadily rebuilding the organisation and recapturing 
lost ground.120   
Unlike the Moro rebellion, the communist-led national democratic movement 
gained traction in every region and almost every province of the country. 121  After Martial 
Law was formally lifted in 1981 and during the restoration of civil liberties in the post-
Marcos period, the national democrats’ emphasis on mass base building and “united front” 
work with sections of the elite opposed to Marcos and his successors also meant that the 
national democratic movement developed an above-ground dimension.122  As mentioned 
earlier, legal organisations that share national democratic ideology and program of reforms 
participate in open democratic processes.  They are entitled to field candidates to 
represent them in local and national elections through the party-list groups Bayan Muna, 
Anakpawis, Gabriela and others.    
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2.4.1.  Peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA-NDF in the transition from Marcos to Aquino 
and the United States’ role in “reformed” counterinsurgency 
 
During the period of Martial Law under Marcos (1972-1986), the Philippine 
government’s approach to the CPP-NPA was military-led, while the Philippine military was 
essentially bankrolled by US military assistance.123  In the transition to the post-Marcos 
order, US involvement in Philippine counterinsurgency deepened further.  According to 
Bello,124 the US policy on the Marcos regime in its later years was determined in large part 
by the desire to counter what the US saw as the communist threat to its interests in the 
Philippines.  Starting in 1983,125 sections of the US government, principally the State 
Department, invested in an option of dumping Marcos, seen as ineffective in countering 
the insurgency, in favour of a “Third Force” or “centrist” alternative between Marcos and 
the communists.126  The triumph of this “Third Force” strategy is reflected in US pressure 
coming to bear on the decision of Marcos to declare a snap election, and the eventual US 
backing for Corazon Aquino.   
In the twilight of the Martial Law period, the US government formulated ideas 
about a more effective counterinsurgency strategy against the CPP-NPA.  In 1984, US 
President Ronald Reagan called for an inter-agency review of US policy towards the 
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Philippines that would address the “worsening insurgency situation”. 127  The resulting inter-
agency study recommended reforms pertaining to the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP).128  The chief recommendation is the installation of a “professional, apolitical 
leadership” in the AFP.  Secondly, it called for “improvement in dealing with military 
abuses” which were seen as one of the main reasons driving civilians to the arms of the 
NPA.  Thirdly, the Philippine military had to improve “counter-propaganda” and “civic 
action capabilities”.  The Americans saw socio-economic programs that improved the 
image of government in the eyes of civilians as “a necessary adjunct to military action”, and 
pushed for the integration of socio-economic programs and military operations in 
counterinsurgency.  Fourthly, it also called for the reorientation of the Philippine military’s 
weaponry from high-tech items for external defense towards practical counterinsurgency 
weapons like trucks and field radios.  Finally, it envisioned a more robust US training 
program for Filipino soldiers.129  These ideas did not encompass the resolution of the 
conflict with the CPP-NPA through a negotiated political settlement.  Instead, it was 
premised on continuing war with the CPP-NPA but with added non-military, socio-
economic tools of “counter-propaganda” and “civic action”. 
The US government’s ideas about counterinsurgency found better reception in the 
Aquino government.130  At first, the new President experimented with peace negotiations 
with the CPP-NPA.  President Aquino announced that she was interested in negotiations to 
address “the roots of the insurgency” which she identified as “the economic conditions of 
the people and the social structures that oppress them”.131  For this purpose, she also 
ordered the release of imprisoned leaders of the CPP including Jose Maria Sison 
(imprisoned since 1977).  The government initiated a dialogue with the NDF, which 
represented the CPP-NPA.  By December 1986, a 60-day ceasefire was agreed upon.132  But 
sections of the US government, particularly the Pentagon, were unconvinced with peace 
negotiations.  US Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage remarked , “As a general 
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proposition, we support any program that would reduce bloodshed” but “at the end of the 
day, military action will be required to defeat the insurgency.”133  They continued to push 
for the new kind of counterinsurgency strategy that they have been selling to Marcos in 
which military offensives were integrated with socio-economic programs.  In what Bello 
called the Pentagon’s “strongest attack yet on the government’s peace efforts”, 134 
Armitage opined: 
“As with the Marcos regime before, the Aquino government has also regrettably failed 
to develop a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan that integrates military, political, 
economic and social programs.  Marcos erroneously relied exclusively on military 
action.  Some members of the Aquino administration believe that they can rely almost 
exclusively on symbolic political acts to cure the insurgency.  They continue to cling to 
the forlorn hope that the insurgents will fade from the scene and that coordinated civil 
and military action will not be necessary.”135 
 
Peace talks with the CPP-NPA collapsed in January 1987 after the NDF withdrew from talks 
following the killing by government forces of unarmed peasants demonstrating for land 
reform near the presidential palace.  Thereafter, the government resumed the 
counterinsurgency war, with the US playing direct roles.  The new counterinsurgency 
approach adopted features that a US inter-agency group has recommended since 1985, 
particularly, the emphasis on civic action, propaganda and psychological warfare; US 
training of Philippine military personnel; and US assistance in battlefield communications 
and logistics.      
There was also a parallelism between the periods of the Corazon Aquino and Gloria 
Arroyo administrations in terms of patterns of human rights violations.  The Aquino 
administration exhibited contradictory tendencies.  To repudiate authoritarianism, Aquino 
“linked up with [the] international human rights regime”, signing the country onto most UN 
                                                                 
133 Richard Armitage, ‘Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’ (3 June 1986) 10.  
134Bello (n 123) 73.  Jetschke also reports that there was reason to doubt the Aquino government’s 
commitment to a negotiated solution to the conflict with the CPP-NPA. “In July 1986, members of 
Aquino’s cabinet met with Robert Gates, the United States deputy director of central intell igence, to 
get moral and military support from the United States for a planned counterinsurgency campaign 
against the NPA.  At this meeting Aquino emphasized that she preferred a military option to 
negotiations.  Those at the meeting developed a consensus that, unlike the Communist Party of the 
Philippines, the NPA was a military problem that needed to be tackled by military means. … Aquino 
agreed with the thrust of the Gates briefing. ‘By integrating political, economic and civic action and 
military policies into an overall  counterinsurgency strategy, inroads could be made in stopping 
CPP/NPA growth and later reducing the size of the insurgent numbers by consciously targeting 
certain groups to be weaned away.’ The Philippine military was united in its stanc e against 
negotiations.” Jetschke (n 6) 179.  
135 Richard Armitage, ‘Statement before House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs’ (17 March 
1987) 9. 
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human rights instruments and creating the Commission on Human Rights.136  But human 
rights violations also soared, making the country a flashpoint for international human rights 
organisations.  The violations that attracted the most attention were those committed in 
the context of counterinsurgency against the CPP-NPA.  In particular, the government’s 
employment of “vigilante groups” in counterinsurgency and their barbaric conduct towards 
civilians were condemned.137  The “vigilantes” were anti-communist religious cults that 
engaged in macabre methods of violence, which included cannibalism, to strike fear in the 
hearts of communists and their sympathisers.138  Reflecting the influence of the US doctrine 
of “low intensity conflict”, the Armed Forces of the Philippines under Corazon Aquino 
developed the “AFP Broad Front Strategy”, which proposed to target the “mass base 
support systems” of the CPP-NPA instead of NPA regular combatants.  The CPP-NPA’s mass 
base, explained an AFP official, “gives the CPP/NPA force maximum freedom of movement 
and limits severely government initiatives”.139  Thus, the AFP’s battalions were proposed to 
be broken up into smaller groups to occupy NPA-controlled villages and convert them into 
government-loyal areas.   In practice, confronting the CPP-NPA’s mass base involved 
mobilisation of “vigilante groups”, which often targeted members of legal, cause-oriented 
organisations.140 
 
2.4.2. From peace negotiations under Ramos to Arroyo’s alignment with the “War on 
Terror”  
 
Peace negotiations did not resume until 1992, when the Ramos administration 
announced a policy of “national reconciliation”.  The policy featured the repeal of the Anti -
Subversion Law (hence making membership in the CPP no longer illegal.  Before Ramos’ 
term ended, the negotiating parties also concluded a Comprehensive Agreement on 
Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), the first of four 
                                                                 
136 Jetschke (n 6) 172.  Attention was laid on some two hundred “vigilante groups” formed 
nationwide.  
137 Amnesty International, ‘Phil ippines : Unlawful Killings by Military and Paramilitary Forces’ 
(Amnesty International 1988). 
138 Jetschke (n 6) 171–198; David Kowalewski, ‘Vigilante Counterinsurgency and Human Rights in the 
Philippines: A Statistical Analysis’ (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly 246-264; Amnesty International 
(n 137); McCoy (n 5) 433–451. 
139 McCoy (n 5) 239. 
140 ibid 440. 
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substantive items that the parties identified as the agenda of the talks. 141  Although the 
succeeding president Estrada signed the CARHRIHL in August 1998, he subsequently 
reverted to a policy of “all-out war” against the CPP-NPA, as with the MILF.  After Estrada’s 
ouster, President Arroyo briefly held formal talks with the NDF in April and June 2001, but 
changed tack after 9/11.142  
As mentioned above, President Bush’s search for allies in his “War on Terror” 
opened material and political opportunities for President Arroyo.  US military aid to the 
Philippines had flattened following the Philippine Senate’s decision to reject a treaty 
extending the lease for American military bases in the Philippines in 1992.143  Between 
1994 and 1998, the average amount of US military aid was only USD 1.6 million per annum.  
However, in 2001 Arroyo negotiated a package of USD 4.6 billion projected aid to rearm the 
Philippine military for a “robust defence partnership into the 21st century”.  $520 million of 
this military aid package was actually delivered in the course of seven years (2002-2009).  
The US also directed $260 million in US development to Muslim Mindanao.144  The infusion 
of money into the military undoubtedly meant that Arroyo could strengthen her 
relationship with the military, the institution from which she sought support to bolster her 
shaky, increasingly unpopular administration.145   
 
2.4.3. United States’ terrorist designation of the CPP-NPA 
 
The advent of the US’ “War on Terror” also ushered in dramatic consequences for 
the counterinsurgency war with the CPP-NPA, including the reframing of the CPP-NPA as a 
“terrorist organization”.  The US led this development on the international front.  In August 
2002, shortly after his visit to the Philippines, US Secretary of State Collin Powell 
                                                                 
141 From 1995-1998, talks under the Ramos administration produced nine procedural accords, 
including the four-point agenda of the talks, as well as the CARHRIHL.  The other items in the agenda 
are: socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, and disposition of forces and 
cessation of hostil ities. Two more supplemental agreements were reached in 2001. National 
Democratic Front of the Philippines International Information Office, ‘Chronology of the Peace 
Negotiations between the GRP and the NDFP: 1988-2006’ <http://www.ndfp.org/chronology-of-the-
peace-negotiations-between-the-grp-and-the-ndfp-1988-2006/> accessed 4 January 2016. 
142 Public Interest Law Center, ‘Laws, Labels, Liberation: The Case of Jose Maria Sison’ (2004) 6 –7 
<http://www.josemariasison.org/legalcases/related/LLL_jmscase_290504.html> accessed 5 May 
2015.  
143 Philip Shenon, ‘Phil ippine Senate Votes to Reject U.S. Bases Renewal’ The New York Times (16 
September 1991) <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/16/world/philippine-senate-votes-to-reject-
us-base-renewal.html> accessed 4 February 2016. 
144 McCoy (n 5) 511. 
145 ibid. 
 87 
announced the designation of the “Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army 
(CPP/NPA)” as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO) under the terms of the 1996 Anti -
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).146  Jose Maria Sison, who had been 
negotiating for the NDF side, was also tagged as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” 
three days thereafter on the basis of belief that he leads the CPP-NPA.  Thus, the CPP-NPA 
was officially classed as a terrorist organisation alongside the Abu Sayyaf, which had 
already been tagged as an FTO in 1997.147   The government of the Netherlands, where the 
NDF negotiating panel was based, followed suit by placing the NPA and Sison in its terrorist 
blacklist on August 13, 2002. The Council of the European Union, as well as governments of 
the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia also designated the NPA and Sison as terrorists 
days later. 148  These listings did not merely follow the directive of the UN Security Council 
in its listing of entities linked to Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, as the NPA and 
Sison were not in the later list.149  Rather, these were their own initiatives in compliance 
with the provision of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 to freeze the assets of 
“terrorists”.        
The designations were more than symbolic acts.  In addition to being a show of 
support to the Philippine government in the diplomatic realm, they had fatal 
consequences.  The Philippine military updated its rhetoric by referring to the CPP-NPA not 
merely as “communist insurgents” but also as “communist terrorists”.  More importantly, 
the international designations of the CPP and/or NPA, as well as Sison, as “terrorists” 
helped the Philippine government’s campaign to recast the entire national democratic 
movement – not merely the CPP-NPA but also an array of open, legal mass organisations 
which compose its organised mass base - as a kind of terrorist network.  At the time of the 
designations by these Western governments in 2002, the Philippines had not enacted an 
anti-terrorism law, and therefore the Philippine government lacked a legal basis for making 
a similar move.  Moreover, membership in the CPP had ceased to be illegal on September 
                                                                 
146 Pub L. No. 104-132 (1996).  The AEDPA was a response to the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995. 
Ironically, despite the bombing having been committed by an American citizen, AEDPA was directed 
at “foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs).  The act empowered the Secretary of State to designate 
any entity in a l ist of FTOs defined as: (1) any foreign organisation; (2) that engages in any terrorist 
activity; (3) where such activity threatens the security of US nationals or the national security of the 
United States. “National security” was defined as “the national defense, foreign relations, or 
economic interests of the United States”.  Designation as FTO results in: (1) seizure of as sets of the 
organisation; and (2) criminalisation of the provision of “material support or resources” by any 
person to that organisation. 
147 United States Department of State (n 102). 
148 Public Interest Law Center (n 142) 19. 
149 UNSC 1267 (15 October 1999) S/RES/1267. 
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22, 1992 upon the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law by Congress during the Ramos 
administration.  The foreign designations gave the impression that Arroyo had international 
normative support (as it were, in lieu of domestic law) – the new international norms 
against terrorism – to justify (at least to international audiences) cracking down on groups 
or individuals that supported or were “linked” to the CPP-NPA.   
Aquino therefore focused her attention on exposing “guerrilla-linked groups”, 
justifying this in terms of the need to cut down the NPA’s source of funding. 150   The 
military alleged that party list groups Bayan Muna, Gabriela and Anakpawis were 
channelling their congressional allowances to the CPP-NPA.151  Other well-known NGOs 
were also subjected to the same allegations of financing, as well as supporting, “terrorists” 
through political propaganda and other activities.152  “Given the prescriptions of the 
international terrorism financing convention,” Jetschke argues, “this claim was based on 
accepted norms.”153  Under the prism of international anti-terrorism norms, otherwise legal 
activities of legal organisations assumed an illegal colouring.  Human rights organisation 
and their work of documenting violations were not spared.  Arroyo warned, "We shall not 
relent in the fight against terrorists and criminals hiding behind the veil of human rights 
advocacies or other seemingly deceptively legitimate political advocacies." 154   As we have 
seen in the opening discussion of the extrajudicial killings of leftist activists from 2001-
2006, this new way of approaching previously legitimate organisations and their activities 
and the prescription for their “neutralisation” explains the wave of violence that ensued.   
Thus, as with the period of transition to a post-Marcos order, the ascendancy of 
counterinsurgency thinking within the Philippines in the Arroyo government was not simply 
a fortuitous event.  It was enabled by US support, both normative and material.  In 1987, 
when peace talks collapsed under Corazon Aquino’s watch, the ensuing counterinsurgency 
campaign was underpinned not only by US military aid but also by US thinking on “low 
intensity conflict”.  Similarly, the brief peace talks in 2001 under Gloria Arroyo came to a 
sudden halt because the “War on Terror” made the counterinsurgency campaign that 
replaced peace talks materially attractive and normatively plausible.   
 
                                                                 
150 Jetschke (n 6) 250. 
151 ibid. 
152 ibid. 
153 ibid. 
154 Aurea Calica and Marichu Villanueva, ‘US: GI Medic Might Have Saved Abu Suspect’s Life’ 
Philippine Star (30 July 2002) <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/170134/us -gi-medic-might-have-
saved-abu-suspect’s-l ife> accessed 4 February 2016. 
 89 
3.  Recapitulation and Tasks Ahead 
 
This chapter examined the local meaning of “counterterrorism” in the Philippines 
by recovering some of the political and historical context that is erased when it is assumed 
that counterterrorism is a uniform universal phenomenon.  As I have shown, following the 
constructivist argument of Jetschke, counterterrorism in the Philippines was not an 
unavoidable necessity, i.e., a necessary response to terrorism.  Rather, it is a contingency 
that was consciously chosen for its material and political advantages to the state.  The 
Philippine government also sought to overlay counterterrorism rhetoric on pre -existing 
counterinsurgency.  While espousing the new counterterrorism discourse, the government 
continued to pursue old counterinsurgency goals with the increased resources afforded by 
partnership with the United States.  The decisions to frame the criminal gang Abu Sayyaf as 
terrorists and then to dub the MILF and other associated Muslim groups as terrorist 
networks, along with the CPP-NPA and ideologically aligned legal mass organisations, were 
increasingly implausible.  The differing American investments in counterinsurgency or 
peace negotiations against the MILF and CPP-NPA also proved to be a decisive factor in the 
fates of these organisations. 
This chapter forms the background to the discussion in succeeding chapters on 
human rights advocates’ engagement with the ‘War on Terror’ in the Philippines. As will be 
argued, each expansion of the counterterrorism frame to cover the Abu Sayyaf, MILF and 
CPP-NPA caused or threatened serious human rights violations, to which advocates 
responded with a variety of strategies.  The following two chapters critically examine 
instructive examples of these strategies. 
How did counterterrorism and human rights interact with each other in the 
Philippines? Did human rights serve as a constraint on counterterrorism policies and 
practice?  Did human rights language facilitate or inhibit human rights violations 
perpetrated in the name of counterterrorism?  What impact did greater recognition of the 
need to respect the rule of law and human rights have counterterrorism (or state security) 
practices? 
In the next two chapters, I explore these questions by examining four interrelated 
human rights campaigns addressing the impact of the “War on Terror” in the Philippines.  
The four campaigns are:  
(1) the campaign against joint US-Philippine military exercises in Basilan;  
(2) the campaign to expose the truth about “mysterious bombings” in Mindanao;  
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(3) the campaign to get CPP founder Jose Maria Sison off the terrorist blacklist of 
the Council of the European Union; and   
(4)  the campaign against extrajudicial killings and disappearances of legal left-wing 
activists.   
In these four campaigns, local human rights organisations and advocates and their 
international supporters played key roles in making issues out of counterterrorism 
practices of the Philippine government and its foreign allies.  In 2001, Arroyo allowed the 
presence of US troops in Basilan, an island province in Western Mindanao, in the name of 
counterterrorist cooperation against the Abu Sayyaf group. Hence, in the campaign against 
joint US-Philippine military exercises Basilan, campaigners addressed the question of 
whether the Abu Sayyaf were terrorists.  In the period from April 2002 to February 2005, a 
series of bombings hit different parts of Mindanao (as well as Manila) in rapid succession.  
The government claimed these bombings illustrated the threat of terrorism not only from 
the Abu Sayyaf but also from the MILF.  Campaigners in Mindanao reframed these 
bombings as “mysterious” and criticised government’s move to blame some of the 
bombing incidents on the MILF as unfounded.  In October 2002, following US and Dutch 
listings, the Council European Union put the NPA and Jose Maria Sison in its own terrorist 
blacklist, greatly aiding the Philippine government in its counterinsurgency.  Lawyers led a 
legal campaign to take Sison (though not the NPA) off the EU list, on the ground that no 
evidence existed that Sison committed any terrorist, indeed any criminal, offense.  Starting 
in 2001, as related above, extrajudicial killings as well as disappearances of leaders and 
members of left-wing legal organisations increased during the period of Arroyo’s alignment 
with the US-led “War on Terror”.  Human rights organisations campaigned to stop the 
killings. 
I describe and analyse these four campaigns and their outcomes.  The first three 
aforementioned campaigns are grouped together and discussed in Chapter 3.   In Chapter 
4, I discuss the campaign against extrajudicial killings and disappearances of legal left-wing 
activists and its impact on Philippine policy.  In considering each campaign, I look for both 
transformative and preservative tendencies.  I focus on their specific goals, and the content 
of the arguments campaigners raise, ascertaining where they lay the blame for human 
rights violations, and if and how they try to accommodate the legitimacy of 
counterterrorism.  I am also interested in discovering discrepancies in patterns of 
engagement with counterterrorism among Filipino actors and mainstream international 
human rights actors. 
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Chapter 3 
Promoting Human Rights While Rejecting Counterterrorism: Three Filipino Campaigns  
 
This chapter examines local human rights advocates’ views and initiatives on 
counterterrorism in the Philippines, and asks to what extent the discourse of human rights -
compliant counterterrorism resonates with them.  If local advocates’ strategies of resisting 
abuses in the name of counterterrorism are different from the strategy adopted by 
international human rights advocates, then we can establish two propositions.  First, 
developing the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism is not the only way 
to advance human rights to resist the abuses in the “War on Terror”.  Second, the 
ascendance of the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism may be silencing 
rather than aiding local human rights advocates.   
I show below that as much as local advocates have documented and exposed 
violations of individual rights, they resisted the move of the Philippine government and 
supportive foreign governments to frame the Abu Sayyaf, MILF and CPP-NPA as “terrorist” 
threats.  In other words, instead of “countering terrorism while respecting human rights” 
which was the slogan of UN-level advocates, Philippine advocates rejected 
“counterterrorism”.  They saw this critique as part of their efforts to stem the deterioration 
of the human rights situation.  That is to say, they resisted escalating military operations by 
undermining the government’s justification for these operations, that is, that the Abu 
Sayyaf, MILF and CPP-NPA posed a terrorist threat.  While the discourse of human rights-
compliant counterterrorism contributes to the advancement of the global counterterrorism 
agenda by improving it, the thrust of Filipino campaigning strategies is to oppose this 
agenda’s extension to the Philippines.  In this sense, Filipino strategies and the discourse of 
human rights-compliant counterterrorism worked at cross purposes.      
 
1. The Campaign to Oppose Joint Military Exercises in Basilan 
 
Human rights arguments formed an important component of efforts to oppose the 
“War on Terror” in the Philippines.  These arguments articulated what was wrong with the 
“War on Terror” when other arguments based on sovereignty and non-intervention failed.  
However, human rights arguments by themselves did not rebut the claim that it was 
necessary to confront the Abu Sayyaf through military means.  Hence, resistance to the 
“War on Terror” also necessitated showing that the government’s approach to the Abu 
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Sayyaf did not work or was ineffective.  The Abu Sayyaf were literally being aided by 
elements of the Philippine military and high government officials.  They profited from the 
continued existence of the Abu Sayyaf, and hence, government efforts to quell the Abu 
Sayyaf threat was not serious.  Instead of promoting a convergence between human rights 
and counterterrorism, human rights advocates continued to oppose the “War on Terror”, 
employing human rights arguments side by side with sceptical arguments against the 
counterterrorism project.  The debate in Basilan and later in Mindanao echoed the debate 
between human rights and counterterrorism on the international plane.  However, the 
result was quite different as the debate in the Philippines did not produce  concordance.  
 
1.1. Failure of sovereignty arguments before the Supreme Court 
The arrival of American troops in southwestern Mindanao in 2001 was 
controversial in the Philippines.  The controversy initially revolved around questions of 
sovereignty rather than lack of compliance with human rights.  A provision in the 1987 
Philippine Constitution, which had been adopted after the ouster of the Marcos regime in 
1986, prohibited the presence of “foreign military bases, troops and facilities” unless 
covered by a treaty between the Philippines and another state.  Moreover, the 
Constitutional provision prescribed a treaty which was recognised as such by the other 
contracting party.1  In September 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected a proposed 
extension of permission for American military bases to remain on Philippine soil.  But in 
May 1999, the Philippine Senate ratified the Republic of the Philippines-United States 
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which allowed and governed the conduct of visiting US 
troops.  The US regarded the VFA as an executive agreement not requiring US Senate 
ratification.  In 2000, nationalists invoked Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Philippine 
Constitution in an attempt to invalidate the VFA for having failed to pass the constitutional 
requirement.2  A dissenting Supreme Court justice decried the VFA as a “slur to our 
                                                                 
1 Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: “After the expiration in 1991 of the 
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning 
Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facil ities shall not be allowed in the Philippines 
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified 
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and 
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.”  According to the Philippine Supreme Court, 
this provision “betray[s] a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence, or of foreign 
influence in general.  Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of 
direct exception.” Lim v Executive Secretary [2002] Phil ippine Supreme Court G.R. No. 151445.  
2 BAYAN v Zamora [2000] Phil ippine Supreme Court G.R. No. 138570. 
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sovereignty”3 because the US Senate did not ratify it as a treaty.  Moreover, the VFA sought 
to extend the same privileges, such as immunity from suit in Philippine criminal courts, to 
visiting personnel of US armed forces that were extended to Americans under the infamous 
1947 Military Bases Agreement.  Nevertheless, the Philippine Supreme Court did not 
invalidate the VFA.4  
Despite the VFA, nationalists returned to the Supreme Court in 2001 to seek a halt 
of the deployment of US troops in Mindanao under the aegis of “joint military exercises” 
dubbed “Balikatan 02-1”.5  Balikatan 02-1 “war games” entailed the entry of US troops in 
the island of Basilan, the site of Philippine military operations against the Abu Sayyaf, 
hence a real combat zone.  Lawyers argued that Balikatan 02-1 in Basilan island was not 
simply a “military exercise”, war games or combined training operations within the purview 
of the VFA, and were thus “treaty-less” and constitutionally disallowed.6  Rather, it was an 
actual “rescue and combat operation” given that authorities announced that the goal was 
to rescue hostages of the Abu Sayyaf and that American soldiers were to accompany 
Filipino troops in combat with the Abu Sayyaf and may fire back when attacked. 7  “The 
Balikatan exercise allows a foreign military power to interfere in the protection of the 
Philippines’ internal security,” said one of the petitions.8  However, this legal effort proved 
insufficient.  The Supreme Court did not invalidate the decision to allow a US troop 
presence in Mindanao.  Though the court agreed with the petitioners that “US forces are 
prohibited from engaging in an offensive war in the Philippines”, it held that no direct 
evidence was provided as to what was actually happening on the ground and what the 
American troops were actually doing there.  The court refused to conclude that the “Terms 
of Reference” governing the conduct of US troops under the Balikatan exercises had been 
breached.9  In any case, the court said this question of fact was not properly addressed to 
the Supreme Court, which could only review questions of laws.   
                                                                 
3 Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno, ibid. 
4 ibid.  
5 Delon Porcalla, ‘SC Asked to Stop “Balikatan” Games’ Philippine Star (2 February 2002) 
<http://www.philstar.com/headlines/149153/sc-asked-stop-‘balikatan’-games> accessed 4 February 
2016. 
6 Indybay, ‘Text of High Court Pleading Re: VFA, Balikatan’ 
<https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2002/01/27/1146051.php> accessed 30 December 2015 
(petition of BAYAN). 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid. 
9 The “Terms of Reference” provided that “US participants shall  not engage in combat, without 
prejudice to their right of self-defense” (I.8) and “At no time shall  US Forces operate independently 
within RP territory.” (II. 1.b.) See, Lim v. Executive Secretary (n 1) 2–3. 
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1.2.  Human rights violations 
On May 27, 2001, the Abu Sayyaf kidnapped foreign and Filipino guests at the Dos 
Palmas resort in Palawan.  The military pursued the kidnappers into their hideouts in 
Basilan.  In June 2001, the military laid siege on Lamitan town in Basilan but still failed to 
apprehend the kidnappers.  In embarrassment, President Arroyo declared a “state of 
lawlessness” in the island of Basilan.  Up to eleven battalions of the Philippine military were 
deployed, dominating the small island province.  The military placed numerous checkpoints 
along the only road that connected Basilan’s towns to each other.  On July 13, 2001, the 
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to arrest 
of “all members of the Abu Sayyaf Group, their conspirators, associates and agents”.  
Arrests were made on the strength of this blanket authority.10     
The heavy handed manner by which arrests were made alarmed the regional office 
of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).  According to the report of the said CHR office, 
raids were conducted in Barangay Tabuk on July 13, 2001 at dawn while the villagers were 
still sleeping.  Soldiers wearing bonnets barged into homes and made use of masked 
informers to identify suspects.  All the male residents of the barangay were collected 
together.  Then, informers whose faces were covered pointed out who were the persons 
they regarded as Abu Sayyaf members or sympathisers.  The ones singled out were 
“immediately arrested, hogtied and blindfolded”.  The military also searched their houses.  
Although some of villagers insisted to be shown arrest or search warrants, none was shown 
to them.11  The CHR regional found these actuations to be “blatant human rights violations” 
and condemned the illegality of the raids.  It recommended the filing of criminal charges 
against the military for warrantless arrests and physical injuries.   
The human rights organisation Karapatan also conducted its own fact-finding 
mission on the situation in Basilan on September 2001.  Its report featured cases of “brutal 
killings” and torture of suspected Abu Sayyaf.12 From the testimony of relatives, ten 
                                                                 
10 Department of Justice, Memorandum Circular No. 40 (July 13, 2001). Karapatan, ‘Basilan Under 
Seige: Report of the Fact-Finding on Human Rights Violations, Relief and Medical Mission, 
September 9-16, 2001, Basilan Province, Mindanao, Philippines’ (2001) 4.  The DOJ Memorandum of 
July 13, 2001 signed by Secretary Hernando Perez authorised arrests based on “verified 
information”, a lower standard than that required by Rule 13, Section 5 of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure which allowed warrantless arrests based on “personal knowledge” of the commission of a 
crime.  Amnesty International, ‘Torture Persists: Appearance and Rea l ity within the Criminal Justice 
System (Philippines)’ (Amnesty International 2003) ASA 35/001/2003 56.  
11 International Peace Mission, Basilan: The Next Afghanistan?: Report of the International Peace 
Mission to Basilan, 23-27 March 2002 (Akbayan Citizens Action Party 2002) 19.  
12 Karapatan (n 10) 5, 10, 12.  
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persons were reported to have died at the hands of the military and the paramilitary 
Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) in the course of the military operation in 
Basilan.  Moreover, they were brutally killed, since the bodies were found mutilated or 
showed signs of physical torture.  For example, Banodin Ujajon, 45 years old, was found 
beheaded a month after being picked up by CAFGUs along with his two sons.  The CAFGUs 
accuse his family of being Abu Sayyaf sympathisers.  Banodin’s son Al-Ikram believes his 
father’s beheading was a “retaliation” for the beheadings committed by the Abu Sayyaf.13  
The Karapatan fact-finding team visited 25 detainees held at the Basilan Provincial Jail on 
suspicion that they were Abu Sayyaf.  It reported that all of them were tortured, 
documenting the same with written statements and pictures.14 
Campaigners against US troops in Mindanao followed up on the findings of the CHR 
and Karapatan.  As legal arguments that US military presence in Mindanao to counter the 
Abu Sayyaf constituted an unconstitutional foreign military intervention proved insufficient 
to prevent the deployment of US troops to Mindanao, protest efforts turned to 
documenting the realities on the ground.  It was in this context that campaigners turned to 
human rights arguments to advance the goal of opposing the “War on Terror” in Mindanao.  
The networks of Akbayan and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),15 who have 
challenged the VFA and Balikatan 02-1 in the Supreme Court, were soon mobil izing local 
human rights organisations and international activists to document and report on the 
impact of Balikatan 02-1 in Basilan in terms of rights violations.  Two international fact-
finding missions were launched in March and July 2002 in Basilan.  The International Peace 
Mission launched in March 2002 trumpeted Basilan as the “prototype of impending US 
operations in its ‘global war against terrorism’” and aimed first, “to look into officially 
denied reports of civilian casualties, arbitrary arrests, and displacements of affected 
civilians” and second, “to evaluate the conduct of the joint US and Philippine military 
exercises as well as its possible ramifications on the Moro separatist struggle”.16  The 
                                                                 
13 ibid 11.  
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peasants, workers, and other marginalised sectors.  They also have rival human rights organisations 
associated with them.  The human rights organisation Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of 
People’s Rights) is associated with BAYAN, while the Philippine All iance of Human Rights Advocates 
(PAHRA) is associated with Akbayan.   
16 International Peace Mission (n 11) 6.  The International Peace Mission of March 2002 included 
prominent international anti -war activists who had earlier intended to launch a fact-finding mission 
to Afghanistan, but instead chose to investigate the conditions in Basilan. Leading the mission wer e 
Matti Wouri, former chairman of Greenpeace International and a Member of the European 
Parliament; Lee Rhiannon, a leader of the Australian Greens and a member of the Legislative Council  
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mission of July 2002 was called “International Solidarity Mission against US Armed 
Intervention in the Philippines” signalling a continuing focus on asserting Philippine 
sovereignty.17  Nevertheless, this latter mission also identified observance of human rights 
and international humanitarian law and the impact on peace negotiations as areas of 
concern.18 
When the International Peace Mission arrived in Basilan in March 2002, the 
number of detainees held at the provincial jail on suspicion of being Abu Sayyaf 
members had increased.  Of 113 detainees, 62 claimed they had been arrested without 
warrants and had been held for months without being charged.19  Many detainees also 
alleged that they had been tortured into confessions that they were Abu Sayyaf.20  The 
International Solidarity Mission (ISM) of July 2002 underscored that aggressive raids on 
communities suspected of supporting the Abu Sayyaf had continued following the start 
of US troop involvement, which began in January 2002.21  A case that was highlighted up 
by national and international media was that of Buyong Buyong Isnijal, a farmer who 
was allegedly shot in the thigh by an African-American soldier in the course of a raid on 
his house in Barangay Canas in Tuburan town.22  The wife and mother of Isnijal gave 
testimony to the mission that a composite team of Filipino and American soldiers raided 
their house on July 25, 2002, that his captors took the wounded Isnijal to the hospital, 
but thereafter, left the family uninformed about his exact whereabouts.23  In a 
subsequent CHR investigation, it was established that the American soldier was a certain 
Sgt. Reggie Lane, who was identified by a hospital doctor among 15 Filipino and 3 
American soldiers who brought Isnijal to the Lamitan district hospital.24  The witnesses 
who spoke to the ISM also reported that the raids had been preceded by “US spyplanes 
                                                                 
of New South Wales; and Pierre Rousset, a leader of the European Uni ted Left and a Member of the 
European Parliament. 
17 International Solidarity Mission Against U.S. Armed Intervention in the Philippines, July 24 -31, 
2002, ‘Statement’ <http://www.yonip.com/statement-of-the-international-solidary-mission-ism-
against-u-s-armed-intervention-in-the-philippines/> accessed 4 January 2016. 
18 ibid. 
19 International Peace Mission (n 11) 17. 
20 ibid. 
21 International Solidarity Mission Against U.S. Armed Intervention in the Philippines, July 24 -31, 
2002 (n 17). 
22 Julie Alipala, ‘US Combat Role Reported First in 2002’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (29 August 2009) 
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20090829-222542/US-combat-role-
reported-first-in-2002> accessed 10 March 2015. 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid. 
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circling overhead for hours”, showing active provision of intelligence support to the 
raiding team.25 
In condemning the arrests as arbitrary, the missions gave credence to the 
allegation that many if not most of those arrested had been simple folk rather than 
members of the Abu Sayyaf.  The “Free the Basilan 73” campaign, which grew out of the 
fact-finding mission of 2001, pressed for the release of 73 of the 75 local residents arrested 
in the course of 2001 and charged with kidnapping.26  Campaigners argued that the 73 
were plain civilians.  Some of them could even prove that they or their relatives were in 
fact victims of the Abu Sayyaf’s criminal activities.27  The IPM report suggested that among 
those arrested as Abu Sayyaf were victims of local internal quarrels who had nothing to do 
with terrorism. By relying on finger-pointing hooded informers,  
 
“the military only allowed itself to be used – wittingly or unwittingly – for personal 
vendetta by warring powers in the province.  Instead of taking their revenge 
personally, these elements would simply inform the military that their personal 
enemies have links to the Abu Sayyaf and these enemies would eventually be arrested 
without proper charges.” 28   
 
The Karapatan report also argued that the “bounty system” of government advertised 
monetary rewards for the capture of Abu Sayyaf, had in certain cases motivated informers 
to denounce innocent individuals.29   
Campaigners also documented substantial displacement of communities due to the 
human rights consequences of military operations.  On an island of only 61,546 households, 
the government’s Department of Social Welfare and Development reported that 13,421 
                                                                 
25 International Solidarity Mission Against U.S. Armed Intervention in the Philippines, July 24-31, 
2002 (n 17). 
26 Kawagib, ‘Kawagib Moro Human Rights Calls for the Release of Basilan Detainees’ MindaNews (23 
July 2008) 
<http://minda2010.timonera.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4783:kawagib -
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accessed 5 February 2016; Lyn V Ramo, ‘After Ramadan 11 behind Prison Bars, Basilan 73 Cry for 
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27 Amirah Lidasan, a leader of the Moro-Christian Peoples’ All iance (MCPA) and a campaigner of the 
“Free the Basilan 73” campaign said that in choosing whom to include in their campaign, they 
intentionally avoided known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.  For example, Hector Janjalani who was 
captured earlier and held in Camp Bagong Diwa in Manila to which the Basilan 73 were eventually 
transferred was not included.  E-mail from Amirah Lidasan to author (March 12, 2015). 
28 International Peace Mission (n 11) 18. 
29 Karapatan (n 10) 14. 
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families were displaced by the military operations against the Abu Sayyaf.30  Karapatan 
charged that “mass displacement has become a standard consequence of military 
operations”; that looting by soldiers sometimes occurred on the evacuated properties; that 
evacuees were forced to stay with relatives or in evacuation centres for extended periods, 
causing hardship; and that schools had been interrupted by the conversion of school 
buildings into evacuation centres or military accommodation facilities.31     
 
1.3.  Limitations of human rights arguments 
So far we have seen that exposing the human rights conditions in Basilan assumed 
crucial importance to the campaign to oppose the “War on Terror” in the Philippines after 
the Supreme Court ruled against the constitutional challenge to American troop 
deployment.  Human rights arguments that civilians bore the brunt of the military 
operations against the Abu Sayyaf tended to reveal that the “militaristic approach” to the 
Abu Sayyaf took a heavy toll on civilian life.  This focus on the human rights consequences 
of the “War on Terror” helped strengthen resistance efforts, albeit in the realm of political 
debate.  However, this arena was also fraught with difficulties. 
First, human rights arguments did not by themselves rebut the necessity to 
confront the Abu Sayyaf, whose atrocities were all too well known.  Indeed, the Abu Sayyaf 
had committed such atrocious human rights violations against civilians, including in Basilan, 
that focusing on violations by the Philippine and US military who vigorously pursued them 
risked being perceived as misplaced or biased.  Hence, President Arroyo criticised the 
International Peace Mission for not looking into Abu Sayyaf violations as well.32  So long as 
President Arroyo could maintain a reputation for fierceness against the Abu Sayyaf, critics 
of the military’s human rights record in Basilan could be dismissed as naïve or even worse, 
as “Abu Sayyaf lovers”.33 
Moreover, the design of American troop involvement in military counterterrorism 
operations in Mindanao presented a challenge to campaigners.  There was evidence that 
                                                                 
30 ibid 8. 
31 ibid 9–10. 
32 At the public hearing of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Human Rights which was 
made to coincide with the second day of the IPM, alleged victims of the Abu Sayyaf presented 
themselves to the committee and “insisted on speaking, crowding out the witnesses [to violations by 
the military] whose narrations the [representatives] sought out in the first place. International Peace 
Mission (n 11) 10.  
33 BBC World Service, ‘Arroyo Calls US Critics “Terrorist Lovers”’ BBC News (8 February 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1809222.stm> accessed 4 January 2016. 
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American troops participated in actual combat operations, but it was difficult to connect to 
specific abuses.34  The Americans planned their involvement to have “low visibility” as well 
as “sustainability”.35 This was necessary as the US considered the “War on Terror” to be 
temporally open-ended.  In contrast to Afghanistan and Iraq, where Americans deployed 
large occupation forces, in Basilan the US employed an “indirect approach” 36 that 
emphasised the need to operate through “indigenous armed forces”, i.e., the Philippine 
military, and to work through the local population to isolate and defeat “common 
enemies”, i.e., the Abu Sayyaf.37  The key point is that the “political acceptability” of 
American military involvement in the country, particularly in the eyes of its “moderate 
Muslim community”,38 was already factored into the calculation of its success.  Thus, while 
American soldiers were aware that they were engaging in war in the Philippines, they 
sought to play background role from behind the frontline.  As the controversial Terms of 
Reference provide, American troops were only supposed to act as advisers and trainers to 
Philippine soldiers in yearly, routine Balikatan military exercises, whose expressed aim was 
improving the Philippine military’s technical capacity for counterterrorism.39   
The American military was more visible in the area of community relations, where 
it sought to create a more favourable view of its presence in deprived villages.  The US thus 
ran “focused civil-military operations” or “humanitarian and civic action projects”, which 
provided development assistance to build or repair infrastructure such as roads, bridges 
                                                                 
34 The single case of Buyung Buyung Isnijal uncovered by the ISM in 2002 was never officially 
investigated despite a Congressional resolution, and was quickly forgotten.  Another eye witness 
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Approach’ (2006) 86 Military Review 2-12, 2. 
36 ibid 4. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid 3. 
39 According to Wilson, US special forces did accompany Filipino soldiers on combat operations but 
operated under restrictive rules of engagement: 
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Naval Construction Task Group.  All  US forces operated under restrictive rules of engagement.  Once 
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the rescue of the kidnapped American Gracia Burnham in Zamboanga del Norte, see also, CH 
Briscoe, ‘Rescuing the Burnhams: The Unspoken SOCPAC Mission’ (2004) 17 Special Warfare 46 -51.   
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and airports.40  A “psychological operations component” also developed strategies for 
addressing what the Americans perceived as “a decidedly anti-American bias” on the part 
of the Philippine media.41  These initiatives reveal that, just like human rights campaigners, 
the American military was prepared to do battle in the sphere of local public opinion. 
 
1.4.  Corruption and military collusion with the Abu Sayyaf 
To demonstrate that the government is not solving the Abu Sayyaf problem, 
allegations of human rights violations needed to be bolstered with additional arguments.  
As reflected in the IPM and ISM reports, an additional criticism of the Basilan war was 
fashioned from detailed allegations of corruption and collusion between the Abu Sayyaf, 
the Philippine armed forces and government officials.   
Father Cirilo Nacorda, a Catholic priest based in Lamitan, Basilan, who was 
kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf in 1994, reported that in captivity, he witnessed his Abu 
Sayyaf captors negotiating with military officers for the delivery of weapons with the help 
of a local government official.42  Moreover, while he and his Abu Sayyaf captors were 
trekking in the mountains, they came upon Philippine soldiers who nevertheless 
conveniently ignored them, failing to halt them.43  Further evidence of corruption and 
collusion came from the Congressional investigation of the so-called Lamitan siege of June 
1, 2002 in which the Abu Sayyaf escaped unscathed from a military cordon of the Lamitan 
hospital in Basilan, where they had taken refuge with 20 hostages.44  Witnesses related that 
an exchange of ransom money was effected through military officers during the siege; that 
soldiers were ordered to abandon the back door from which the Abu Sayyaf escaped; and 
                                                                 
40 Cherilyn A Walley, ‘Civil  Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island’ (2004) 17 Special Warfare 
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43 ibid. 
44 Thomas Fuller, ‘Phil ippine Armed Forces Helped Kidnapping Gang Escape, He Says : The Fighting 
Priest’ The New York Times (24 August 2001) <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/24/news/24iht-
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that a truck provided by the provincial government was used in the escape. 45  A similar 
scandal shook the administration of President Estrada when the German newspaper Der 
Speigel alleged that a cabinet secretary close to Estrada had received part of the ransom 
money paid for hostages abducted by the Abu Sayyaf in Sipadan, Malaysia in April 2000. 46  
These well-publicised allegations convinced parts of the public that the intractability of the 
Abu Sayyaf problem was partly due to corruption.  The IPM built on this argument by 
suggesting that “the Abu Sayyaf may be resistant to a military solution”,47 and proceeded 
to ask, “How can the Philippine military solve the Abu Sayyaf when it itself may be part of 
the problem?”48  The suggestion was therefore that intensifying military operations in 
Basilan would be ineffectual without first addressing the problem of corruption and 
collusion with the Abu Sayyaf kidnappers.   
While this argument gained traction as against the Philippine military and 
government officials, the American military seemed inoculated from its effects.  In fact, 
since the Americans could present themselves as capable and committed to countering the 
Abu Sayyaf as “international terrorists”, in stark contrast to the inefficiency and corruption 
of the Philippine military and the Estrada government, the decision to involve Americans in 
the Basilan campaign appeared more justifiable or acceptable.49  As Jetschke put it, 
“emerging evidence about the military’s corruption and inefficiency appeared to make 
American assistance the most rational solution”.50  It was clear that in order to convince the 
public to support their goals, campaigners needed to refine their arguments, drawing upon 
new information demonstrating the deleterious effects of American involvement. 
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1.5.  Finding 
 
In the campaign to oppose the deployment of US troops in Basilan, the strategy of 
Filipino campaigners was discrepant with the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism.  The local campaigners were not merely aiming to get the Philippine and 
US armed forces to comply with human rights standards in their conduct of the operations.  
In fact, the Philippine and US governments touted that the rules of engagement governing 
the conduct of American troops in Basilan were restrictive and ensured that they did not 
commit human rights violations.  This was part of the calculation to make American military 
presence “politically acceptable”.  The campaigners rebutted this argument through the 
case of Buyung Buyung Isnijal who was al legedly shot by a team which included an 
American soldier.  But more significantly, to the campaigners, averting human rights 
violations was not simply a question of strict enforcement of the rules of engagement.   
They raised the concern that the increased military presence in Mindanao in the name of 
counterterrorism was a precursor for escalation of conflict with the MILF and the CPP-NPA.  
This fear materialised when the MILF was later linked to the Abu Sayyaf, and attacks on the 
MILF were undertaken despite its ceasefire agreement with the government, resulting in 
massive displacement of communities.  
Unlike the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism, local 
campaigners did not concede that there was a credible “terrorist” threat which 
necessitated “counterterrorism”.  The campaigners questioned the assumption that 
military operations simply aimed to counter the Abu Sayyaf.  They argued that many 
individuals who were arrested allegedly for being Abu Sayyaf were not in fact Abu Sayyaf, 
but ordinary folks.  Finally, they highlighted the Philippine military and government 
officials’ collusion with the kidnappers which showed lack of seriousness in the pursuit of 
the Abu Sayyaf. 
 
2.  The Campaign on “Mysterious Bombings” in Mindanao  
 
In 2003, human rights organisations were hard at work documenting the impact of 
the “War on Terror” as it expanded from Basilan to Mindanao.  The geographical shift gave 
critics new opportunities.  Opponents had feared that Philippine alignment with the US’ 
“War on Terror” might decrease the prospects for peaceful settlement of armed conflict 
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with the MILF, thus increasing displacement of civilians and other human rights violations.51  
This was already evident in February 2003, when the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development reported that 411,004 persons had been displaced from the provinces of 
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Bukidnon as a result of fighting following the attack on 
the MILF’s stronghold in the Buliok complex.52  
The threat of a total breakdown of peace negotiations and further escalation of the 
conflict between the Philippine government and the MILF in the name of counterterrorism 
raised the stakes for campaigners against American military involvement.  As in Basilan, 
military operations in Mindanao against the MILF were being perpetrated in the name of 
counterterrorism.  In response, campaigners not only continued exposing human rights 
violations, but also challenged the extension of the terrorism discourse to the MILF.   
The terrorism discourse appeared to be confirmed by the rapid succession of 
bombings in Mindanao.53  The biggest bombing in Mindanao targeted Davao City’s 
international airport on March 4, 2003.  It killed 21 people and injured 124.  Barely a month 
later, another bombing destroyed Davao City’s Sasa wharf on April 2, 2003, killing 16 dead 
and injuring 56.  There were 36 bombing incidents in various parts of Mindanao from 
February 25, 2000 to May 18, 2007.54  In addition, there were four bombing incidents in 
Manila from May 21, 2000 to February 27, 2004 that the government attributed to 
terrorists.  The most devastating of these was the bombing of the passenger vessel 
“Superferry 14” just outside Manila Bay on February 27, 2004 which killed 116 people.55  As 
Human Rights Watch note, altogether these bombings within a period of seven years 
claimed more casualties than bombings in Indonesia (including the 2003 Bali bombing) in 
the same period, or in Morocco, Spain, Turkey or Britain.56   
In response to the Davao airport and wharf blasts in 2003, President Arroyo 
declared a “State of Lawless Violence” in Davao city and the Davao provinces. 57  She further 
                                                                 
51 Memories of the 2000 all -out war against the MILF under the Estrada administration was sti ll 
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52 ibid. 
53 Human Rights Watch, ‘Lives Destroyed: Attacks Against Civil ians in the Philippines’ (2007).  
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55 ibid. 
56 ibid 3. 
57 Carlos H Conde, ‘Blasts at Phil ippine Mosques Follow Bombing at Terminal’ New York Times (4 
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ordered the formation and deployment of Task Force Davao, comprising different units of 
the AFP, to pursue the perpetrators of the Davao blasts.58 The police built a case against 
the MILF leadership who were blamed for the Davao airport bombing, accusing them of 
using a suicide bomber.59  This was denied by the MILF.60  Meanwhile, the Abu Sayyaf 
claimed responsibility for the Davao airport bombing,61 as well as the Super Ferry blast.62     
As will be seen below, the campaigners focused on questioning the dubious 
authorship of these bombings in order to overturn the discourse that Mindanao was 
gripped by Islamic terrorism.   
 
2.1.  The Mindanao Truth Commission 
 
The convergence of concerns for human rights, the peaceful settlement of armed 
conflict, truth-seeking and terrorism, is illustrated in the so-called Mindanao Truth 
Commission (MTC), which was an unofficial private citizen’s initiative that probed a spate of 
bombings in Mindanao in 2003.63  The MTC arose from the Initiatives for Peace in 
Mindanao (InPeace Mindanao), which was initially a joint initiative of Mindanao-based 
religious and civil society leaders, who sought to respond collectively to the threat of 
escalating conflict in Mindanao.  InPeace Mindanao circulated a “Manifesto for Peace” and 
held public forums across Mindanao to discuss “urgent peace issues”.64  It evolved into a 
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Arroyo government for “crimes against humanity”. 
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permanent forum for advocating peace negotiations and documenting human rights 
violations, in the context of the apparent shift in government policy from peace 
negotiations with the CPP-NPA and MILF to a military approach.  The network of human 
rights organisations under the Karapatan banner affiliated with InPeace Mindanao.   From 
May 2003, InPeace Mindanao adopted two major objectives:  
 
“(1) The resumption of the Peace Negotiations between the GRP-NDFP and the GRP-
MILF, and (2) Conduct of an Independent Fact Finding Mission on the ‘mystery’ 
bombings in Mindanao and the human rights violations in the island ensuing from 
militarization, international humanitarian law violations ensuing from AFP-MILF and 
AFP-NPA armed engagements.”65 
 
Making good on its second major call, InPeace Mindanao launched the Mindanao Truth 
Commission (MTC) on June 25, 2003 in Davao City.  The MTC had a total of 23 
commissioners, headed by Professor Robinson Montalba from the Ateneo de Davao 
University, with six lawyers, two bishops, two other academics, and religious leaders 
making up the rest.  The MTC investigated thirty three (33) incidents of bombings on the 
island in the period from April 2002 to March 2004 which were considered to be 
“mysterious”.66  These bombings killed 95 people and injured 490 others.67  They targeted 
civilians in shopping malls, public markets, mosques, transport hubs and other public 
places.68   
The MTC set up regional investigating teams in five regions of Mindanao to identify 
prospective witnesses and gather information about the bombings, including on the human 
rights impact of the state’s response to the bombings.  Over the course of five months, the 
MTC conducted seven fact-finding sessions in different public venues in four different 
Mindanao cities.69  At these sessions it heard testimonies from invited witnesses and 
received documentary and other evidence.  In total, forty six (46) persons gave testimony.70  
The MTC produced a report in March 3, 2004.71 
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66 ibid 3. 
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68 See also Human Rights Watch (n 53).   
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70 ibid. 
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2.2.  Human rights violations 
 
The MTC report highlighted that the rush to implicate the MILF in the bombings 
had caused substantial human rights violations.  It argued that the state had resorted to 
indiscriminate raids on Muslim communities in order to make arrests following the Davao 
airport and Sasa wharf bombings, and that these arrests had been illegally effected without 
judicial warrants, and had invariably led to cases of torture.72  The rush to implicate the 
MILF resulted in the gross inadequacy of evidence in the criminal cases that were filed. 73   
In the Davao airport bombing, the police speculated that the bomber was 
Montaser Sudang, a 19 year-old man, who had been among the casualties in the said 
bombing.  The police alleged that Montaser, his uncle Undungan Sudang and father Terso 
Sudang were members of the MILF.  The latter two were also arrested and charged, 
alongside the MILF chairman Hashim Salamat and the rest of the MILF leadership, in 
connection with the bombing.  However, while the prosecution produced documents which 
purported to show that the Sudangs were MILF members (supposedly MILF identity 
documents had been recovered by the AFP from an overrun MILF base), no evidence was 
provided that Montaser actually procured and planted the bomb.74  Thus, the case against 
the Sudangs was dismissed by the court that tried the case for lack of evidence.  Moreover, 
the MTC pointed out that the scene of the crime, which could have produced other and 
better leads and physical evidence, was quickly cleaned up by the Fire Marshall while the 
post-blast investigators from the police took a brief rest from investigation.75   
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In the case of the Sasa wharf bombing, the state’s case against two youths, who 
were also charged alongside the MILF hierarchy, was no more compelling.  It surfaced that 
the extrajudicial confessions by two youths Jimmy Balulao and Tohamie Bagundang, who 
had allegedly planted the bomb, had been secured following their torture by police.76  The 
retractions of these confessions forced a reinvestigation of the case by the public 
prosecutor.77 
 
2.3.  The theory that bombings were fabricated by state agents 
 
Probably the most novel part of the work of the Commission was its examination of 
the theory that the bombings were staged by Philippine military officials as well as a 
possible state agent of the United States.  This theory shattered the distinction between 
state agents and the terrorists they were supposedly pursuing, demonstrating in an 
explosive way that the dichotomy between terrorism and counterterrorism was a farce.  
The commissioners took the allegations in support of the theory seriously and built a case 
for pursuing an official investigation of the documentary evidence and of the implicated 
state agents.   
 
2.3.1.  Testimonies of junior military officers 
 
While the documentation of human rights violations was a major part of the 
report, the MTC proceeded to explore the question whether the bombings were fabricated 
to implicate the MILF.78  In this regard, the MTC considered the potential role of state 
agents, both Philippine and American, in fabricating the events.  Public accusations of an 
AFP hand in the Mindanao bombings were first aired by a group of junior military officers 
identified with the so-called Oakwood mutiny.  The Oakwood Seige involved the one-day 
occupation of a serviced apartment building in Makati City by a group of 321 armed Filipino 
soldiers in July 27, 2003.  The soldiers disarmed the security guards and planted mines 
around the building.  Thereafter, their leader Army Capt. Gerardo Gambala read a prepared 
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statement entitled “Message to the Filipino People” to the media demanding the 
resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes, and 
AFP Intelligence chief Victor Corpuz for staging bombings in Mindanao and selling arms to 
rebels.79  The MTC devoted its first two sessions, in October 2003, to receiving sworn 
statements and documents from detained junior officers of the Philippine military who had 
participated in the Oakwood mutiny relayed through their lawyer Rafael Pulido. 80  The 
junior officers, Antonio Trillanes, Milo Maestrecampo, Jose Enrico Dingle and Kristopher 
Bryan Yasay, offered elaborate allegations of fabricated terrorism.81   
Lt. Sgt. Trillanes alleged that on February 27, 2003 he had uncovered two 
documents from the Philippine presidential palace, namely, a Memorandum of Instructions 
dated 11 February 2003 by President Arroyo addressed to Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes, 
and “The President’s Four-Point Policy Framework in Addressing the Southern Philippine 
Secessionist/MILF Problem” signed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, which 
purportedly outlined President’s Arroyo’s overall plan for the handling of the conflict with 
MILF.82  The documents allegedly show that high government officials planned the 
occupation of the MILF’s Buliok complex , as well as the spate of bombings in Mindanao.83  
In relation to the Mindanao bombings in particular, the second document purportedly 
instructed that “the MILF must be made responsible” for the bombings.84  Trillanes claimed 
that these moves were aimed at dislodging the MILF’s hold in the resource -rich area of 
Liguasan marsh in order to implement a joint Philippine-Malaysian resource extraction 
project in the said area.85  He also claimed that they aimed to weaken the negotiating 
position of the MILF in the peace negotiations,86 and to justify the continuation of American 
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counterterrorism assistance and joint military exercises with American troops in 
Mindanao.87   
While they were sensational pieces of evidence, Trillanes’ documents were not the 
most persuasive.  The presidential spokesperson has denied the authenticity of the said 
documents, a conclusion that was reiterated in a subsequent official investigation.88  
However, the MTC did not immediately brush aside the documents.  It noted, as Trillanes 
did in his written analysis of the documents, that the documents were uncovered a few 
months before bombings took place in the places identified therein.89  If they had been 
purely a forgery, then the fact that they had predicted the bombings and other events 
mentioned therein would have to be attributed to lucky guesses or coincidences.  The MTC, 
therefore, called for further scrutiny of the documents.90 
The MTC made greater use of the testimonies of Maestrecampo, Dingle and Yasay.  
Corroborating Trillanes’ allegations pertaining to the AFP’s hand in bombings, scout rangers 
Capt. Maestrecampo, Lt. Dingle and Lt. Yasay gave sworn statements about a military order 
to bomb mosques.91  Capt. Maestrecampo alleged that as a company commander he was 
approached by his superior officer, Maj. Rene Paje, to form a special operations team to lob 
grenades and C-4 explosives at mosques in Madaum, Davao del Norte, but that he refused 
the order.92  Lt. Dingle also alleged that as a company commander, he was also approached 
by Maj. Paje for the same purpose; but unlike Capt. Maestrecampo, his subordinate 2nd Lt. 
Yasay said, Lt. Dingle did not disobey the order.   Instead, Lt. Dingle and 2nd Lt. Yasay 
formed a special operations team in furtherance of Paje’s instructions.  
Yasay furthermore alleged that Paje instructed the team to “scrape off markings on 
the grenades we were going to use” and to “remove plastic wrappings of the C-4” to avoid 
identification, to prepare the company’s civilian jeep for their use as a backup vehicle, 
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removing all markings therefrom, and for the grenade thrower to use a motorcycle.93  Paje 
supposedly gave assurances that the special operation would be protected by other teams 
and that they would not be arrested.94  The final order to go ahead with the mission, 
however, supposedly did not come.  Nevertheless, shortly after Yasay’s  team was formed, 
on April 3, 2003, four mosques in Davao City exploded in short succession, as a result of the 
handiwork of grenade throwers.  In the first incident, witnesses reported that the 
perpetrators sped off to the downtown area, where joint police and military checkpoints 
were already set up along the roads because of the Sasa wharf explosion the day before.  
The MTC considered that the three officers’ testimony constituted “substantial evidence 
that the AFP ordered a special operation to lob grenades at mosques”, and concluded that 
the fact that the government lacked interest to prosecute Paje or initiate a criminal 
investigation against him, but instead promoted him, was “suspicious”.95  The 
commissioners included the filing of charges against Paje among its recommendations to 
the government.96 
 
2.3.2.  Incident involving Michael Meiring  
 
There were also indications of American involvement in the fabrication of terrorism 
in Mindanao.  Authorities have actively hindered pursuing these leads.  The MTC resisted 
efforts to downplay these facts, and instead highlighted them in its report.   Suspicions of a 
US hand in the Mindanao bombings arose from the curious case of Michael Terrence 
Meiring.97  Meiring, an American national, was nearly killed (he lost his leg) when 
                                                                 
93 ibid IV3. 
94 ibid. 
95 Mindanao Truth Commission, ‘Abridged Progress Report’ (n 74) 5. 
96 Mindanao Truth Commission, ‘Executive Summary Progress Report June 2003-March 2004’ (n 64) 
20. 
97 Carolyn O Arguillas, ‘The Meiring Mystery: “Affront to Phil ippine Sovereignty” (First Part)’ 
MindaNews (30 May 2003); Carolyn O Arguillas, ‘The Meiring Mystery: The “Second Coming” 
(Second of Three Parts)’ MindaNews (31 May 2003); Carolyn O Arguillas, ‘The Meiring Mystery: The 
Extradition That Never Was’ MindaNews (1 June 2003) 
<https://jewterror.wordpress.com/2003/06/01/the-meiring-mystery-the-extradition-that-never-
was/> accessed 8 May 2015; Dorian Zumel -Sicat, ‘Treasure Hunter a Player in a More Absorbing Tale 
(First of Three Parts)’ The Manila Times (29 May 2002) 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20020620012301/http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2002/may/2
9/top_stories/20020529top5.html> accessed 8 May 2015; Dorian Zumel -Sicat, ‘Treasure Hunter Had 
White Supremacists for Associates (Second of Three Parts)’ The Manila Times (30 May 2002) 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20021028074217/http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2002/may/3
0/top_stories/20020530top6.html> accessed 8 May 2015; Dor ian Zumel-Sicat, ‘Spies, Terrorists 
Attracted to Treasure Hunters’ Circles (Conclusion)’ The Manila Times (31 May 2002) 
 111 
improvised explosive devices he had brought into his hotel room in Evergreen Hotel in 
Davao City exploded and caused a fire on May 16, 2002.98  Meiring had been a guest at the 
hotel for 10 years99 and has represented himself to hotel staff as a treasure hunter.100  He 
told police that a grenade was lobbed into his room,101 but investigation revealed that the 
explosion emanated from materials contained in boxes that he had brought in the hotel.102  
As a result, on May 22, 2002, he was charged by the city prosecutor with illegal possession 
of explosives and reckless imprudence in its handling.103   
The incident would have passed without inviting public attention, were it not for 
the fact that Meiring escaped the Philippine legal process, apparently with the help of US 
agencies under rather unusual circumstances that were publicly decried by the city 
mayor.104  On May 30, the mayor of Davao City Rodrigo Duterte claimed before the 
Regional Peace and Order Council that “arrogant agents of the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation” barged into the hospital room where Meiring was recuperating and, 
outsmarting Philippine police guarding him at the hospital by “showing their badges”, 
whisked him away from the country.105  Mayor Duterte complained that Meiring was taken 
“without the knowledge of any police, military or government official in the city or region” 
and called the action of US officials an “affront to Philippine sovereignty”.106  The escape 
was widely publicised in Mindanao newspapers and his case was also serialised in a 
national daily.107  There was widespread speculation about Meiring’s true identity and 
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activities in Mindanao and it was reported that Meiring may have been covertly working for 
the US government.108   
The US Embassy denied any FBI role in Meiring’s “departure”, though it confirmed 
that FBI agents had travelled to Davao City purportedly to assist Philippine police 
investigation into the explosion at Evergreen Hotel.109   Moreover, the US Vice Consul 
Michael Newbill settled the hospital bills.110  A year after the issuance of the warrant of 
arrest against Meiring, Philippine government authorities have still not asked for the 
extradition of Meiring to face criminal charges in Davao City.111   This only contributed to 
the perception that information about a possible American role was being suppressed.     
The MTC heard the testimony of respected journalist Carolyn Arguillas, editor-in-
chief of the Mindanao News Service who reported on the Meiring case in the local press, 
who shared her research on the case.112  Arguillas provided the MTC copies of court 
documents on the Meiring case, indicating the criminal charges brought against him, the 
warrant for his arrest, the sworn statements of witnesses.113  In its analysis of the Meiring 
case, the MTC noted that the Philippine government “lack[ed] the resolve” to extradite and 
prosecute Meiring.114  The MTC said that the theory that Meiring was a “CIA or American 
federal agent” was supported by unusual circumstances of his escape from Philippine legal 
process.115  The commissioners said they were “alarmed” that US officials have directly 
intervened in his escape, indicating that Meiring had such “influence” on or “value” to the 
US government.116   The thrust of MTC’s findings in the Meiring case was thus to push the 
government to pursue the extradition of Meiring to the Philippines. 
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2.3.3.  MTC’s assessment of the theory 
 
The theory that some of the bombings may have been fabricated by state agents 
therefore has some evidentiary basis.  If the evidence was not conclusive, this should not 
be held against its proponents, as the Philippine authorities have not shown any interest in 
pursuing inquiries that could further substantiate or, alternatively, rebut or discredit, the 
theory, such as by ordering the investigation of Paje or requesting the extradition of 
Meiring.117  
The MTC’s main contribution to public debate was to question the moral standing 
of the state in framing the MILF as a terrorist. This is evident from its finding that:  
 
“In the course of the independent probe and having found insufficiency of solid 
evidence against the MILF, the MTC observes a shifting of evidence of culpability 
towards the Arroyo government.  Here, the MTC’s most encompassing statement is 
that the moral ascendancy of the Arroyo and the United States governments in their 
so-called ‘war against terror’ has crumbled under allegations of state -sponsored 
terrorism.”118 
 
In summary, the MTC did not concede that the bombings that hit Mindanao can simply be 
characterised as a rise in “terrorism” perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and/or MILF.  The 
commissioners argued that characterising the bombings as “terrorism” was not an innocent 
move.  Rather, it served to portray the MILF as illegitimate and justified the government in 
escalating war against it.  The commissioners countered the government’s “terrorism” 
rhetoric by challenging the government to investigate charges that bombings in Mindanao 
were fabricated by state agents, both Philippine and American.  
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2.4.  Contrast with Human Rights Watch report 
 
The pattern of engagement with counterterrorism evident in the MTC report can 
be contrasted with that of a subsequent report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the same 
topic.119  HRW’s 2007 report entitled “Lives Destroyed: Attacks on Civilians in the 
Philippines” tackled the impact on civilians of “over 40 major bombings against civilians and 
civilian property” mostly in Mindanao since January 2000.120  The HRW report concluded 
that the human rights violations had been perpetrated against civilians by terrorists and 
that the state had failed to bring terrorists to justice.121  The HRW report faulted the 
Philippine government for proceeding with prosecutions too slowly, although numerous 
suspects in bombing attacks had been arrested since 2000.122  The international group said 
that very few have been successfully brought to trial, and prosecutions in some cases have 
been delayed for more than four years.123   
The HRW report laid responsibility for the bombings on Islamic extremists from the 
Abu Sayyaf and the similarly marginal Rajah Solaiman Movement, since they had admitted 
responsibility for the bombings.124  It emphasised the alleged links of these marginal groups 
to JI, “the violent Indonesian Islamist group responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings”.125  
This stands in stark contrast with the MTC report which expressed doubt as to who the 
bombers really were.  The MTC was struggling against the perception that Mindanao was 
gripped by terrorism; whereas HRW appeared to have already conceded this as established 
fact.   
Importantly, the HRW report distanced itself from the claim that the government 
was responsible for bombings.  HRW acknowledged that the belief that the Philippine 
government fabricated the bombings was widely held among “the Moro community, civil 
society, and opposition political movements” in Mindanao.126  The perception that the 
Philippine government had concrete motivations for fabricating the bombings was 
widespread “throughout the Philippines”.127  However, HRW ignored the proponents of this 
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view, sidestepping their arguments by saying “no substantive evidence” supported them.128  
Instead, HRW offered a diagnosis of why “conspiracy theories” proliferated:  
 
[T]he continued prevalence of these conspiracy theories about bombing attacks in the 
Philippines is attributable, at least in part, to the government’s failure to prosecute 
the perpetrators of attacks.  Without the transparency of fair public trials, people in 
the southern Philippines are more likely to believe dubious claims—conspiracy 
theories that undermine their confidence in the government and make political 
reconciliation all the more difficult to achieve.129 
 
HRW’s broad dismissal of “conspiracy theories” seems to ignore efforts of the MTC to 
collect and critically examine evidence for fabricated terrorism.  To HRW, the line between 
terrorism and counterterrorism in Mindanao appears to be clearly demarcated.  The 
effective deployment of law against terrorists should help to refute the supposedly 
spurious conspiracy theories of the government’s critics and thus bolster the credentials of 
counterterrorism. 
 
2.5.  Impact of MTC report and implications of MILF’s diplomatic move  
 
Overall, the impact of InPeace Mindanao’s truth-seeking was limited, as the issue it 
raised - whether or not the Philippine and United States governments could validly frame 
the MILF as a terrorist organisation - became moot by virtue of the MILF’s subsequent 
moves in the peace negotiations.  By engaging the United States diplomatically in an effort 
to involve them in peace negotiations, the MILF acknowledged that it was necessary to 
demonstrate to the United States that it was not a terrorist organisation, that it was distinct 
from the Abu Sayyaf, and that it could become a partner in counterterrorism against the 
Abu Sayyaf and JI.  This move has several important implications.  First, the MILF implicitly 
recognised the US government’s power or claim of authority to determine whether or not 
the MILF was engaged in terrorism.  This directly undercut the thrust of campaigning by 
InPeace Mindanao.   
The MILF’s move also tended to marginalise criticism of American troop presence 
in Mindanao. The MILF appeared to acknowledge the legitimacy of counterterrorist 
operations against the Abu Sayyaf and JI (with American involvement) within territory that 
MILF controlled.  This was so long as the MILF was not also targeted.  This position 
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contradicted campaigners’ claim that the Americans had no compelling reason to have 
their troops present in Mindanao.  Also, the US was provided the opportunity to claim that 
its military presence in Mindanao did not negate peace negotiations, contrary to 
campaigners’ fears.   
 
2.6.  Finding 
 
In the campaign on “mysterious bombings” in Mindanao, the campaigner’s strategy 
was again difficult to reduce into the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism.  Instead of accepting the threat of terrorism as given, campaigners 
directly challenged the view promoted by the government that Mindanao was gripped by 
terrorism.  Not only did they highlight that evidence against the alleged MILF bombers was 
deficient, they also used new information that Philippine and US state agents may have had 
a role in fabricating bombings.  Campaigners therefore continued the strategy of the 
Basilan campaign in suggesting that “terrorism”, rather than threatening to the Philippine 
government, was beneficial to it because it justified increased military attacks on the MILF. 
This section also considered the contrast between the thrusts of HRW’s report on 
the bombings in Mindanao, on the one hand, and Filipino campaigning on “mysterious 
bombings”, on the other hand.  Consistent with the discourse of human rights -compliant 
counterterrorism, HRW’s report reproduced government’s view of the bombings and 
ignored rare but important evidence gathered by campaigners. It contributed to the 
suppression of dissident views by branding them as “conspiracy theories”.  Moreover, it 
hoped to bolster the credentials of counterterrorism through the prosecution of those 
arrested for the bombings.  HRW’s report illustrates the service that the discourse of 
human rights-compliant counterterrorism can accomplish for the state. 
 
3.  The campaign to remove Jose Maria Sison from the European Terrorist List 
 
The last campaign considered in this chapter pertains to the case of Jose Maria 
Sison.  This campaign was pursued not only in the political front, through debates in the 
media and the like, but in the legal front as well, as Sison pursued the legal remedy under 
the EU regulation that governed the blacklisting process.    
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3.1.  Political consequences of terrorist listing 
 
The risks that Filipino campaigners against the “War on Terror” faced as the 
terrorism discourse expanded to the CPP-NPA were similar to those addressed by 
campaigners in Mindanao, namely, the breakdown of peace talks with the communist-led 
NDF and escalation of war in the Philippines with its attendant human rights violations.  
The situation and reactions of the CPP-NPA and the peace negotiators of the NDF, 
however, differed from those of the MILF.  In the expansion of counterterrorism to the 
CPP-NPA, the role of foreign states was much more obvious earlier on.  On August 9, 2002, 
the United States government formally designated the CPP-NPA as a “foreign terrorist 
organization” and Jose Maria Sison as a “specially designated terrorist” under US laws, a 
fate avoided by the MILF.130  The US designation caused a cascade of similar designations, 
first by the Netherlands on August 13, 2002131 and then by the Council of the European 
Union on October 28, 2002, and then other Western states, including Australia.   
The designations of Jose Maria Sison as a “terrorist” by the Netherlands and the 
Council of the European Union under Dutch and EU laws were especially significant.  Sison 
had been a long-time asylum seeker in the Netherlands and was playing a key role in the 
NDF’s peace negotiations with the Philippine government.   These formal negotiations were 
taking place in Norway, with the Norwegian government acting as host.  
Technically speaking, the designations were only meant to impose an asset freeze 
and a travel ben, and not a withdrawal of support for peace negotiations.  In practice, 
however, the parties took this as signal to quickly wrap up peace negotiations with the 
NDF.  
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The designations were carried out under regulations promoted by the United 
Nations Security Council under Resolution No. 1373 designed to combat terrorist financing 
by effecting freezing of financial assets held by the designated organisations and persons 
(and under US laws, criminalisation of material support to the designated organisations and 
persons).132  Under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, member states must comply 
with obligations imposed by the Security Council, and the provision of Resolution No. 1373 
on the freezing of assets of terrorists was obligatory in its language.133  However, the 
Security Council did not specify who were the terrorists whose assets must be frozen.  
Hence, the listing of specific persons as terrorists subject to the asset freeze  were 
essentially discretionary acts of these governments.134  As Cameron pointed out, the 
decision to blacklist or not to blacklist is determined by political consideration.135  Persons 
or groups committing acts that may fall within the definition of terrorism may not be 
blacklisted because an EU member state objects.  Persons or groups committing much less 
serious acts may be blacklisted while others who commit more serious acts are not.136 
There are many criticisms levelled against the procedure that the EU Council has 
adopted for terrorist listing.  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe criticised 
the procedure for not incorporating “minimum procedural safeguards”.137  These included 
notification of the affected persons of the reasons for their listing; the opportunity for such 
persons to be heard and to defend themselves; the ability of such persons to have their 
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listings reviewed by a court, and to be compensated for wrongful listings.138  It proclaimed 
that the substantive criteria for listing persons were “vague” so that persons may be listed 
on “mere suspicion”.139  It lambasted the procedure as “unworthy of international bodies 
such as the United Nations and the European Union.”140 Numerous legal scholars share 
these criticisms.141  For example, Cameron pointed out that the EU procedure carries no 
requirement that the group directs their attacks on civilians or democratic governments.142  
Thus, there is an inherent danger that the listing procedure will be abused to criminalise 
groups engaged in internal conflicts against illegitimate or oppressive governments.143  
In the specific listing of the CPP-NPA and Sison, the political consequences of being 
condemned a “terrorist” indubitably went beyond the expressed legal consequences.  The 
CPP-NPA has no known bank account or other financial assets held in its own name and 
hence the asset freezing directive was best understood as a symbolic gesture.  But, as 
Sison’s lawyers argued, the designations gave the Philippine government added leverage in 
the peace negotiations.  Foreign Affairs Secretary Blas Ople is supposed to have said: “Once 
there is a peace agreement, I will request the European Union, the United States and other 
countries to delist [the rebels] as terrorists.  If they sign, they will no longer be 
terrorists.”144 
The NDF negotiating panel alleged that the Philippine government used the 
designations in order to pressure the NDF to “capitulate” to a “final peace agreement”. 145  
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Just as Filipino critics of the “War on Terror” feared for the MILF, the reframing of the CPP -
NPA as a terrorism problem resulted in dimmer prospects for peace with the CPP-NPA.  
Talks came to a standstill in August 2004 over the issue of the CPP-NPA’s and Sison’s 
continued terrorist listing,146 and by 2006, the Arroyo government started filing criminal 
charges against other individuals with key roles in the peace negotiations with the NDF 
before Philippine courts.  The terrorist listing of the CPP-NPA painted it as lacking 
legitimacy and made a more militarily oriented approach to them more acceptable.  It also 
affected legal organisations that were ideologically aligned with the reform agenda of the 
NDF, an issue which I discuss in the succeeding chapter.   
 
3.2.  Legal challenge to Sison’s listing 
 
In this section, I examine how human rights were used in order to resist the 
expansion of counterterrorism to the CPP-NPA.  I focus on campaigners’ efforts in getting 
Jose Maria Sison removed from the terrorist list of the Council of the European Union.  As I 
relate below, Sison and the NDF negotiating panel, aided by an international group of  
lawyers and campaigning organisations, responded primarily through a legal challenge 
against the decision of the Council of the European Union to list Sison.  Sison’s case was 
handled by a group of European and Filipino lawyers led by Belgian lawyer Jan Fermon and 
prominent Filipino human rights lawyer Romeo Capulong.  The Sison campaign resulted in 
Sison’s removal from the list, and showed that governments had been lacking evidence of 
terrorism against him.  
To begin with, a legal challenge against a decision of an instrumentality of the 
European Union in the EU’s judicial system was not an obvious choice as a site for resisting 
the expansion of counterterrorism to the CPP-NPA.  As Sison’s lawyers, Jan Fermon and 
Mathieu Beys revealed, the CPP-NPA decided not to apply to the European Court for relief 
to remove them from the EU terrorist list.  The CPP-NPA thought that “the revolutionary 
struggle in the Philippines was not be subject of the judgment of a Court established by an 
                                                                 
Negotiations: Major Written Agreements and Outstanding Issues (NDFP Human Rights Monitoring 
Committee 2006) 82–98. 
146 See, National Democratic Front of the Philippines International Information Office, ‘Chronology of 
the Peace Negotiations between the GRP and the NDFP: 1988-2006’ 
<http://www.ndfp.org/chronology-of-the-peace-negotiations-between-the-grp-and-the-ndfp-1988-
2006/> accessed 4 January 2016; Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, ‘Highlights 
of the GPH-NDF Peace Negotiations’ <http://opapp.gov.ph/cpp-npa-ndf/highlights> accessed 4 
January 2016. 
 121 
imperialist institution as the European Union.”147  It simply was not correct for an 
organisation that regarded itself as a revolutionary movement to come under the 
jurisdiction of a judicial body of a foreign power in this way.  In any case, the legitimacy of 
the CPP-NPA’s revolution was a political question that was not capable of being addressed 
by a court of the European Union.  This decision of the CPP-NPA provides an interesting 
contrast to the MILF’s strategy.  Whereas, the MILF pragmatically sought a direct dialogue 
with the United States to prevent a terrorist designation, the CPP-NPA acted as if the US 
and allied governments’ determinations could be ignored and did not affect its status as a 
revolutionary organisation.  
These considerations, however, did not affect Jose Maria Sison.  Sison, unlike the 
CPP and NPA, was not an underground figure.  Rather, he was a long-time resident of the 
Netherlands as an asylum-seeker.  Moreover, as a result of having had to battle rejections 
of his asylum requests, he had become quite adept at invoking his individual human rights 
under Dutch and EU laws before the Dutch and European courts.148  The impact upon him 
of the asset freeze was also real and not merely symbolic.  It caused welfare support for 
himself to be frozen, preventing him from paying his rent, among other things.149  
Moreover, he considered the “terrorist” tag a smear to his reputation, and he argued that 
it amounted to an invitation to violence against his person. 150  Thus, Sison decided to 
launch a legal challenge against these measures for interfering unjustifiably in his exercise 
of individual human rights.  At the same time, there was no way that Sison could be 
disassociated from the CPP-NPA.  While the CPP-NPA was not party to Sison’s case and the 
question whether the CPP-NPA could be properly characterised as a “terrorist 
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organization” was not considered by the  court, the defense of the CPP-NPA’s legitimacy 
could not be avoided in the accompanying public campaigning.  As Fermon and Beys 
revealed, the legal case of Sison could not bring up the argument that the CPP-NPA’s armed 
struggle was a revolutionary struggle that was incompatible with terrorism.  However, 
raising this argument was “necessary” to their “work in public opinion”.151   
The public campaigning was undertaken by a group of Sison’s political associates 
and friends in Europe.  Dubbed the Committee Defend, this group launched in Amsterdam 
to raise awareness over Sison’s predicament and the implications of terrorist listing in the 
Philippines.  Branches of the Committee Defend later formed in other cities in Europe, 
North America and Hong Kong.152  
 
3.2.1.  Sison’s arguments 
 
Sison’s petition to be delisted from the EU list was submitted on February 6, 2003 
before the Luxembourg-based Court of First Instance of the European Court of Justice.   He 
argued that his designation as a terrorist by the EU Council was taken in violation of 
fundamental rights which were recognised in the founding laws of the European Union.  In 
particular, he argued that it violated the right to a fair trial, the rights of the defence and 
the presumption of innocence, to which he was entitled.153  Sison maintained that by listing 
him as a terrorist, the EU Council accused him of the crime of terrorism and meted out 
punishment (freezing of his welfare benefits) without giving him any factual basis for such 
accusation.154  This prevented him from defending himself from such accusation, and 
denied the court the opportunity to review the lawfulness of the Council’s decision.155  He 
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asked for the files or records containing the factual bases of his designation by the Council 
but the Council maintained the position that it was not legally obliged to accommodate his 
requests, and denied them.   
Sison also alleged that at the time of his terrorist designation, he had never been 
formally accused of terrorism or any crime by a prosecutor or court anywhere in the 
world.156  He pointed out that in the Philippines, two formal investigations, viz., for a 
bombing in 1971 resulting in multiple murders and for subversion activities which were 
initiated in 1981 and 1988, respectively, both resulted in dismissals in 1994 and 1998, the 
first for “lack of sufficient evidence” and the second because the Philippine anti -subversion 
law was repealed.157  In the Netherlands, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to a 
parliamentary question put on August 16, 2002, stated that “the public prosecutor’s office 
was of the view that there was no basis for instigating a criminal investigation against 
[Sison].”158  The clear suggestion was that there was no evidence that Sison had 
participated in any act of terrorism upon which the Council could have relied for its 
decision, and thus that he was being vilified and severely punished without legal 
justification. 
Sison and his supporters raised several other arguments.  For example, Sison and 
members of the NDF negotiating panel emphasised that far from advocating terrorism, 
Sison had been the chief political adviser to the NDF negotiating panel.  In that capacity, he 
had been instrumental in seeking a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict between the 
Philippine government and the CPP-NPA.  They thus argued that the EU Council’s decision 
was an abuse of power because its main purpose was to create an association between 
Sison and terrorism in the public mind and increase the Philippine government’s political 
leverage in the talks.159  Sison’s lawyers also argued that the Council’s designation of him as 
a terrorist and the imposition of the asset freeze was tantamount to denunciation for a 
crime and application of a criminal penalty and thus that the Council  had arrogated to itself 
a judicial role and powers in criminal matters that did not pertain to it. 160 
The most effective argument, however, was Sison’s simple and bold statement that 
he was not the subject of any criminal investigation anywhere in the world.  This provoked 
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strong reactions from the governments who had initiated his terrorist designation as well 
as the scrutiny of the court to which he addressed his case.  If there was evidence that 
Sison had participated in terrorism, what was preventing these governments from bringing 
criminal charges against Sison?  Why did they resort to less than judicial, more politicised 
measures?   Without evidence linking Sison to terrorism, why was he being designated a 
terrorist and subjected to counterterrorism measures? 
 
3.2.2.  Philippine and Dutch governments’ response  
 
Sison’s provocation led governments and the court to attempt to shore up the 
integrity of the counterterrorism measures taken against him.  The Philippine and Dutch 
authorities moved to bring new charges against Sison in their respective courts, which 
would have prevented Sison from claiming that he was not accused of any wrongdoing.  
Although Philippine authorities were not able to serve him summons, Sison was included in 
a 2006 indictment for rebellion which the crisis-ridden Arroyo government brought against 
a broad array of critics in response to what President Arroyo called a “conspiracy between 
the left and the right” against her government.161  However, the investigations were so 
tainted with irregularities that the Supreme Court ordered a halt thereof and the dismissal 
of charges against all 51 respondents.162  
The Dutch response came on August 28, 2007 when Dutch police arrested Sison in 
Utrecht.163  The police also searched his office and at least seven other addresses in Utrecht 
and Abcoude, where some of Sison’s close associates resided.  The Dutch Public 
Prosecution Service announced that Sison was under investigation for ordering killings 
while on Dutch soil, an offense under Dutch law.164   The case was founded on the fact that 
Romulo Kintanar and Arturo Tabara, both well-known former CPP-NPA leaders who had left 
the organisation, were killed by assassins in 2003 and 2006, and that the NPA claimed 
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responsibility for these killings.165  The official statement said a special unit of the New 
People’s Army killed Kintanar as punishment for his so-called “crimes against the revolution 
and the people”.  As for Tabara, the Ministry said, the NPA accused him of being “a 
seasoned criminal and fanatic contra-revolutionist”.  The statement alleged that a special 
unit of the New People’s Army said they attempted to arrest him and try him under the 
NPA’s court.  Tabara and his son in law resisted their capture and were killed as a result.166  
Sison was thus being charged under Dutch law on the basis that he was commanding the 
NPA, and was responsible for the NPA’s decision to kill Kintanar and Tabara. 167  He was 
detained by the Dutch police for 17 days, during which time he was not allowed to contact 
family or friends except for his lawyer.168  Luis Jalandoni, the chairman of the NDF 
negotiating panel, and whose residence was among those searched, decried the searches 
as a “fishing expedition”, and said the police operation involved some 100 police officers 
seizing computers, files, papers and personal effects.169  
The Dutch move, however, also backfired.  In 2007, the investigating judge, as well 
as the appeals court that affirmed his judgement, found that while the prosecutor referred 
to numerous indications that Sison during his exile in the Netherlands continued to have 
influence within the CPP, there was insufficient evidence specifically linking Sison to the 
killings.170  Furthermore, the court commented that the witnesses’ testimonies offered 
against Sison “contained a high degree of indefiniteness in time” and “cannot just simply be 
taken as reliable”.171  Far from undermining Sison’s claim that no evidence linked him to 
terrorism or indeed to any crime, the aggressive responses of the Philippine and Dutch 
governments, had the ironic effect of bolstering Sison’s claim, and further highlighting the 
weakness of the EU Council’s case against Sison.     
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3.2.3.  Response of the court: the 2007 decision  
 
The challenge to the integrity of the terrorist designation posed by the claim that 
there was not sufficient evidence to link Sison to terrorism was not lost on the Court of 
First Instance.  The court responded by ordering the Council of the European Union to 
delist Sison from the EU terrorist blacklist.  It further required that future terrorist 
designations by the EU Council must inform the designated person of the evidence used 
against him or her and allowed his/her the right of response.172   
The decision of the court can be read as upholding Sison’s individual rights, but also  
more broadly, aiming to improve the integrity of the EU’s terrorist designation process. 
The court’s legal reasoning in its judgment of July 11, 2007, in essence, reproduces the 
synthesis of human rights and counterterrorism that underpinned the approach of other 
international courts confronted with similar issues.173  As mentioned, Sison has invoked, 
among other things, “rights to defence”, which is to say, the right to be informed of the 
evidence used against him (“notice”) and to have his views on such evidence heard 
(“hearing”), which are “fundamental rights” recognised in the law of the European 
Union.174  The EU Council as well as the United Kingdom, which filed an intervention in 
favour of the EU Council, argued that the “rights of the defence” were not applicable in the 
context of the specific counterterrorism measures taken in this case.175  The EU Council and 
the UK argued that “prior consultation” with the person whose funds were going to be 
frozen would render asset freeze “ineffective”.176  The UK also argued that “compelling 
reasons of national security” may justify governments’ refusal to disclose the evidence for a 
person’s involvement in terrorism.177  As we have seen in Chapter 1, Section 1 of this thesis, 
similar arguments have been made by the US and the UK that established human rights law 
was not applicable in the context of counterterrorism. 
Had the Court upheld the EU Council and UK government’s positions, no 
government would have been obliged to inform a designated person of the basis for 
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his/her terrorist designation.  Instead, the court rejected the EU Council’s and UK’s 
argument and decided that the “rights of the defence” were indeed applicable in the 
context of a counterterrorist asset freeze, albeit tailored to the demands of 
counterterrorism.  The court thus upheld both the imperative to counter terrorism as well  
as human rights, following the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  
While the court understood that notification of the evidence prior to asset freezing 
jeopardised the effectiveness of the said measure and therefore ruled that it was not 
necessary, the court nevertheless required notification of evidence “concomitantly with or 
as soon as possible after” asset freezing.178  The court saw this as a striking a “balance” 
between “observance of the fundamental rights of the persons included in the list at issue 
and the need to take preventive measures to combat international terrorism”. 179  Since 
Sison was not provided any statement of the reasons for the decision concomitantly with 
or even at any time after the decision was made, his rights to defence were violated. 180  It 
also followed that his right to a judicial remedy is violated as without such statement of 
reasons for the decision, the court is not in a position to undertake judicial review of the 
lawfulness of the council’s decision.  The court therefore annulled the council decision of 
May 29, 2006. 
 
3.2.4.  Response of the EU Council to the 2007 decision 
 
Up to this point, the decision of the European court was favourable to Sison, but 
the Sison campaign had not yet fully achieved its goal.  The CFI had not decided that Sison 
was not a terrorist, rather that the EU Council had to give Sison notice and hearing.  This 
decision gave Sison, but also the Philippine government, some leeway or room for 
interpretation for their own purposes.  The Sison campaigners hailed the decision a victory. 
181  But Arroyo’s national security adviser and the presidential adviser on the peace process 
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were quick to downplay the implications of the European court decision, saying it merely 
pointed out a “procedural lapse” but that it didn’t mean that Sison would be delisted from 
the EU terrorist blacklist. 182  As it turned out, Sison was again listed as a terrorist in a 
subsequent decision of the EU Council on May 30, 2006.  This time, however, he was given 
a letter by the EU Council dated April 23, 2007 containing a “statement of reasons”, which 
informed Sison “that he could submit observations to the Council on the latter’s intention 
to continue to maintain him in the list and on the reasons stated in that regard, and any 
supporting documents, within a period of one month.”183   The EU Council later argued that 
this decision following a new procedure corrected the previous mistake of omitting to give 
Sison notice and hearing.184 
 
3.2.5.  Court’s judgment on EU Council’s 2007 listing of Sison 
 
Sison therefore had to return to court and file a second case in order to review the 
sufficiency of the files or evidence that the EU Council revealed as the basis for its decision 
against him.185  As it turned out, the EU Council’s evidence was very thin.  The EU Council’s 
case was to suffer the same fate as that produced by the Philippine and Dutch 
governments’ earlier attempts in 2006 and 2007 to bring charges against Sison.  
The EU regulation that governs the designation procedure, viz., Common Position 
2001/931, provided in paragraph 1(4) that: 
 
“The list in the Annex shall be drawn up on the basis of precise information or material 
in the relevant file which indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent 
authority in respect of the persons, groups and entities concerned, irrespective of 
whether it concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act, 
an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious and 
credible evidence or clues, or condemnation for such deeds. ...”186 
 
From this provision the Court of First Instance had previously inferred, in the cases of OMPI 
v Council I (Case T-220/02), 2006 E.C.R. II-4665, paragraphs 117, 131, and OMPI v Council II 
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(Case T-284/08) 2008 ECR II-0000, paragraph 52, that the procedure actually involves two 
levels or stages.  First, a national authority, usually a court, decides that a group or 
individual should be investigated or prosecuted on the basis of serious and credible 
evidence or ‘clues’ for a terrorism-related offense.  Second, the Council decides that the 
group or individual should be included in the list on the basis of the fact that a national 
authority has taken the decision in the first stage.187 
The evidence relied on by the EU Council , however, were determinations/findings 
by the Dutch Secretary of State for Justice rejecting Sison’s asylum application, twice 
reversed by the Council of State, but finally affirmed by the Hague District Court.188  Sison 
was denied asylum for various reasons, including that the Netherlands’ regard for good 
relations with the United States outweighed his individual interests, but Sison was also 
pronounced as being subject to a clear danger to his life if sent back to the Philippines.189  
The EU Council’s “statement of reasons” claimed that the Dutch authorities’ decisions to 
deny asylum to Sison rested on evidence that Sison “gave leadership – or has tried to give – 
to the armed wing of the CPP, the NPA, which is responsible for a number of terrorist 
attacks in the Philippines” and that he “maintains contacts with terrorist organizations 
throughout the world”.190  However, the CFI thought otherwise.  First, the court said the 
Dutch decisions did not concern the instigation of investigation or prosecution for acts of 
terrorism.  Rather, they related to the lawfulness of the State Secretary’s rejection of 
Sison’s asylum application.191  Second, while it was true that the State Secretary studied the 
confidential file of the Netherlands internal security service that alleged that Sison was 
leading the NPA or was links to it, no investigation or prosecution for terrorism had been 
instigated against Sison as a result.  There may have been indications in the intelligence 
dossier of Sison’s “possible involvement” with activities of the CPP-NPA, but it appeared 
that those indications were not serious or substantial enough to compel an investigation 
for a crime, much less for terrorism.192 
Learning from the facts of the Sison case, the court set a precedent for the EU 
Council.  The national decision that the Council may invoke as basis for including a person 
in the terrorist list should relate to the imposition on that person of preventive or punitive 
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measures “by reason of that person’s involvement in terrorism”.193  A decision of national 
court that ruled “only incidentally and indirectly” on a person’s “possible involvement” in 
illegal acts, and which related to proceedings of civil nature only, could not be used as basis 
for terrorist listing.194 
This outcome was essentially a repeat of the Sison campaign’s victories in the 
Hague in 2007.  Whereas the Dutch government thought it was enough to give basis for 
believing that Sison still was chairman or at least had a position of influence within the CPP-
NPA to prove that he has a terrorist, the court had ruled that what was needed was to 
produce evidence that Sison had actually participated in a terrorist act.  In other words, 
there could be no finding of guilt by mere association. 
 
3.3.  Outcome of the Sison campaign 
 
Repeatedly, therefore, the frame that the Sison campaign offered – that there was 
no credible evidence linking Sison to terrorism, and that the governments that rushe d to 
paint him as a terrorist did not have a case that could stand judicial scrutiny – was accepted 
and confirmed by the European Court.  The success of the Sison campaign consists in 
showcasing that counterterrorism measures have been abused or misused to vilify the CPP 
founder and NDF consultant.  With his legal victory, Sison’s right to his property was 
restored.  It also defused pressure to remove Sison from the Netherlands and to transfer 
him to Philippines.  
 
3.4.  Finding 
 
Like in the two previous campaigns, campaigners claimed that what was at stake in 
the branding of the CPP-NPA and Sison as “terrorists” was the prospects of a negotiated 
political settlement of the conflict.  However, the campaign to get Sison removed from the 
EU terrorist blacklist appeared to have used dual strategies.  In the political front, 
campaigners insisted that the CPP-NPA waged a “revolution” and had to be dealt with by 
the government politically, through peace negotiations, and not merely militarily; and 
therefore rejected the “terrorist” label for the group and for Sison.  This was not an issue 
capable of being addressed in the courtroom.  Nevertheless, Sison made good use of the 
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judicial terrain to obtain his removal from the European blacklist.  In the legal front, Sison 
concentrated on his claim that the Philippine and Dutch governments had no evidence to 
try him for any crime, much less for terrorism.  As a legal measure, his listing by the 
European Union as a terrorist was so grossly defective in that it did not follow the stated 
procedure.  Though Sison’s court case victory did not involve any pronouncements on the 
CPP-NPA, it helped expose the fact that the Council of the European Union abuse d the 
terrorist listing process.   This helped advance the campaign in the political front.  Foreign 
government supporters of the Philippine government contributed to the depoliticisation of 
CPP-NPA’s armed struggle through terrorist listing.  But the arguments of Sison’s 
supporters in his law suit that his listing intended to create a political leverage in the peace 
negotiations between the Philippine government and the CPP-NPA tended to show that the 
EU’s terrorist listing was politically motivated.      
Sison’s legal strategy interacted with the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism but was not subsumed by it.  This section has examined the language of 
the European Court of First Instance’s judgment in the Sison case.  The judgment was 
consistent with the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  The court’s 
concern in strictly abiding by the stated procedure for terrorist listing and for respecting 
the right of defence of the person subject to asset freeze showed that the court thought 
that counterterrorism and human rights should be pursued together.  Though the court’s 
application of this reasoning eventually led to Sison’s removal from the terrorist list, the 
court’s preoccupation was to bolster the credibility of the EU Council’s terrorist listing 
process.  To the court, the terrorist listing process was legally defined and its abuse can be 
stemmed by perfecting the process through jurisprudential refinement, such as what it 
accomplished in the Sison decisions.  In contrast, the Sison case campaigners exposed the 
political nature of terrorist listing.  
 
4.  Conclusion  
 
This chapter advanced the critical evaluation of the discourse of human rights-
compliant counterterrorism by revealing the discrepancy between it and the resistance 
strategies in three Philippine human rights campaigns.  The common element in the 
strategies of these three campaigns is their insistence that “counterterrorism” measures 
had political aims that campaigners rejected.  Hence, even as the rhetoric of 
“counterterrorism” was depoliticising, they exposed that “counterterrorism” measures 
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were political.  Campaigners believed that promoting human rights required rejecting 
“counterterrorism”.  In contrast, the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism 
elides politics.  It took the announced goal of counterterrorism measures for granted and 
hence participated in the depoliticisation of conflict.   
This is not to deny that international advocates who resisted abuses through the 
development of the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism did not help.  In 
fact, as this chapter illustrated, the European Court’s approach of accommodating human 
rights in terrorist listing helped Sison to overturn his terrorist listing.  However, this chapter 
suggests that the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism also has a silencing 
effect.  It channels human rights advocates’ efforts into improving or transforming 
counterterrorism efforts, discounting local human rights advocates critique of 
“counterterrorism”.   Its potential trajectory can lead critics to the abandonment of critique 
and solidify or perfect counterterrorism policy. 
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Chapter 4 
The Extrajudicial Killings Campaign and the Government’s Response: Failed Remedy, 
Changed Rhetoric, Continuing Practice 
 
This chapter discusses the campaign to stop extrajudicial killings and enforced 
disappearances of leftist activists, and it introduces the writ of amparo (providing a new 
legal remedy to human rights violations) and the national security policy Oplan Bayanihan 
of the Aquino Administration (featuring “adherence to human rights” and “addressing root 
causes” as cornerstones of counterinsurgency).  The Philippines responded to this 
campaign with reforms and there was a decline in the number of reported killings and 
disappearances.  But while the state response rhetorically aligned the country more with 
the international approach, the practices of killings and disappearances persist at an 
alarming rate.     
Of the four Filipino campaigns examined in this thesis, the activist killings campaign 
can be seen as the most successful because it mobilised a broad transnational audience 
that managed to effect rhetorical changes from the Philippine state.  At the peak of the 
campaign in 2007, local campaigners and international NGOs worked with the United 
Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions to press for 
recognition of limits to the counterterrorism/counterinsurgency campaign.  The Arroyo 
government responded by making concessions, acknowledging that human rights violations 
had been committed and undertaking to investigate them.  On the legal front, and 
supported by campaigners, the Philippine Supreme Court introduced an innovative judicial 
remedy of amparo to address rights violations.   
When the succeeding Benigno Aquino administration came to power, it adopted 
seemingly bolder rhetorical changes.  A new national security policy discontinued the 
“terrorism” discourse against the MILF and the CPP-NPA-NDF.  It also acknowledged the 
need to adhere to human rights and to “address the root causes of insurgencies”.  The se 
judicial and policy developments, together with the enactment of the Human Security Act 
(2007)1 defining the crime of “terrorism” under Philippine law, the Anti-Torture Act (2009),2 
the Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances Law (2012)3 and Philippine Act on Crimes 
Against Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity (2009),4 appear 
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to steer official rhetoric away from the unrestrained militaristic approach of the past, and 
provide a semblance of a human rights-friendly legal framework for undertaking 
counterinsurgency. 
Jetschke and Becker paint an optimistic picture of the impact of the extrajudicial 
killings campaign on counterterrorist/counterinsurgency practices.  Jetschke provides a 
constructivist account of the impact of the Philippine extrajudicial killings campaign, 
arguing that they established normative limits to counterterrorism in the Philippines.5  
Becker draws specific lessons about the engagement of the UN independent expert in the 
extrajudicial killings issue, presenting Alston’s Philippine visit and report  as having positive 
though limited impact as reflected in the decrease of killings immediately after Alston’s 
visit and report.6  In this chapter, I question the grounds for Jetschke and Becker’s 
optimism.  I highlight the problematic nature of the reforms adopted by the state in 
response to the campaign.  My main contention is that, notwithstanding the adoption of 
new legal remedies to disappearances and killings, as well as policy pronouncements that 
appeared to resonate with the UN discourse of “countering terrorism while respecting 
human rights”, there are scant grounds for expecting a transformation of security practices.  
This is because the underlying belief that counterinsurgency must address the subversive 
operation of enemies through legal organisations and activities persists.  This continues to 
put leftist activists at risk of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Against the 
idea that more law and recognition of violations can by themselves constrain state 
behaviour and transform counterterrorism/counterinsurgency practices, the chapter 
illustrates how rhetorical changes attuning official discourse with international law are in 
fact used as substitutes for genuine reform. 
 
1.  The Campaign to Stop Extrajudicial Killings of Legal Activists 
 
The expansion of the terrorism discourse to the CPP-NPA did not just affect well-
known personalities in the peace negotiations such as Sison.  As discussed in Chapter 2, in 
the counterterrorism-inflected counterinsurgency strategy that appeared after 2001, 
leaders and activists of mass-based organisations became legitimate targets of military 
operations, unprotected by their legal status.  Hundreds of legal activists were caught up in 
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intelligence profiling documents (called “orders of battle”) identifying them as “NPA fronts” 
and “enemies of the state”, and were accordingly abducted, tortured and/or killed by 
assassins, sending a chilling message to other legal activists and the communities they work 
with.   
While being targeted themselves, local human rights organisations and advocates 
responded by documenting and publicising the phenomenon of extrajudicial killings and 
enforced disappearances of legal activists.  Karapatan documented the highest number of 
cases and it attributed the “alarming pattern of killings and disappearances” to a state 
policy “aimed not only at silencing government critics and quelling dissent, but also at 
annihilating the country’s progressive people’s movement”.7  It drew specific attention to 
the career of General Jovito Palparan, who appeared to have left a trail of violations behind 
him, as each province where he was assigned subsequently experienced a surge of killings 
and disappearances of local activists.  But efforts to investigate General Palparan and 
others implicated by witnesses proved fruitless prior to 2006.  In 2003, the House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Civil, Political and Human Rights recommended the 
investigation of Palparan for violations in the Southern Tagalog region where he was 
assigned, and his temporary suspension from duty.8  But the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines ignored the recommendation, while a presidential task force on the case of 
Eddie Gumanoy and Eden Marcellana did not hold Palparan responsible.9    
As the killings and disappearances intensified, the phenomenon attracted the 
attention of other local and national groups, including the Catholic Bishops Conference of 
the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, both of which issued statements 
of concern.10  In May 2006, in the first government move that acknowledged the existence 
of the problem, the Arroyo government formed Task Force Usig.11  This interagency body 
within the Philippine National Police was tasked with investigating the killings of members 
of party list groups and journalists.12  Task Force Usig however entered the public debate by 
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impugning the credibility of Karapatan’s list, underplaying the seriousness of the problem 
by suggesting that Karapatan has exaggerated the number of victims.13  Moreover, it 
blamed most of the killings on the CPP-NPA.14 
From 2006, mainstream international actors began to increase pressure on the 
state to respond.  Amnesty International (AI) took up the issue of “political killings” in the 
Philippines in a report published on August 15, 2006, which helped mobilise other 
governments and the UN.15  The AI report described the “repeated” reports of local human 
rights groups as “credible”.  Furthermore, it noted that heightened tension between 
President Arroyo and her leftist detractors had intensified the threat of further killings of 
leftist activists,16 and it called for urgent measures to be taken.  Three days after the 
release of AI’s report, President Arroyo tried to manage the situation by establishing the 
Melo Commission and inviting the United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary and arbitrary executions Philip Alston to the Philippines to demonstrate her 
commitment to human rights.17   
The Melo Commission, headed by the retired Supreme Court justice Jose A.R. Melo, 
was mandated to address killings of “media workers and left-wing activists”.18  Karapatan, 
did not participate in proceedings of the Melo commission, fearing a whitewash.19  The 
commission relied on the evidence of the head of Task Force Usig Gen. Avelino Razon, the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines chief Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Gen. Palparan, as well as 
information from the Commission on Human Rights, certain witnesses to killings of farmer-
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activists in Davao City, and media groups.20  The Melo Commission issued its report on 
January 22, 2007, concluding that there was no “sanctioned policy on the part of the 
military or its civilian superiors” to resort to killings.21  The report decried Karapatan’s non-
participation in its proceedings, stating: 
 
If these activist groups were indeed legitimate and not merely NPA fronts, as they 
have been scornfully tagged, it would have been to their best interest to display the 
evidence upon which they rely for their conclusion that the military is behind the 
killings.  In fact, this refusal irresistibly lends itself to the interpretation that they do 
not have the necessary evidence to prove their allegations against the military.22 
 
The commission nevertheless concluded that “certain elements and personalities in the 
armed forces”, particularly Gen. Palparan, were responsible for killings “by allowing, 
tolerating and even encouraging the killings”.23  President Arroyo initially prevented the 
public release of the Melo Commission’s findings until pressured by Alston’s 
recommendation to do so.24   
The intervention of the United Nations’ special rapporteur Philip Alston became a 
watershed in campaigning on the issue.  Alston’s visit and report legitimated local human 
rights organisations’ claims and made it harder for the Philippine military and government 
to deny the seriousness of the killings and disappearances issue.  Unlike the Melo 
Commission, Alston obtained the support of all local human rights organisations, including 
Karapatan.  Local organisations advised Alston on the places to visit in the country and 
provided him with detailed case files regarding 271 extrajudicial killings.25  His team 
interviewed witnesses to 57 incidents involving 96 killings.26  Alston later remarked that the 
“incredibly detailed dossiers from NGOs on both the left and the right” that he received 
were “very sophisticated”, and enabled him to write a report that was more detailed than 
his previous reports.  As a result of cooperation with all local organisations from across the 
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political spectrum, he said he “brought back three to four feet of files, and had a better 
database than anyone in the Philippines.”27  Like Amnesty International, Alston found the 
vast majority of the cases he examined to be “entirely credible”, while find ing that 
government allegations of misreporting or propaganda against Karapatan had done “very 
little to discredit the vast number” of reported cases.28   
The Alston report debunked the claims by the Philippine military that an internal 
“purge” within the CPP-NPA had caused the killings.29  “The military is in a state of denial 
concerning the numerous extrajudicial executions in which its soldiers are implicated,” 
Alston concluded.30  In clear terms, Alston’s report attributed the surge in killings to the 
military’s counterinsurgency strategy that focused on dismantling CPP-NPA front 
organisations within civil society.  Accordingly, to eliminate extrajudicial executions from 
counterinsurgency operations, Alston recommended that the President “take concrete 
steps to put an end to those aspects of counterinsurgency operations which have led to the 
targeting” of civil society.31  These steps should include in particular instituting the principle 
of command responsibility as understood in international law, immediately directing all 
soldiers “to cease [] making public statements linking political or other civil society groups 
to those engaged in armed insurgencies”, and introducing transparency to the “orders  of 
battle” and similar lists.32 
Significantly, Alston also shone a spotlight on other agencies of government, 
particularly, the criminal justice system and law enforcement, as having perpetuated 
impunity for the killings of leftist activists.33  In contrast to other cases, e.g., those of 
journalists, in the cases involving leftist activists, there had been a zero conviction rate.34  
Some of the reasons for this have to do with failure of cooperation between police and 
prosecutors and an inadequate witness protection program.35  But  Alston’s report also 
drew attention to the fact that law enforcement officials actively participated in the 
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counterinsurgency/counterterrorism focus on civil society by prioritizing the prosecution of 
“enemies of state” within leftist partylist groups and other organisations rather than 
tracking down or pursuing their killers.36  Prosecutors had been encouraged to work 
alongside intelligence and military officers, as reflected in the functioning of Inter-Agency 
Legal Action Group (IALAG), an executive body that coordinated the “legal offensive” 
against leaders and members of the CPP-NPA and their “front organisations”.37  The 
reluctance of the police to investigate the military for offenses committed against alleged 
CPP-NPA members may have been partly due to “solidarity fostered in the current 
cooperation in counterinsurgency operations”, opined Alston.38  Accordingly, Alston 
challenged the government to end impunity for violations by achieving “convictions in a 
significant number of extrajudicial executions”.39  He also recommended that IALAG be 
abolished.40  
With transnational pressure, government’s approach to the issue changed.  Year 
after year prior to Alston’s visit, the number of killings and disappearances recorded by 
local human rights organisations have been increasing, reaching a peak in 2006 when more 
than 200 killings and close to 80 disappearances were recorded by Karapatan for that year.  
After Alston’s visit in February 2007, the recorded number of killings and disappearances 
began to diminish.  Karapatan recorded 100 killings and 30 disappearances in 2007 and 90 
killings and nine disappearances in 2008.41  President Arroyo begun referring to Palparan 
and military perpetrators as “killers”, while the AFP leadership started to profess 
“command responsibility”, creating its own human rights office with a mandate to 
investigate complaints against its members.42  Congress also legislated the principle of 
“command responsibility” in the new Anti-Torture Law, Anti-Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances Law, and the Philippine law on IHL.43 
 
2.  The Failure of Legal Remedies: the writ of amparo 
 
In this and the succeeding sections, I examine more closely changes in the post-
2007 legal and security policy fields that were meant to transform security practices.  The 
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changes seemingly recognise human rights limits to counterinsurgency, adding new layers 
of human rights rhetoric onto official discourse.  However, as I argue below, the practice of 
targeting civil society remains unaffected by the changes.     
In this section, I look at the writ of amparo. “Amparo” means “protection” in 
Spanish.  The writ of amparo originated in Mexico in the 19th century, and was later 
adopted in the constitutions of almost every Latin American country.44  The introduction of 
the writ of amparo into the Philippine judicial system was significant because it registered 
official recognition of the need to provide judicial remedies to protect the rights of persons 
at risk of being targeted by extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.  Chief Justice 
Reynato Puno explains the intent of the writ of amparo in this manner: 
 
“The writ of amparo serves both preventative and curative roles in addressing the  
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.  It is preventative in that 
it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative 
in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will i nevitably 
yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.”45  
 
The immediate origins of the remedy can be traced to the campaign against extrajudicial 
executions and enforced disappearances.  The remedies were introduced into the judicial 
system by then Chief Justice Puno during the peak of campaigning.  Following Alston’s visit 
in February 2007, Puno proposed a role for judges and lawyers in helping curb the killings 
during the National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced 
Disappearances on July 16-17, 2007.46  Thereafter, he spearheaded the adoption of the 
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, an unprecedented judicial innovation.47  The Philippine 
Constitution in Art VIII, sec. 5(5) had provided the Supreme Court the power to adopt rules 
of judicial procedure to protect human rights without need for legislation, and the Rule on 
the Writ of Amparo was the first instance in which the court had invoked and exercised this 
power.  As the guest of honour, Puno announced its drafting to the Founding Congress of 
                                                                 
44 Secretary of National Defense v Manalo [2008] Phil ippine Supreme Court No. 180906.  
45 Roxas v Arroyo [2010] Phil ippine Supreme Court G.R. No. 189155.  
46 Reynato Puno, ‘The View from the Mountaintop (Keynote Speech at the National Consultative 
Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances – Searching for Solutions, Manila 
Hotel, July 16, 2007)’ <http://ca.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php?action=mnuactual_contents&ap=j5070> 
accessed 17 February 2016. 
47 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Phil ippines Supreme Court A.M. 07-9-12-SC, came out two 
months after on September 25, 2007, and came into effect at the 62nd anniversary of the United 
Nations on October 24, 2007. Felipe Enrique M Gozon Jr. and Theoben Jerdan C Orosa, ‘Watching 
the Watchers: A Look into the Drafting of the Writ of Amparo’ (2008) 82 Philippine Law Journal 8-28, 
11. 
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the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL) on September 16, 2007 in Cebu City. 48  
Carlos Isagani Zarate said that lawyers of the NUPL and Karapatan helped popularise the 
new writs through trainings and primers, and filed a barrage of cases that forced the Office 
of the Solicitor General to form a special unit for amparo cases.49 
In the internal deliberation of the Supreme Court, Puno successfully suggested that 
the United Nations-endorsed standard on investigation50 for extrajudicial executions and 
enforced disappearances be incorporated into the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 51 effectively 
making such standard part of the right to life, liberty and security.  Under the Rule on the 
Writ of Amparo, the court can establish that a violation existed and that respondents were 
“responsible” or at least “accountable” to conduct a thorough investigation.52  Significantly, 
the amparo rule included the requirement to specify “the steps or actions taken by the 
respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or 
persons responsible for the threat, act or omission.”53  On paper, amparo is a more 
sophisticated remedy, and in theory it should be harder to thwart or evade than the older 
writ of habeas corpus.  Even if the body of the person is not produced, the court still 
undertakes or requires a thorough investigation and protection of the person and 
witnesses.54  The court may order the inspection of particular places, and the production of 
objects or documents which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the investigation. 55  
Moreover, the procedure is meant to be speedy.56   
 
                                                                 
48 Reynato Puno, ‘Message to the NUPL Founding Congress, September 16, 2007’.  
49 Interview 28. 
50 UN Manual on the Effective Protection and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary 
Execution, ST/CSDHA/12-1991, Model Protocol for a Legal Investigation of Extrajudicial, Arbitrary 
and Summary Executions, available at http://www.icrc.org. 
51 Gozon Jr. and Orosa (n 47) 23. 
52 “Responsibil ity” and “accountability” are different from criminal culpability for the enforced 
disappearance, and are determined for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to preserve 
the l ife and restore the l iberty and security of the disappeared.  See Razon v Tagitis, Phil ippine 
Supreme Court decision, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA 598, 663.   
53 Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Sec 9 (b). 
54 “[O]ur orders and directives relative to the writ are … not truly terminated until  the extrajudicial 
kil l ing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and 
the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of 
his or her l iberty and security, and in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action 
against the guilty parties.” Razon v Tagitis (n 52). 
55 Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Sec 14. 
56 Cheryl Daytec-Yañgot, ‘The Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo: A Comparison of Remedies 
Against The Menaces of State Power’ in Edre Olalia (ed), Legal Remedies for Human Rights 
Violations: Studies on the Writs of Amparo, Habeas Corpus, and Habeas Data  (National Union of 
Peoples’ Lawyers 2013) 68.  
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To supplement the protections afforded by the amparo remedy, the Supreme Court issued 
in January 2008 the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.57  The writ of habeas data commands 
“the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or 
files kept by the respondent.”58  Puno explained that if the investigation made by police or 
military is insufficient or if they try to “hide or disregard” relevant information that might 
solve the case, the writ can used to obtain the said information.  This is so that the families 
of the victims, especially those of the disappeared, will be aided in knowing about their 
relative’s fate.59 
While initially greeted with enthusiasm by campaigners, especially by lawyers, the 
new judicial remedies have proven ineffective in facilitating punishment for violators or 
breaking the expectation of impunity.  As I relate below, extremely few victims were 
secured; hardly any perpetrator was brought to justice; and so violations continued at a still 
alarming rate.60   In hindsight, it can be said that the expectation that the amparo remedy 
would contain the problem rested on the belief that the AFP would cooperate in tracking 
down and prosecuting the presumably few bad elements in its ranks.  If the violations, as 
the Melo Commission put it, were not a “sanctioned policy on the part of the military or its 
civilian superiors”, and have only resulted from the misbehaviour by a few bad elements, 
then a crackdown on these wayward elements should be possible.  Once found 
“responsible” or “accountable” by the court, the AFP should be willing to secure victims 
and bring wayward elements to justice in demonstration of respect for human rights.  
These assumptions were proven to be grossly unrealistic.  As I will relate below, in a 
number of cases the court declared the AFP responsible or accountable for the violations, 
but the AFP refused to secure victims and prevented prosecution of offenders within its 
ranks.  The framers of the new judicial remedy did not imagine that the extent of complicity 
in the violations could be wider than what the Melo Commission acknowledged. 
 
                                                                 
57 Phil ippines Supreme Court A.M. 08-1-16-SC, January 22, 2008. 
58 Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, Sec. 6 (e). 
59 Leila Salaverria, ‘How Habeas Data Complements Writ of Amparo’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (3 
February 2008) <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080203 -
116471/How-habeas-data-complements-writ-of-amparo> accessed 15 May 2015. 
60 Karapatan recorded 229 extrajudicial killings and 26 enforced disappearances from the start of the 
Arroyo presidency in July 2010 to December 2014. Karapatan, ‘2014 Karapatan Year-End Report on 
the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines’ (Karapatan 2015). 
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The amparo remedy has only afforded relief to very few victims of violations.   The 
earliest successes were in Western Mindanao in the separate cases of Ruwil Muñasque61 
and Luicito Bustamante62 whose liberty was secured following applications for writs of 
amparo.  But just as noteworthy as the positive result of the proceedings was the 
respondent military’s audacious attempt to thwart the remedy , by getting the victims 
themselves to deny the violation in open court.  Muñasque and Bustamante were 
produced in court but they testified that they were not being held against their will and 
that they preferred to be in military custody rather than to be released to their families 
who had applied for the writ of amparo in their behalf.63  During the trial, Muñasque had to 
be declared a “hostile witness” by the petitioners’ lawyer, who noted that Muñasque was 
“under duress and was mentally tortured” by his custodians.64   
Similarly, Bustamante testified, to the surprise of his family, that he was an NPA 
who voluntarily surrendered to the military; and that he feared being harmed by the NPA 
and thus preferred military custody.65  Moreover, Bustamante appeared to have executed a 
written statement sworn before a prosecutor in Davao del Norte, although the statement 
was written in English, a language he did not understand.66  The judge in his case ruled that 
he was free to go with whomever he wished, with the added proviso that the military 
should provide him protection in any case.67  At the last minute, Bustamante chose to go 
with his mother Bebelita and revealed that he was tortured and intimidated into testifying 
in favour of his captors.  He showed “cigarette burn marks on his neck and back and his 
severely scarred ankles, which days before had been tied with wires” and also recalled 
being severely beaten and forced to swallow his own feces during his captivity.68 
                                                                 
61 Muñasque was a local activist with Christian Youth Fellowship-United Church of Christ in the 
Philippines and Bayan Muna.  The petitioners alleged that he was abducted by soldiers belonging to 
the 53rd Infantry Battalion in Zamboanga del Sur on October 24, 2007. Amnesty International, ‘UA 
295/07 Possible Enforced Disappearance / Fear for Safety’. 
62 Two friends of Bustamante, a farmer, stated that they saw Bustamante being dragged and taken 
against his will by a paramilitary commander in Paquibato town. Germelina A Lacorte, ‘Mother of 
Missing Youth Files Amparo Petition’ Davao Today (9 November 2007) 
<http://davaotoday.com/main/human-rights/mother-of-missing-youth-fi les-petition-for-writ-of-
amparo/> accessed 23 February 2016. 
63 Purple S Romero, ‘Unprecedented Victories in Wri t of Amparo Cases’ (20 December 2007) 
<http://archives.newsbreak-knowledge.ph/2007/12/20/unprecedented-victories-in-writ-of-amparo-
cases/> accessed 26 June 2014; Carlos Isagani T Zarate, ‘Luicito’s Amparo’ Philippine Daily Inquirer 
(19 November 2007) <http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20071119-
101722/Luicito%92s_amparo> accessed 15 June 2015. 
64 Romero (n 63). 
65 Zarate (n 63). 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid. 
68 ibid. 
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But judges have not always seen through the attempt to thwart the remedy in this 
way as the similar cases of sisters Rose Ann and Fatima Gumanoy in Southern Luzon,69 and 
Rubelyn Aba Gelacio and Rosbie Estoque Fundador in Negros Occidental ,70 appear to show.  
Like Muñasque and Bustamante, the Gumanoy sisters and Gelacio and Fundador also said 
they were opting for “voluntary custody” with the military, and that was apparently 
enough for the judges to conclude that the purpose of the amparo remedy was satisfied, 
ending the court’s protective intervention.71  In fact it could be contended that in the cases 
of Muñasque and Bustamante, when the amparo remedy worked, the writ of habeas 
corpus could have worked just as well since the bodies were produced in court.  Clearly, 
the most important factor that determined whether victims were secured in these cases 
was whether the judges played a proactive role.  Added judicial tools to curb the violations 
absent this factor amount to nothing.  
Unfortunately, to devastating effect, the military respondents no longer produce 
the alleged victims in court at all.  According to lawyer Isagani Zarate, a founder of the 
Union of Peoples’ Lawyers in Mindanao (UPLM) in Davao City who has handled various 
cases of amparo for families of the disappeared, the military has “learned lessons from the 
early cases” of Muñasque and Bustamante, avoiding any chance of victims being able to 
leave military custody through a court order.72 
The measures that the writ of amparo allows in terms of mobilizing respondents to 
produce or preserve evidence have not resulted in the ascertaining of the whereabouts and 
fate of the person.  “No one has been surfaced because of amparo,” summarised lawyer 
Rachel Pastores, lawyer at the Public Interest Law Center (PILC), a law office that supports 
NDF peace negotiators and has considerable experience with handling amparo cases.73  
Pastores said that in actual practice, the respondents have gotten away with “token 
efforts” that steps have been taken to find the victim, but in truth no earnest investigation 
                                                                 
69 The Gumanoy sisters were daughters of peasant leader Eddie Gumanoy, of the Samahang 
Magbubukid ng Timog Katagalugan (Peasant Association of Southern Tagalog). Karapatan, ‘Abducted 
Daughters of Slain Peasant Leader Stil l  in Military Custody’ (Karapatan.org) 
<http://www.karapatan.org/node/175> accessed 23 February 2016. 
70 GMANews.TV, ‘Judge Denies Amparo for 2 Alleged NPA “Amazons”’ (GMA News Online) 
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/126401/news/regions/judge-denies-amparo-for-2-
alleged-npa-amazons> accessed 23 February 2016. 
71 Karapatan, ‘2008 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines’ (2009) 22. 
72 Interview No 28. 
73 Interview No 37. 
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is conducted.74  “The military has the burden of showing that they take efforts to look for 
the person.  But in truth, they don’t, and you cannot force them to.”75   
Lawyer Marie Yuvienco echoes this complaint.  She says that the court’s issuance of 
the writ of amparo directing respondents to specify efforts taken to investigate specific 
cases of disappearances has only resulted in a lot of “pencil -pushing” on the part of military 
chain of command, generating written directives to subordinates to investigate but ending 
in further denials that the person is in their custody.76  Illustrative of the lack of earnest 
efforts at investigation is the extraordinary case of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo 
Manolo.77  In this case, the petitioners were the victims of disappearance themselves, who 
after 18 months of captivity were able to escape from military custody and identify 
members of CAFGU and some of the soldiers (including General Palparan) who abducted 
and tortured them.  They furthermore witnessed the violations against Sherilyn Cadapan, 
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino while detained in the same place.  But the investigation 
conducted by the military unit commander who had command of the six implicated CAFGU 
members absolved them based on their own statements that the Manolo brothers were 
NPA sympathisers who simply had a grudge against the CAFGU.78   
 
                                                                 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid. 
76 Marie Francesca Therese J Yuvienco, ‘Servir Y Amparar - To Serve and Protect: Thoughts on the 
Efficacy of the Writ of Amparo’ (2011) 36 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Journal 54-76, 71. In the 
six amparo cases that reached the Supreme Court, Yuvienco said that the military chain of 
command’s response to the court’s directive to make a thorough investigation showed a pattern of 
perfunctory compliance.  She summarised their response in the following manner:  
“1. If the President of the Republic has been impleaded, he or she will  claim immunity from suit;  
“2. If the Secretary of Defense has been impleaded, he wi l l  depose that he does not directly engage 
in or command military operations; that, immediately upon receipt of the writ of amparo, he caused 
to be prepared a Memorandum Directive addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the 
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disappearance; that they have caused an investigation to be made and will  submit a report to higher 
authorities; and that they will  faithfully comply with the conditions of the writ.” ibid 70. 
77 Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo, Phil ippine Supreme Court decision, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 
2008. 
78 ibid.  
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Pastores complained that in practice petitioners are burdened with producing 
specific evidence identifying the perpetrators at the outset of the case, even though the 
amparo rule provides no such requirement.  This follows from the fact that petitioners get 
absolutely no support from the military or the police with respect to gathering evidence 
against soldiers or paramilitary.  Furthermore, Pastores also complained that many judges 
act as if the amparo remedy were a criminal case for kidnapping, dismissing petitions 
where no direct evidence identifying the actual abductors is presented.  As a result, 
Pastores explains, her decision as a lawyer whether or not to file a petition for amparo 
depends on whether there are witnesses available to identify the actual abductors, which is 
rarely the case.  Absent knowledge of the identity of the actual abductors, she said, it’s no 
use making the AFP chief or an AFP commander a respondent in an amparo case.  This was 
because the petitioner cannot expect them to do the investigation.  The respondents 
themselves might be involved in the abduction.  Assuming further that there are witnesses 
who could identify the actual abductors, the amparo remedy can still be defeated by having 
such witnesses disappeared.  This has happened in the case of her client Leo Velasco. 79 
Thus, in actual practice, the petitioners, instead of the respondents, are made to do 
the investigation of the disappearance or ki lling.  Zarate concludes:  “[T]he writ of amparo 
became useless.  In fact, we hardly use it nowadays. Sparingly, very sparingly, if at all.”80 
Even in those rare cases where petitioners, through their own efforts, have been 
able to gather evidence, courts can still be unwilling to step in.  Zarate gives the example of 
his own amparo case to protect against a threat of disappearance filed in 2010, which was 
dismissed because the court did not accept a “leaked copy” of an Order of Battle document 
bearing his name as evidence that it existed.81  The amparo case of Jonas Burgos also 
stands out for the unusual amount of evidence obtained by the petitioner.  This evidence 
included: eyewitnesses to the abduction; a car plate traced to a vehicle in the military’s 
possession; and leaked copies of confidential Army reports which purported to show that 
Burgos was “apprehended” and “processed” by the military .82  Yet, despite all this 
evidence, the case has dragged on for years.  The Supreme Court has had to order that the 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) take over the investigation, as investigations by the 
Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) and the AFP 
                                                                 
79 Interview 37. 
80 Interview 28. 
81 ibid. 
82 Burgos vs. Esperon, Phil ippine Supreme Court decision, G.R. No. 178497, February 4, 2014. 
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have been “less than complete” and “had significant lapses”.83  While one of the eight 
abductors was identified and charged following the CHR’s report of March 15, 2011, the 
petitioner Edita Burgos, Jonas’ mother, thought the courts could have uncovered more 
evidence from the military’s possession and acted more quickly.84  The judges’ unfamiliarity 
with the contents of the new rules was less the problem than their lack of appetite or 
aptitude for a proactive role.85 
Not only has the remedy of amparo been ineffective in facilitating punishment or 
breaking the expectation of impunity, it has even caused legal problems for some of the 
organisations targeted by the military.  Pastores reports that amparo has been used to 
accuse Kabataan Partylist and Bayan Muna of facilitating recruitment of minors into the 
CPP-NPA, and Karapatan for hiding families or relatives of alleged rebels, on the theory that 
these were also instances of enforced disappearance or human rights violations.86  Without 
guidance from the Supreme Court as to whether non-state agents can be made 
respondents in amparo cases, proponents of counterinsurgency have experimented with 
more amparo cases against leaders of targeted organisations.87 
Indeed, the “legal offensive” against “front” organisations and alleged leaders of 
the CPP-NPA within civil society continues, undeterred by repeated dismissals of the state’s 
court cases.88  Years after the Arroyo government abolished IALAG in compliance with a 
recommendation of the Alston report, prosecutors continue to hound leaders of partylist 
and other legal mass organisations accusing them of criminal responsibility for illegal acts 
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of the CPP-NPA-NDF, on the theory that legal and illegal leftist organisations form a 
seamless network.89  Satur Ocampo, formerly a member of the House of Representatives 
representing the Bayan Muna partylist organisation, and a number of individuals who 
support the NDF as consultants in the peace negotiations, have been targeted in this way.  
On February 2007, prosecutors charge that Ocampo along with Randall Echanis, Rafael 
Baylosis and Vicente Ladlad, all prominent leftist leaders and consultants of the NDF in 
peace negotiations, were members of the Central Committee of the CPP.90  They were 
indicted for alleged NPA killings of “suspected military informers” in Leyte, alongside 71 
other named and unnamed persons allegedly members of the CPP-NPA-NDF.91  The energy 
for building cases against Ocampo and others contrasts sharply with the lethargy for 
investigating killings and disappearances of leftist activists.  It also confirms that the 
government’s pursuit of civil society-focused counterinsurgency has barely diminished. 
 
3.  The Rhetoric of “Adherence to Human Rights” and “Addressing Root Causes” in 
Counterinsurgency: Oplan Bayanihan 
 
Karapatan has always maintained that extrajudicial killings and disappearances 
were systemic or policy-driven rather than mere random incidents attributable to a few 
wayward elements within the AFP, as the Melo Commission had contended.  This is 
reflected in Karapatan’s trenchant criticism of Oplan Bantay Laya, Arroyo’s operational plan 
for the AFP.92  After Benigno Aquino III assumed the presidency, he received flak for 
continuing on with Oplan Bantay Laya for the first six months of his term.93  On December 
22, 2010, however, the Aquino government released the AFP’s Internal Peace and Security 
Plan (IPSP), also called Oplan Bayanihan, which outlines the new president’s security policy 
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and is meant to guide the activities or operations of the AFP during his six-year term.94  The 
document was formulated after a series of workshops among officials of the Department of 
Defense, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commission on Human Rights, Office of the 
Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, civil society and academics.95  In several respects, 
the IPSP reflects the Aquino government’s response to the human rights campaigning 
around the “War on Terror” in the Philippines.  First, it scales back official counterterrorism 
rhetoric, restoring the MILF and CPP-NPA to the status of “insurgencies”, and reserves the 
label “terrorism” for the Abu Sayyaf and JI.  Second, it grafts a human rights language onto 
official security policy. 
Broadly, the IPSP claims to commit the security establishment to a “paradigm shift” 
in understanding and pursuing security, in which the importance of “adherence to human 
rights” is explicitly acknowledged.  The plan is supposed to herald a conceptual shift by 
adopting the United Nations’ concept of “human security”, also referred to in the 
document as “people-centered security”, and applies it to the country’s internal armed 
conflicts. 96  The concept is defined in the document as follows: 
 
“[H]uman security is freedom from fear and freedom from want.  It is the state of being 
able to live with human dignity.  More than the absence of violent conflict, human 
security means the protection and respect for human rights, good governance, access 
to economic opportunities, education and health care.  The concept has several 
components: economic security, health security, environmental security, personal 
security, community security, and political security requiring the entire government 
bureaucracy, the private sector, and the civil society to collectively implement.”97  
 
In its 1994 report, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) first 
proposed the concept of “human security” as a new approach to security. 98  The UNDP 
argued that states have generally interpreted security narrowly to refer to the  
protection against threats to the state, and that there was a need to recognise the 
broader concept of “human security” which referred to the protection of people’s 
individual freedom (“freedom from fear”) and enhancement of their well-being 
                                                                 
94 Jules Maaten and Pauline Sanchez, ‘Aquino Administration’s Human Rights Direction: Traversing a 
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95 ibid. 
96 Armed Forces of the Philippines, ‘Internal Peace and Security Plan’ 25. 
97 ibid 25–26. 
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(“freedom from want”).99 The new approach sparked debates among states and 
scholars alike regarding the scope of the concept of “human security” and how to 
operationalise the same in the context of specific countries.100  In Southeast Asia, some 
scholars argue that the concept of “human security” remains marginal, confined to 
counter-discourses of non-government organisations.101   Although the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has began to espouse a rhetoric of a “people-
centered” ASEAN, “a community of peoples”, and has tried to implement this idea in the 
security sphere,102 certain member states view the term “human security” with 
suspicion.103  As a result, the term is not used in the ASEAN Charter.104  Instead, the 
ASEAN and certain member states prefer the term “comprehensive security”, which 
admits the existence of a variety of security threats, including “non-traditional” ones 
such as health epidemics, terrorism, and climate change, but nonetheless threats to the 
political stability of the state.105  Thus, seen from a regional perspective, Oplan 
Bayanihan’s adoption of the term “human security” is a daring rhetorical move.    
This implies, according to the document, that “security is no longer solely focused 
on ensuring the stability of the [Philippine] State” but that “[o]f equal concern … is the 
safety and well-being of the Filipino people with human rights as the overarching frame”. 
106  The idea is that adopting the human security concept allows for an understanding of 
national security as a shared goal among the AFP and the civilian branches of government 
as well as civil society.  As such, the document highlights the importance of the 
involvement or support of “all stakeholders”, meaning the different government agencies, 
non-governmental organisations and citizens in the so-called “whole-of-nation 
approach”.107  To underscore this point, the plan is made available to the public.   Previous 
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operational plans for the AFP had been confidential documents.108  There is, furthermore, a 
call for the AFP to engage directly in consultation and dialogue to forge partnerships with 
civil society organisations.109 
The framers of the IPSP also appear to recognise that addressing armed security 
threats involve addressing the “root causes” thereof, which are “structural problems”.   
 
[I]nsurgency is largely driven by structural problems in Philippine society, such as 
unequal development, non-delivery of basic services, injustice, and poor governance 
– all of which are beyond the military purview.110 
 
The “military solution” which was the decades-long strategy of previous governments, is 
acknowledged as “inadequate in effectively addressing armed security threats”.111  Military 
operations simply “support” efforts by the civilian government to implement structural 
reforms “to win the peace”.112  Combat military operations must therefore be “focused” on 
combatants, i.e., the “armed components of internal armed threat groups” as opposed to 
their “mass bases”.113  New emphasis is given to non-combat military operations such as 
civil-military operations and development-oriented activities. 114   
In more specific terms, the IPSP directs the AFP to approach different “armed 
security threats” differently.  With respect to “terrorist groups”, which the document 
identifies as the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah, the AFP should aim to defeat them 
through military operations, albeit after isolating them from other armed threat groups, 
foreign support, and their mass base, who are said to be co-ethnics and kin who provide 
them sanctuary.115  In glaring contrast, the AFP’s goal for the MILF, which is regarded as an 
“insurgency”, is “to achieve a negotiated political settlement and attain a just and lasting 
peace in Mindanao”.116  Under the so-called “primacy of the peace process” principle, the 
AFP should only conduct military operations “when necessitated by the security situation” 
and it should focus on peace building, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.117  
                                                                 
108 Interview 43. 
109 Armed Forces of the Philippines (n 97) 25. Military-civil society dialogues are undertaken through 
a project of the Alternative Law Groups (ALG) and the Bantay Bayanihan (Bayahihan Watch), both 
headquartered at the Ateneo de Manila Uni versity campus in Quezon City. Interviews 41, 43 and 45. 
110 ibid 1. 
111 ibid. 
112 ibid 45. 
113 ibid 29. 
114 ibid 24. 
115 ibid 31–32. 
116 ibid 31. 
117 ibid 28. 
 152 
Military operation should be “focused” on “rogue elements of the MILF who resort to 
atrocities”.118  Maintaining a “credible deterrent posture” is the main objective for the AFP 
in dealing with the MILF.119     
The approach to the “communist insurgency” is strikingly different from the 
approach to the MILF.  With respect to the “communist insurgency”, the envisioned end 
goal is not a negotiated political settlement but rather “to render their armed component, 
the New People’s Army (NPA), irrelevant and show the group the futility of their armed 
struggle”. 120 The peace negotiations with them noted but they are not regarded as the 
primary mode for addressing the root causes of the armed conflict.  The main mechanism 
for ending the NPA’s armed struggle is “social pressure” which will supposedly come from a 
demonstration of the government’s sincerity in delivering development, social services, 
justice, good governance, etc., i.e., the root causes of the conflict.  The NPA should be 
made to realise that the use of armed struggle to achieve its political agenda is “not 
acceptable to the Filipino people and to any civilized society”.121     
Satur Ocampo, who headed the National Democratic Front (NDF) negotiating panel 
in the very first peace negotiations with the Philippine government in 1986, underscores 
that this interpretation of “addressing root causes” departs from previous understandings.  
He recalled that the term “addressing the root causes of the armed conflict” started with 
President Corazon Aquino, and it has been the framework of the peace negotiations with 
the NDF.  Aquino used the term in a speech at the graduation exercises in the University of 
the Philippines in March 1986.  There she called for negotiations and said she would seek 
to address the root causes of the armed conflict and war.  The NDF proposed that to 
address the root causes of the armed conflict, there has to be “nationalist 
industrialisation”, respect for human rights, and other elements of its reform program.  
Ocampo said, under Benigno Aquino’s presidency, “addressing the root causes of the 
armed conflict” no longer referred to “structural transformation” of politics, the economy, 
etc.  Rather, the government only sought to “address the root causes of conflict in the 
areas of conflict” primarily through “a combination of military offensives and peace and 
development operations”.  “So that did away with [necessity of the] peace negotiations to 
address the root causes.”122 
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Oplan Bayanihan’s stated approach to the CPP-NPA-NDF continued to focus on 
their mass base just as the previous counterinsurgency strategy did.  Where the 
“communist insurgency” is concerned, “structural problems” are acknowledged to fuel 
insurgency but only by way of “perceptions”, which implies that the perceptions are 
misguided.  Communist insurgents are seen as exploiting these structural problems, i.e., 
peddling false perceptions of the government’s role in the perpetuation of these problems, 
to recruit people to take up arms against the government and/or support the NPA. 123  Thus, 
undermining the hold of the NPA on their mass base requires influencing their perception 
of the government’s efforts at addressing structural problems.  “Non-combat military 
activities”, which include “public information campaigns, civic action programs, 
development-related projects and collaborative activities with government and non-
government stakeholders” in NPA strongholds, are supposed to accomplish this task.124  
They show armed combatants and their mass base alike “that the government is sincere in 
addressing the roots of conflict”.125  Therefore, “addressing root causes” actually masks a 
strategy of disavowing the necessity of peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA-NDF and 
reliance on countervailing positive images and messages about the government. 
Furthermore, without a negotiated arrangement with the CPP-NPA-NDF, bringing 
development to mass bases in conflict areas necessitates removing the NPA (“armed 
security threats”) in those areas by force as armed threats are seen as hindering the 
promotion of development in those areas.126  Inevitably, therefore, “addressing root 
causes” also means an escalation of warfare.  Although advised to be “accurate and 
precise” - meaning targeting only “armed insurgents” - in compliance with human rights 
and international humanitarian law, military combat operations must be “intensified and 
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relentless”.127  “Focused military operations involve the use of combat operations and 
development activities.”128  
The prominent mention of “focused” operations, “non-combat” methods, the 
distinction between armed combatants and mass base, and the call for dialogue with civil 
society in Oplan Bayanihan appeared designed to suggest a transformation of military 
relations with civil society, so that legal organisations are not treated like combatants in the 
armed conflict with the CPP-NPA.  However, in practice, one can identify two trends in 
military-civil society relations.  On the one hand, certain non-governmental organisations, 
such as the Alternative Law Groups (ALG) and the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights 
Advocates (PAHRA), have welcomed Oplan Bayanihan’s call for dialogue on human rights 
and security and have cultivated improved relations with the military.129  On the other 
hand, the relationship of the military to other leftist organisations remain conflictual.   
According to Atty. Marlon Manuel of the ALG, their affiliated civil society organisations 
have since October 2009 conducted a series of regional-level dialogues with middle-level 
officers of the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) under the aegis of a jo int 
project with the two institutions and the Commission on Human Rights. 130  The aim was 
simply to establish open communication lines between civil society organisations and the 
AFP and PNP, and in this, the project was successful.131  PAHRA’s chair Max de Mesa, who 
represents PAHRA on another project with the AFP called Bantay Bayanihan (Bayanihan 
Watch), explained that they joined the project because they regard the existence of open 
communication channels with certain officials as opportunities to promote human rights.132  
De Mesa clarified, however, that open communication lines had not yet facilitated the 
resolution of even a single case that they have documented and brought to the attention of 
their contacts within the AFP.133  
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A more persistently conflictual relationship is evident between the AFP and other 
left-wing civil society groups, including Karapatan.  In upland areas of believed NPA 
influence in northern Mindanao populated by non-Islamised indigenous peoples (lumad), 
military-civilian conflict is prevalent.  Removing the armed threat of the NPA and bringing 
“development activities” to NPA mass bases in those areas  would entail sharp conflict 
between legal organisations and communities, on the one hand, and the military, on the 
other hand.  In the face of a resistant or non-cooperative mass base, the conceptual 
distinction in Oplan Bayanihan between the NPA and its mass base would quickly 
evaporate in practice, exposing leftist activists and community leaders to legal charges for 
being “fronts” of the NPA and/or the risk of extrajudicial killings.134   
Lumad communities have taken to evacuating from their upland villages and 
putting up makeshift camps in public spaces and shelters in cities and towns to protest 
military presence and activities in their villages and negotiate their withdrawal 
therefrom.135  The protest phenomenon is simply called bakwit (evacuees).136  The recorded 
complaints from evacuees provide a bakwit perspective on the military’s treatment of 
believed mass bases.  These complaints reveal the systematic use by the military of 
intimidation and coercive action against civilians, including children.  The allegations 
include that soldiers engage in heavy-handed tactics to gather intelligence about the NPA 
from unarmed civilians including children; the use of the communities’ children as guides in 
combat operations; threats to attack civilians if the NPA attacks the military; indiscriminate 
firing at houses and properties; the use of their schools and houses as military barracks or 
outposts; and disruption to farming and other livelihood activities, such as through the 
imposition of curfews.137  The difficult trek from the mountains to cities and towns and the 
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unliveable conditions in makeshift camps have also caused sufferings, and resulted in 
several deaths.138   
A local campaign in Davao City, dubbed “Save Our Schools” (SOS), draws specific 
attention to the shutting down of self-run schools and the plight of school children in 
militarised lumad villages.139  According to the SOS network, which includes KATRIBU and 
Karapatan, there were 146 self-run schools in Mindanao that were established by the 
lumad themselves in their villages, despite the chronic lack of government investment in 
education and basic services.140  The deployment of soldiers to these villages, which Oplan 
Bayanihan claims seeks to deliver basic services to NPA mass bases, has ironically, 
subjected 87 of these schools to disruption or “attack”.141  As a result, an estimated 5,000 
lumad school children were prevented from going to the school.142  The military has alleged 
that one such school, which was owned by the local lumad organisation Salugpongan Ta 
’Tanu Igkanogon (Unite to Save the Ancestral Land) in Talaingod, Davao del Norte , and 
which was established with the help of civil society organisations was “run by the NPA”.143  
As a result, the provincial superintendent of schools recommended non-renewal of its 
license to operate and the construction instead of another school “utilizing the  resources of 
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the military and using soldiers as para-teachers”.144  The Talaingod evacuees have 
protested this move by camping outside the regional office of the Department of Education 
(DepEd) in Davao City.145  While the Salugpongan school eventually had its license renewed, 
the SOS campaigners allege that government education officials continue to allow or 
condone militarisation of schools.146  
Bakwit protests have sometimes prompted local negotiations to withdraw military 
troops from some villages permitting the lumad to return home.147  In 2012, evacuees in 
Bukidnon returned home after the military made promises to arrest the main suspect in 
the killing of their village chief,148 while evacuees from Kicharao, Agusan del Norte were 
persuaded to return in 2011 with the military’s assurance to the municipal government 
that it was safe to return.149   In more recent cases, however, the military has simply 
escalated the conflict with lumad leaders and legal organisations supporting the bakwit by 
criminalising their protest.150  In these situations, the military appear to regard the conflict 
with civil society as an extension of the armed conflict with the NPA.  Col. Romeo Brawner, 
spokesperson of the Eastern Mindanao Command of the AFP, called the bakwit protest a 
“tactic” of the CPP-NPA-NDF and claimed that the lumad are forced by the NPA to evacuate 
from their villages and to stay in evacuation centres which are “also controlled by the CPP -
NPA-NDF”.151  The bakwit are not seen as bona fide protestors; instead, NPA “front” 
organisations are suspected of coercing or manipulating them.  This theory is developed in 
criminal charges for kidnapping and human trafficking which have been brought against 
leaders of leftist organisations, including Bayan and Karapatan in Davao City, who have 
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supported the “bakwit” protest through campaigning, and the United Church of Christ in 
the Philippines (UCCP), which owns the premises of the Haran compound that have been 
used as a shelter for the evacuees from Talingod in Davao City.152  Ironically, the theory that 
the “bakwit” are victims has allowed petitions for writs of amparo and habeas corpus to be 
filed against lumad leaders and supportive legal organisations in connection with a 
“bakwit” protest.153      
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted the problematic nature of human rights rhetoric in 
official discourse in the Philippines, as exhibited in the writ of amparo and Oplan 
Bayanihan.  I have suggested that these measures, though appearing to advance official 
recognition of human rights in the context of counterinsurgency, have not actually made 
much difference in practice.  Though designed to prevent and deter enforced 
disappearances and extrajudicial killings, the amparo remedy is almost always 
circumvented, belying a much wider extent of complicity in violations than has been 
officially admitted.  Notwithstanding the profession of “adherence to human rights” and 
“addressing root causes”, principles which resonate with the Uni ted Nations global 
counterterrorism strategy, Oplan Bayanihan does not aim to transform the approach to the 
CPP-NPA.  The underlying belief that counterinsurgency must target communist enemies 
operating through legal organisations and activities remains unchallenged.  Moreover, 
extrajudicial killings and disappearances of leftist activists continue to occur.  According to 
Karapatan, since Aquino took office in July 2010 to December 2014, there were 229 
recorded extrajudicial killings, of which 106 victims had known organisational affiliation 
with legal left-wing organisations.154  
Recent policy shifts have not ushered in normative change.  Rather, they have the 
effect of delaying to undertake change, continuing the denial of the necessity to undertake 
more serious actions.  The interpretation of “addressing root causes” in reference to the 
“communist insurgency”, for example, denies the need for negotiations with the CPP -NPA 
over economic, social and political reforms.  In this manner, though it restores the CPP-NPA 
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to the status of “insurgency”, Oplan Bayanihan’s approach to the CPP-NPA has the same 
effect as the designation of the CPP-NPA as a terrorist organisation.  The continuation of 
practice of denying the legitimacy of left-wing activism, which we observe in the military’s 
denial that the bakwit protests against military abuses are genuine, elides the necessity to 
account for human rights violations against the lumad.  The result is the perpetuation of 
impunity for abuses. This chapter therefore shows that alignment with the discourse of 
human rights-compliant counterterrorism can mask a continuing denial for the need to 
undertake serious reforms and a continuing impunity for abuses.   
As we move on to the Indonesian case study, it is worth emphasising the key 
lessons from the Philippine case study.  This thesis has provided a critical re-evaluation of 
the local discourse of terrorism in the Philippines after 9/11.  In Chapter 2, I showed that 
the Philippine government labelled the MILF and the CPP-NPA “terrorists” in order to take 
advantage of opportunities afforded by alliance with the US’ “War on Terror” even though 
the terrorist label was not compelling.  The appearance of countering terrorism allowed the 
Philippine government to advance a more aggressive policy against them as well as against 
legal left-wing organisations, resulting in grave human rights consequences.  Given the 
problematic nature of the local terrorism discourse in the Philippines, Filipino human rights 
campaigners were more keen on promoting human rights by rejecting the labels 
“terrorism” and “terrorist” than in improving counterterrorism through the incorporation 
of human rights in counterterrorism policy.  In Chapter 3, I provided an analysis of Filipino 
advocates’ initiatives, namely, the campaign against American troop presence in Basilan; 
the Mindanao Truth Commission; and the Sison delisting case, elucidating their rejection of 
the application of the terrorism discourse to the MILF and the CPP-NPA.  Thus, the 
discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism represents a departure from the 
strategies that have been adopted by Filipino advocates.  Finally, in this chapter, I had 
probed whether attaching a human rights language to Philippine counterterrorism has  had 
transformative effect.  After the height of campaigning against extrajudicial killings of left-
wing activists, the Philippine government responded with policy reforms that sought to 
align the country to the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  I evaluated 
these post-2006 Philippine policies, showing that these policies have not resulted in a 
transformation of counterinsurgency practice towards the CPP-NPA and legal left-wing 
organisations.  The Philippine case study thus argues against a transformative effect.  
Rather, it illustrates that the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism can be 
deployed by government to create a semblance of change and to prolong undertaking 
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more serious reforms.  By perpetuating a state of denial, the discourse may be contributing 
to conditions that breed impunity for abuses. 
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Chapter 5 
Indonesian Counterterrorism Discourse from Suharto to Bali 
 
 
[T]here remain individuals and Muslim groups who keep the idea of establishing 
an Islamic state in Indonesia alive.  Depending on the political situation at 
certain times, these people can operate underground or openly in achieving 
their goals.  They may also collaborate with certain unhappy military elements 
or even with other radical groups, which, in terms of ideology, are incompatible 
with theirs.  … Therefore one should be very careful in analysing radical groups.  
Some of them could genuinely be motivated by religious factors, but others 
could be ‘engineered’ radicals sponsored by certain individuals and groups for 
their own political ends.1 
 
At first glance, the rationality of counterterrorism policy in Indonesia seems beyond 
question.  Unlike Western democracies or the UN Security Council, Indonesia did not rush 
into legislating counterterrorism policy immediately after 9/11.  Rather, it did so only after 
an initial draft law was debated at length and only after the Bali bombings of October 12, 
2002 illustrated the reality of the threat on Indonesian soil.2  Careful police investigation 
revealed the Bali bombing to be the handiwork of a conspiracy of operatives acting out of 
religious zeal, identified with a clandestine organisation called Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).3  If 
foreign governments were involved in pressuring Indonesia to adopt a counterterrorism 
policy, it was because innocent foreign nationals, mostly Australians, were victims of the 
bombings.  To deny the need for counterterrorism seems to exhibit extreme scepticism or 
foolish complacency. 
In the search for ways to prevent similar terrorist incidents, international observers 
focused on the identities of individuals and organisations involved in the violence, the ideas 
and goals that motivate them, the internal workings of such organisations, and the 
networks in which these individuals and organisations circulate.4  Assessments of the 
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nature and seriousness of the terrorist threat draw upon profiling “terrorist organisations” 
such as JI and its offspring.5  There is intense interest, e.g., in whether Al Qaeda is “linked” 
to JI, whether JI has broader, regional goals, and whether it is involved in violence outside 
Indonesia, such as in the Philippines.6  Abuza provides a stern assessment of JI, painting it 
as the regional “affiliate” or “franchisee” of Al Qaeda and arguing that terrorists are 
capable of influencing the direction of Indonesian politics because of terrorism’s broader 
social base within Indonesia.7  The premise underlying many of these threat assessments is 
that violence arises from fanatical commitment to radical Islamic ideas and goals, which 
define terrorist organisations.  In step with this understanding, Indonesian 
counterterrorism encompasses police operations aimed at apprehending JI and other 
operatives, as well as preventing the spread of their radical ideas.8   
The problem with understanding terrorism in this manner is that it tends to identify 
the cause of violence in the psychological or ideological pathology of radical clerics and 
recruits.9  Terrorism thus seems to be inherent in the terrorists themselves, and little or no 
attention is paid to the wider political context in which they are embedded.  Like chapter 2 
on the Philippines, this chapter reinforces the need to pay greater attention to context and 
local meaning of practices.  This context includes a history of state suppression or 
neutralisation of government opponents (or would-be opponents) who mobilise in the 
name of Islam.  Once terrorism is contextualised within this history of suppression of 
“Islamism”, it will be more difficult to frame counterterrorism operations as a neutral and 
necessary reaction to terrorism (which in contrast, embodies all that is partial and 
unnecessary).  Counterterrorism is not a neutral or a technical exercise.  Rather, 
counterterrorism itself is also part of an intensely political struggle involving the identity of 
the state and the place of Islam in it.  
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In this chapter, I discuss the Indonesian counterterrorism discourse developed by 
the Suharto regime and the re-emergence of the “terrorist threat” in 2000.  Contemporary 
Indonesian counterterrorism, that is, post-2002 Bali bombing, is then addressed in Chapter 
6.  The examination in this chapter thus provides a necessary background to Chapter 6.  I 
will argue that like the Arroyo government in Chapter 2, the Suharto regime  did not simply 
discover, but in many senses created or fostered “terrorists”.  Counterterrorism discourse 
bolstered Suharto’s hold on power, with devastating consequences for human rights.  
Moreover, the problematic conditions that allowed Suharto to foster “terrorism” have 
continued long after Suharto’s fall. 
The argument in this chapter draws from John Sidel’s critical reassessment of the 
“Islamist threat” in Indonesia.10 Sidel’s argument provides historical and political context to 
the terrorist violence and enables a critique of counterterrorism that cannot be easily 
dismissed as a simple mode of denial or “conspiracy theory”.  The argument is not that 
terrorism does not exist.  Rather, it is that the fixation of counterterrorism on the belief 
that terrorist violence is caused by Islamic extremists who must be neutralised results in a 
distorted understanding of terrorism.  There is a more complex pattern to terrorist violence 
that requires more than a shallow and circular assertion that terrorism is caused by 
terrorists.  To understand why terrorism re-appeared after Suharto and why foreigners 
were targeted in Bali, it is as important to know the political and historical context of the 
violence as it is to point out who their immediate architects were.      
Sidel joins Hamilton-Hart11 in criticising the dominant current of studies of terrorist 
violence in Indonesia for promoting a one-sided and manipulated understanding of 
terrorism that favours the agenda of rigidly anti-Islamist forces.  The dominant current 
relies heavily and largely uncritically on official or state sources, whose orientation is 
decidedly anti-Islamist, and whose security and intelligence services have a history of 
manipulation of information as well as torture and other human rights abuses. 12  The result 
is that orthodox terrorism studies on Indonesian groups like JI emphasise “alarmism” at the 
spectre of a rising “Islamist threat” that demands further surveillance, neutralisation and 
suppression.13  Within this dominant current of terrorism studies, the identification of JI or 
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similar radical Islamist groups, suffices to explain the pattern of terrorist violence.  Beyond 
critique, Sidel offers an alternative picture of Indonesian Islamist forces in decline, retreat 
and disorientation, and an alternative explanation for the eruption of terrorism.  In his 
view, terrorism signals not a rising “Islamist threat”, but rather Islamist insecurity.  Islamist 
forces are in decline, divided, cut off from channels of government influence, and violence 
is employed in their name largely as a form of defense mechanism to defend against 
attacks, encroachments or rising social influence of non-Muslims or anti-Islamists.14  In 
short, terrorism evidences not the strength of radical religious ideas but the desperate 
denial of their weakness.      
 
1.  Indonesian Islamism, Radical Islamism, and Terrorism within a History of Repression 
 
1.1. Definitions: “Islamist”; “Radical islamist”  
Before proceeding, a few clarifications are in order pertaining to the words 
“Islamist” and “radical Islamist” in the Indonesian context.  “Islamism”, as the word is used 
by scholars of Muslim societies today, is the conception or use of Islam as a political 
ideology or the basis of a political ideology, particularly by contemporary political 
movements.15  Muslims and “Islamists” are not the same.  One is an “Islamist” only if one 
believes that Islam provides a blueprint for political action.  Muslims can differ or disagree 
with Islamists, as when they see Islam primarily as a personal faith, or would disassociate 
Islam from political ideologies, particularly those they regard as illiberal or intolerant of 
other religions or faiths.16   
When defined in this way, “Islamism” can encompass various forms of activism in 
pursuit of many different (specific or general) goals and with varying levels of drive or 
commitment.17  The varieties of “Islamism” have been categorised in two broad ways.  
First, they are classified according to how different their goals are from the status quo or 
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from Western-style liberal democracy.  Those who aspire towards a liberal democratic 
political system are said to be “mainstream” while those that aspire towards a different 
political system such as an Islamic state are seen as “radical”.  Second, they are classified 
according to the willingness of adherents to employ violent means, such as jihad or holy 
war, to pursue their goals.  They are classed as “moderate” if they use only peaceful means; 
“militant” if more forceful means, such as mob or vigilante attacks, are employed; and 
“extremist” if they employ jihad or holy war.  Thus, the terms used often to describe 
Islamism (“moderate”, “mainstream”, “radical”, “militant”, or “extremist”) are necessarily 
subjective, reflecting the observer’s own liberal bias and perception of Islamism as 
threatening in various degrees.  For example, Barton calls “radical Islamists” those who 
would force what is claimed as shariah or Islamic law on society without regard for its 
consent.  Here what Barton references by “radical” is the goal (introduction and application 
of shariah), and he takes this goal as problematic in itself as it “can lead to erosion of 
human rights, especially those of women”.18  He also criticises “radical Islamists” as acting 
“in the spirit of theocracy rather than democracy”.19  
Abuza plots Islamic groups in Indonesia into a graph, one dimension of which 
represents the continuum of objectives, and the other that of tactics used by the groups.20  
Objectives range from maintaining Indonesia’s present political system of “secular, pluralist 
democracy”, on one end, to establishing a “regional caliphate” on the other end.  Pursuing 
a “greater role for Islam”, “sharia for Muslims within pluralist democracy”, “sharia for 
Muslims in pluralist state but no democracy”, and “Islamic state” are arranged as different 
gradations from moderation to radicalism.  The other dimension, the continuum of tactics, 
ranges from “no violence” at one end, through “protests”, “intimidation”, “mob 
violence/attacks on property” and “armed struggle/paramilitary activity for limited 
objective”, to “terrorism/paramilitary activity for revolution” at the other end.  Abuza 
places the largest organisations and most organisations including Islamic political parties 
near the least threatening end of both the objectives and tactics dimensions, and simply 
calls them “political Islam”.  He calls “militant” those organisations that engage in 
intimidation and attacks on property as a tactic to push for a “greater role for Islam”; and 
reserves the label “terrorist” for those who “use terrorist tactics to bring about a radical 
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political and social realignment”.21  While these labels appear clear cut, they can be 
challenging to apply in view of Indonesia’s religious and political diversity and history of 
repression of Islamism. 
 
1.2. Islam in Indonesian society and politics 
As Indonesia is home to more Muslims than any other country in the world, it is 
unsurprising that Islam plays a large part in its social life.22  The two largest Muslim civil 
society organisations in the world are Indonesian organisations, namely, Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU, Revival of the Religious Scholars), founded in 1926, and Muhammadiyah, founded in 
1912, which are “giants in Indonesian Islam”.23  NU, the somewhat larger of the two, has 
been estimated to have 30-40 million members, while Muhammadiyah has 25-30 million.24  
Thus, about one quarter of the Indonesian population belong to either NU or 
Muhammadiyah.25  As Pringle notes, the two organisations’ presence are felt through their 
operation of several thousands of high schools and hundreds of colleges and universities, 
as well as hospitals and clinics all over the country.  They each have affiliated organisations 
for women and youth.26  Moreover, historically, Muhammadiyah, founded during the 
period of Dutch colonialism, championed so-called “reformist Islam” which promoted a 
progressive understanding of Islam that viewed the teachings and values of the Koran 
(stripped of the allegedly improper, locally derived practices) combined with modern 
Western-style education as indispensable for closing the gap between the secular West and 
their country.27  Muhammadiyah’s detailed reform agenda, centred on education and 
building a literate Muslim citizenry, served and appealed to a mostly urban-based Muslim 
commercial class, which resented the Dutch for disadvantaging their commerce in favour of 
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traditional aristocratic privileges.28  Traditionalist NU emerged in reaction to and in 
competition with Muhammadiyah’s reformism, as a bulwark of the “older, rural, land-
owning clerical establishment rooted in the Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) of East 
and Central Java”.29   
If the social picture in Indonesia suggests a vibrant Islamic presence, the political 
picture is different.30  Islamic political parties have participated in politics since the 
federation of NU and Muhammadiyah in November 1943 in the Masyumi (Majelis Syuro 
Muslimin Indonesia – Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), sponsored by the 
Japanese occupying authorities in World War II.  However, they compete with other 
political parties and leaders who, while also Muslim, maintain political identities separate 
from Islam.31  When Indonesian nationalism arose during the period of Dutch colonialism, 
its adherents were diverse in their identification with Islam. While some nationalists 
identified with either reformist or traditionalist Islam, other Muslims, like Sukarno, founder 
of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party) and Indonesia’s first 
president, “chose to minimize religious distinctions and concentrate on forging national 
unity”.32 Moreover, many Indonesian Muslims politically identified as communists as well, 
to the extent that before the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) was crushed in 1965, it 
was the largest communist party outside the Soviet Union and China.33    
When the 1945 Indonesian Constitution was drafted under Japanese occupation, 
Indonesians chose not to anoint Islam as the official state religion.  Instead, a state 
philosophy was defined that embodied religious and moral values important to Islam, 
whilst avoiding specific reference to it.34  Sukarno enunciated a set of five principles, called 
pancasila, which supposedly embody the common beliefs and aspirations of all religions 
and ethnicities that comprise the nation, to be incorporated in the preamble to the 
constitution.35  The fifth principle of pancasila as originally drafted was “Belief in God 
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(Ketuhanan)” with no particular reference to Islam.36  To this the drafting committee, 
following the objection of Masyumi, wanted to add the phrase “with the obligation for 
adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law (dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam 
bagi pemuluk-pemulukanya)” (now referred to as the Jakarta Charter).37   The Japanese did 
not agree to the addition of the phrase, citing potential Christian objection and threat of 
secession.38  However, as a gesture to Muslim leaders, the Japanese moved the fifth 
principle to first place and changed the wording to “Belief in a singular God Almighty 
(Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa)”.39  Given that that origin of Indonesia is as state founded in 
the belief in one God albeit unspecified, Indonesia is not technically a secular state but a 
religious one.  Nonetheless, it is not simply an Islamic state either, as is neighbouring 
Malaysia, which has a far smaller proportion of Muslims in the population.40  Instead, the 
Indonesian constitution gives equal recognition and status to other monotheistic religions 
alongside Islam.41    
 
1.3.  The Darul Islam rebellion and marginalisation of Islamic parties 
Indonesian Islamism found a more “radical” expression in the historic Darul Islam 
rebellion.  In the 1950s, this so-called Darul Islam rebellion posed an important challenge to 
the fledgling Indonesian state.  At its height, it commanded 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers.42  
The rebellion also took a human toll and caused material destruction on a scale far bigger 
than the terrorist incidents being blamed on groups like JI today.43  The rebellion started 
during the Indonesian revolution, when the Republican government of Sukarno, in the 
course of fighting with the returning Dutch forces, agreed with the Dutch to the 
unfavourable terms of the so-called Renville agreement of 1948, which called for 
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Republican forces to withdraw from West to Central Java.44  Muslim militias in West Java, 
led by Kartosuwirjo, broke with Sukarno’s government on this score and created their own 
government “which recognized no legislation but the shari’a”.45  Beyond West Java, the 
rebellion spread to four other provinces, namely, Central Java, South Sulawesi, South 
Kalimantan and Aceh.46  In August 7, 1949, Kartosuwirjo declared an “Indonesian Islamic 
State” (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) with himself as imam or religious and political chief.47  
While the reasons for the rebellion were different in each province, 48 the rejection of the 
idea of the Pancasila-based Indonesian republic was a key point of unity.49  With the 
military defeat of the Darul Islam rebellion, the identity of Indonesia as a multi-religious 
republic under Sukarno’s rule  was cemented. 
In the 1960s, Sukarno instituted “Guided Democracy” and promoted a united front 
of nationalist, communist and religious parties called Nasakom.  Motivated by its instinct 
for survival, NU played along.  In contrast, Masyumi, which took a strong stand against 
Sukarno’s collaboration with the PKI, and whose leaders were already suspected of links to 
the Darul Islam, was excluded from the coalition and its political fortunes declined after 
1955.50  In 1958, Masyumi leaders joined the so-called Outer Islands Rebellion, a US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) ploy to overthrow Sukarno.51 When this too was crushed, 
Masyumi was banned.52 
The marginalisation of Islamic parties continued even after Suharto was replaced in 
the notorious 1965 coup d’état that destroyed the PKI.  The NU and Masyumi participated 
in the mass killings of alleged communists of 1965-66 that empowered Suharto, but 
Suharto did not reward them for this act as might be expected.  Instead, there was a steady 
decline of Islamic parties under Suharto’s rule.  Suharto engaged in a campaign of 
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“depoliticisation” of Islam that sapped the capacity of Islamic parties to exert influence 
over state policies.  First, Masyumi leaders, freed from prison, tried to return to the 
political scene, reformulated as the political party Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, 
Indonesian Muslim Party) in the late 1960s.  Suharto recognised Parmusi but considered 
the loyalty of its senior leaders to be suspect, so screened them out as candidates for 
election.53  Nearly 75% of its candidates were rejected, and as a result, a Parmusi purged of 
its Masyumi identity garnered only 5.5% of the votes in the 1971 elections, or about a 
quarter of Masyumi’s vote (20.9%) in the 1955 election.54  
Suharto’s interference in the affairs of the Islamic parties escalated with his 
decision in 1973 to “simplify” the party system by merging all Islamic parties into the PPP 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party) and the nationalist and 
Christian parties into the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party), 
while maintaining GOLKAR as the regime’s own electoral machine.55  According to 
Bruinessen, the forced merger of the Islamic parties was “calculated to weaken political 
Islam by exploiting internal conflicts and rivalries, and it was quite successful in this 
respect”.56  The NU, which cooperated with Sukarno under “Guided Democracy”, 
maintained its previous strength, polling 18.67% of the popular vote in the 1971 elections, 
similar to its showing in 1955 (18.4%).  But under the PPP, NU was emasculated.  Suharto 
imposed Djaelani Naro, a long-time associate of one of his favoured generals Ali Murtopo, 
first as chairman of the Parmusi and then as president of the PPP, and Naro presided over 
the division of parliamentary seats to the various “streams” within the PPP that 
marginalised the NU.57  In the face of these machinations, the NU in 1983 decided to 
withdraw from party politics altogether, leaving its followers to vote for any party.58  As a 
result, the lone Islamic party’s share of the vote plunged to 16% in the 1987 elections 
(compared to the combined vote of Masyumi and NU of 39.3% in 1955).59   
Depoliticisation of Islam peaked in the mid-1980s, when Suharto turned Pancasila 
from a symbol of national harmony in diversity into an instrument to “stamp out all 
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ideological alternatives and in fact all opposition to the regime.”60  All mass organisations 
were required to adopt Pancasila as their “sole principle” (azas tunggal), or risk being 
declared illegal.61  The sole Muslim political party was required to renounce Islam as its 
principle to be replaced by Pancasila, to refrain from using the word “Islam” in its name and 
all Islamic symbols to identify it, and to open its membership to non-Muslims, so that 
henceforth all pretense that it still represented the political aspirations of Islam was lost. 62  
Islamists rightly felt that Suharto targeted them unfairly, in a deliberate strategy to 
decrease their political power, influence and agency.  Suharto effectively closed channels 
within the political system for pursuing their goals; and henceforth, the  state regarded 
Islamist goals inherently seditious.  
The enfeeblement of Islamic parties gave rise to new, extra-parliamentary forms of 
Islamic political activism.  The most prominent ex-Masyumi leaders, including Mohammed 
Natsir, a former prime minister, unable to return to politics, concentrated on missionary 
work (dakwah), forming the umbrella group Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII).  
Study groups on campuses as well as in mosques, and religious gatherings known as 
pengajian,63 became important forums to air political views critical of the regime.  Young 
people flocked to mosques, often taking over their day-to-day operations, to seek outlets 
for their activism in the form of discussions, publishing of leaflets and periodicals and 
community work.64  However, extra-parliamentary forms of Islamic activism were diverse in 
their ideas and methods of operation, with only some initiatives meriting a tag of “radical 
Islamism”.  According to Bruinessen, DDII was a proponent of “an unlikely combination of 
attitudes” that blended “a belief in the superiority of Western style democracy over the 
neo-patrimonial forms of rule adopted by Sukarno and Suharto, an almost paranoid 
obsession with Christian missionary efforts as a threat to Islam, and an increasingly strong 
orientation towards the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia.”65  On the other hand, the most 
                                                                 
60 ibid 3. 
61 ibid 13. 
62 “No one regards the PPP as articulating any more the political aspirations of Islam. … [T]here is no 
longer such a thing as a party representing political Islam in Indonesia.” TAPOL Indonesia, Muslims 
on Trial (TAPOL Indonesian Human Rights Campaign 1987) 11.  
63 Pengajian could refer to various kinds of religious gatherings including “Quran incantation 
sessions, small house meetings, gatherings at mosques or outdoor rall ies”. Itinerant preachers draw 
crowds to these rall ies  held at or near the mosques. ibid 14.   
64 ibid 15. 
65 Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia’ (n 44) 123.  According to 
Sidel, with support from Saudi donors , DDII “nurtured” the proselytisation and educational efforts of 
much earlier established organisations Persatuan Islam (Persis) and Al -Irshad.  John Thayer Sidel, 
Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia  (Cornell  University Press 2006) 204.  Identified 
with descendants of Hadrami Arab immigrants, Persis and Al -Irshad were said to be “puritanical” in 
 172 
prominent student organisation HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Student 
Federation) spawned famous architects of a “new liberal Muslim discourse” that was 
favoured during the New Order.66  Nevertheless, this has not prevented Suharto from 
targeting HMI for the imposition of Pancasila as sole principle, achieved only after an 
extended fight.67  
The discussion in this section serves to underline the importance of political 
context in understanding what the words “extremist” or “radical” denote.  As the opening 
quote from Azra hints, individuals who harbour Islamist aspirations will pursue these 
aspirations openly or underground depending on the opportunities offered by the political 
system.  Thus, whether they will resort to “mainstream” or “extremist” means is also 
dictated by the political environment.  As we have also seen in Suharto’s campaign to 
depoliticise Islam, the subversive or “radical” nature of Islamist aspirations is not inherent 
in these aspirations but is also a construct.     
 
2.  The Spectre of Terrorism in the 1970s and 80s 
 
2.1. Komando Jihad and Terror Warman 
 
Dovetailing with the general campaign to neuter political Islam, a terrorism 
discourse emerged in the 1970s and 80s which stigmatised and discredited all forms of 
Islamic dissent by linking them to violence.  In the lead up to the 1977 election, which was 
also the year the Suharto regime proposed the program of indoctrination in Pancasila to 
the legislature, Admiral Sudomo, the head of Komkaptib (Internal Security Command), 
announced the discovery of a violent anti-government conspiracy dubbed Komando 
Jihad.68  The group was supposedly responsible for a string of bombings that targeted a 
hospital, a mosque, a church (set off on Christmas day), a nightclub and a cinema in 
                                                                 
the sense of standing opposed to “traditional religious practices and beliefs” (more so than 
Muhammadiyah) and in favour of “a l iteral reading of the Qur’an and authentic hadith”, but did not 
show much interest in political applications of Islam. Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism 
in Post-Suharto Indonesia’ (n 44) 125.  
66 Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia’ (n 44) 124. 
67 TAPOL Indonesia (n 62) 13–14. 
68 R Will iam Liddle, ‘Indonesia 1977: The New Order’s Second Parliamentary Election’ (1978) 18 
Asian Survey 175-185, 181; David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 
1975-1983 (Cornell  Modern Indonesia Project, SoutheastAsia Program, Cornell  University 1984) 58; 
June Chandra Santosa, ‘Modernization, Utopia and the Rise of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia ’ (PhD, 
Boston University 1996) 434. 
 173 
Sumatra in late 1976.69  Core members of Komando Jihad were also alleged to be veterans 
of the Darul Islam rebellion.70  In June 1977, authorities arrested 700 people for 
involvement in “the Komando Jihad movement” organised in Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau, 
South Sumatra, Lampung, Jakarta, West Java, and East Java.71  The movement supposedly 
had a military structure led by a “war commander” and a “Messiah” and its long-term goal 
was an Islamic state.72  Thus, the Suharto regime used the Komando Jihad to remind 
audiences of a continuing threat of radical Islamism committed to bringing about an Islamic 
state through force.73   
However, very little is known about Komando Jihad apart from these official 
allegations.  Jenkins has explored its origins in a special project of an Indonesian 
intelligence service faction led by Ali Murtopo.74  As confirmed by members of Murtopo’s 
group, Murtopo cultivated relations with Darul Islam veterans with the intention of making 
them “useful” for the Suharto regime.75  He has similarly cultivated relations with veterans 
of the 1958 Outer Islands rebellion, and was responsible for the release from military 
prisons of leading Masyumi politicians as well as prominent army officers who participated 
in that rebellion – some were later to assume positions within the army intelligence 
service.  The leaders of Komando Jihad, including the son of Kartosuwirjo, the leader of the 
Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s, were such Darul Islam veterans that Murtopo “wanted 
to use”.76 Haji Ismail Pranoto, one of the main defendants in the Komando Jihad trials 
charged with setting up Komando Jihad commands in various parts of East Java, claimed 
during his trial that Murtopo had in fact “used” them in a “joint struggle against 
communists”.  It was alleged that Murtopo’s agents had implanted among the veterans 
rumours of a communist comeback and had promised to arm them to fight the 
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communists.77  As the court did not summon Murtopo to testify despite Pranoto’s wishes,78 
Murtopo’s role in the creation of Komando Jihad was never judicially examined.  Whatever 
the actual facts might have been, the timing of Komando Jihad’s “discovery” before the 
elections have led scholars to conclude that it was almost certainly an election ploy to 
tarnish the PPP.79 This is bolstered by the fact that in the lead up to the 1982 elections, 
there was a recurrence of violent acts imputed to Muslims with a political agenda.   
The so-called Terror Warman band was held responsible for a string of robberies 
and murders in 1978-81.  Terror Warman appeared to be an offshoot of Komando Jihad 
and it was supposedly planning to assassinate the judge and prosecutor in Ismail Pranoto’s 
case.80  However, the group’s leader, Musa Warman, was killed when police went to his 
hideout to arrest him in 1981, his responsibility was never fully substantiated.81   
Authorities also claimed that the main culprit in an attack on a police station in 
Cicendo in 1980, which led to its burning, and the hijacking of a Garuda plane in 1981, was 
Imran bin Muhammad Zein, a preacher in Bandung.82  Imran had already attracted the 
attention of authorities for his strong criticism of Pancasila and established Muslim leaders, 
as well as his advocacy of direct social enforcement of Islamic religious obligations which 
sometimes led to acts of violence.83  It was alleged that Imran, supposedly as imam to 189 
persons sworn in as members of his congregation, ordered his followers to denounce 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and to wage an armed struggle.84  The hijackers were 
Imran’s followers (including his brother), and their demands supposedly included the 
release of radical activists from Imran’s group and Terror Warman, as well as the 
resignation of the Indonesian Vice President for corruption.85  However, all but one of the 
six hijackers were killed when the Anti-Terror Unit of Kopassandha (red berets) stormed 
the plane.  The sixth died later in custody, preventing a detailed investigation into their 
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motives.86  Imran was accused of “aiming to launch an Islamic revolution, of gathering 
militant forces, funds and arms towards the establishment of an ‘Islamic revolutionary 
council””.87  During his trial, there was evidence presented that showed Imran’s group had 
been infiltrated by army agents, but this evidence was never examined.88  Imran’s group 
believed that Najamuddin, who had been active in the group, had been a government 
informant, but his real identity and role were never established as he was murdered by 
members of Imran’s group.89   
 
2.2.  Tanjung Priok massacre and bombings 
 
The chilling effect of the discourse of a radical Islamist threat in this period 
extended not only to the already defanged PPP but more importantly to extra-
parliamentary forms of Islamism.  This can be illustrated in the events following the famous 
Tanjung Priok massacre of September 12, 1984.  Following the massacre, the Suharto 
regime jailed various kinds of Muslim critics of Suharto, from previously obscure preachers 
and simple folk to high-profile critics and politicians for alleged Islamic terrorist 
conspiracies.   
The massacre started as a community protest around Islamic issues and grievances.  
The Jakarta dockland district of Tanjung Priok and especially its mosques, at the time of the 
massacre, was already a bustling site for preacher-led religious rallies protesting the “sole 
principle” law and deteriorating living conditions.  When an army officer entered a local 
Muslim prayer-house (mushollah) without taking off his boots and blacked out wall posters 
(commenting on Muslim problems and announcing forthcoming rallies) pasted on the 
mushollah’s walls, using gutter-water for the purpose, the acts of desecration of a holy 
place caused agitation in the community.  An angry man set fire to the soldier’s motorcycle 
in protest.  He was subsequently arrested along with three others.   
A few days after, a pre-scheduled religious rally turned into a march to the police 
station and the sub-district military command to demand the release of those arrested, 
participated in by some 1,500 local residents.90  Troops fired upon the march, killing an 
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estimated six hundred people according to surviving witnesses, although the exact number 
has never been ascertained because the government refused calls for independent 
investigation of the incident.91  However, the official version of events grossly understated 
the numbers killed, and excused the killings as having been provoked by the protestors, 
who were described as having been armed.92   
When prominent critics of Suharto (from the so-called Petition-of-50 group) 
challenged this version of events based on eyewitness accounts, more violence ensued 
including a series of bombings and fires that took place almost every month from October 
1984 to July 1985 in various parts of the country.93  The authorities regarded the violence 
as the handiwork of radical Islamists in retaliation for the Tanjung Priok massacre.  These 
incidents included the bombing of the famous Borobudur temple. 94   Like the terrorist 
incidents in the years prior, these incidents revived the spectre of Islamic insurrection.   
The regime initiated a series of complex and prolonged trials against the supposed 
culprits in an attempt to establish that there was a conspiracy between preachers, activists, 
and prominent critics of the Tanjung Priok massacre.  Tapol, a human rights campaign 
organisation that was sympathetic to the defendants, argued that otherwise innocent 
connections were exaggerated into “a conspiracy of terrifying proportions”.95  The 
prosecutions had sometimes imputed motives to individuals’ actions that they didn’t have, 
and often held individuals responsible for acts in which they had no participation.96  
Defendants’ lawyers alleged the existence and role of agents provocateurs from the 
Indonesian intelligence service in the violence, and decried the use of torture to extract 
confessions.97  Tapol’s advocacy put in question the very existence of terrorists, espousing a 
counter-discourse to Suharto regime’s terrorism discourse.  “[I]n Indonesia today,” wrote 
Tapol of the many questions clouding the prosecutions’ theory and of official terrorism 
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discourse, “the word terrorist has no more certainty of meaning than the word 
fundamentalist.”98  
In the late 1980s, a series of arrests and trials took place in Central Java in which it 
was alleged that a radical Islamic movement had taken root.  The region had previously had 
a reputation for being least pious and adhering to syncretic forms of Islam.99  These arrests 
and trials involved the so-called “usroh” movement whose alleged leader was Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir.  The trials alleged that the members had “supported the establishment of an 
Islamic state and schemed to undermine the lawful government.”100  From the evidence 
submitted to the courts, however, the “usroh” movement appeared to be a network of 
close-knit groups of seven to 15 persons (“usroh” is the Javanised form of the Arabic word 
“usrah” which means “family”) established to support each other in living in accordance 
with Islamic laws and avoiding contact with non-Islamic institutions or customs.101  The 
movement was supposed to have taken root among students of an Islamic boarding school 
founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Ba’asyir called Pesantren Al-Mukmin or Pondok Ngruki 
(as it was located in Ngruki near Solo, Central Java) from which it fanned out to other 
areas.102  Drawing on the ideas of Hassan Al-Bana, the Egyptian thinker who founded the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Ba’asyir was supposed to have conceived of the “usroh” as the social 
basis for a future Islamic State.  Bruinessen explains: 
 
The struggle for an Islamic state, according to these ideas, was a step-by-step 
process in which the activist had first to engage in moral self-improvement, then 
to be part a ‘family’ (usrah) of like-minded people who guide, help, and control 
one another.  These are steps towards the building of an Islamic community 
(jama’ah Islamiyah), which in turn is a precondition for the establishment of an 
Islamic state.103 
 
Defendants in the usroh trials typically said that the usroh was not organised for the 
purpose of violence and was not a continuation of the Darul Islam rebellion.104  The 
military, however, regarded them as an “extremist movement” that engaged in discrediting 
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the government among the local population and creating discord.105  During these trials, 
and in an earlier indictment against Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in 1978, authorities used 
the name “Jemaah Islam” and “Jemaah Islamiyah” to designate alleged underground 
organisations that the “usroh” constituted or fed into.106  
 
2.3.  Jemaah Islamiyah and the continuing legacy of Suharto’s counterterrorism discourse  
 
After the Bali bombings of 2002, prosecutors revived the term “Jemaah Islamiyah” 
apparently to conjure the impression of a tight organisational structure and discipline 
among leaders and followers.  This picture of JI may be an exaggeration.  Indeed the 
repeated but unsuccessful efforts to prove that Ba’asyir had a hand in planning or 
executing terrorist operations has led to doubts about the prosecution’s theory.107  Even 
the research of the International Crisis Group (ICG), which is based partly on interrogation 
depositions and intelligence sources, could only suggest a hazy picture of JI as a loose 
network of individuals with shared intellectual or life experiences.   From this picture, JI 
itself is less a functioning organisation that unleashes terrorist violence upon command of 
its leaders that it is alleged to be, and more a suspect community that occasionally 
produces individuals who engage in violence.108   
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A more serious cause for scepticism towards the official theory of the JI 
organisation is that the so-called “Ngruki network”109 has a long history of intelligence 
surveillance and infiltration.  As Sidel relates, the Indonesia security services closely 
monitored the boarding school in Ngruki since the 1970s.  As a result, its founders Abdullah 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir were arrested and imprisoned in the late 1970s and driven to exile in 
Malaysia in 1985.  Afterwards, the caretakers of the boarding school allowed the security 
services to have “an active role in the management of the school”.  Moreover, A.M. 
Hendropriyono, who was chief of Badan Intelijen Negeri (BIN), or the National Intelligence 
Agency in 2001- 2004, has a long history of personal connection with the Ngruki  network.  
In 1989, then an army colonel, Hendropriyono led troops that massacred members of a 
community of religious believers established in the rural village of Lampung by graduates of 
the Ngruki boarding school.  Later, he diligently sought to reconcile with the survivors and 
family members of the victims of the Lampung massacre as his career in government 
advanced.  He offered them monetary aid, jobs in the government as well as his own 
private businesses, and also land while he was minister for transmigration in the late 1990s.  
These efforts meant that when he became the country’s intelligence chief, he had already 
fostered “a coterie of clients and informants from within the Ngruki network”.110  The 
connections that Hendropriyono developed help explain the numerous links (e.g., cell 
phone conversations) that police investigators, journalists, and other researchers 
discovered between Indonesian intelligence and army officers and some of the activists 
arrested and charged with the bombings of 2000-2004.111  The allegation is serious because 
it shows that the infiltration is not merely a historical fact from a bygone era of military-
backed authoritarianism that is no longer relevant.  Rather, if the allegation is true this 
suggests that infiltration and manipulation persists in contemporary Indonesia.   
In fact, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), a legal organisation established in 2000 
which counterterrorism officials and scholars would often present as part of the network 
associated with JI, has been alleged by its senior leader Irfan Awwas to be infiltrated by 
Indonesian intelligence.112  Awwas alleged that Haris, a member of the MMI’s management 
and who had unsuccessfully lobbied the membership to name the organisation “Jemaah 
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Islamiyah” during its founding congress, was an intelligence agent.113  Furthermore, he 
alleged that Haris played a role in the conflict in Maluku, later a flashpoint for “terrorism” 
discussed in the succeeding section.114  Haris is also linked through his daughter’s marriage 
to Omar Al-Faruq, the Kuwaiti national alleged by the United States as an Al Qaeda 
operative whose capture and interrogation led to accusations that MMI leader Abu Bakar 
Basyir was also linked to Al Qaeda.115  Since the capture of Al-Faruq, Haris has 
disappeared.116  If true, these allegations would also suggest Indonesian intelligence’s 
continuing efforts to give “Jemaah Islamiyah” a demonstrable existence, and continuing 
preoccupation with fostering terrorist events.  At the very least, they would suggest 
foreknowledge of terrorist incidents and responsibility for failing to stop them.  
As we have seen, there has been considerable debate about whether the 
“Komando Jihad”, the “Terror Warman” gang, the conspiracies related to the Tanjung Priok 
massacre, and the “Jemaah Islamiyah” suggest, as the Indonesian government alleged in 
the related trials, the continuous existence of an underground network of radical Islamists 
which can be traced to the Darul Islam rebellion.  As the quote from Azra in the opening of 
this chapter explains, it is likely that there were indeed religiously motivated individuals 
who would desire to commit terrorist acts.  After all, the prevailing atmosphere of 
repression meant that Islamists who might otherwise openly or peacefully pursue their 
goals were pushed underground and towards the margins of acceptable behaviour.   It is 
also likely that these individuals were manipulated by state agents to conjure the 
impression of a radical Islamic threat to the state , which would require Suharto’s regime to 
save it.  The responsibility for the supposed terrorism of the 1970s and 80s have not been 
fully uncovered, thereby shrouding official claims in a cloud of doubt.   
What is clear is that the spectre of a Darul Islam revival benefited the Suharto 
regime by discrediting resistance to his regime and justifying the prosecution of his various 
critics.  “Terrorism” did not threaten Suharto’s hold on power as much as it strengthened it.   
As Jetschke points out, the threat of an Islamic uprising in Indonesia also allowed Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime to be viewed with more sympathy by Western audiences.117  An 
Islamic revolution seized power in Iran in 1979, replacing a pro-Western monarchy with a 
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quasi-theocratic government that was representative but that was supervised by clerics led 
by a supreme religious leader.118  Suharto’s efforts to prevent a resurgence of radical 
Islamism in Indonesia made his regime appear commendable and committed to rational or 
mainstream conceptions of what a state should be, even though his regime was 
authoritarian and undemocratic.     
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the dichotomy between terrorism and 
counterterrorism can be challenged in the context of Indonesia’s history.   The picture of 
counterterrorism as distinct from and only a response to terrorism is unconvincing and 
ignores the rich pattern exhibited by historical events.  The line separating terrorism from 
counterterrorism is blurred, as terrorists and the security services are linked.   Prosecutors 
and courts have not only exposed “terrorists” but have likely played a more active role in 
their construction.  Terrorism, understood as the threat of revived Islamic insurrection, was 
likely manufactured or encouraged by actors in order to give the Suharto regime the 
beneficial role of countering terrorism.       
 
3.  Terrorism as Despair and the “War on Terror” 
 
3.1.  Re-emergence of the spectre of terrorism after Suharto 
 
After Suharto’s fall, his successor B.J. Habibie undertook a political liberalisation of 
Indonesia which included the repeal of the “sole principle” law , allowing multiple parties to 
participate in free elections beyond the three parties recognised by the Suharto regime; 
decentralisation of government, giving provincial governments more power in running their 
affairs; a freer mass media; the release of Muslim political prisoners; and a referendum on 
the future of East Timor.119  Islamists were once again allowed to openly advocate for their 
goals within and outside of the political system.  Many observers agree that Islamist 
political parties and civil society groups exhibit high levels of engagement with the political 
system, which have enabled them to make incremental gains.120   While the changes in 
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terms of opening channels for political participation post-Suharto have been dramatic, 
fears of Islamic terrorism remained.   
In 2000, the spectre of terrorism, which had lain dormant since the 1980s, re-
emerged.  That year, paramilitaries styled as “jihadis” under the aegis of Laskar Jihad  were 
formed and mobilised in Maluku.  There was already communal conflict between Christians 
and Muslims raging in Maluku and Poso before that, which was prompted by a host of 
complex reasons.121  The paramilitary mobilisation of jihadis from outside Maluku and Poso 
(mostly from Java) contributed to the heightening and prolongation of violence in both 
areas.122  In the same year, a conspiracy of Islamist extremists, allegedly the Jemaah 
Islamiyah, bombed 40 churches around the country on Christmas Eve.123  Meticulous 
investigative work by the International Crisis Group revealed that the bombings in 2000 
were part of a bombing campaign that peaked with the 2002 bombings in Bali targeting 
mostly foreign tourists.  Since then, bombings were reduced to one incident per year since.  
Analysts emphasised the provenance of the latest jihadis and bombers in the same network 
of Darul Islam remnants that the Suharto regime blamed for the terrorism of the 1970s and 
1980s.124  After 9/11, analysts emphasised Indonesian extremists’ connections with a global 
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jihadi movement and particularly with Al Qaeda, given that many of them had common 
experiences of undergoing jihadi trainings in Afghanistan and Pakistan and of being 
educated in universities in the Middle East before returning to Indonesia.125 
To Sidel, however, the radicalism of the actors behind the paramilitary mobilisation 
and bombing campaign did not suffice to explain why such particular forms of violence 
resurfaced starting in 2000.  The decade-long gap when no terrorism took place is worth 
underlining.  During this gap decade, there was no shortage of Islamists who espoused 
radical views.  The network of organisations under Persatuan Islam (Persis) published 
trenchant criticisms of perceived kristenisasi or Christianisation of Indonesian politics and 
society and railed against Muslims’ weakness.  They attacked “the closet secularism” of 
Muslim intellectuals who looked to the West for inspiration.  Persis and Al-Irsyad schools 
educated thousands of students and produced thousands of graduates in that decade, and 
yet not a single one of those students or graduates is known to have engaged in armed 
rebellion or jihad in that period.  If their radical beliefs are what’s causing Islamists’ resort 
to extremist methods, why didn’t the same radicalism result in terrorism before 2000?126 
In order to explain the resurgence of Islamist violence in 2000, it is necessary to 
consider the political and discursive context in which “radical Islamists” found themselves .  
That context also explains why jihad took the particular forms it did, namely, paramilitary 
mobilisation and bombing campaign, and why foreigners were later targeted. 
In the 1990s, political Islam was all but crushed, and then avenues within the state 
and the public sphere for Muslim representation suddenly expanded, reversing its fortunes.  
The turning point was Suharto’s endorsement of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-
Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) in December 1990.  Led by 
technology minister B.J. Habibie, ICMI pioneered an Islamic bank as well as a quality 
Muslim newspaper to rival the dominant Christian-owned ones.127  While ICMI was 
dominated by bureaucrats, hitherto critics of Suharto associated with the banned Masyumi 
played important roles in it.128  Suharto also appointed Muslims to economic ministries 
previously held by Christians and sacked Christian generals from the intelligence service 
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and armed forces in favour of Muslim ones.129  Scholars debate why Suharto turned for 
support in his final years in office to Islamists he previously persecuted.130  The important 
thing to note here is that he did.  The leadership of Habibie and allied Muslims, which was 
based on a claim to champion the Islamisation of society, negated the need for channeling 
Islamist sentiments through extremist methods.   
Thus, notwithstanding the political liberalisation, the post-Suharto period was 
actually a period of “precipitous decline” of Islamist gains compared to the 1990s, which 
caused “disappointment if not despair” on the part of Islamists.131  Political liberalisation 
allowed Islamists to emerge from clandestine study groups to form political parties and 
contest elections once again starting in 1999.  But their fractiousness and poor showing 
(the Islamist parties together polled less than 20% of the votes) and the greater appeal of 
secular nationalists (who won the plurality of votes, 34%) to both Muslim and non-Muslim 
voters in the 1999 election shattered illusions of actors seeking to unify Muslims under the 
banner of Islam.132  It is true that Islamist parties were consequential enough to form a 
coalition with Pancasila-based parties that catered to NU and Muhammadiyah 
constituencies that successfully prevented PDI-P’s Megawati Sukarnoputri from becoming 
president in 1999.133  But even this proved to be a bane to them.  The candidate they 
backed Abdurrahman Wahid quickly turned against them in favour of his long standing 
secular, liberal and Christian allies.  By the following year, Wahid’s erstwhile Islamist 
supporters were already speaking of Wahid’s betrayal and seeking his removal from 
office.134  Importantly, Wahid, a long-time advocate of the protection for religious 
minorities, opposed agitation for jihad in Maluku and Poso.135   
 
3.2.  The call for jihad:  Thalib and Basyir 
 
According to Sidel, the call for “jihad” in 2000 was a call to “reassert and reawaken 
seemingly lapsed religious sensibilities and solidarities”, that is, to unite the nation’s Islamic 
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majority population in the face of apparent indignities to their religion.136  The call for jihad 
was publicly raised in a demonstration that launched Laskar Jihad in Jakarta in April 2000 by 
Ja’far Umar Thalib, the organisation’s founder and leader.137  The demonstration was 
attended by 100,000 people in the capital city’s Senayan stadium.138  In December 1999 
and January 2000, armed Christian groups slaughtered Muslims in Maluku, arousing anger 
among many Indonesian Muslims.139  At the public demonstration, Ja’far Umar Thalib 
referred to the massacre of Moluccan Muslims as a genocidal threat made possible by the 
indifference of the Wahid government, the media and the public towards the plight of their 
fellow Muslims.  He proclaimed that jihad, or holy war, was justified, and announced that 
Laskar Jihad members, numbering in 10,000, were willing to do battle in support of 
Muslims in Maluku.140  Thalib’s pronouncements at the demonstrations echoed the 
sentiments previously expressed by him and his supporters and followers that Indonesian 
Christians under the banner of the organisation called Republic of South Moluccas 
threatened the dismemberment of Maluku from Indonesia.141  They charged that 
Netherlands-based leadership of the said group was in collusion with foreign Christian 
and/or Jewish powers and/or with communists.142    
Following the demonstration, Laskar Jihad marched to the presidential palace in 
order to warn the Wahid government that they will engage in jihad in Maluku if the 
government does not do more to help the Muslims.143  President Wahid met their 
representatives led by Thalib, but the meeting went awry after the latter accused Wahid of 
siding with Christians in Maluku, and Wahid had them thrown out.144  Thereafter, Thalib 
established recruitment centers in urban centers in the country to publicly recruit 
volunteer fighters to be sent to Maluku,145 and trained them in a paramilitary training camp 
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in Bogor, in the outskirts of Jakarta,146 and in a few cities in East and Central Java.147  
Although Wahid had ordered a naval blockade of the islands of Maluku in order to prevent 
Thalib’s paramilitaries’ arrival there, the navy did not stop them.148  When the first batch of 
volunteer jihadi fighters arrived in Ambon, military men greeted them and issued them 
standard military weapons.149  Military collusion with Laskar Jihad showed Wahid’s lack of 
control over the military, greatly embarrassing and discrediting his leadership.150  Laskar 
Jihad managed to get some 3,000 trained men into the conflict zone to engage in combat 
by September 2000.151   
Laskar Jihad also mobilised the support of Salafi muftis, or Muslim legal experts 
authorised to issue opinions on religious matters, from Saudi Arabia and Yemen.152  Seven 
Salafi muftis issued fatwas, or legal positions, endorsing the lawfulness or obligatory nature 
of a defensive jihad in the context of Maluku, some subject to certain specific conditions.153  
For example, a Saudi mufti required that jidahi fighters first appoint a representative to 
meet and advise the country’s ruler; only if the ruler rejects the fighters’ suggestion are 
they allowed to rebel against him, and only if they have sufficient power. 154  Laskar Jihad’s 
abortive meeting with Wahid and its setting up of a paramilitary training camp appear to 
address these conditions.   
Thus, Thalib’s jihad was premised on the rejection of the state’s perceived inaction 
or unwillingness to perform its role to defend Muslims, and attempted to claim that role 
instead for the volunteer jihadi fighters mobilised under the Laskar Jihad banner.  
Furthermore, as Thalib claimed to be fighting against the Republic of South Moluccas, his 
jihad was designed not as a rebellion against the Indonesian state but as an attempt to 
preserve its territorial integrity.   
In 2000, another organisation called Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian 
Council of Holy Warriors) led by Abu Bakar Basyir also called for jihad.  MMI was 
established on August 7, 2000, on the anniversary of Kartosuwirjo’s Darul Islam rebellion, in 
a public gathering in Yogyakarta attended by 1800 people from various Islamist 
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organisations.155  MMI’s main purpose was to unite Islamist organisations to rally for the 
implementation of shari’ah law for Indonesia.156  MMI eventually evolved from a loose 
federation of organisations into a separate independent organisation with membership 
largely drawn from the network around the Ngruki pesantren established by Basyir.157  
Bashir’s call for jihad involves resistance to “infidels”, conceived as those who actively 
destroy or subjugate Islam or Indonesian Muslims as a collective.158  As also expressed by 
Thalib in his justification for jihad in Maluku, the MMI sees that Indonesian Muslims as a 
group are being victimised by forces, including secular authorities, who are bent to ruin 
Islam, and therefore, Muslims have an individual duty to fight those perfidious forces to 
preserve their religion.159  Hence, the premise for jihad is a situation in which Muslims are 
seen as weak, and the state has aided rather than hindered the decline in the position of 
Muslims.  According to Basyir, his call for jihad encompasses the use of violence and 
martyrdom, albeit only allowed for those who have the capability and resources.160   
 
3.3.  Context of bombing campaign 
 
In comparison with the paramilitary mobilisation of Laskar Jihad, the bombing 
campaign attributed to JI would appear to suggest a heightening of the threat of Islamist 
extremists by turning to foreign targets.  In fact, however, the turn to foreign targets only 
masked the reality that Islamist extremists have been even more marginalised.  If under the 
Wahid government, Laskar Jihad had received support from elements of the military, under 
the succeeding Megawati government decisive action was taken against them.  Authorities 
detained Thalib in May 4, 2002.161  The military moved to crush paramilitaries in Maluku 
and Poso, and the government enforced peace accords among the warring groups to 
formally end the conflict.162   Finally, the Laskar Jihad disbanded itself in October 2002.163   
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Importantly, proponents of the US-led “War on Terror” turned against jihad-style 
paramilitaries and their supporters in Maluku and Poso, as well as Abu Bakar Basyir and 
Jemaah Islamiyah, on the basis of speculations that they were involved in giving Al Qaeda a 
presence in the country.  Moreover, Megawati’s intelligence chief Hendropriyono claimed 
that Al Qaeda had trained in Poso.164   
The “War on Terror” thus greatly encouraged the crackdown on these targets in 
the name of counterterrorism.  In November 2001, US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz announced that “going after al-Qaeda in Indonesia is not something that should 
wait until after al-Qaeda has been uprooted in Afghanistan”.165  Singapore led other 
governments in the region in raising the alarm over alleged Al Qaeda-linked terrorist threat 
to the region and identifying and labelling the network that posed the threat as “Jemaah 
Islamiyah”.  Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kwan Yew charged, based on interrogation 
deposition of suspects detained in Singapore, that MMI founder Abu Bakar Basyir was the 
leader of JI which had presence in both Indonesia and Malaysia. 166  Although an Indonesian 
police team sent to interview detained suspected JI members in Singapore and Malaysia 
found no solid evidence to implicate Basyir for any crime, Basyir was nevertheless placed 
under tight watch by Indonesian security agents.167    
United States authorities put direct pressure on the Megawati government to 
arrest Basyir, on the strength of allegations obtained from the forcible interrogation of 
Omar Al-Farouq that Basyir had ties with Bin Laden.168  It also later surfaced that the United 
States Ambassador to Indonesia Ralph Boyce suggested to Megawati that Basyir be 
subjected to extraordinary rendition, although this suggestion was rebuffed by Megawati.  
In a testimony before a Jakarta court, American Frederick Black Burks said he was the 
interpreter in a meeting between Megawati and an American delegation on September 12, 
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2002. The delegation consisted of Ambassador Boyce, National Security Council official 
Karen Brooks and a CIA officer.  According to Burks, the CIA official told Megawati that 
Basyir was responsible for the 2000 Christmas eve bombings and asked to “rendition” him 
to US officials.  Burks said Megawati declined this request, saying Basyir was too popular 
for people not to notice his disappearance.  Boyce will later acknowledge that the meeting 
took place but claimed that the US only pressured Indonesia to arrest Basyir not to subject 
him to rendition.169 
Singapore’s representative to the United Nations requested the inclusion of JI in 
the list of organisations affiliated with Al Qaeda which is maintained by the committee set 
up under Security Council Resolution 1267.170  The Singaporean representative 
characterised JI as a “clandestine regional terrorist organisation” operating through 
branches in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and southern Philippines and aiming to 
establish a “pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia”.171   Other governments in the region soon 
participated in what appears to be a coordinated response.  Malaysian authorities 
undertook arrests of Indonesian Muslim activists in June 2001,172 while Philippine 
authorities arrested Indonesian Muslim activists in January and March 2002, on allegations 
that they were JI members involved in terrorist activities.173  Two of the three arrested in 
Manila in March 2002, Tamsil Linrung and Agus Dwikarna, had been active supporters of 
jihad in Maluku and Poso.174    
Thus, at the time of the Bali bombing in 2002, the climate of desperation 
confronting radical Islamists has become even more severe compared to when the 
bombing campaign started in 2000.  As Sidel puts it, the bombing campaign turned to 
foreign targets in mid-2002 as a way of “forestalling if not foreclosing a belated 
acknowledgment and acceptance of defeat” of the Islamist project in Indonesia.175  
Ironically, the “War on Terror” gave the bombers the image of being organisationally linked 
to Al Qaeda, and thus a part of a growing international Islamist movement that threatens 
the United States.  This exaggerated the nature of the threat they posed.  By transposing 
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the bombings from the Indonesian political context onto an international stage dominated 
by conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda, the bombings lost their meaning as 
defensive mechanisms and appeared totally irrational or senseless.   
 
 4.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a critical perspective on the counterterrorism discourse in 
Indonesia during the Suharto regime up to the 2002 Bali bombing.  Indonesian 
counterterrorism is not simply a technical endeavour by security experts, nor objective 
management of threats from Islamic extremists, but rather it is part of an intensely political 
struggle.  To begin with, radical Islamists have been pushed to the margins of Indonesian 
politics during the Suharto regime through a concerted campaign to depoliticise Islam, 
creating individuals willing to experiment with extreme methods.  Moreover, the threat of 
a revival of Islamic insurrection was likely fostered by the regime in order precisely to give 
the regime the salutary role of rescuing the pluralist state from terrorism.  Like in the 
Philippines during the Arroyo period, raising the spectre of terrorism and then responding 
thereto caused devastating consequences for human rights.   
The problematic nature of counterterrorism during the Suharto period is illustrative 
also for the situation post-Suharto.  The link between the supposed “terrorists” and 
elements of the security establishment that blurred the distinction between terrorism and 
counterterrorism had continued beyond Suharto’s fall.  Since 2000, paramilitary 
mobilisations in Maluku and Poso and the bombings of churches and foreign targets 
demonstrated the reality that violent methods attracted radicalised Islamists more than 
ever before.  But while this situation resulted from their weakness and further 
marginalisation, counterterrorism continued to be premised on fears of a growing threat 
posed by radical Islamists.  The “War on Terror” only contributed to the exaggeration of the 
Islamist threat by reviving allegations about the existence of JI, now presented as linked to 
Al Qaeda. 
 
 
 
 191 
Chapter 6 
Indonesia’s Legalised Counterterrorism: Divergent Domestic Reactions 
 
 
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that the prevailing counterterrorism discourse in Indonesia 
should be closely scrutinised.  In this chapter, I show that in the post-2002 Bali bombing 
period, there has been a diminished appetite among mainstream human rights advocates 
to subject counterterrorism to such scrutiny.  An important reason for this is that a human 
rights language has been attached to Indonesian counterterrorism through the enactment 
of Law No. 15/2003, the legal framework for counterterrorism, and the adoption of a 
police-led approach.   
This chapter advances the central argument of the thesis by examining changes 
that have resulted from the attachment of a human rights language to counterterrorism in 
Indonesia.  The chapter shows how the approach of local advocates towards 
counterterrorism has evolved.  The second section of this chapter, subtitled “Divergent 
Reactions to Counterterrorism” is based on and reports data obtained from fieldwork in 
Indonesia in the period between June and August 2013.  For this fieldwork, twenty-three 
(23) respondents from different organisations based in or around Jakarta were interviewed 
to elicit their views on human rights violations in the course of counterterrorism. 1  The 
interviews targeted organisations and individuals focused on promoting human rights and 
engaged in the issue of counterterrorism.2 
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(1) Organisations and individuals focused on promoting human rights  
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(2.4) Academic expert on Indonesian police – 1 respondent 
(2.5) Reporter focused on counterterrorism – 1 respondent 
(2.6) Politician – 1 respondent. 
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Indonesia provides a case study of counterterrorism that is more legalised than in the 
Philippines.  The Philippine government engages in war against insurgents and struggles to 
create for that war the appearance of human rights compliance, whereas the Indonesian 
government instead claims to champion a law-enforcement approach that is supposedly 
different from a war-like approach to terrorism and is supposedly inherently law-governed 
and respectful of human rights.  As I show later in this chapter, the reactions of local actors 
have also been different.      
At first glance the differences between the Philippines and Indonesia with respect 
to their counterterrorism approaches appear enormous.  First, Indonesia has had a legal 
framework for counterterrorism, i.e., Law No. 15/2003 on Combating Terrorism, since 
immediately after the 2002 Bali bombing, and has prosecuted and tried the perpetrators of 
the 2002 Bali bombing and other subsequent incidents under the said law.3  The law, 
furthermore, has the added virtue of explicitly recognising the  applicability of human rights 
in the context of counterterrorism.4  Many observers stress that Indonesia did not adopt a 
more draconian law similar to the Internal Security Act in Malaysia and Singapore, thanks 
to the vigorous critical participation of human rights organisations in deliberations towards 
the anti-terrorism law.5  New rights, such as, the right of victims and heirs of victims of 
                                                                 
3 Relying on different sets of government data, the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) 
estimates that since the 2002 Bali  bombing, the police arrested and tried some 700 persons for 
terrorism offenses up to September 2013, with a near 100% conviction rate. Institute for Policy 
Analysis of Conflict, ‘Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in 
Indonesia’ (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2013) IPAC Report No. 2 6.  
4 “According to Article 2 of the Law No.15/2003 on Combating Terrorism, eradication of criminal acts 
of terrorism shall  be a set of policies and strategic steps to strengthen the public order and safety by 
remaining committed to upholding the law and human rights, non-discriminatory in nature in 
respect of ethnicity, race or groups.” Republic of Indonesia, ‘Fifth Report to the Counter -Terrorism 
Committee (CTC) of the United Nations Security Council  Pursuant to Paragraph 6 Security Council  
Resolution 1373 (2001), S/2006/311’ 17.  There are also interesting contrasts with Western law as 
pointed out by legal comparativist Kent Roach: “Indonesia’s new anti -terrorism law rejects the idea, 
prominent in the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act, that terrorism is a crime based on religious and 
political motives, and it explicitly embraces the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of 
politics and religion. Indonesia has also followed the more l ibertarian American example of not 
empowering the legislature or the executive to proscribe organizations and then making it a crime to 
support, associate, or be a member of such an officially designated organization.” Kent Roach, ‘Anti-
Terrorism and Militant Democracy: Some Western and Eastern Responses’ in András Sajó (ed), 
Militant Democracy (Eleven International Publishing 2004) 175. 
5 Interview 22. Leonard Sebastian, ‘The Indonesian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on 
Terror Without Becoming a National Security State’ in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (eds), 
After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia  (World Scientific 2003) 368; Jawahir Thontowi, 
‘The Islamic Perspective on the War on Terrorism and Current Indonesian Responses’ 24 (‘middle 
way’); Zachary Abuza, ‘Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward’ (The Jamestown 
Foundation, 14 January 2010) (unpaginated) 
 193 
terrorism to compensation and/or restitution as well as the right to rehabilitation of those 
cleared of all legal charges by the court, were even provided for.6  In contrast, the 
Philippines only enacted legislation defining terrorism in 2007.7  Moreover, the Philippine 
anti-terrorism law is rarely used; even alleged members of the CPP-NPA who are 
prosecuted are not charged under that law but are instead charged with rebellion or 
common crimes under the criminal code.8  Second, in Indonesia, the police, particularly the 
special anti-terrorism unit called Detasemen Khusus 88 (Special Detachment 88), or simply 
“Densus 88”, is the main instrument of the state for counterterrorism, consistent with an 
approach that treats counterterrorism as law-enforcement.  In the Philippines, in contrast, 
the main instrument of counterterrorism/counterinsurgency is the military, reflecting a 
“War on Terror” approach that features actual military operations with American troop 
involvement.     
Sebastian and Abuza praise the aforementioned characteristics of Indonesian 
counterterrorism.9  They note that the country’s decision to commit to counterterrorism 
did not lead to a concentration of power and capacity in the Indonesian military, nor did 
the Indonesian government enact draconian laws similar to the Internal Security Act in 
Singapore and Malaysia.10  These characteristics appear to give Indonesian 
counterterrorism greater political legitimacy or acceptability.  From the viewpoint of Abuza, 
Indonesia has been able to successfully develop a credible and effective counterterrorist 
force without imperilling its democratic gains. This is a unique achievement that 
distinguishes Indonesia from countries the world over.11  Where Indonesia is seen as having 
achieved better results than the Philippines in defeating terrorists, a difficult enough 
contention to make in itself, it has been argued that the different outcomes can be 
                                                                 
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35910> accessed 4 
April  2016.  
6 Arts. 36 and 37, Law No. 15/2003. See, also, Lindsey ‘Indonesia’s New Anti -Terrorism Laws - 
Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t’ (JURIST, 30 October 2002) 
<http://jurist.org/forum/forumnew65.php> accessed 7 August 2015. 
7 Republic Act No. 9372 defines terrorism as a crime under Phil ippine law. 
8 Interview 27.  Satur Ocampo opined that it might be because Rep. Act No. 9372 provides more 
hurdles for prosecutors than the criminal code. 
9 Sebastian (n 5) 363, 368; Abuza (n 5) (unpaginated). 
10 Malaysia’s Internal Security Act of 1960 was enacted after the country gained independence in 
1957. The law allows for detention without trial or criminal charges under certain circumstances. In 
2012, the ISA was replaced and repealed by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 which 
came into force on 31 July 2012.  Amnesty International, ‘Malaysia: Human Rights Undermined: 
Restrictive Laws in a Parliamentary Democracy’ (Amnesty International 1999) ASA 28/006/1999.   
Malaysia’s ISA extended to Singapore on 16 September 1963 when Singapore was a state of the 
Federation of Malaysia, and was retained after its separation from Malaysia. 
11 Abuza (n 5) (unpaginated). 
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accounted for by the differences in the philosophical and operational approach to 
counterterrorism.12   
However, as I show in chapter 7, these differences notwithstanding, serious human 
rights violations nonetheless continue to plague Indonesian counterterrorism.  In 
particular, extrajudicial killings and torture remain part of the repertoire of 
counterterrorism in practice.  While the scale of reported killings in Indonesia is lower than 
in the Philippines,13 the killings belie an approach to counterterrorism that is not 
dramatically more respectful of human rights than that in the Philippines.  Indeed, impunity 
for serious violations persists in both approaches.  Even in Indonesia, there remains room 
for the possibility of a killings program, albeit existing side-by-side with regular law 
enforcement.   
Ironically, impunity for serious violations stems partly from the belief that Densus 
88 essentially embodies the correct legal path to counterterrorism.  Because of the 
perception that Indonesia has already got counterterrorism right, violations by Densus 88 
have not attracted serious consideration.  No transnational campaigning has been 
undertaken on the issue of Densus 88 killings that is comparable to the transnational 
mobilisation on extrajudicial killings of Filipino leftist activists.  Campaigning on this issue 
has been confined to the domestic level, where the pressure for reform of Indonesian 
counterterrorism is divided between mainstream human rights and Muslim legal 
advocates. 
The argument in this chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I establish how Indonesia 
arrived at its own approach to counterterrorism, featuring Densus 88 as the lead agency 
which is identified with the legal framework.  Second, I consider the different responses to 
the terrorism discourse in Indonesia after the establishment of the legal framework.  I 
argue that two patterns of engagement with counterterrorism can be discerned.  Among 
mainstream human rights advocates, the premise of legalised counterterrorism tends to be 
accepted, especially as counterterrorism resonates with anti-extremism. This contrasts 
with the fundamental questioning of counterterrorism by Muslim lawyers of the Tim 
Pengacara Muslim (TPM).  This chapter prepares the stage for a consideration in Chapter 7 
of the most divisive and controversial issue, namely, extrajudicial killings and torture by 
Densus 88.  It shows that there is a deep division among possible opponents of abuses 
committed by Densus 88 that weakens the pressure for reform.  
                                                                 
12 Jonathan R Martin, ‘Comparing Strategies for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in Southea st 
Asia’ (2011) 12 Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 103 -117. 
13 The scale of Densus 88 kil l ings will be discussed in the next chapter.     
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1.  An Indonesian Model Emerges: Legal framework and Densus 88 
 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the government of President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri showed inconsistency or lack of single-mindedness in pursuing the 
counterterrorism agenda pressed by the United States and allied regional governments, 
including Singapore and Malaysia.  Unlike Arroyo, the Megawati did not immediately jump 
to join the United States in its War on Terror after 9/11.  This was despite the fact that 
Megawati was the first foreign head of state to visit Washington after 9/11.14  Elements of 
her government, including the head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Abdullah 
Mahmud Hendropriyono, and the Minister of Defence Matori Abdul Jalil, also advocated to 
Megawati the so-called “Musharraf scenario”, in which support for the US-led War on 
Terror would attract some debt relief and an end to the arms embargo imposed on the 
Indonesian military (TNI) since 1999 following human rights violations in East Timor.15  
However, she did not seem to heed this advice.  During her state visit to the US in 
September 2001, while Megawati offered condolences to victims of 9/11 and condemned 
terrorism, she stopped short of endorsing a retaliatory military response by the US.16  In 
return, the United States offered only non-military aid and equipment.17  On her return to 
Jakarta, prevailed upon by parliamentary leaders, Megawati moreover delivered a speech 
in mid-October 2002 in which she expressed her disapproval of the US invasion of 
Afghanistan.18   
Singapore and Malaysia, which claimed they had uncovered “terrorist cells” of 
Jemaah Islamiyah in their countries and in Indonesia, criticised Indonesia’s “indecisiveness” 
in acting against alleged terrorists by failing to arrest Abu Bakar Basyir.19  Many observers 
point to Megawati’s delicate domestic political position as explaining her apparent 
                                                                 
14 Will iam Wise, Indonesia’s War on Terror (United States-Indonesia Society 2005) 25. 
15 Tatik S Hafidz, ‘The War on Terror and the Future of Indonesian Democracy’ (IDSS, Nanyang 
Technological University 2003) Working Paper 46 2–3.  The Leahy-Feingold Amendment of 1999 
banned all  military training and most equipment transfers.  There were also US bans on military 
training under the International Military Education and Training funds (IMET) in 1992 -1996; on l ight 
weapons in 1993; and heavy weapons and equipment in 1995 and 1996. Damien Kingsbury, 
‘Australia’s Renewal of Training Links with Kopassus: A Critique’ (Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, ANU 2004) SDSC Working Paper 387 15, n. 4.  An “Arroyo scenario” by which was meant 
inviting direct American troop involvement in counterterrorism operations in Indonesian soil was 
ruled out by Megawati’s advisers apparently for being too unpatriotic. Hafidz 8. 
16 Wise (n 14) 26. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid 26, 28. 
19 Jonathan T Chow, ‘ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11’ (2005) 45 Asian Survey 302 -
321, 309–310. 
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indecision towards alleged terrorists in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.20  Megawati was 
catapulted to the presidency by a coalition with Islamist parties.  Joining the US “War on 
Terror” would have angered these allies who considered the US’ action on Afghanistan and 
Iraq as aggressive and directed at Muslims.21  Moreover, popular opinion coalesced 
towards nationalist sentiments critical of American intervention in Indonesian affairs. 22 
Nevertheless, Megawati was not altogether indifferent to external pressure.  While 
she did not join the US-led Coalition of the Willing, Megawati coordinated with the United 
States to capture foreigners Omar Al-Farouq and Mahammad Saad Iqbal Madni, alleged by 
the US to be Al Qaeda operatives in Indonesia, and to quickly transfer them to US 
custody.23  As discussed in Chapter 5, Megawati also moved to crush paramilitary 
mobilisation in Maluku and Poso, which had been an embarrassment to her predecessor 
Wahid’s administration.  Importantly, in the aftermath of 9/11, Megawati also initiated a 
draft anti-terrorism legislation, which was widely opposed and was shelved until the 
government revived it after the 2002 Bali bombing.24   
Indonesian human rights advocates had contributed to the domestic efforts that 
restrained Megawati from exhibiting all-out support for the US’ counterterrorism agenda 
by resisting Megawati’s draft anti-terrorism law.  The draft law, prepared by the Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights, proposed that “terrorism” be treated as a “special criminal 
action” which required extraordinary measures.  These measures included allowing 
investigators to have custody of a suspect for a period of 270 days without trial ;25 tap 
communications, keep a suspect under surveillance, and trespass property;26 as well as 
deprive the suspect of the rights to an attorney, to remain silent, to bail, and to have 
contact with family or external parties during the investigation.27  The draft law defined 
“terrorism” as a political crime based on a political motive.28  Islamic parties, human rights 
                                                                 
20 Hafidz (n 15); Sebastian (n 5). 
21 Leonard C Sebastian, ‘Indonesian State Responses to September 11, the Bali  Bombings and the 
War in Iraq: Sowing the Seeds for an Accommodationist Islamic Framework?’ (2003) 16 Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 429-446, 433. 
22 Hafidz (n 15) 7. 
23 Kuwait-born Omar al-Farouq was captured on June 6, 2002 in Bogor near Jakarta, and was 
subjected to extraordinary rendition to a CIA facil ity in Afghanistan.  Pakistani Mahammad Saad 
Iqbal Madni was captured on January 9, 2002 in Jakarta, and rendered to Egypt on the request of the 
CIA. Wise (n 14) 31–34. 
24 Sebastian (n 5) 361. 
25 art. 17 of the Draft Law on Anti -Terrorism cited in Bivitri  Susanti, ‘National Security, Terrorism, and 
Human Rights in Indonesia’ (2002) 7–8. 
26 Arts. 18 and 20 of the Draft Law on Anti -Terrorism cited in ibid 8. 
27 Art. 19 of the Draft Law on Anti -Terrorism cited in ibid. 
28 Art. 1 of the Draft Law on Anti -Terrorism defined terrorism as “actions using violence with a 
political background or objective, in the form of: (1) actions that create danger for other people’s 
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organisations and civil society more broadly opposed the proposal on the ground that it 
may lead to suppression of legitimate dissent.  The Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)  argued that, 
while the proposed bill was akin to the emergency legislation in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, there was no such urgency in Indonesia.  Comparing the bill to the Anti-
Subversion Law of the Suharto regime, all five Islamic parties in parliament warned that the 
authorities will likely use the law if passed to target Islamic leaders and activists, including 
Abu Bakar Basyir.29  Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara, a human rights lawyer added that “[the] 
legal approach, especially [the] penal code, can never solve the problem of terrorism” 
anyway as terrorism can be a state tactic, while non-state terrorism “is, in fact, rooted in 
the problems of injustice” in the social sphere.30   
The Indonesian government’s reaction to the Bali bombing of 2002 was 
dramatically different from its reaction to 9/11.  After the Bali bombing, the Indonesian 
government’s perceived apprehension gave way to certainty.  The Bali bombing of 2002 
appeared to confirm the dire warnings by foreign governments and domestic proponents 
of the “War on Terror” about the threat of terrorism from radical Islamists.  The bombs 
targeted the Paddy’s Irish Bar and Sari Club, killing 202 people, mostly tourists from 21 
nationalities.31  Unlike the violence in Maluku and Poso, it immediately paralysed the 
tourism industry, a major contributor to the national economy.32  The government was 
under pressure to respond decisively.  This prompted the Indonesian government to 
develop an approach to counterterrorism that it could call its own.   
The 2002 Bali bombing gave Megawati the justification not only to revive the 
proposed anti-terrorism bill, but also to implement it, with certain changes, in the form of 
interim laws.33  Six days after the Bali bombing, while Parliament was in extended recess, 
Megawati signed Interim Law No. 1/2002 (PERPU 1/2002), defining and punishing acts of 
                                                                 
l ife; (2) destruction of goods; (3) elimination of personal freedom; or (4) actions that create fear in 
the society”.  There is no definition of what constitutes a “political background or objective”. ibid 6–
7; Sebastian (n 5) 364. 
29 Devi Asmarani, ‘Muslims Oppose Jakarta Anti -Terror Bil l ’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 11 May 
2002). 
30 Susanti (n 25) 9. 
31 BBC News, ‘The 12 October 2002 Bali  Bombing Plot’ BBC News (11 October 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138> accessed 6 Apri l  2016. 
32 International Crisis Group, ‘Impact of the Bali  Bombings’ (International Crisis Group 2002) Asia 
Briefing No. 23 5 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B023-
impact-of-the-bali-bombings.aspx> accessed 6 April  2016. 
33 An interim law or peraturan pengganti undang-undang (perpu) is a form of legislation enacted by 
the President in emergency situations.  A perpu is one level below a statute (undang-undang) in the 
hierarchy of Indonesian laws. Hikmahanto Juwana, ‘Anti -Terrorism Efforts in Indonesia’ in Victor V 
Ramraj and others (eds), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Second Edition, Cambridge University 
Press 2012) 291, n. 2. 
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terrorism and related acts, as well as Interim Law No. 2/2002 (PERPU 2/2002), which 
sought to retroactively apply the provisions of the former to the Bali bombing incident. 34  
With the 2002 Bali bombing, Megawati easily undercut the claim that there was no urgency 
to address the problem of terrorism.  The intentional targeting of foreign tourists also 
underscored the necessity of Indonesia’s acceding to international instruments pertaining 
to terrorism, as embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 1373.35  The interim laws were 
subsequently ratified as Law No. 15/2003 and Law No. 16/2003, respectively, by the 
Indonesian legislature (DPR) at its next following sitting on April 4, 2003, in accordance with 
the Constitution.36 
Law 15/2003 departed from the draft anti-terrorism law in certain respects, but it 
still contained certain provisions that human rights organisations criticised at the time and 
consider problematic today.  The definition of “terrorism” in Law 15/2003 did not refer 
anymore to a “political background or motivation”, apparently in order to address the 
concern that the law would be used to curb political expression.37  However, the provisions 
of Law 15/2003 still allowed for longer periods of arrest and detention than provided under 
the Indonesian Code of Criminal Procedure (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Acara Pidana, 
KUHAP);38 permitted additional types of adducible evidence;39 and approved the power to 
tap and intercept communication in terrorism cases.40  An investigator may use any 
“intelligence report” as preliminary evidence.41  When the preliminary evidence is deemed 
adequate by the Head or Deputy Head of the District Court in a closed-door inquiry 
process, the investigator may arrest and further investigate any person suspected of 
                                                                 
34 On 23 July 2004, the Indonesian Constitutional Court declared the retroactive application  of the 
anti-terrorism law to the Bali  bombing incident as a violation of art. 28 (I) (1) (“the right not to be 
tried under a law with retroactive effect”), but did not strike down the previous convictions of the 
petitioners, saying the court’s decision itself only applied prospectively. ibid 295–296; See also, Ross 
Clarke, ‘Retrospectivity and the Constitutional Validity of the Bali  Bombing and East Timor Trials’ 
(2003) 5 Asian Law 1-32. 
35 See, PERPU 1/2002, considerations (b)-(e), discussed by Juwana (n 33) 291.  
36 The 1945 Indonesian Constitution provided in art. 22 that the Parliament may ratify or reject 
interim laws, but did not provide that Parliament may amend or modify provisions of interim laws.  
The understanding that Parliament may not amend or modify interim laws but may only ratify or 
reject them was codified in later laws governing the subject, namely, Law No. 10/2004 and Law No. 
12/2011.   
37 Sebastian (n 5) 364. 
38 Arts. 28 (arrest), 25 (2) (detention). 
39 Art. 27. 
40 Art. 31. 
41 Art. 26 (1). Juwana (n 33) 294; Simon Butt, ‘Indonesian Terrorism Law and Criminal Process’ 
(University of Melbourne Centre for Islamic Law and Society 2009) Islam, Syari’ah and Governance 
Background Paper (ARC Federation Fellowship) 16 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=140 0506> 
accessed 29 October 2013. 
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committing a terrorism offense based on such preliminary evidence for a maximum period 
of a week.42  Ordinarily, under the KUHAP, the arrested person must be released after a 
period of one day, unless he or she is formally detained.43  The KUHAP allows detention up 
to 50 days under the order of a district attorney or 60 days under the order of a judge; 44 
but Law 15/2003 allows detention up to 270 days.45  Moreover, the investigator may be 
authorised by the Head of the District Court to intercept and tap a suspect’s 
communications for a period of one year.46  Because the law did not essentially differ from 
the draft law, Muslim parties continued to oppose ratification, with several critical 
members of Parliament staging a walkout when a decision came to a vote.47  However, 220 
members of Parliament, out of 266 present, voted in favour of ratification. 48 
Notwithstanding legitimate concerns with the anti-terrorism law, a legal framework 
had been established.  Just as importantly, the police emerged from the 2002 Bali bombing 
investigation as a credible actor who could, with international assistance, undertake the 
gathering of necessary evidence to lead to successful prosecutions.49  This development 
was crucial.  Giving the police, particularly Densus 88, the lead role in counterterrorism 
became acceptable, a formula that appeared to satisfy international and domestic 
audiences alike.  Domestic actors’ concerns that commitment to counterterrorism would 
threaten democratic gains by re-empowering the military were allayed, as the military was 
in fact bypassed.  At the same time, foreign (especially American and Australian) 
governments could be satisfied that there was a counterterrorism force capable of 
neutralising threats to their interests. 
Before Densus 88 was established to play the lead role in counterterrorism, there 
had been established anti-terrorism desks in different units of the police, military and 
intelligence services, none of which appeared to be the primary or lead actor. 50  In the 
police, there was the Brigade Mobil (Mobile Brigade) or Brimob.  General I Made Mangku 
Pastika, who had been appointed to the national police headquarters, had possessed carte 
                                                                 
42 Art. 28; Juwana (n 33) 294; Butt (n 41) 17 ff. 
43 Art. 19 (1), KUHAP; Butt (n 41) 13. 
44 Arts. 24 and 25, KUHAP.  
45 Art. 25 (2). 
46 PERPU 1/2003, arts. 30, 31 (1) (a)-(b); Juwana (n 33) 295. 
47 Sebastian (n 5) 363. 
48 ibid. 
49 Greg Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia  (Singapore University Press 2005) chap. 
1.  Sidney Jones said that public opinion surveys up to 2012 consistently reflect a dislike of the 
police.  “But the one area where they are given high marks on – and they are very high marks …- is in 
counterterrorism.” Interview 22. 
50 Muradi, ‘The 88th Densus AT: The Role and the Problem of Coordination on Counter -Terrorism in 
Indonesia’ (2009) 2 Journal of Politics and Law 85 -96. 
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blache to form the Anti-Terror and Bomb (ATB) Task Force, reporting directly to the 
national police chief.51  The ATB investigated the 2002 Bali bombing and coordinated with 
the multinational team.  Emerging from this unit, in order to carry on the police 
investigations into other “terrorist networks” and incidents beyond Bali , Densus 88 was 
created on June 20, 2003 through a decree by then national police chief General Da’i 
Bachtiar (Decree No. 30/VI/2003).52  Combining intelligence and operational capabilities, 
and also assuming surveillance tasks over convicted prisoners in terrorism cases, Densus 88 
quickly overshadowed the anti-terrorism desks in other agencies.    
Western governments provided Densus 88 with specialised equipment and 
training.  In fact, the formation of Densus 88 was made possible through the “additional 
funding” of US$ 13 million from Australia and the United States. 53 The US Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance (ATA) program in Indonesia started in 2001 and was catalysed by the 2002 Bali 
bombing.  Thirty graduates of the US program were assigned to the ATB Task Force and 
worked on the Bali bombings and J W Marriot cases.  The formal establishment of Densus 
88 (in March 2004) was slightly delayed to await funds from the ATA program as well as US 
Congressional authority to provide equipment.  US$ 20 million was spent on the Indonesian 
ATA from 2003-2005, only slightly decreasing in the following years.54  According to Wise, 
the original plan was to grow Densus 88 into a force of 300 personnel, with 150 in Jakarta 
and 150 attached to regional police headquarters.55  By 2009, Densus 88 had approximately 
500 personnel, including 50-75 personnel assigned in regional headquarters.56  
Furthermore, the US funded a $3.5 million counter-terrorism training facility east of Bogor 
at Megamendung, which was completed in October 2003.  Australia funded a similar facility 
in Semarang.57  According to Wise, Australian funding for Densus 88 focused on providing 
                                                                 
51 Wise (n 14) 39. 
52 Muradi (n 51) 86.  Pastika was honoured in both Indonesia and Australia for the successful 
investigation of the 2002 Bali  bombing, and then returned to Bali  as regional police chief. “As Pastika 
moved on, General Baktiar signed ‘secret telegram No. 217/IV/2003’ directing the establishment of 
Directorate VI/Anti -Terrorist Bomb Unit in the Criminal Investigations Directorate at the National 
Police Headquarters. The directorate was ‘to be responsible for the development of strategy and 
policy, including the control of operational units in Indonesia.’ … This entity became the core of 
Detachment 88…” under its first director Pranowo, who was also involved in the 2002 Bali  bombing 
investigation.  Wise (n 14) 39–40.  
53 Muradi (n 51) 86. 
54 So closely identified was the new police unit to the US ATA program that it is sometimes remarked 
that the “88” in Densus 88 stemmed from a mispronunciation of “ATA”. “The American trainers 
called it the ‘ATA’ detachment … The Indonesians heard it as ‘88’.” Wise (n 14) 40.  An alternative 
speculation is that 88 is a reference to the number of Australians killed in the 2002 Bali  bombing.  
55 ibid. 
56 Muradi (n 51) 87. 
57 Wise (n 14) 67–69. 
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counter-terrorism intelligence training to the intelligence arm of the special unit.58  
Australia similarly assisted the National Intelligence Agency, BIN, and the financial 
intelligence unit, PPATK.59     
 
2.  Views of Mainstream Human Rights Advocates 
 
2.1.  Counterterrorism did not target mainstream civil society 
 
After Law No. 15/2003 came into effect, the fears that human rights organisations 
entertained did not all materialise.  It was feared that the enactment of an anti-terrorism 
law would lead to criminalisation of legitimate dissent.  However, police counterterrorist 
operations and prosecutions for terrorism did not appear to target civil society in general.  
Nor were Muslims indiscriminately targeted.  Nonetheless, non-government organiations 
working with communities were clearly aware that the threat of terrorism might be used to 
advance other unrelated agendas detrimental to local communities.  Deddy Rathi of 
Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Indonesian Forum for the Environment, WALHI) 
stated that his organisation’s concern was “how to make [sure] social and economic issues 
[do] not become a terrorism issue.”60   WALHI and Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan 
Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekologis (Society for Law Reform Based on Community 
and Ecology, HuMa), which are organisations focused on environmental and land rights 
issues, were particularly concerned about the potential criminalisation of protest by 
communities resisting corporations encroaching on their lands, resources or livelihood.  At 
the time of my interviews with WALHI (June 2013) and HuMa (July 2013), the WALHI 
regional director in South Sumatra, Anwar Sadat, had recently been charged “as a 
provocateur of peasants against a state-owned company” and WALHI’s Deddy Rathi and 
HuMa’s campaigner Widiyanto made references to Sadat’s case to underline this concern.61  
                                                                 
58 ibid 75. 
59 ibid. 
60 Interview 2. 
61 Interviews 2 and 15.  The arrest and charges were reported on internationally in calls for support 
by the Asian Human Rights Center (AHRC), Friends of the Earth UK, Amnesty International Australia, 
and East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) in January to February 2013. According to 
Amnesty International, there has been an ongoing land dispute between farmers and a state owned 
plantation company in Ogan Il ir district, South Sumatra since 1982. The police have participated in 
the conflict, including by ordering vil lagers in Betung to leave their land, destroying a place of 
worship in Betung, and opening fire on a crowd of farmers kil l ing a 12 -year old boy and injuring four 
others in Limbang Jaya vil lage on July 27, 2012.  The arrest of Anwar Sadat, the WALHI director, 
along with his aide and at least 25 others came as a result of a protest action on January 29, 2013 by 
farmers before the regional police headquarters in which farmers demanded that the police not be 
involved in their land dispute with the state company.  Violence attended the arrest, with Anwar 
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Respondents from HuMa were also concerned about the increased involvement of the 
military in managing socio-economic conflicts.62  According to Widiyanto of HuMa, the 
enactment of Law No. 7/2012 or the Social Conflict Management Law allows the police and 
military a greater role in the handling of “social conflicts”, which include tenurial conflicts.  
The law could thus have a substantial impact on civil society organisations in the future.63  
He speculated that the police might use the discourse of counterterrorism against 
indigenous peoples’ protest against palm oil and mining companies; but to date, he 
conceded that counterterrorism and tenurial conflicts remained distinct.64  Anggalia Putri 
Pematasari of HuMa added that the Indonesian government’s counterterrorism strategy , 
which is led by the police, had not yet resulted in land grabbing and other land conflicts.65  
She said it had been the military rather than the police who had committed or facilitated 
land grabbing.66   
Thus, an opportunistic convergence of terrorism discourse with socio-economic 
issues doesn’t seem to have taken place.  The respondent from WALHI said such a situation 
was more likely to have occurred in the years close to 9/11, when the “terrorist” label was 
applied more indiscriminately against Muslims more generally.67  He believed that over the 
years, there had been changes in terms of people’s knowledge or perceptions  of terrorism 
so that “if you use [the] terrorism issue, you must be clear” because people have 
associated the label “terrorists” with a very specific type of Muslim.68  For example, the 
respondent from WALHI said that in 2006/7, in the wake of allegations by WALHI that the 
Australian mining company Newmont was illegally dumping mine tailings in Buyat Bay, 
North Sulawesi, an Australian senator branded WALHI’s former director Halik Muhammad a 
“terrorist” in a radio show.69  The respondent said that this incident only created a stir for a 
couple of days, but was put to rest after the senator acknowledged his mistake, as people 
(including Australians) clearly saw that the terrorism accusation against Halik Muhammad 
was loose talk.70 
                                                                 
Sadat suffering blows and injuries in the head.  Amnesty International, ‘Indonesia: Authorities Must 
Ensure Accountability for Police Violence in South Sumatra’ 
<http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/30965/> accessed 5 April  2016. 
62 Interviews 15 and 16. 
63 Interview 15. 
64 ibid. 
65 Interview 16. 
66 ibid. 
67 Interview 2. 
68 ibid. 
69 ibid.  
70 ibid. 
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When asked whether counterterrorism had had any effect on communities 
involved in land or resource conflicts, the respondents from HuMa said that they had not 
yet seen counterterrorism rhetoric or resources used systematically against communities 
resisting corporations.71  HuMa’s Anggalia Putri Pematasari, however, noted that a possible 
exception to this is Papua, in which the mining giant Freeport operates.72  Therefore, the 
general impression is that counterterrorism’s impact was limited to specific target groups, 
i.e., “terrorists”, and civil society organisations such as WALHI and HuMa did not have to 
deal with the counterterrorism issue.  The respondent from the labor federation 
Gabunganan Serikat Buruh Indonesia (GSBI), Emilia Yanti, related specific violations of 
workers’ rights to strike and freedom of association and expression, in the form of threats, 
intimidation and outward violence from the police and military.  She referred to these as 
forms of “terrorism” committed by the state.73   However, regarding the impact of 
counterterrorism on workers’ unions, she similarly reported that the charge of terrorism 
had not yet been used to repress union activities.74 
It is telling that respondents from mainstream human rights organisations often 
referred to counterterrorism’s target group as “the terrorists” or “terrorist/terror ism 
community”, implying that terrorists were a distinct or identifiable group apart from civil 
society.  Thus, except in certain regions, counterterrorism operations and prosecutions 
were generally seen as focused rather than indiscriminate, and moreover,  focused on the 
correct targets.  This seems in accord with changes in general public perceptions about 
radical Islamic groups and personalities.  As a result of police investigations into the 2002 
Bali bombing and other bombings of high profile targets in Jakarta and Bali, it simply 
became harder to deny that “terrorist networks” existed and plotted violent attacks.  The 
minute details of the activities of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Noordin M Top, Jamaah Ansharut 
Thauhid (JAT), etc., became the subject of everyday discourse in the media, and the threat 
of terrorism no longer appeared doubtful.    
Mainstream human rights organisations Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid 
Institute, LBH), Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (Commission for 
the Disappeared and Victims of Violence, KontraS), Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi 
                                                                 
71 Interviews 15 and 16. 
72 I discuss this case later in this section.   
73 She expressed sceptical views about the counterterrorism discourse similar to those propounded 
by Muslim lawyers discussed below. Interview 9. 
74 ibid. 
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Masyarakat (Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy, ELSAM) and WALHI echoed this 
perception in my interviews with their representatives.  They largely acknowledged that 
terrorism was indeed a problem in Indonesia, i.e., a home-grown problem and not merely a 
foreign agenda.75  Hence, they accept counterterrorism as a legitimate imperative for the 
Indonesian state, and also as a legitimate object of international cooperation with the 
United States and Australia.76  To the interviewee from WALHI, counterterrorism was 
acceptable as long as it wasn’t indiscriminately affecting Muslims in general, and thus 
remained focused on “terrorists”, i.e., only those Muslims with extreme beliefs plotting 
violent actions.77  Hence, in the view of respondents, the legitimacy of counterterrorism 
was dependent on whether counterterrorism remained focused on “terrorists”.  There was 
no further questioning of the category “terrorist”.  
 
2.2.  Religious intolerance is a pressing concern 
 
It is also significant that police operations and deradicalisation efforts targeted 
individuals or groups that appeared to espouse illiberal religious Muslim ideas.  In this 
sense, counterterrorism actually resonated with some of the goals of mainstream human 
rights organisations, i.e., against religious intolerance.  For example, a recent theme in 
human rights campaigning in Indonesia revolves around the issue of religious freedom.  The 
immediate stimulus for this campaign was the wave of attacks on minority religious groups 
including Protestants and Catholics, Baha’i, Shia and Ahmadiyah.  The Ahmadiyah view 
themselves as Muslims, but others regard them as deviations from Islam.78   In 2005, the 
semi-official peak body for Islamic religious doctrine, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(Indonesian Ulama Council, MUI), reiterated an earlier edict declaring that the Ahmadiyah 
deviated from Islamic doctrine by declaring Ahmadiyah founder Mira Ghulam Ahmad a 
“prophet”.79  This prompted attacks by Islamist organisations on the Ahmadiyah theology 
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college in Bogor, and Ahmadiyah communities in other parts of the country. 80   In 2008, the 
Religious Affairs Minister and Attorney General signed a decree requiring Ahmadiyah to 
stop preaching its beliefs.81  This again prompted an increase in violence against 
Ahmadiyah, which included destruction of Ahmadiyah mosques, harassment and physical 
assault using stone, sticks and machetes, and even killings.82  The organisations that 
participated in the attacks include the Forum Umat Islam (Islamic People’s Forum, FUI), 
Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum, Forkami), 
Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI), Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and 
Gerakan Islam Reformis (Islamic Reformist Movement, Garis).83   
Human rights campaigners have also subsumed the denial of building permits for 
and closing down of Protestant and Catholic churches under the theme of religious 
intolerance.84  In 2006, the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs 
reaffirmed the policy adopted in 1969, which permitted regional governments to regulate 
the building of houses of worship.85  In practice, regional governments have used this 
power to restrict the number of Christian churches in Muslim-majority areas, and to shut 
down “illegal churches” built without permit and to prevent the use of private homes as 
houses of worship.86  Islamist groups have also participated in pressing regional 
governments not to issue permits and in preventing “illegal churches” and private houses 
of worship.87  Islamist groups have conducted public demonstrations, and also engaged in 
intimidation and arson attacks.88  As in the attacks against Ahmadiyah and Shia, the 
government has exerted little effort to prosecute or prevent these attacks, and has even 
been accused of coddling the FPI.89  Crouch observed that local governments had used 
conflicts over places of worship as opportunities to gain the political support of Muslim 
voters influenced by radical Islamists.90  Other observers charged that the police do not 
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restrain the FPI allegedly because the latter serve as an “attack dog” for the police, that is 
by carrying out illegal acts for them.91  
Mainstream human rights groups view these attacks as violations of the right to 
belief of the minority groups caused by religious intolerance.  They criticise the Front 
Pembela Islam (FPI) and similar groups that undertake attacks on Ahmadiyah and others as 
“perpetrators” of human rights violations, alongside local governments and villagers who 
support them, as well as the police and national officials who appear to tolerate them.92  
Illiberal Muslim groups have also turned against supporters of minority religious groups, 
including human rights organisations themselves, heightening the animosity between the 
two camps.  In the so-called “Monas incident” of June 1, 2008, Front FPI and HTI, under the 
banner of Komando Laskar Islam (Islamic Defenders Command, KLI), physically assaulted 
activists from the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion (AKKBB).  The latter were 
celebrating Pancasila day by highlighting the plight of the Ahmadiyah religious 
community.93  The assault, which further illustrated intolerance, only served to alienate 
Islamist groups from mainstream human rights organisations and from the public in 
general. 
Following the view that terrorism proceeds from extreme Islamic ideology, an 
interviewee from Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) suggested that religious intolerance was 
linked to terrorism and must therefore be addressed in a counterterrorism strategy.94  
According to LBH’s Muhamad Isnur, Head of Research and Development Division, in 
particular, counterterrorism strategy must address the proliferation of religious speech 
inciting hatred, such as those heard from FPI and other illiberal groups.  To illustrate the 
connection, the interviewee mentioned the case of a perpetrator of a bombing targeting 
police in Cirebon in April 2011, who appeared to have previously been involved in an anti -
Ahmadiyah attack in Cirebon in 2010.95  He said the police’s apparent unwillingness to take 
action to prevent the proliferation of religious intolerance in public discourse, and other 
illiberal practices of certain Islamic groups like the FPI, was casting a shadow over the 
integrity of its counterterrorism strategy, particularly the seriousness of its deradicalisation 
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efforts.96  Thus, it would even appear that mainstream human rights advocates considered 
pushing for counterterrorism to cover a greater swathe of Islamic groups.  The attacks on 
religious minorities are providing advocates of human rights more reason to distance 
themselves from radical Islamists, sustaining the broad community support for 
counterterrorism that the government enjoyed after the 2002 Bali bombing. 
 
2.3.  Criticism of counterterrorism operations in Poso 
 
Mainstream human rights organisations, however, raise objections to the 
counterterrorism discourse when the targets have not been “terrorists”, i.e., of the 
recognised Islamic extremist kind. 
According to respondent from KontraS, this has been the case in Poso and Papua.97  
Poso is one of the regions that saw communal fighting immediately after the downfall of 
Suharto in the late 1990s.98   KontraS seeks to prevent Poso from reverting to communal 
fighting and focuses on the interest of victims of violence, many of whom, according to 
KontraS’ vice coordinator Syamsul Alam, still hold grudges and long for revenge.99  
According to KontraS, the local government has mismanaged reconstruction and 
development funds that international donors provided in support of the peace process in 
Poso.  In particular, the failure to deliver development projects to certain groups of ex-
combatants intended for their disengagement from violence, exacerbated the grudges and 
sense of injustice that ex-combatants still harboured.100   
KontraS acknowledges the claim of counterterrorism officials that “terrorists” from 
Java (i.e., Jemaah Islamiyah) operate there, recruiting and directing a few residents of Poso, 
especially prior to 2007.  However, KontraS criticises the “repressive approach” of police 
counterterrorism in Poso, and warns that counterterrorism there actually “re-radicalises” 
people.101  Violations such as arbitrary arrest and torture, suffered at the hands of police, 
reignite feelings of revenge.102  Syamsul Alam claimed that the “new” terrorism in Poso is 
                                                                 
96 Interview 8. 
97 Interview 4. 
98 Gerry van Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars  
(Routledge 2007); Dave McRae, A Few Poorly Organized Men: Interreligious Violence in Poso, 
Indonesia (Bril l  2013). 
99 Interview 4. 
100 Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan, ‘Laporan Pemantauan KontraS: Temuan 
Lapangan Dari Poso-Sulawesi Tengah’ (KontraS 2012). 
101 Interview 4. 
102 ibid. 
 208 
not about jihad or Islamic ideology of the “terrorists” of the 2002 Bali bombing, but a kind 
of throwback to the ill feelings of the 1990s communal conflict now directed at the 
police.103  He further said that the people targeted and captured by Densus 88 in Poso “do 
not have a strong ideology” and are “not jihadists”.104  For example, he cites the case of 
Basri, a tattooed rock musician who turned to violence to avenge the killing of his family.105  
KontraS believes that he was wrongly added by Densus 88 in the list of wanted persons for 
alleged involvement in Jemaah Islamiyah.  He was captured in 2007 and suffered torture 
while in police detention.  KontraS thinks that his confinement in prison together with 
“terrorists” with “radical ideologies” only strengthened his resolve to fight the police.   
 
2.4.  Concern over Densus 88 presence in Papua 
 
In recent years, KontraS and National Papua Solidarity (NAPAS) were also 
concerned that counterterrorism resources had been channelled to fight non-Islamic 
Papuan pro-independence groups, resulting in a new pattern of repression in that area.106  
Respondent Zely Ariane, the coordinator of NAPAS, a solidarity group based in Jakarta, has 
worked to popularise the human rights situation in the Papuan provinces.  According to 
her, Papuan activists believed that there had been a shift in Indonesia’s approach to 
Papuan separatism towards giving Densus 88 a role in the suppression of pro-
independence groups.107   
This unprecedented development was exhibited in the separate killings of Mako 
Tabuni and Kelly Kwalik by Densus 88 personnel.  Mako Tabuni was a prominent leader of 
the legal organisation Komite Nasional Papua Barat (West Papuan National Committee, 
KNPB) while Kelly Kwalik was a high-profile community leader who proclaimed himself a 
member of the armed separatist group Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement, 
OPM).  Mako Tabuni was attacked by masked men in unlabelled cars and then taken to the 
police hospital 20 minutes away, instead of to the nearest hospital.108  Instead of being 
treated, he was apparently left to bleed to death and was subjected to further questioning 
at the hospital.  Tabuni’s lawyer, his relatives, and activists including Andreas Harsono of 
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Human Rights Watch believe he died at the hands of a Densus 88 operation.  The presence 
of Densus 88 in security operations in Papua has been underlined in an Australian news 
report in August 2012.  In 2011, there was a video that surfaced showing what appeared to 
be a Densus 88 operation in Papua.109  In the case of Kelly Kwalik, allegedly killed while 
sleeping, the Indonesian police acknowledged that Densus 88 was involved.  In fact the 
Papuan police chief praised the work of Detachment 88 in the killing.110  These 
developments have created an opening for transnational mobilisation on the human rights 
situation in the Papuan provinces to increase pressure on the United States and Australia, 
which provide material support for Densus 88 in terms of weapons, training and technical 
capacity to undertake wiretaps, bomb detonation, and the like.111  
NAPAS has also observed a change in the Papuan political prisoners issue that 
appears to be in step with this shift in the government’s approach to the independence 
movement.  Human rights organisations have been campaigning around the fact that there 
are “political prisoners” in Papua, i.e., Papuans imprisoned for their political beliefs or their 
peaceful expression.112  Before 2004/5, most of these prisoners were charged with the 
crime of treason or violation of the law banning the raising of the Papuan flag.  More 
recently, however, the charges have related to ownership of guns, or to violent activities 
such as bombings, which can also be defined as terrorism under the anti-terrorism law.113  
Victor Yiemo, the new leader of KNPB, says KNBP members have been arrested supposedly 
for making bombs in order to frame them as terrorists and justify Densus 88 involvement in 
Papua.114  
Human rights advocates rightly pay critical attention to developments in Papua, 
and they make an important contribution by doing so.  They are showing that the 
government has been unable to resist the temptation of using counterterrorism discourse 
to break the Papuan independence movement and mobilise support for state dominance in 
Papua.  However, limiting criticism of the counterterrorism discourse only to Papua and 
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Poso tends to reinforce their acceptance that counterterrorism discourse could have a 
proper application, that is, towards Islamic extremists.  
 
3.  Views of Muslim Lawyers 
 
While mainstream human rights advocates have not been particularly critical of 
Indonesian counterterrorism discourse, a group of Muslim lawyers view Indonesian 
counterterrorism practice in a completely different light.  Tim Pengacara Muslim (Muslim 
Lawyers Team, TPM) is a group that emerged to represent terrorism suspects after the 
enactment of Law No. 15/2003.  Unlike ELSAM, LBH and KontraS, which have effectively 
accommodated the counterterrorism discourse (except as applied to the conflicts in Poso 
and Papua), TPM continues the rejectionist rhetoric of the years previous to the 2002 Bali 
bombings. 
 
3.1.  Representation of defendants in terrorism cases 
 
TPM has become quite prominent for offering pro bono legal representation to 
Muslims accused of terrorism.  According to Wirawan Adnan, a senior lawyer who serves as 
an adviser to TPM lawyers, the TPM evolved from a committee of lawyers into a formal 
organisation with presence in different parts of the country.115  Its chairman 
Mahendradatta estimates that TPM has represented around 300 individuals accused of 
terrorism and that there are about fifty TPM lawyers actively handling cases. 116  TPM has 
succeeded in carving a kind of niche legal practice defending terrorism suspects . TPM 
lawyers are also identified with legal radical Islamic organisations like FPI, having also acted 
as counsel for FPI members who get in trouble with the law.  As revealed by the TPM 
chairman, however, FPI has decided to form its own group of in-house counsel, the 
Bantuan Hukum Front (BHF), after TPM declined to come under the FPI organisation.117  
This might indicate a demand for Muslim lawyers who are less autonomous. 
In contrast, mainstream human rights lawyers from LBH and KontraS have reported 
that they have been inactive in the legal representation of terrorism suspects.  An 
interviewee from KontraS complained that suspected “terrorists” avoid mainstream human 
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rights organisations, preferring to work with Islamic groups.118  KontraS and LBH offer legal 
representation for victims of human rights abuse, and campaigning often revolves around 
cases that they deal with directly.  However, KontraS lawyers do not have a single client 
who is a victim of counterterrorism abuse outside of Poso.119   Senior LBH lawyer Adnan 
Buyung Nasution represented Abu Bakar Basyir in 2003 but, according to the LBH 
respondent, LBH has not represented him or others accused of terrorism since the 
establishment of TPM.120 
The TPM senior adviser said Islamic clients are naturally attracted to TPM lawyers 
because they are conversant in their Islamic views, particularly their concept of jihad.121  
However, being a “Muslim lawyer”, explains the respondents from TPM, doesn’t imply 
mixing law and theology, but rather the opposite.  Muslim individuals and organisations 
defended by TPM and other Muslim lawyers (terrorism suspects as well as groups like FPI) 
often have particular religious perspectives or interpretations for violent actions.  In the 
courtroom, however, TPM lawyers do not defend clients on the basis of the Koran or 
Islamic beliefs, but on Indonesian law alone.  TPM lawyers, he continues, do not comment 
on the different religious perspectives outside the courtroom as well.  This is ostensibly 
because there are many different Islamic factions they deal with, and they try to avoid 
getting entangled in their religious differences.  
 
3.2.  Criticism of counterterrorism discourse 
 
In my interviews, TPM respondents categorically rejected the legitimacy of 
counterterrorism.  The senior adviser said TPM lawyers believe that alleged terrorist 
activities are a fabrication by police.122   Therefore, TPM’s self-perception of its role is to 
expose what liesbehind the allegations.  However, the TPM chairman emphasised that TPM 
lawyers have been “cut off from information” and so this role is hard if not almost 
impossible to fulfill.123  Especially since 2010, the police have been preventing TPM lawyers 
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from having access to clients in their detention places.124  TPM lawyers have only been able 
to confer with clients while in the courtroom.125    
Asked why the police would fabricate terrorism ten years after the Bali bombing, 
the senior adviser said that among TPM lawyers, three theories are popular.  First, 
counterterrorism exists to defame Islam.  This is supposedly borne out by the fact that only 
Muslims are ever accused of committing terrorism offenses.126  Second, the perpetuation of 
a threat of terrorism justifies the organisational existence of Densus 88 and 
counterterrorism agencies, and therefore of continued material assistance from Western 
countries.  And finally, the terrorism issue is a useful tool to distract public attention from 
more real or more important socio-economic problems, such as corruption, criminality and 
lack of basic government services.  
The approach of TPM to counterterrorism thus differs considerably from those of 
mainstream human rights organisations.  The two major differences are first, that TPM 
lawyers openly reject the need for counterterrorism; and second, they consider that Islamic 
ideas are under attack, including through deradicalisation.127  The perception of Western 
interest in Indonesian counterterrorism also differs between the two groups.   
 
3.3.  Absence of a middle ground 
 
Professor Heru Susetyo from the University of Indonesia (UI) and senior Muslim 
lawyer from Pusat Advokasi Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia (Indonesian Advocacy Center 
for Law and Human Rights, PAHAM) positioned himself and his organisation as occupying 
an “in between” orientation with respect to human rights law and Islam.128  His interview 
further illustrates the tendency for Islamic and human rights advocacies to bifurcate.   He 
confirms that mainstream human rights activists and radical Muslim activists tend to view 
each other’s discourses with suspicion.  While he believes there is a lot of “common 
ground” in which the peaceful promotion of Islamic values, practices or institutions 
converge with the promotion of human rights, he finds that convergence between these 
two camps has been difficult to acheive.  This is reflected in his own professional 
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development.  Following his graduation from law school, he founded PAHAM together with 
other lawyers from UI in order to provide legal advocacy to victims of communal conflicts in 
the immediate post-Suharto years.  While not intending to establish a niche in the defense 
of the rights of Muslims, he said, PAHAM lawyers attracted Muslim clients because of their 
own Islamic activist background.  Thus, in the late 1990s, he participated in the 
representation of prominent cleric Jafar Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad, and also 
Abu Bakar Basyir in 2003.   However, he chose not to join TPM, and at the time of the 
interview, PAHAM’s focus had shifted from counterterrorism to the persecution of the 
Muslim Rohingya people in Burma, the international litigation over the Freedom Flotilla 
incident, and the campaign against the ban on wearing the veil in some parts of the 
Indonesian civil service. 
Unlike the TPM respondents, the respondent from PAHAM acknowledged that 
some Indonesian militants were targeting Westerners, saying that some of his own clients 
were such militants who had undergone combat training in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia. Hence, he also acknowledged that Western countries had a legitimate interest in 
counterterrorist cooperation with Indonesia in order to prevent more of their own citizens 
from becoming victims. Nevertheless, he held the view that Densus 88 operations were 
losing popular support because of their abuse of power and the victimisation of ordinary 
people.  He reported that Densus 88 had pursued ordinary people, arresting them and 
torturing or subjecting them to ill treatment, only to release them for lack of evidence.  
Furthermore, those who had been wrongfully arrested and whose rights had been violated 
had not received any compensation or reparation from the police, even for medical costs.  
Unfortunately, the advocacy for the rights of suspected terrorists has become marginalised 
in Indonesia.  According to Heru Susetyo, since “the perpetrators are mostly comi ng from 
Islamic organisations” and their legal advocates “Muslim activists like TPM and PAHAM”, 
the perception that is created is that such advocacy is part of an Islamic agenda, not a 
genuine human rights issue.129 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I traced the emergence of Indonesia’s legalised approach to 
counterterrorism.  I also showed the divergent reactions to the terrorism discourse after 
Law No. 1/2003 was enacted.  Unlike the Philippines, Indonesia developed a police-led 
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counterterrorism approach that avoided direct participation of American or Western 
troops and even the country’s own military forces in everyday operations.  This approach 
would appear better suited to the official claim that Indonesian counterterrorism took 
human rights concerns into account.  However, in reality, the legal framework for 
counterterrorism bypassed human rights advocates’ objections to the original proposal. 
Even though the text of the anti-terrorism legislation adopted after the 2002 Bali 
bombing contained provisions that human rights advocates found objectionable, by 2013 
human rights organisations did not appear to question the necessity of counterterrorism.  
This reflects a change in perception of the broader public about the threat of radical Islam 
that was brought about by credible police work in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombing.  
Densus 88’s identification with the legalised approach was made possible through the 
goodwill generated by the police in this period.   As long as the police focused on the threat 
of violence posed by extremist Muslim networks and did not implicate Muslims 
indiscriminately, and as long as the evidence of criminal acts was established through the 
legal process, as was done in the investigation of the 2002 Bali bombing, mainstream 
human rights advocates were willing to accept the legitimacy of counterterrorism.   
However, to a distinct set of legal advocates working directly with suspects 
apprehended by police, however, the fact that counterterrorism was police-led and not 
military-led did not matter.  To the TPM, the terrorism discourse remained questionable 
and its credibility was compromised by the opportunism of its proponents.  Where 
mainstream human rights had seen problems with counterterrorism, namely, in Poso and 
Papua, they have argued that targets had not been Muslim extremists, i.e., they had not 
really been jihadists or they had not been Muslims at all.  TPM, on the other hand, offered 
its critique of the terrorism discourse precisely when they were directed against Muslim 
radicals or jihadists.  The divergence between mainstream human rights and Muslim legal 
advocates is most clearly exhibited by the fact that in the legal representation of 
defendants in terrorism cases, TPM lawyers had completely displaced LBH and KontraS 
lawyers.   
Although there would appear to be no lack of domestic critics of human rights 
abuses in the course of counterterrorism in Indonesia, the critics are in fact divided in 
regard to the question of the legitimacy of the terrorism discourse and the acceptability of 
countering terrorism.  Therefore, there is also no consensus on what to do with Indonesian 
counterterrorism, i.e., whether a dialogue with police about human rights compliance is 
sufficient or rather its overthrow is needed.  Also, as Heru Susetyo has remarked, the state 
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of affairs in which terrorism suspects are identified with radical Islamic ideology and with 
Islamic defenders has resulted in a kind of marginalisation of their issue as not a genuine 
human rights issue.  This has only weakened pressure to hold the police to account for 
violations and undertake reforms.    
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Chapter 7 
Densus 88: Impunity for Extrajudicial Killings 
 
 
In this chapter, I expound on human rights violations committed by the main counterterrorism actor 
in Indonesia, the special anti-terrorism police unit Detasemen Khusus 88 (Densus 88).1  Drawing 
upon KomnasHAM’s special reports released in 2010 and 2011 on the topic of human rights 
violations in the course of police counterterrorism operations, as well as additional documentary 
evidence and interviews with advocates in two incidents that KomnasHAM investigated 
subsequently (the Tanah Runtuh and Tulungagung cases), I illustrate the gravity of violations 
committed by police.  This evidence shows that there is impunity for serious violations, including 
killings and torture.  This impunity is clearly exhibited in the lack of any significant response by the 
police and the government to the investigations.   
The lesson that I draw from this is not only that in reality, the main actor tasked to pursue 
human rights-compliant counterterrorism is a human rights violator.  I also ask why legal restraints 
on the killings by Densus 88 do not appear to work.  The explanation that I propose is that the 
killings persist because Densus 88 is able to publicly justify them despite their illegality.  This is 
because the killings are viewed as responding to threats to public security, that is, the killings 
counter terrorism.  The irony is that it is also Densus 88 that pronounces on the existence, location 
and severity of terrorist threats, its authority on this matter being essentially unchallenged.   
This chapter advances the central argument of the thesis by showing that adopting an 
approach to counterterrorism that is even more legalised than in the Philippines and that explicitly 
incorporates human rights has not prevented the regular commission of extrajudicial killings and 
other grave violations in Indonesia.  Although the number of recorded extrajudicial killings by 
Densus 88 is smaller than those imputed to the Philippine military, nevertheless, the impunity with 
which they are committed are much the same in the two countries.   Their different approaches to 
counterterrorism do not appear to make a difference in practice.   The attachment of a human rights 
language to counterterrorism does not make counterterrorism practice dramatically more respectful 
of human rights.  On the contrary, and ironically, the belief that Densus 88 embodies legal ideals 
(civilian supremacy, human rights) helps perpetuate impunity for violations.  
This chapter also analyses the response of an important local human rights actor, namely, 
Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission or KomnasHAM, as exhibited in its reports on 
Densus 88 operations.  I show that KomnasHAM’s response is limited by an accomodationist position 
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towards the counterterrorism discourse.  In the final section, I use the Tulungagung case to reflect 
on how adopting an accomodationist frame has prevented human rights advocates from responding 
effectively to Densus 88 abuses, and why a more robust critique is needed.  
 
1.  Evidence of serious human rights violations: KomnasHAM reports of 2010 and 2011 
 
Since it was first established, Densus 88 has undertaken hundreds of arrests on suspicion of 
terrorism.  The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) estimated in 2013 that since the 2002 
Bali bombing, there had been around 700 suspected terrorists arrested, most of whom had been 
brought to trial, with a near 100 per cent conviction rate.2  This impressive record of arrests, 
however, was accompanied by an equally concerning record of killings.  Indeed, while some of the 
persons believed responsible for the major terrorist bombing incidents, namely, Bali (2002), JW 
Marriot Hotel (2003) and the Australian embassy (2004), were captured alive and prosecuted for 
terrorism, others were killed by police.  Among the most notorious of the suspects is Malaysian 
national Noordin M. Top.  He was believed responsible for the bombings of JW Marriot Hotel (2003), 
the Australian embassy (2004), Bali (2005), and JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels (2009).  Top was 
killed in a police operation on September 17, 2009 in Solo, along with three others. 3  Others 
suspected of involvement in major terrorist bombings, including Dulmatin (Philippine ambassador’s 
residence 2000; Christmas eve bombings 2000; Bali 2002) and Azahari Husin (Christmas eve 
bombings 2000; Marriot 2003; Australian embassy 2004), were also killed in different police 
operations.4  A tabulation of “Persons Killed by Indonesian Police in Operations” prepared by IPAC, 
shows that from August 2005 to February 2014, there were at least 46 separate operations or 
incidents that resulted in the deaths of suspected terrorists.  Ninety one (91) names are included in 
the IPAC tabulation as having been killed. 
These deaths did not cause any great public alarm, as those killed were believed to be 
armed and dangerous, and may well have maimed or killed police and others during the operation 
against them had they not been stopped.   However, the circumstances of at least some of these 
                                                                 
2 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, ‘Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted 
Extremists in Indonesia’ (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2013) IPAC Report No. 2 6 –7.  
3 Agence France-Presse, ‘Terror Mastermind Kil led in Indonesia Raid’ The Sydney Morning Herald (17 
September 2009) <http://www.smh.com.au/world/terror-mastermind-kil led-in-indonesia-raid-20090917-
ftaz.html> accessed 15 February 2016. 
4 Tom Allard, ‘Bali  Bomb Mastermind Kil led in Shoot-Out’ The Sydney Morning Herald (10 March 2010) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/world/bali -bomb-mastermind-kil led-in-shootout-20100310-py9n.html> accessed 15 
February 2016; Australian Associated Press, ‘Azahari “Dead after Police Raid”’ The Sydney Morning Herald (9 
November 2005) <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/azahari -dead-after-police-
raid/2005/11/09/1131407703698.html> accessed 15 February 2016. 
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deaths raise questions about the extent to which the police had justification for the killings.  
Ibrohim, for example, was killed in an operation that was supposed to be targeting Noordin M. Top.  
This operation involved a 17-hour siege of the house in Temanggung, Solo where Top was said to be 
hiding.  The whole seige was broadcast live on Indonesian television on August 7-8, 2009.  When it 
was learned that the person killed in the operation was Ibrohim and not Top, the authorities 
emphasised that Ibrohim was also suspected to have been a participant in the Ritz Carlton Hotel 
bombing of 2009.  He was the hotel’s florist and he had allegedly taken advantage of his position to 
smuggle in explosives.  Authorities justified the use of heavy fire power against the lone man in the 
Temanggung siege by alleging that he carried a bomb at the time of the police operation.  But as the 
intelligence information that led to the Temanggung siege was faulty to begin with, the belated 
justification for killing instead of taking Ibrohim alive was dubious.5 
On March 9, 2010 in Pamulang, South Tanggerang, Densus 88 shot Dulmatin and two 
companions Ridwan and Hasan Noer, said to be his bodyguards.  The police alleged that the suspects 
were armed and were killed in a shootout.  However, a controversy was created in the media when 
witnesses to the killings Ridwan and Hasan Noer said they had not seen guns used by the targets, 
and that the targets were moreover shot at close range, ensuring their deaths.6  One witness said 
Ridwan was shot on the chest, fell on the witness’ porch, and then was shot again at close range by 
police.  Another witness said Hassan was pinned down on the ground and was shot while in that 
position.7  
Even more concerning was an incident in Cawang, Jakarta on May 20, 2012, where three 
men were killed, two of whom have never been identified.8  In that incident, the police contended 
that Densus 88 officers shot a man after he physically resisted arrest.9  Two other persons, whom 
the first man was about to meet at that place, were beaten and shot to death after trying to escape 
from police.10  The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) condemned this incident as “excessive 
                                                                 
5 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Top Stil l  at Large’, PM with Mark Colvin (12 August 2009) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2008/s2654003.htm> accessed 20 October 201 5. 
6 Hidayatullah, ‘Saksi: Tersangka Ditembak Dari Jarak Dekat’ Hidayatullah.com (11 March 2010) 
<http://www.hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/read/2010/03/11/42867/saksi-tersangka-ditembak-dari-jarak-
dekat.html> accessed 16 February 2016; Elin Yunita Kristanti and Zaky Al -Yamani, ‘Saksi: Teroris Ditembak Di 
Kepala Saat Jatuh’ (10 March 2010) <http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/135252 -warga-terduga-
teroris-itu-ditembak-di-kepala> accessed 16 February 2016. 
7 Hidayatullah (n 6); Elin Yunita Kristanti and Zaky Al-Yamani (n 6). 
8 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(KomnasHAM 2011) 58. 
9 Dhanny Krisnadhy, ‘Densus 88 Grebek Teroris Di Cawang Dan Cikampek’ Harian Online Kabar Indonesia (12 
May 2010) 
<http://www.kabarindonesia.com/berita.php?pil=8&jd=Densus+88+Grebek+Teroris+di+Cawang+dan+Cikamp
ek&dn=20100512194418> accessed 16 February 2016. 
10 Asian Human Rights Commission, ‘An Open Letter to Chief of Indonesian National Police’ 
<https://www.ammado.com/nonprofit/108433/articles/15523> accessed 23 October 2015. 
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use of force” given that all three men were unarmed and did not appear to have threatened public 
security at the time of their killings.11  A witness said the bag one of the men was carrying turned out 
to contain only fruit.12  Indeed, while the shooting took place on the same day as another operation 
in Cikampek that killed two suspects who were identified as Maulana and Saptono, the police has 
not been able to cite any allegation linking the Cawang men to these other suspects. 13  They were 
buried by Densus 88 in coffins simply marked as “Mr. X-I/CWG/001” and “Mr. X-I/CWG/002”.14 
According to Yodhisman Soratha, an investigator at KomnasHAM, the commission started to 
investigate the police’s counterterrorism operations in 2009 due to public concern caused by news 
reports of police excesses.15  The commission also began to receive written complaints, including 
from TPM, obliging it to act.16  An ad hoc team of KomnasHAM investigators prepared a progress 
report in 2010 covering thirteen (13) incidents involving the police’s reported counterterrorism 
operations in four provinces, including two operations targeting Noordin Top.17  In 2011, 
KomnasHAM released the special report on the theme of counterterrorism, which included the 
incidents covered by the 2010 report (except for two incidents which were deleted) and an 
additional six incidents.  The 2011 report represents a limited but revealing sampling of police 
counterterrorism operations in six provinces, namely, Aceh, North Sumatra, Jakarta, Central Java, 
West Java and West Nusa Tenggara, in the period from August 2009 to June 2011.  The report 
documents the impact of counterterrorism operations on rights through diverse sources of 
information, including statements of witnesses and written documents.18  The commission sought 
information first from media reports, and then from victims and their families, and also from the 
police. 
Witnesses’ descriptions of the incidents to KomnasHAM invariably alleged that excessive 
force was used in police counterterrorism operations, often resulting in serious human rights 
violations.  Not only did the police kill suspects (see Table 1), but they also subjected them to torture 
or ill treatment (see Table 2).   
 
                                                                 
11 ibid. 
12 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(n 8) 57. 
13 ibid 55–58. 
14 ibid 58–60. 
15 Interview 3. 
16 Interviews 3 and 17. 
17 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(KomnasHAM 2010). 
18 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(n 8). 
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1.1.  Killings of persons against whom allegations of involvement in terrorism were made 
belatedly and were scant or purely speculative 
 
The commission identified 17 victims who had been killed by counterterrorism operations in 
the period studied (See Table 1).   Some victims, such as Noordin Top and Dulmatin, were facing 
detailed police allegations.  The allegations against other victims, however, were drastically more 
scant and belated.  For example, Abdullah bin Ismail, killed during the police’s pursuit of the 
supposed terrorist training camp in Aceh (“Aceh camp”) in February to  March 2010, was alleged to 
be a suspected terrorist.  However, the allegation was made by police only after he was killed, in an 
attempt to justify his death to his family.  He was in fact first caught in a “sweeping” operation 
conducted by police for not bringing his national identification card (KTP) with him, taken to the 
police station, and then was allowed to go home to get it.  Police said he did not come back and 
instead ran to the mountains.  Eight days later, the police told his family that he was shot dead 
because he was suspected to be involved in terrorist activities.  However, the circumstances of his 
killing were never fully divulged.  It would appear that the reason he was alleged to be involved in 
terrorism was that he purportedly ran to the mountains where counterterrorist operations against 
alleged “Aceh camp” terrorists were taking place.  Abdullah bin Ismail’s case mirrors those of the 
two men in the Cawang incident of March 9, 2010 who were buried as “Mr. X-1” and “Mr. X-2”, 
whom the police speculated had been conspirators with terrorists, a claim that appeared to have 
little or no supporting evidence.   
In another case, that of Nur Iman, he was not alleged to be a terrorist at all, but a si mple 
bystander who was a casualty in the incident involving the shooting of Sigit Qurdowi and Hendro 
Yunanto in Solo on May 15, 2011.  Nonetheless, Densus 88 refused any responsibility for the death, 
suggesting he was hit by bullets coming from the guns of Sigit and Hendro, although it was contested 
whether these other suspects were even carrying guns at the time.   
KomnasHAM reminded the police that their task starts prior to the stage of actual operation, 
i.e., with the investigation stage.  Before the police can proceed to the next stage of investigat ion 
involving the arrest of the person, they are legally obliged to first conduct a search of information to 
establish sufficient initial evidence.19  Indonesian criminal procedural law requires, as a general rule, 
a warrant of arrest, which must state the reason for the arrest, a short description of the crime 
believed to be committed and its location.20  This measure is intended to ensure protection of 
                                                                 
19 ibid 103. 
20 Art 18 (1), Law No. 8/1981; Art 34, Law No. 39/1999. 
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human rights of the person to be arrested.21  KomnasHAM emphasised that killing suspects at the 
initial level of investigation is a violation of human rights, as well as the criminal procedural code, as 
it is not in compliance with the principle of presumption of innocence as well as the principle of non -
self-incrimination.22 
 
Table 1.  List of killings in counter-terrorism operations23  
 
No. Name Date and Place of Police Operation Comments 
1. Ibrohim alias Boim August 8, 2009, Temanggung, Solo  
2. Noordin M. Top September 17, 2009, Mojosongo, Solo  
3. Bagus Budi Pranoto alias 
Urwah 
September 17, 2009, Mojosongo, Solo  
4. Hadi Susilo alias Adib September 17, 2009, Mojosongo, Solo  
5. Ario Sudarso alias Aji September 17, 2009, Mojosongo, Solo  
6. Abdullah bin Ismail February 2010, Padang Tiji, Lamtamot, 
Aceh 
The police has not 
informed the family 
of the exact date of 
the killing nor of the 
circumstances 
thereof, but the 
shooting is presumed 
part of the pursuit of 
“Aceh camp” 
participants 
conducted around 
February to March 
2010.   
7. Dulmatin March 9, 2010, Pamulang, Tangerang, 
Banten 
 
8. Ridwan March 9, 2010, Pamulang, Tangerang, 
Banten 
 
9.  Hasan Noer March 9, 2010, Pamulang, Tangerang, 
Banten 
 
10. unidentified March 12, 2010, Mayjen Sutoyo Street, 
Cawang, Jakarta 
The corpse was 
buried without being 
identified. 
11. unidentified March 12, 2010, Mayjen Sutoyo Street, 
Cawang, Jakarta 
The corpse was 
buried without being 
identified. 
12.  Dani October 19, 2010, Tanjung Balai, 
Medan, North Sumatra 
Densus 88 said Dani 
appeared like he was 
about to take his 
weapon when he was 
                                                                 
21 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(n 8) 117. 
22 ibid 113. 
23 ibid 116. 
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shot.  There was in 
fact no gun fight.  As 
no gun was found, the 
regional police chief 
said there was no link 
between this raid and 
the robbery of CIMB 
Niaga.24 
13. Deni, a.k.a. Deden October 19, 2010, Tanjung Balai, 
Medan, North Sumatra 
Similar situation as 
Dani. 
14. Sigit Qurdowi May 15, 2011, Sukuharjo, Solo TPM Solo said Sigit 
never left Solo for a 
long time, and was 
not officially in the list 
of wanted persons 
(DPO) suspected of 
terrorism when he 
was killed.  
15. Hendro Yunanto May 15, 2011, Sukuharjo, Solo TPM Solo said Hendro 
was a known Islamic 
activist with Laskar 
Misbah, a group 
similar to FPI. 
16. Nur Imam May 15, 2011, Sukuharjo, Solo A street vendor 
selling rice and light 
meals, he was a 
simple bystander.   
17. Untung Budi Santoso 
alias Khaidir 
June 12, 2011, Soreang, Bandung Died suddenly after 
Densus 88 captured 
him.  The police 
doctor concluded that 
he died of cardiac 
arrest. 
 
 
1.2.  Torture and ill-treatment 
 
KomnasHAM’s reports did not have any particular discuss ion of torture and ill-treatment of 
terrorism suspects, and did not systematically report or analyse information thereon.  However, 
many statements made by witnesses to the KomnasHAM team contained allegations that persons 
arrested during an operation had been manhandled while in police custody.  In some instances, the 
beatings or violence were witnessed by children, and this circumstance caused KomnasHAM to 
                                                                 
24 Densus 88 later alleged that Alek, one of the eleven persons who were in the raided house but who escaped, 
has been injured in another operation against CIMB Niaga robbers.  The robbery was believed to have been 
intended to raise funds for terrorism.  
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comment in the reports about the beating.  KomnasHAM underlined that exposing children to such 
show of violence was contrary to the rights of children protected under Indonesian law.25   
In Table 2, I extract the allegations from witnesses’ statements which indicate torture or ill 
treatment.  (See Table 2)  In many of these cases, the witnesses were relatives who only had a 
limited opportunity to freely confer with the victims and/or observe their physical condition.  Hence, 
the witnesses could not specify the extent of the injury or the exact methods used to torture the 
victims.  In this regard, the statements of relatives pertaining to the torture of Abdul Hadim, Agung 
and Muhammad Jibril stand out for their detail.  (Table 2, Nos. 4-6) 
 
 
Table 2.  Indications of Torture or Ill Treatment in Witnesses’ Statements 
No. Main Target, Date 
and Place of Police 
operation 
Persons arrested 
during operation 
Witness statements 
indicating torture or 
ill-treatment 
Comments 
1. Ibrohim, August 7, 
2009, 
Temanggung, Solo 
Brothers Aris and 
Indra Arif, and 
Muhamad Djahri  
(house owner)   
According to Indra 
Arif, he and Aris were 
captured by six 
armed men shortly 
before the siege, and 
beaten by Densus 88 
officers into saying 
that Noordin Top was 
in the house which 
they then proceeded 
to attack. 
 
Indra Arif said Aris’ 
left hand was 
dysfunctional and 
cannot be moved 
after Aris was held by 
police. 
Three days after their 
capture, Aris, Indra 
Arif and Djahri were 
taken to the 
Indonesian Police 
headquarters in 
Jakarta and presented 
to the President.  
Djahri was released 
following three 
further days of 
interrogation and 
after agreeing to sign 
a statement narrating 
the events as well as 
the assertion that 
Ibrohim carried a 
bomb inside the 
house.  Aris and Indra 
Arif were legally 
charged; but Indra 
Arif was released 
before the court 
proceedings started. 
2. Noordin Top, 
September 17, 
2009, Mojongoso, 
Solo 
Puteri Munawaroh, 
wife of one of Top’s 
companions 
Puteri was pregnant 
at the time, and she 
was shot in the leg 
during the police 
operation.   
Supriyanto, Puteri’s 
brother-in-law, said 
although Puteri could 
be visited in 
detention, the police 
would not allow her 
                                                                 
25 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemanta uhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(n 8) 120. 
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child to be taken 
therefrom. 
3. Heri Suranto, May 
14, 2010, Surakarta 
Heri Suranto Siti Khotimah, the 
wife of Heri Suranto, 
said she met Heri for 
two hours under tight 
guard at the police 
station in Jakarta and 
saw that Heri’s left 
face was bruised and 
his leg was injured.   
Anis, the lawyer from 
TPM Solo who 
accompanied Siti to 
Jakarta was 
prevented from 
entering the police 
station because the 
police said another 
lawyer, Asluddin 
Hanjani supposedly 
from TPM Poso, has 
already been assigned 
to Heri. 
4. Abdul Hamid, May 
13, 2010, Solo 
Abdul Hamid Eny Kustiah, wife of 
Abdul Hamid, said 
when Abdul was 
captured he was 
beaten in front of his 
pupils.   
 
When the family 
visited him in 
detention, they saw 
that he had wounds 
and some of his teeth 
were gone.  Abdul 
said that the night 
when he was 
captured until the 
fourth day, he was 
badly beaten and 
called names.  He had 
bruises all over his 
body including his 
genitalia, and he was 
shivering from the 
pain.  His face was 
also covered with 
plastic.  Abdul’s feet 
were paralyzed.  He 
was only allowed to 
go out of his cell once 
a week and could 
therefore not 
practice walking. 
 
5. Several suspects, 
Klaten, Solo, 
January 25, 2011 
Agung, 11 years old Siti Lestari, mother of 
Agung, said that 
when the family 
visited Agung in 
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detention in Jakarta, 
they saw that his 
hands were bruised.  
They were told by 
police that Agung 
was mentally 
distressed, and would 
scream at night.  He 
was later hospitalised 
for his mental 
condition for 22 days. 
Later, he was placed 
in an isolation room 
with no lights and 
water, and was 
always under strict 
supervision of two 
officers. 
6. Ust. Abu 
Muhammad Jibril 
Abdul Rahman, 
Jakarta, August 25, 
2009 
Ust. Abu 
Muhammad Jibril 
Abdul Rahman 
According to Abu 
Jibril, father of 
Muhammad Jibril, 
when they met on 
September 1, 
Muhammad Jibril had 
bruises under his eye, 
swollen head, 
wounds in hand and 
feet, and missing 
teeth, and he hadn’t 
received any 
medication.  
Muhammad Jibril 
told him he was 
tortured for a week.  
Abu Jibril also said 
that he saw burn 
wounds in his wrists 
which may have been 
caused by 
electrocution. 
 
Soon after 
Muhammad Jibril’s 
capture, he was sent 
to Densus 88 chief 
Gories Mere.  He was 
forced to undress, 
and was molested by 
the officers.   
Abu Jibril said after 
his son was captured 
he called the police 
on August 25, 2009 
but he didn’t get any 
answer with regard to 
the existence of his 
son.   
 
Family visits were 
limited.  His lawyer 
was prevented from 
entering the 
detention center.   
7. Tanjung Balai, 
Medan, North 
Ust. Khairal Ghazali 
(house owner) 
Kartini Panggabean, 
wife of Ghazali, said 
She did not know 
where Ghazali was 
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Sumatra, October 
19, 2010 
Ghazali was beaten in 
front of his and his 
neighbor’s children at 
the time of his arrest. 
taken to after his 
arrest, as the 
authorities did not 
inform her.  TPM later 
helped Kartini 
petition the Jakarta 
police, through the 
chief of KomnasHAM, 
to see her husband. 
8. Abu Bakar Basyir, 
Tasikmalaya, 
August 8, 2010 
Abu Bakar Basyir; 
Sartono, the driver 
of Basyir; 
Muslikha, Basyir’s 
wife 
Sartono, the driver of 
Basyir, and Widodo, 
spare driver who was 
also riding with them 
were beaten at the 
time of the arrest.   
According to Sartono, 
his beating caused his 
head to bleed.   
 
According to 
Muslikha, Basyir’s 
wife who was riding 
with them at the 
time, Basyir was 
threatened with 
being shot with a 
gun.   
 
 
Sartono was brought 
to Jakarta for 
interrogation where 
he was assigned to 
the lawyer Asluddin. 
 
Muslikha was taken 
to the police station 
where she was 
interrogated, her bag 
was searched and her 
phone was taken and 
it was never returned.  
She was not allowed 
access to her family, 
nor allowed to watch 
the TV report on her 
husband’s arrest. 
 
 
Families of victims also complained about the condition of the dead bodies of their relatives when 
they recovered them from the police.  The condition of the corpse reveals either that it has been 
manhandled while alive, or that it has been desecrated or disrespected.  The police have also caused 
delays in or prevented the burial of corpses in accordance with their religion.  Supriyanto, brother of 
Hadi Susilo who was killed alongside Noordin Top, complained that Hadi Susilo’s  corpse showed that 
his nose was broken, his lips had blisters and there were scars from his neck to his chest. 26  Arif H 
and Ragil Susanto, who knew Susilo, said Susilo’s body was not allowed by authorities to be buried 
until two weeks after he was killed, whereas under Islamic law the corpse should be buried 
immediately.27  Moreover, after the body was recovered and a funeral arranged, the authorities 
caused a delay as they wanted the people not to bury the body in accordance with Islamic practice, 
                                                                 
26 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(n 17) 15. 
27 ibid. 
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but instead to reject the corpse.28  They also commented that the face of the corpse was deformed, 
and the body from the chest down was not shown.29  Only Supriyanto, Puteri Munawaroh and 
Muanas (TPM Jakarta) were allowed to see the whole body.30   
In the case of Yuki Mansyur who was killed in a Sept 19, 2010 operation, his brother Yudi 
Mansyur, said that when he saw Yuki’s dead body, it was opened up from his chin to his belly 
botton.  The right part of his stomach was sewed up, his arm and head were disfigured.  Whe n his 
body was about to be buried, an officer intimidated people to reject his burial.  And although a hole 
had already been dugged out, the police covered it up again so the burial wouldn’t take place.  As a 
result, Yuki was buried in another cemetery in Sukoharjo.  The circumstances in which Yuki’s corpse 
was found indicated that Densus 88 had treated the suspect, while alive and/or after he died, with 
extreme brutality.  The prevention of burial according to Islamic practice was also unjustified as it 
interfered with the relatives’ and friends’ freedom to practice their religious belief in relation to the 
terrorist suspect’s burial.    
 
1.3.  Other violations 
 
Also revealing is the “orchestrated legal assistance”31 that Densus 88 extended to captured 
suspects.  In many cases, Densus 88 assigned suspects a lawyer named Asluddin Hanjani to 
represent them during investigation and in court.  Asluddin was presented to suspects as a TPM 
lawyer.  However, TPM would later clarify that Asluddin was not a member of their group.32  
Asluddin was the assigned lawyer to Aris, Heri Sutanto, Agung, and Sartono, who were captured in 
separate incidents.  The orchestration of legal assistance by Densus 88 violated the suspects ’ right to 
obtain legal assistance from the counsel of their own choice.  
A case involving aggressive treatment of children belonging to a suspected radical 
community received critical attention in the report.  Munajib, who was shot and wounded during a 
counterterrorist operation in Sleman, Yogyakarta on March 20, 2007, complained that following the 
operation, his 11-year old son and his son’s classmates at Pondok Pesantren Al-Husna were 
intimidated and subjected to surveillance by police.33  Munajib said his son was beaten and was 
                                                                 
28 ibid 15–16. 
29 ibid 16. 
30 ibid. 
31 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(n 8) 118. 
32 ‘Tim Pengacara Muslim Jakarta Bantah Temui Ghazali’ Tempo (26 September 2010) 
<http://www.tempo.co/indeks/2010/09/26/> accessed 27 October 2015. 
33 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(n 8) 44. 
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brought to a cliff and threatened with death.34  Other students of the school were still being 
interrogated by police during lunch breaks years later, and the school has been monitored, 
sometimes with a camera.35  KomnasHAM noted that the intelligence activities of spying and 
interrogating directed at Pondok Pesantren Al-Husna school children had “created fear” and 
“terrorised people both physically and non-physically” and violated the right to security under 
Article 3 of the Indonesian Human Rights Act of 1999, which provides for the right to feel secure and 
to protection against coercion to do or not to do something.36  Emphasising that children should be 
spared from violence, the commission made a specific reference to the human right of the child 
under article 58 (1) of the Indonesia Human Rights Act of 1999.37   
The commission also received statements that hint at possible disappearances, although 
these allegations were not further investigated.  Witnesses in two separate incidents said their 
children were missing.  Rohmad Puji Prabowo, a.k.a. Bejo, who was captured by Densus 88 in Gading 
Market, Solo on September 17, 2009 said he was with his five-year old son when he was forcibly 
taken into a car.  His son was taken in another car.  It is not clear whether the child was later 
released, or if he was mistreated or killed.  Another statement involves the child Eko.  Eko was a 
friend of the 11-year old child Agung, who was among those arrested during an operation against 
various terrorism suspects in Klaten, Solo on January 25, 2011.  It appeared that Eko’s family 
believed his disappearance was related to the said counterterrorist operation.  Eko’s family said Eko 
went missing from a hospital where he was confined after being injured at work.  However, the 
family does not know how it happened as Eko was very ill when he disappeared.  
 
1.4. Commission’s findings and conclusions 
The commission found sufficient preliminary evidence that Densus 88 had committed a host 
of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings.  Accordingly, it recommended that the 
police investigate or examine the ranks of Densus 88 and provide legal sanctions against those who 
may have perpetrated or committed violations.  The commission hoped that the investigation would 
have a deterrent effect and would help to prevent similar acts in the future.38  It called for the 
“conduct of regular monitoring of the implementation of the functions, duties and authority of  the 
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police, especially Densus 88 in the treatment of acts of terrorism”, recommending that the 
legislature use its power over the budget to similar effect.39 
The KomnasHAM report gathered important evidence of human rights violations in the 
course of counterterrorism.  By bringing this evidence to the attention of the President, the 
legislative body and the national police headquarters, the report placed the question of Densus 88’s 
compliance with human rights squarely on the official agenda.  This contributes towards the 
legitimisation of public criticism of Densus 88.  However, the KomnasHAM report did not 
fundamentally challenge the premises of counterterrorism.  Rather, the report aligned with the 
mainstream viewpoint on the legitimacy of counterterrorism and did not engage the critical 
viewpoint.  On the kindest interpretation of Densus 88’s acts, the killings could suggest that the 
police has been too quick both to effect arrests and to use firearms during operations.  An 
alternative interpretation, however, might question the assumption that operations were taken with 
good intentions, amounting to assassinations.  KomnasHAM maintained an extremely charitable 
viewpoint towards Densus 88’s acts when it concluded that Densus 88 ignored its task to first 
establish sufficient initial evidence before attempting to make arrests.  
Even if the killings committed during police operations were illegal and did not respect the 
already thin human rights protections built-in to the anti-terrorism law, this did not necessarily 
mean that the police was acting with ill intent.  Their practice of shooting first before collecting the 
evidence for a proper warrant of arrest may have reflected over-eagerness or a lack of restraint, but 
some observers of Densus 88 do not question that its motive is to protect public security or safety.40  
This is reflected in the expression “shoot first policy” which was simultaneously critical of the 
illegality of the practice but also sympathetic towards assumed dilemmas that the police faced as 
they confronted terrorists.41  The critical viewpoint, however, questions this assumption.  If the 
threat of terrorism has subsided, then the perception that it is an “extraordinary threat” as Law No. 
15/2003 deemed it to be, could again be challenged and reviewed, and so too could the need for 
Densus 88.  Hence, the decline in terrorism might actually create a need for authorities to 
exaggerate the threat of terrorism or otherwise manage perceptions so that they align with the 
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depiction of terrorism in the law.  From this viewpoint, the killings may not arise from an 
insufficiently restrained desire to ensure public safety.  Rather, they may be part of a strategy to 
increase public fear to justify Densus 88’s continuing operations.  None of this line of thinking was 
engaged in in the report.  My interviews with KomnasHAM had not delved into why this was so.  It is 
possible that the commissioners thought that this question was beyond their remit, or they 
considered that their findings will be best received if they didn’t criticise the basis or motivation for 
these counterterrorism operations.  But it is also possible that the commission simply did not 
consider the critical position worth engaging with.  However, clearly, the critical position needed to 
be engaged, and a vigorous investigation into whether the threat of terrorism has subsided is 
necessary. 
All said, the KomnasHAM report of 2011 was significant because it challenged Densus 88 to 
investigate and make those officers who committed violations of human rights law and legal 
procedure answerable.  Henceforth, evidence of abuses having been laid as it were on the door of 
the police and the government, the failure to exact accountability from erring members of Densus 
88 carried the implication that the unit committed serious violations with impunity.  
 
2.  The 2013 Investigation of Video Evidence Pertaining to the Tanah Runtuh Operation 
 
In this section, I focus on how Densus 88 has come to enjoy such impunity for human rights 
violations.  Siane Indriani, the commissioner of KomnasHAM who focuses on the issue of human 
rights violations in the context of counterterrorism, reported that no member of Densus 88 had ever 
been punished or sanctioned for committing serious violations in the course of operations.42  Indeed, 
Densus 88 had continued to perpetuate violations despite these being publicly exposed. 
Although the KomnasHAM report of 2011 was submitted to the police, the President, and 
parliament, it remained largely confidential and was not publicised in the media.43  However, in 
2013, Densus 88 abuses became a national issue again following the leaking in 2013 of a video 
recording abuses committed in Tanah Runtuh, Poso.44   
The video clip was presented to the national police headquarters by Muhammadiyah 
chairman Din Syamsuddin, who was also the deputy chairman of the Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI), 
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as well as representatives of NU, DDII and Persis.45  The video appears to show Densus 88 uniformed 
men torturing a suspect, telling one suspect, “You are going to die, now istighfar [go ask for God’s 
mercy].”46  It was not clear who took the video nor why it was made public (by posting it on the 
online video-sharing site Youtube) that moment.  The Islamic groups who formally brought them to 
the attention of the police considered the video authentic and found the acts depicted therein 
deeply offensive, provocative and counterproductive.  They argued that the video had the effect of 
provoking sympathy for the militants among the Muslims.  Din Syamsuddin, in particular, denounced 
Densus 88 and called for an evaluation of the methods of the organisation.47  He said that, if 
necessary, Densus 88 should be abolished or dissolved and replaced with another body that would 
pursue a different approach.48    
KomnasHAM picked up on the significance of the video as evidence of serious human rights 
violations.  In 2013, the then newly-appointed commissioner Siane Indriani received the same video 
clip while she was conducting an investigation into allegations of extrajudicial killings and torture by 
Densus 88 in Kalora village in the town of Poso in Central Sulawesi.  Local residents from Poso told 
her that this and similar videos had been circulating in Poso.  Because the police initially denied the 
veracity of the video, KomnasHAM decided to verify the authenticity of the video clip in its 2013 
investigation in Poso.49  
The commission concluded that the video depicted real events that took place in Tanah 
Runtuh village, Poso during a police operation in January 22, 2007.50  The investigating team 
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identified some of the persons who appeared in the video and took their testimonies and those of 
other witnesses in order to confirm the events shown and provide further context.  It also produced 
a re-enactment of the incident at the exact location in the village where the event took place.  Three 
persons, Wiwin and Tugiran (both interviewed in prison under the strict supervision of Densus 88) 
and Rasiman (who was already released from prison at the time of the interview) said the video 
depicted them, as well as Fachruddin (already dead) and Ridwan (imprisoned elsewhere) , after they 
surrendered to the police following several hours of fire-fighting.51  Wiwin, whom the team 
interviewed in prison, said he was the person shown in the video walking from a nearby house with 
his arms up in the act of surrendering to police.  As the video shows, he was directed by the police to 
undress to show that he was no longer armed, but was nevertheless still shot at by the police, 
wounding him in the chest.  The rest of the video shows the five men with their hands tied behind 
their backs, huddled together lying on the ground, while police interrogated and verbally and 
physically abused them. 
Rasiman, who was shown in the video among those huddled on the ground and with a 
wound on his right leg, explained that he was also shot by police while he was surrendering.  The 
three further claimed that after they were collected in a backyard as shown on the video, they were 
brought together to the Poso police station and then to the provincial headquarters in Palu , where 
they continued to be interrogated and beaten.  Wiwin said that despite his gunshot to the chest, he 
received medical attention only after his interrogation the following day.  Fachruddin, who had no 
gunshot wound at the time of his arrest, died as a result of the beatings he received during his 
interrogation at the police station.  Rasiman said that his corpse was in very bad shape.52  The 
investigation thus added to the commission’s already substantial trove of evidence that Densus 88 
had perpetrated torture and unjustified killings in the course of its counterterrorism operations. 
If it has not been clear that Densus 88 enjoyed impunity for violations, after the 
investigation of the video in 2013, this conclusion can no longer be avoided.  With KomnasHAM’s 
confirmation that the video was authentic, it became the single most persuasive piece of evidence 
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debunking Densus 88’s official position that its conduct had been necessitated by self-defense.  
Furthermore, given that the video clearly showed the faces of at least some of the uniformed men, it 
should have been possible to identify, investigate and discipline at least some of the off icers 
engaged in abusive conduct during the operation.  However, the police did not take any steps 
towards this end.   
How did Densus 88 manage to avoid accountability despite the mobilisation around the 
video by Islamic groups and KomnasHAM?  At first, Din Syamsuddin’s call to evaluate, and if needed, 
abolish Densus 88 created a stir in the Indonesian legislature.  After viewing the video, several 
members of the House of Representatives acknowledged that they were tired of repeated reports of 
abuses committed by Densus 88 and supported the move to abolish it.53  However, the government 
and the police maintained that Densus 88 was still needed because terrorism still existed in different 
parts of the country, and in Poso in particular.54  From the outset of the mobilisation by the Islamic 
groups, the police said the abolition of Densus 88 was not an option.55  Ansyaad Mbai, then chief of 
the national counterterrorism coordinating body BNPT, said the disbandment of Densus 88 would be 
a mistake, a “victory to the terrorists”, adding that “it is the terrorists who should be disbanded” not 
Densus 88.56  Instructively, an us-or-them logic was supplemented with references to the fact that 
the Indonesian approach to counterterrorism embodied by Densus 88 already incorporated human 
rights and rule of law values.  Ansyaad emphasised that Indonesia’s approach to counterterrorism 
stood up well in comparison to those of other nations, stating:  
 
Compare it with Yemen, which uses missiles, or Pakistan, which uses airplanes to e radicate 
terrorism. In Indonesia, [terrorists] are being prosecuted by police officers. The world has 
praised our efforts.57   
 
Hence, the idea of abolishing Densus 88 was dismissed as too radical, hasty and foolish. 
The debate within KomnasHAM was even more instructive. Despite its findings that serious 
violations were committed by Densus 88, KomnasHAM was reluctant to recommend robust reform 
of the unit and its operations.  Siane Indriani revealed that privately she concluded that Densus 88’s 
approach in Poso was counterproductive, and needed to be replaced.58  Densus 88 had engaged in 
wrongful arrests and torture so often that it had actually generated local hatred towards the police. 
The human rights organisation KontraS has already made a similar observation in Poso.  According to 
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Syamsul Alam, police abuses towards ordinary Muslim folks in Poso were “re -radicalising” them, 
rekindling their feelings of hatred towards Christians generated during the inter-communal conflict 
of years past.59  A KontraS fact-finding report into the causes of renewed violence in Poso concluded 
that most of the so-called radicals in Poso were ex-combatants in the inter-communal conflict who 
had been victims of atrocities.  The recent “terrorist” attacks in Poso had not been directed at 
civilians, but targeted police.60  Recent counterterrorist operations by Densus 88 had been taken in 
retaliation for attacks on police.61  (This observation echoed that made by Sydney Jones.62)  Instead 
of fostering security, these operations have only heightened fear in the community.63  Given the 
complexity of the situation in Poso, the KontraS report concluded that, “Poso should not only be 
seen as a case of terrorism.”64   
Similarly, in Siane Indriani’s estimation, describing what takes place in Poso as terrorism was 
not helpful.  Rather than terrorism, it is the dynamic between the police (who use abusive methods 
for repression), on the one hand, and local fighters (who act out of vengeance and/or hatred 
directed at the police), on the other hand, that defines the lingering conflict in Poso.   The 
commissioner’s private views are inching towards the critical position in the sense that she was 
questioning whether the terrorism/counterterorism discourse (viewing local fighters as simply 
terrorists and the police as simply engaged in supressing terrorism instead of fomenting conflict) was 
not itself part of the problem.  
Within the commission, she pushed for the recommendation to replace the police with the 
military as the lead agency to implement an alternative “persuasive approach” towards the 
remaining local fighters.  This was a surprising position to take given the record of human rights 
abuse of the Indonesian military.  However, Siane explained that the military might have more 
credibility in pursuing a dialogical approach, as opposed to the police’s “repressive approach”. 65  As 
it stands now, because Poso local fighters are considered terrorists, even local fighters who 
surrender to the military are turned over to Densus 88 (as the lead counterterrorism force) and are 
legally processed and imprisoned under the strict supervision of Densus 88. 66  In her estimation, the 
risk of torture and killings at the hands of Densus 88 acts to prevent local fighters from surrendering, 
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thus perpetuating the conflict.  If instead a more dialogical approach is taken, then fighters can be 
encouraged to surrender without fear of being tortured.67   
However, the majority of the commissioners considered that recommending the military to 
have the lead role in Poso was a step backward not forward.  A commissioner who revealed that he 
was in the majority on this score said the recommendation tended to show “lack of sufficient 
appreciation for the principle of civilian supremacy”.68  The perception was that the police embodied 
this legal principle and, for that reason, was preferable to the military.  In the end, KomnasHAM did 
not recommend the abolition of Densus 88, instead proposing that the operations of Densus 88 
should be more closely monitored to ensure stricter adherence to its rules of engagement and to 
human rights.69  The Indonesian parliament endorsed this recommendation.70  It did not, however, 
specify who would undertake such monitoring.   
Thus, while pressure on the police to exhibit fidelity to human rights increased following the 
investigation of the leaked video evidence of abuses in Tanah Runtuh, it did not lead to anything 
more than minimal reforms.  These reforms included reducing the number of Densus 88 officers, 
and placing all Densus 88 under direction of the national headquarters in Jakarta so that Densus 88 
officers were no longer permanently assigned to provincial headquarters. 71  The downsizing and 
centralisation of Densus 88 appear intended to ensure closer monitoring of Densus 88 operations by 
the chief of police and the President.   
The reforms undertaken suggest that the abuses were caused by lower ranked officers 
acting on their own.  This is a possibly unwarranted assumption given that Densus 88 is an elite 
organisation with strict vetting requirements for members, including lack of previous a record of 
human rights violations.72  According to Dr. Muradi, assignment to Densus 88 is a much sought after 
position; the senior leadership selects only the brightest and most capable police officers usually 
from the Mobile Brigade.73  Furthermore, according to Hanibal Wijayanta, their identities are 
officially kept secret.74  This suggests that Densus 88 is already a tightly supervised professional 
organisation.  Moreover, in the case of Muhammad Jibril, the witness Abu Jibril alleged that the chief 
of Densus 88 Gories Mere was personally involved in Muhammad Jibril’s torture. 75  In the case of the 
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Tanah Runtuh operation which sparked the debate in parliament, KontraS has emphasised that it 
was a “centralised special operation”, with the directive for the operation emanating from the 
national police chief.76  Officials from the national headquarters, namely, the chief and deputy chief 
of operations, were deployed to Poso to manage the operation.77  The lack of inquiry has prevented 
ascertaining the extent of participation of higher ranked officers in violations.   Furthermore , killings 
and torture continue to be reported after these reforms.  Thus, it does not appear that closer 
supervision by itself sufficed to ensure that violations will be significantly stemmed. 
 
3. The Tulungagung Case 
 
In the preceding sections, I have discussed evidence of serious violations by Densus 88 that 
was collected by KomnasHAM and I have argued that Densus 88 enjoys impunity.  I have also argued 
that an accommodationist position towards the counterterrorism discourse has underpinned 
KomnasHAM’s understanding of Densus 88’s violations until 2013 (as reflected in its reports of 2010, 
2011 and 2013).  I suggested that the accommodationist framing has narrowed the inquiry into 
these violations.  Thus, while the inquiry concluded helpfully that serious violations were committed, 
it neglected to explain what these violations signify and what purpose they serve.  Extrajudicial 
killings were thus counted as the unfortunate result of the “excessive use of force”, an illegal “shoot 
first policy”.  However, the inquiry did not explore whether the killings might have been motivated 
by something other than their declared legitimate purpose, viz., the suppression of terrorism.  This 
question would have been a bridge too far, an inquiry too radical to be engaged in.   
Accordingly, the response to these violations was equally restrained, urging closer 
monitoring of Densus 88’s operations but not its abolition , nor an inquiry into whether terrorists 
continued to pose an extraordinary threat.  In this last section, I explore the implications of the 
accommodationist position by reflecting on a counterterrorism operation in the town of 
Tulungagung. In many respects, there is nothing special about this town, unlike Poso or Papua for 
example, and the operation that took place there had the same significance as operations in other 
parts of the country.  Yet it is precisely because of the ordinariness of the Tulungagung case that the 
refection in this last section can be appreciated as having broader implications for Indonesian 
counterterrorism. 
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3.1.  The ambush of terrorism suspects Rizal and Dayah 
 
The Tulungagung case involves a Densus 88 operation in July 22, 2013 in the rural town of 
Tulungagung, East Java.  The operation took place in front of the bus terminal, which resulted in the 
killing of two persons Rizal (also called Eko) and Dayah (also called Dayat or Hidayah) and the arrest 
of two others, Sapari and Mugi Hartanto, local leaders of Muhammadiyah.  In many respects, the 
Tulungagung case was not novel.  In fact, the killings therein exhibit the same pattern as those 
investigated by KomnasHAM in its 2010 and 2011 reports.  At the time of the killings, there were no 
warrants of arrest against Rizal and Dayah, but the police later justified the killings by pointing to 
intelligence reports that Rizal and Dayah were suspected of  involvement in terrorist networks.78  
Police also alleged that Densus 88 officers were shot at, and that Rizal carried explosive material in 
his bag.79  Witnesses to the operation, however, said there was no exchange of fire, and that it was 
only Densus 88 that fired at the victims.80  Siane Indriani, who led the KomnasHAM investigation into 
this case, ascertained from interviews with villagers that Rizal and Dayah had just alighted from 
Sapari’s and Mugi’s motorbikes and were simply standing on the side of the road when about ten 
men in plainclothes emerged from two cars and sprayed gunfire at them. 81  According to Slamet 
Hariyanto, Rizal’s bag supposedly containing mortar and the lone revolver supposedly recovered 
from Dayah were never presented, casting doubt on their existence.82   
Even if one assumes that the intelligence reports against Rizal and Dayah did exist, giving 
Densus 88 cause to suspect that Rizal and Dayah had committed or would commit a terrorist act, 
this did not give Densus 88 sufficient legal justification to kill them right away.  As KomnasHAM 
emphasised in its 2011 report, Densus 88’s legal obligation begin prior to the state of actual 
operation with the investigation of suspects, during which stage human rights law as well as the 
criminal procedure code require that a warrant of arrest must be secured.  The conclusion is 
especially pertinent, as Siane Indriani argued, because according to villagers, Densus 88 appeared to 
have been conducting surveillance in the villages of Penjor and Gambiran in Tulungagung for at least 
three months prior to the operation.  As such, the unit would have had many opportunities to obtain 
warrants and to arrest the suspects without killing them.83 
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Why does this kind of killings strategy persist, despite having been described as illegal?  Why 
is Densus 88 still able to present these killings as legitimate despite their illegality?  As I see it, the 
claim of legitimacy derives from the declared purpose of these killings, namely, the suppression of 
terrorism.  The notion of human rights-compliant counterterrorism has not been able to change the 
fact that counterterrorism draws on sources of legitimacy that enable it to resist attempts to modify 
it by reference to the requirements of human rights.  In fact, human rights advocates’ 
accommodation of the terrorism/counterterrorism discourse has only helped to solidify rather than 
temper counterterrorism as a legitimate imperative.     
In the Tulungagung case, the nature of the operation as an ambush or assassination was 
hardly concealed.  The props to suggest that this was a shoot-out were scant - as against about ten 
armed Densus 88 officers, the supposed attackers had one lone pistol - and Densus 88 did not even 
bother to secure warrants of arrest before the operations were executed.84  But Densus 88 did argue 
that Rizal and Dayah had been suspected of involvement in terrorism for a long time.  It was alleged 
that Dayat was a fundraiser for the Poso group led by Santoso, and that the funds he collected were 
used to buy guns used for the military training of this group.85  He is supposed to have been under 
surveillance since March 2012.86  As for Rizal, it was alleged that he had been involved in a number 
of church bombings in Solo, Sukuharjo and Klaten in Central Java, and that he has been in hiding 
since 2011.87  To be sure, involvement in terrorism, or more precisely, suspicion of involvement in 
terrorism, did not in itself constitute a valid legal justification for the killings.  But, by invoking the 
spectre of terrorism, Densus 88 may not have been trying to construct a legal justification at all.  
Rather, the spectre of terrorism was used to justify the ambush beyond legality, or despite its 
illegality.  The message seems to be: “So what if this was an ambush?  They were terrorists.” 
Given that a mortar or projectile explosive was supposedly obtained from the suspects, the 
police could also have argued that a warrant of arrest need not be obtained because a terrorist act 
was about to be committed in their presence.  But in fact they did not make this specific allegation.  
The explosive was only used to mark Rizal and Dayah as terrorists, as if that bare assertion was 
enough to justify their assassination.  Within this, as it were, parallel structure of public justification, 
no allegation of specific acts of terrorism, past or future, need to be proven as against Rizal and 
Dayah. 
In my view, therefore, putting a stop to these killings will require directly confronting their 
source of legitimacy in Densus 88’s ability to narrate terrorism.  Demonstrating that these killings are 
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contrary to law has achieved limited results.  It might be a more effective strategy for human rights 
advocates to contest the claim that these killings were in fact taken to suppress terrorism.   
 
3.2.  The arrest and torture of Sapari and Mugi 
 
The new element in the Tulungagung case pertains to the fact that Sapari and Mugi 
Hartanto, the two persons who were accompanying Rizal and Dayah at the time of the ope ration, 
were persons of good standing and reputation in their local community.88  Their arrest and torture, 
following the shooting of Rizal and Dayat, prompted a successful mobilisation that highlighted their 
innocence, and accordingly obtained their release from the custody of Densus 88.89  It also revealed 
Densus 88’s reliance on questionable methods of intelligence gathering that undermined its 
credibility to pronounce on the facts, not only in this case but in other cases of alleged terrorism.   
Following the fatal shooting of Rizal and Dayah, Sapari and Mugi were captured and brought 
to a Mobile Brigade facility used by Densus 88, held for six days and subjected to harsh interrogation 
that constituted torture90, before being released for lack of evidence l inking them to any offense.  
Sapari and Mugi were local leaders of Muhamadiyah, the second largest Muslim civil society 
organisation in the country.  Sapari, furthermore, was a village chief.91  Slamet Hariyanto explained 
that Rizal, a preacher, first came to the village as a companion of a local resident who had recently 
returned to the village after spending an extended period of time elsewhere.  Rizal then decided to 
stay and practice preaching in the village.  Sapari, being the village chief, hosted Rizal, allowing him 
to live in his house.  Dayah had been Rizal’s guest, visiting him in the village for two nights.  When 
Dayah was about to leave the village to return to his home, Sapari volunteered to take him to the 
bus terminal on his motorcycle.  Sapari also asked his friend Mugi to drive a second motorcycle so 
that Rizal could come as well.  This was how the four ended up together in the bus terminal that was 
the scene of the fatal shooting.92 
Slamet Hariyanto further explained that he was engaged as a lawyer and chief of 
Muhammadiyah’s legal bureau in the nearby metropolitan city of Surabaya by Muhammadiyah’s 
national chairperson Din Symasuddin to provide legal assistance to Sapari and Mugi on the night of 
                                                                 
88 Interview 49. 
89 ibid. 
90 Sapari and Mugi were unharmed during the operation but at the time they were released, their bodies 
showed cigarette burn marks in different parts as well as wounds on their wrists and neck.  
91 Sapari was supposed to have been interrogated as to why he did not report Rizal’s presence in his vil lage to 
the vil lage chief, as under Indonesian practice, the presence of an outsider in the vil lage for more than 24 
hours has to be so reported.  To this question, Sapari answered: “But I am the vil lage chief!” 
92 Interview 49. 
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July 22 when the operation took place.93  However, he was prevented from seeing the two while in 
Densus 88 custody.94  He demanded the release of Sapari and Mugi in accordance with the provision 
of article 28 of Law No. 15/2003 (Anti-Terrorism Law) which provides a maximum period of 7 days of 
arrest for the purpose of investigating suspects.95  Six days after the operation, Sapari and Mugi 
were released as no evidence was produced against them.  However, Densus 88 refused to issue 
them the Surat Perintah Panghatian Pendidikan, or the official declaration of the closure of 
investigation that would terminate their status as suspects in a criminal case.96  After their release, 
Muhammadiyah then led a religious rally (pengajian) to demand an apology from the police for the 
wrongful arrests.  The local chief of police, as an invited guest therein, spoke in the said rally, giving 
apologies and saying the arrests of Sapari and Mugi were a mistake.97 
In his interview, Slamet emphasised that Densus 88 did not coordinate with the local police 
in conducting the operation (they were not obliged to do so) .  Moreover, the unit did not make use 
of local sources of information, including local police intelligence, in investigating Sapari and Mugi or 
Rizal, who had resided in the village for a substantial period of time.98  He opined that the torture of 
Sapari and Mugi could have been avoided if Densus 88 had sought intelligence from local police, 
who could have attested that Sapari and Mugi were persons in good standing. 99  The same could be 
said of Rizal.  Had local knowledge been sought about Rizal, villagers and the local police would also 
have attested that Rizal was a person of good reputation and did not give cause for suspicion of 
fomenting violence in his preaching activities.100     
While there is no data on the number of cases of wrongful arrest by Densus 88, some 
respondents have opined that the Tulungagung case is not exceptional. 101  Siane Indriani has also 
noted that allegations of torture figure in almost all of the scores of reported cases of human rights 
violations by Densus 88 that she has investigated as a human rights commissioner.  If torture is as 
rampant as alleged, then this should lead to serious questioning about how much of the official 
narrative about terrorist networks and activities has been constructed through torture.  How much 
of the official narrative is essentially trustworthy?  How long can Densus 88 sustain its credibility?  
                                                                 
93 ibid. 
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96 It appears that actual harm has resulted from their continuing official status as suspects in a terrorism case. 
Slamet Hariyanto reported that Mugi ’s  son was terminated from his employment because of suspicion that his 
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4.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a critique of contemporary Indonesian counterterrorism, noted 
for its legal framework, by showing that in practice it leads to serious human rights violations.  The 
chapter has demonstrated that a legal counterterrorism framework incorporating human rights can 
be adopted without this resulting in significant restraints in reality.  Indonesia’s human rights-
friendly legal framework has not had a transformative effect.  The country’s main counterterrorism 
actor can show a record of effectiveness in making arrests and obtaining convictions in accordance 
with the legal framework.  But, it also casts, as it were, a shadow record of killings, the seriousness 
of which authorities have refused to acknowledge, thus perpetuating the same.    
The attachment of a human rights language to counterterrorism in Indonesia is better 
thought of as having an inoculating effect rather than a transformative effect.  The idea that human 
rights and the rule of law are already correctly embodied in the country’s approach to 
counterterrorism has acted to shield counterterrorism from more serious scrutiny.  There is no 
transformative effect because attaching a human rights language does not result in challenging the 
legitimacy of counterterrorism operations.  On the contrary, by taking for granted that 
counterterrorism operations are always motivated by public security, human rights advocates are 
cementing this claim of legitimacy and aiding in perpetuation of abuse. 
This chapter therefore shows that the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism 
has had limited impact, and in fact, retrogressive effect, on the respect for human rights.  It points to 
the necessity of developing ways of disentangling the language of human rights from the 
counterterrorism agenda.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: Towards a More Effective Human Rights Advocacy  
in the Face of Counterterrorism 
 
This thesis has demonstrated how the intersection of counterterrorism and human rights 
discourses has had a harmful effect on the promotion of human rights in two countries, the 
Philippines and Indonesia.  International law scholars and international human rights 
advocates have so far assumed that the best way to advance human rights in the age of 
counterterrorism is to make sure that counterterrorism practices do not undermine human 
rights.  The approach has led to the development of the discourse of human rights-
compliant counterterrorism.   
This thesis has sought to advance understanding of the relationship between 
counterterrorism and human rights by developing and applying a novel theoretical 
framework that draws upon critical approaches to both terrorism and international law.  
This framework emphasises the importance of paying close attention to the effects of new 
legal developments on counterterrorism on the ground.  The case studies presented in this 
thesis demonstrate that contrary to the expectation in the mainstream international law 
scholarship, the synthesis of human rights with counterterrorism has not had a 
transformative effect on counterterrorism practices.  Rather, it has had a detrimental effect 
on human rights.   The implication of this finding is that the ideal of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism should be either discarded or radically transformed itself, if it is to serve 
as a vehicle for the promotion and protection of human rights.  
 
1.  The Problematic Nature of Counterterrorism Discourses in the Philippines and 
Indonesia 
 
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) scholars criticise the label “terrorism”, as used by 
states and orthodox terrorism studies scholars alike, as perpetuating dichotomous thinking.  
This means that terrorism is seen as emanating from the irrationality of sub-state actors 
who pose the original threat to human rights, while state counterterrorism is viewed as a 
rational phenomenon that merely reacts to terrorist threats to the enjoyment of human 
rights.  Chapters 2 and 5 demonstrated the false dichotomy between terrorism and 
counterterrorism contained in the local counterterrorism discourses in the Philippines and 
Indonesia.  In both cases, the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism 
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facilitates human rights violations by helping create the illusion that counterterrorism does 
not fundamentally threaten human rights. 
While there are differences between the counterterrorism discourses in the two 
countries, for example, in terms of the kinds of actors deemed “terrorists” by the state and 
the histories of repression involved, the counterterrorism discourses in these two countries 
are both deeply problematic and need to be interrogated.  Critical questions include the 
extent to which the counterterrorism discourse has exacerbated the conflict situations 
where it had been applied, and why those conflict situations would not be better 
understood and addressed using other lenses.  However, critically examining 
counterterrorism is not central to the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism, which prioritises the goal of how to improve the practices of 
counterterrorism.   
At the international level, the US and its supporters argued that robust 
counterterrorism measures, of the type employed to wage the “War on Terror”, were 
necessitated by the “newness” of the terrorist threat.1  In both the Philippines and 
Indonesia, however, it is striking that the new “terrorists” were longstanding adversaries of 
the government, identifiable more by their familiarity rather than their “newness”.  In the 
Philippines, the “terrorists” were the old “insurgents” – MILF and CPP-NPA.  Indeed, 
scholars and advocates could not agree on whether the Abu Sayyaf, the raison d’etre for 
the “War on Terror” in Mindanao, should be classified as terrorists or simply bandits.  With 
respect to the MILF and the CPP-NPA, the label “terrorist” does not add any clarity to the 
nature of these organisations or the conflicts that they wage against the government.  
Rather, by adding the appellation “terrorist” to these movements, the Philippine 
government (and the governments of the US and other Western countries that designated 
the CPP-NPA a “terrorist organisation” under their laws) created the false impression that 
they were threatening in a new way.  Yet these movements do not employ the methods 
that are typical of new terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda.  Neither the MILF nor CPP-NPA 
were alleged to be engaged in or considering engaging in mass casualty attacks against 
civilians as a political tactic.  Nor were they said to be seeking to amass or use weapons of 
mass destruction.  Nevertheless, by conveying the false impression that it was dealing with 
“terrorist threats”, the Philippine government was able  to escalate or renew its 
counterinsurgency war against the MILF and CPP-NPA.  The United States and the Council 
                                                                 
1 Obiara Chinedu Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A 
TWAIL Perspective’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall  Law Journal 171-191. 
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of the European Union were instrumental in facilitating this development by providing 
material and normative or discursive support to the Philippine government. The result has 
been devastating for human rights.  According to the local human rights organisation 
Karapatan, the one-sided war on left-wing activists had ballooned the number of 
extrajudicial killings to 1,206 and enforced disappearances to 206 under the Arroyo 
government alone.2  Meanwhile, the escalation of military operations against the MILF 
during the Arroyo administration displaced civilians in the hundreds of thousands.  In the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines’ offensive against the MILF strongho ld in Buliok Complex 
alone, 411,004 persons were displaced.3   
In Indonesia, the “terrorists” were a ghost from the  nation’s past, even though they 
were portrayed as linked to more contemporary groups like Al Qaeda.  They were 
supposedly extremist Islamists who sought to revive the Islamic rebellion of the 1950s and 
turn Indonesia into an Islamic state.  While the attacks on civilians carried out in the name 
of this Islamist revival were indeed shocking, to understand this phenomenon as signifying 
the rise of a “terrorist threat” to the state oversimplifies and distorts political reality.  
Insofar as they were the handiwork of extremist Islamists, spectacular attacks on civilians, 
and particularly on foreigners such as in Bali in 2002, are better appreciated as signs of the 
failure and desperation of Islamist forces rather than of their strength.  Moreover, there is 
credible evidence that intelligence officials of the Suharto regime aided in organising and 
mobilising marginalised Islamist communities to conjure a threat of Islamist rebellion.4  
Furthermore, as Sidel notes, the historical links between intelligence officials and these 
networks continue after Suharto’s fall.5  This is not to claim that terrorism is not real, but it 
does challenge the dichotomous thinking that creates a sharp division between terrorism 
and counterterrorism in Indonesia.  If human rights violations arising from conflict are to be 
properly addressed, it is essential to unravel the labels “terrorism” and “counterterrorism” 
in Indonesia, as it is in the Philippines.  
 
  
                                                                 
2 Karapatan, ‘2010 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines’ (Karapatan 
2011) 16–17 <https://www.scribd.com/doc/44443589/2010-Year-End-Report-on-the-Human-Rights-
Situation-in-the-Philippines> accessed 8 April  2016. 
3 Jose Jowel Canuday, Bakwit: The Power of the Displaced (Ateneo de Manila University Press and 
Flipside Publishing 2009) 23. 
4 For further details, see Chapter 5. 
5 John Thayer Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Cornell  University Press 
2006) 209.  
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2.  Local Human Rights Advocates and the Improvement of Counterterrorism 
 
At the international level, international human rights advocates managed to 
convince world leaders to pursue human rights-compliant counterterrorism, creating the 
impression that the conflict between the pursuit of counterterrorism and human rights 
promotion had been resolved.  In the Philippines and Indonesia, by contrast, local human 
rights advocates have exposed the conflict between counterterrorism and human rights at 
the local level.  In so doing, they have not necessarily sought to advance human rights by 
improving counterterrorism.  Indeed, my examination of local human rights advocates’ 
initiatives and perspectives on counterterrorism reveals a diversity of potential strategies 
to advance human rights in the face of counterterrorism.  These strategies are not easily 
assimilated under the discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  Hence, the 
discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism represents just one of several 
strategies for advancing human rights in the face of aggressive counterterrorism.  Yet as 
this thesis illustrates, the dominance of the discourse of human rights-compliant 
counterterrorism threatens to eclipse alternative local strategies to advance and protect 
human rights in the face of robust counterterrorism operations.       
In Chapter 3, I showed that Filipino advocates launched vigorous human rights 
campaigns around the “War on Terror” to expose the deleterious impact of 
counterterrorism measures on human rights.   In doing so, they directly challenged the 
application of the label “terrorist” to Philippine actors, and questioned the government’s 
use of counterterrorism discourse with respect to armed conflicts in the country.  The 
improvement of counterterrorism was irrelevant to their concerns, in clear contrast with 
international actors, whose promotion of human rights-compliant counterterrorism 
conformed to the global counterterrorism agenda.  In the campaign to resist US troop 
presence in Basilan, advocates argued that the Abu Sayyaf was not a “terrorist threat” and 
that the government’s use of “counterterrorism” discourse  was just a pretext for escalating 
war in Mindanao against the MILF and the CPP-NPA, and part of a calculated strategy to 
justify abandonment of peace negotiations with these groups.  These human rights 
advocates also exposed violations of strict rules of engagement agreed upon by the 
Philippines and the US that supposedly ensured human rights compliance by US troops.  At 
the same time, they also maintained that even if the rules of engagement had not been 
violated, that would not have made military operations acceptable.   
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This thesis revealed differences between local and international strategies with 
regards to the bombings in Mindanao, the subject of another important human rights 
campaign.   Local advocates, acting through the Mindanao Truth Commission, contested 
the assumption that the bombings proved Mindanao was gripped by terrorism.  They 
highlighted the government’s rush to implicate the MILF without sufficient evidence as 
problematic and advocated the need to further scrutinise evidence suggesting the 
involvement of state agents in the bombings.  In contrast, a report by Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) on the issue of bombings, while pressing the government to pursue prosecutions of 
“terrorists” who attacked civilians, did not call for greater scrutiny of state involvement in 
“terrorism” in Mindanao.  Indeed, HRW dismissed the allegations of state involvement as 
conspiratorial thinking, thus undermining the position of local advocates.   
In the campaign to remove Jose Maria Sison from the European Union (EU)’s 
terrorist blacklist, Sison’s lawyers and Filipino campaigners exposed the fact that EU 
governments did not have evidence to show that Sison committed acts of terrorism, nor 
indeed any crime.  Sison succeeded in convincing the European Court to delist him because 
his listing failed to respect the minimal human rights protections within the EU listing 
process.  The EU Court’s concern was that those human rights standards were credibly 
observed.   The EU Council tried to present the EU terrorist designations of Sison and the 
NPA as merely implementation of legal obligations under UNSC Resolution 1373.  However, 
the campaigners responded that the struggle waged by the CPP-NPA was legitimate and 
should be resolved peacefully through negotiations rather than through the application of 
counterterrorism measures that actually imperilled the peace negotiations.  The strategies 
of Filipino advocates in these three key campaigns showed that there are various ways in 
which human rights advocates can advance human rights protection in the face of 
counterterrorism.   
In Indonesia, it was the government that undertook steps towards synthesising 
human rights and counterterrorism.  Indonesian counterterrorism policy is often praised as 
exhibiting progressive features, among them the existence of a legal framework contained 
in Law No. 15/2003 that explicitly respects human rights and does not concentrate power 
in the military.6   Indonesia could have adopted a dramatically more restrictive law, like the 
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War on Terror Without Becoming a National Security State’ in Kumar Ramakri shna and See Seng Tan 
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Internal Security Act in Malaysia and Singapore, but because local human rights advocates 
vigorously participated in the deliberations over Indonesia’s anti -terrorism law, it did not 
do so.  However, in Chapter 4, I challenged the view that the Indonesian legal framework 
reflected local advocates’ aims.  Local advocates did not originally aim to improve 
counterterrorism in Indonesia to advance human rights.  Prior to the Bali bombing of 2002, 
local human rights advocates actually joined Islamist parties to oppose the enactment of an 
anti-terrorism law on the ground that it was unnecessary.  Law No. 15/2003, which was 
enacted after the Bali bombing, contained provisions that local advocates had objected to 
as excessively curtailing rights.  Even today, local advocates would be loathe to associate 
themselves with these provisions, which they continue to see as vulnerable to abuse.   
It is true, however, that local advocates changed their views after the Bali bombing.  
Both the Bali bombing itself and the police’s successful prosecution of that case changed 
the balance of forces, weakening resistance to counterterrorism measures against alleged 
Islamist extremists.  Whereas before the 2002 Bali bombing, both local human rights 
advocates and Islamists were sceptical of the necessity for robust counterterrorism, the 
local human rights advocates I interviewed in 2013 were willing to accommodate the 
counterterrorism discourse.  They readily conceded that terrorism was a threat and that 
counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments was a necessity.  It helped that 
counterterrorism did not appear to repress Muslims nor civil society indiscriminately, but 
focused on alleged Islamist extremists.  Moreover, radical Islamic organisations, like Front 
Pembela Islam, had attacked religious minorities and human rights advocates who 
defended these minorities.  Mainstream human rights advocates did criticise 
counterterrorism measures in Poso and Papua.  But their advocacy in those locations 
strengthened the perception that the government abused counterterrorism discourse only 
when Islamist extremists had not been the targets.  The rejection of the counterterrorism 
discourse persisted primarily in the views of Muslim lawyers in Tim Pengacara Muslim 
(TPM) who defended suspected terrorists.  The TPM maintained that despite being police -
led and despite the existence of a legal framework, the counterterrorism discourse 
remained extremely problematic.  The gap between the two camps has widened so much 
that the defense of human rights of suspected terrorists has been marginalised.  This state 
of affairs is dramatically illustrated by the fact that mainstream human rights lawyers have 
been inactive in the defense of alleged members of Islamic terrorist networks, while the 
TPM has carved out a niche legal practice in this issue. 
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3.  Human Rights-Friendly Policies and the Reality of Continuing Abuses 
 
International advocates hoped that it might be possible to transform 
counterterrorism by developing a discourse of human rights-compliant counterterrorism.  
However, the Philippine and Indonesian case studies suggest that this expectation is 
unrealistic.  In both countries, in different ways, the state reacted to human rights concerns 
in the context of counterterrorism and incorporated human rights language in their official 
laws and policies.  However, the effect of this development on the practice of 
counterterrorism or, more generally, the pursuit of security, was far from transformative.  
Counterterrorism or security operations continue to result in serious human rights 
violations, including extrajudicial killings and torture.  Instead of transforming 
counterterrorism, legal changes have legitimated robust counterterrorism practices that 
tend to undermine rather than advance human rights. 
In the Philippines, there has been a surge of human rights legislation after 2006, in 
reaction to criticisms of the government’s conduct of counterinsurgency/counterterrorism, 
particularly the killings and disappearances of left-wing activists.  However, my 
examination of the new judicial remedy of amparo and the Internal Peace and Security Plan 
(Oplan Bayanihan) in Chapter 4 showed that while the rhetorical changes were dramatic, 
the practice of counterinsurgency remained largely unaffected.  Extrajudicial killings and 
disappearances of left-wing activists continue to be features of counterinsurgency.  The 
problem is not that there was insufficient legal or official recognition of the need to respect 
human rights in counterinsurgency, nor that there is a lack of judicial remedies for abuses.  
The principal problem is the continuing pervasive disrespect for existing rules by broad 
sections of the security establishment, if not necessarily by the military and police 
institutions themselves.  While conceding that violations may have been committed by a 
few wayward elements, the state has not acknowledged any systemic complicity for the 
killings and disappearances.  Nor has the government ceased denying the legitimacy of left-
wing struggle or protest.  Indeed, the government continues to support and employ the 
same counterinsurgency thinking that has given rise to the violations.  Ultimately, the 
alignment of domestic policy with the international approach permitted the government to 
delay more serious reforms that would put an end to human rights violations.  
In Indonesia, a legal framework for counterterrorism, Law No. 15/2003, explicitly 
incorporated human rights by providing that human rights law continued to apply in the 
context of counterterrorism, and even created new rights such as the right to rehabilitation 
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of those cleared of legal charges of terrorism.  Moreover, a police-led or law enforcement 
approach to counterterrorism was pursued, which resulted in the arrest, trial and legal 
punishment of perpetrators of acts of terrorism.  As mentioned, these features of 
Indonesian counterterrorism have often been praised7  and would appear to make 
Indonesia a model for countries like the Philippines, whose approach to counterterrorism is 
more war-like and less legalised.  However, as the examination of the record of 
extrajudicial killings by Densus 88 in Chapter 7 revealed, the practice of counterterrorism in 
Indonesia is not dramatically different from the Philippines in terms of respect f or human 
rights.  The main counterterrorism actor, Densus 88, is tasked to respect human rights.  Yet 
it commits extrajudicial killings as well as torture in the course of its operations, and it does 
so with impunity.  The seriousness of Densus 88’s record  of violations has not been 
acknowledged by authorities, thus perpetuating impunity.   Hence, just as the legal changes 
in the Philippines have not substantially altered security practices, nor has the Indonesian 
legal framework had the effect of restraining the most serious violations.  I observed that 
killings have been publicly justified simply through reference to the claim that the victims 
were involved in terrorism and that the goal of operations was to counter terrorism.   
Killings against alleged terrorists continue to be committed, not for lack of guidance about 
the legal obligations of police during counterterrorism operations.  Rather, these killings 
persist because the police could justify them despite their illegality, by drawing on, as it 
were, a parallel source of legitimacy beyond legality, that is, the counterterrorism discourse 
that police continue to expound unopposed.   
Instead of constraining counterterrorism practice, the incorporation of human 
rights language into Indonesian counterterrorism helps promote the perception that 
Indonesia’s counterterrorism approach embodies human rights and rule of law values.  This 
perception, in turn, inoculates it from further scrutiny.  Because Indonesia’s approach to 
counterterrorism is thought to be necessary, rational and human rights-sensitive, violations 
committed in the course of counterterrorism operations are regarded ultimately as 
unintended, unfortunate excesses.  Human rights violations, no matter how serious and 
counterproductive, never constitute grounds to discontinue or question the ground for 
counterterrorism.  Thus, in both the Philippines and Indonesia, the attachment of a 
language of human rights to counterterrorism has not had a transformative effect.  Rather, 
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human rights-compliant counterterrorism has emboldened and empowered 
counterterrorism actors to continue employing practices harmful to human rights.  
 
4.  Disentangling Human Rights Advocacy from the Counterterrorism Agenda 
 
The findings of this thesis call into question the investment of optimism and energy 
into the notion that it is constructive to synthesise human rights and counterterrorism.  
They direct us to find or support approaches that will not be reduced to the promotion of 
counterterrorism at the expense of human rights.   
Throughout the thesis, I underscored the importance of disentangling human rights 
advocacy from the promotion of the counterterrorism agenda, especially in places like the 
Philippines and Indonesia where complex ideological conflicts rage on.  The discourses of 
terrorism and counterterrorism are state-affirming, but they profoundly disempower critics 
of the status quo.  They create a bias in favour of state action, including the use of lethal 
force, against those deemed to be terrorists, who are always non-state actors.  These 
discourses present state action as merely a reaction to an original unjustifiable wrong 
committed by terrorists.  The notion of human rights-compliant counterterrorism 
reinforces this logic.  It provides new language to represent state action as restrained, 
sound and rational. 
What might human rights advocacy look like when disentangled from 
counterterrorism?  How can such disentanglement be undertaken?  This advocacy would 
resist dichotomous thinking with regard to terrorism and counterterrorism, and instead 
maintain and promote a healthy sceptical attitude towards the counterterrorism agenda.  It 
would be more attentive to the political calculation behind the deployment by 
governments of the labels “terrorism” and “terrorists” against their adversaries.  It would 
interrogate the use of these labels and contest the move by governments to hide behind 
the label “counterterrorism” to shield their own violence from scrutiny.  International 
human rights advocates have so far argued justif iably that human rights violations are 
counterproductive, and that they tend to foment or aid terrorism rather than defeat it.  But 
the label “counterterrorism” might be further interrogated.  In fact, the persistence of 
serious human rights violations committed with impunity suggests that counterterrorism 
officials may actually prefer to pursue actions that are counterproductive.  If human rights 
scholars and advocates drop the courtesy of assuming that counterterrorism is always 
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about promoting public security, they might broaden the horizons of their analyses and 
interventions.   
A disentangled advocacy might be more supportive of initiatives to pursue the 
truth about atrocities against civilians, not only when the evidence points to extremist 
Islamists, but also, and more importantly, when they point to state agents.  Extreme 
difficulty will likely be encountered in uncovering the full extent of state agents’ 
involvement in manufacturing terrorist events, not only because evidence can be difficult 
to obtain, but also because governments will likely suppress such evidence.  Yet this is all 
the more reason for international advocates to pursue such investigations.   
This disentangled advocacy might also challenge state authorities’ perpetual 
production of claims about terrorist networks and the threats they pose.  Indeed, the 
constancy of officials’ alarm over the terrorist threat despite supposed successes in 
counterterrorism, whether in terms of arrests and legal convictions made or in more 
military terms, is curious.  It resurrects the spirit of the Bush administration’s call for a 
perpetual “War on Terror”, even after governments the world over had become more 
circumspect in describing their actions as war. 
Assassinations of terrorism suspects and the use of torture are not only 
condemnable violations of individual rights that are counterproductive,  but they also 
radically affect the epistemological status of claims made by counterterrorism officials.  As 
such, human rights advocates are well positioned to expose exaggerations, falsities and 
fantasies in terrorist threat projections, which is a needed intervention.  Jackson has 
underlined that counterterrorism officials are able to justify measures that would 
otherwise be considered costly, counterproductive and even bizarre because of the 
disconnection of terror from knowledge.8  In some advanced countries, terror is no longer 
simply a result of actual terrorist attacks, but a permanent condition of anticipating future 
attacks that are believed to be certain to come.9  Hence, counterterrorism officials and 
experts knowingly ignore what is known about past terrorist acts and the motivation of 
attackers.  Having given up trying to understand “terrorists” and their motivations, yet 
remaining convinced that they will surely attack, counterterrorism officials and experts rely 
                                                                 
8 Richard Jackson, ‘The Epistemological Crisis of Counterterrorism’ (2015) 8 Critical Studies on 
Terrorism 33-54, 35.  
9 Joseba Zulaika, ‘Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US 
Counterterrorism’ (2012) 5 Critical Studies on Terrorism 51 -68, 57. 
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on imagination and fantasy to anticipate what “terrorists” might be able to do.  In other 
words, their counterterrorism strategy proceeds from a “paranoid logic”.10   
The use of the “terrorist” label tends to enforce silence around the articulation and 
examination of what “terrorists” want to say and the changes that they seek.  The 
designations of diverse groups as “terrorist organisations”, while apparently only designed 
to combat the financing of terrorism, tends to operate like a taboo or restriction on who 
may talk and be listened to by governments, the international community and the public.  
For this reason, international human rights scholars and advocates should re-examine their 
fundamental position towards the idea of terrorist listing.  A disentangled advocacy might 
extend the criticism of the listing procedure towards a broader rejection of taboos or 
restrictions on talking and listening to designated organisations.  
It may be that the approach that I advocate is particularly suited to insurgent 
groups engaged in long-standing armed conflicts whose designation as terrorist 
organisations by the leading liberal democratic countries aid established governments in 
silencing them.  Yet I would also urge that advocates take another look at the military 
approach that the world’s leading states have preferred to take against extremist groups 
like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  Even in the face of ISIS, there is reason to 
advocate for the disentanglement of human rights promotion from the pursuit of 
counterterrorism.  The videotaped beheadings, rapes, mass executions of disfavoured 
religious groups and other terroristic acts by ISIS in the territories it controls are revolting 
human rights violations.  They seem to be only capable of being adequately described as 
pure evil, against which a war is surely justified.   But it needs to be recalled that wars 
premised on similar condemnations in the past for Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks and the 
atrocities of the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein have prompted not only more 
terrorism but more vociferous forms of terrorism.  ISIS itself would not have emerged 
today had Iraq not been so utterly destroyed and socially fragmented by the “War on 
Terror”.  Given this experience, advocates should be more sceptical of, not more confident 
in the justifiability or rationality of pursuing an evidently perpetual war.  Instead, they 
should invest more energy in forging a completely different approach that avoids the 
reproduction of the dichotomous discourse of counterterrorism.  
I have argued that human rights are entangled in the legitimation and perpetuation 
of the counterterrorism agenda in the Philippines and Indonesia, which in practice remains 
unreformed.  Yet there is no reason why human rights advocacy cannot be recalibrated so 
                                                                 
10 Jackson (n 8) 33. 
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as to avoid this trap.  Like a matchstick, I offer this thesis to human rights advocates and 
scholars, in the hope of sparking a renewal of resistance to abuses in the name of 
counterterrorism. 
 
 255 
Bibliography 
  
Abanton Muslim M, The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy 
Alternative (Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University 
1994) 
Abbahil A, ‘The Bangsa Moro: Their Self-Image and Inter-Group Ethnic Attitudes’ (1984) 5 
Dansalan Quarterly 197-250 
Abinales PN, The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986 (South East 
Asia Program Publications, Cornell University 1996) 
——, Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative (Ateneo de Manila 
University Press and Flipside Publishing 2010) 
Abuza Z, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network’ (2002) 24 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 427-465 
——, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf (DIANE Publishing 2005) 
——, ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution’ (2005) 28 Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 453-479 
——, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (Taylor & Francis 2007) 
——, ‘Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward’ (The Jamestown Foundation, 
14 January 2010) 
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35910> 
accessed 4 April 2016 
Acharya A, ‘Human Security: East versus West’ (2001) 61 International Journal 442-460 
Agence France-Presse, ‘Abu Sayyaf Claim Responsibility for Blast’ Sydney Morning Herald (5 
March 2003) <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/05/1046826429975.html> 
accessed 9 February 2016 
——, ‘Terror Mastermind Killed in Indonesia Raid’ The Sydney Morning Herald (17 
September 2009) <http://www.smh.com.au/world/terror-mastermind-killed-in-indonesia-
raid-20090917-ftaz.html> accessed 15 February 2016 
Alipala J, ‘US Combat Role Reported First in 2002’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (29 August 2009) 
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20090829-222542/US-
combat-role-reported-first-in-2002> accessed 10 March 2015 
Alkire S, ‘Concepts of Human Security’ in Lincoln C Chen, Sakiko Fukada Parr and Ellen 
Seidensticker (eds), Human Security in a Global World (Harvard University Press 2003) 
Allard T, ‘Bali Bomb Mastermind Killed in Shoot-Out’ The Sydney Morning Herald (10 March 
2010) <http://www.smh.com.au/world/bali-bomb-mastermind-killed-in-shootout-
20100310-py9n.html> accessed 15 February 2016 
 256 
Alston P, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Addendum, Mission to the Philippines’ (2008) A/HRC/8/3/Add.2 
Alternative Law Groups, ‘Community-Based Dialogue Sessions on Human Rights Promotion 
and Protection between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National 
Police, and Civil Society Organizations and Local Communities’ (Alternative Law Group 
2011) Initial Project Report  
Amnesty International, ‘Philippines: Unlawful Killings by Military and Paramilitary Forces’ 
(Amnesty International 1988) 
——, ‘Malaysia: Human Rights Undermined: Restrictive Laws in a Parliamentary 
Democracy’ (Amnesty International 1999) ASA 28/006/1999 
——, ‘Torture Persists: Appearance and Reality within the Criminal Justice System 
(Philippines)’ (Amnesty International 2003) ASA 35/001/2003 
——, ‘Philippines: Political Killings, Human Rights and the Peace Process’ (2006)  
——, ‘UA 295/07 Possible Enforced Disappearance / Fear for Safety’  
——, ‘Indonesia: Authorities Must Ensure Accountability for Police Violence in South 
Sumatra’ <http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/30965/> accessed 5 April 2016 
Amoore L and Goede MD, ‘Governance, Risk and Dataveillance in the War on Terror’ (2005) 
43 Crime, Law and Social Change 149-173 
Anghie A, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 
Anghie A and Chimni BS, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 77-103 
Annan K, ‘A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism (Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary)’ 
(2005) <http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/site/documents/?d=268> accessed 7 January 
2016 
Aquino CC, ‘Speech of President Corazon Aquino at the University of the Philippines 
Graduation Rites’ 
Arguillas CO, ‘The Meiring Mystery: “Affront to Philippine Sovereignty” (First Part)’ 
MindaNews (30 May 2003) 
——, ‘The Meiring Mystery: The “Second Coming” (Second of Three Parts)’ MindaNews (31 
May 2003) 
——, ‘The Meiring Mystery: The Extradition That Never Was’ MindaNews (1 June 2003) 
<https://jewterror.wordpress.com/2003/06/01/the-meiring-mystery-the-extradition-that-
never-was/> accessed 8 May 2015 
Armed Forces of the Philippines, ‘Internal Peace and Security Plan’ 
Armitage R, ‘Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’ 
 257 
——, ‘Statement before House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs’  
Asian Human Rights Commission, ‘An Open Letter to Chief of Indonesian National Police’ 
<https://www.ammado.com/nonprofit/108433/articles/15523> accessed 23 October 2015 
Asmarani D, ‘Muslims Oppose Jakarta Anti-Terror Bill’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 11 May 
2002) 
Associated Press, ‘Abu Bakar Bashir Sentenced to 15 Years on Terror Charges’ The Guardian 
(16 June 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/16/abu-bakar-bashir-jailed-
indonesia> accessed 3 April 2016 
Atran S, ‘The Emir: An Interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast 
Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization’ (Terrorism Monitor, 16 December 2005) 
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=562> 
accessed 3 April 2016 
Australian Associated Press, ‘Azahari “Dead after Police Raid”’ The Sydney Morning Herald 
(9 November 2005) <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/azahari -dead-after-police-
raid/2005/11/09/1131407703698.html> accessed 15 February 2016 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Top Still at Large’, PM with Mark Colvin (12 August 
2009) <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2008/s2654003.htm> accessed 20 October 
2015 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Australia Faces Link to West Papua Torture’, 7.30 
Report (28 August 2012) <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2012/s3578010.htm> 
accessed 15 October 2015 
Australian National Security, ‘Abu Sayyaf Group’ 
<http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/AbuSayyafGroup.
aspx> accessed 26 January 2016 
Aventajado R and Montelibano T, 140 Days of Terror: In the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf  
(Anvil Publishing 2004) 
Awwas I, ‘Badan Intelijen Dari Masa Ke Masa: Alat Negara Atau Memperalat Negara?’ 
<https://serbasejarah.wordpress.com/2009/05/14/badan-intelijen-dari-masa-ke-masa-
alat-negara-atau-memperalat-negara/> accessed 29 March 2016 
Azra A, ‘Bali and Southeast Asian Islam: Debunking the Myths’  in Kumar Ramakrishna and 
See Seng Tan (eds), After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia  (World Scientific 
2003) 
Badilla J, ‘Task Force Davao to Stay - Duterte’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (29 December 2003) 
A18 
Baker M, ‘With God and a Gun on His Side’ The Age (2 March 2002) 
<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/03/01/1014704998112.html> accessed 9 
February 2016 
 258 
Balane WI, ‘Bukidnon “bakwits” Return Home’ MindaNews (August 2012) 
<http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2012/08/02/bukidnon-bakwits-return-home/> 
accessed 23 February 2016 
Banlaoi R, ‘The Abu Sayyaf Group and Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: Threat and 
Response’ in Patricio N Abinales and Nathan Gilbert Quimpo (eds), The US and the War on 
Terror in the Philippines (Anvil Publishing 2008) 
Bantay Ceasefire, ‘Mindanao Grassroots Ceasefire Review and Assessment, January 6-12 & 
18-19, 2003, Cotabato, Maguindanao, Lanao & Sultan Kudarat’  
——, ‘The Hunt for Al-Ghozi: An “Anti-Terror” Campaign That Terrorized Lanao? Bantay 
Ceasefire Field Monitoring, Lanao Del Norte & Sur, October 7-9, 2003’ 3 
Barton G, Abdurrahman Wahid, Muslim Democrat, Indonesian President: A View from the 
Inside (University of New South Wales Press 2002) 
——, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia  (Singapore University Press 2005) 
Baswedan AR, ‘Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory’ (2004) 44 Asian 
Survey 669-690 
Baxi U, Human Rights in a Posthuman World: Critical Essays (Oxford University Press 2007) 
BBC News, ‘Estrada Denies German Ransom Allegations’ BBC (11 December 2000) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1065475.stm> accessed 9 February 2016 
——, ‘Manila Links MILF to Bomb’ BBC (6 March 2003) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2824557.stm> accessed 9 February 2016 
——, ‘US “Wanted Ba”asyir Detained’’ BBC News (13 January 2005) 
——, ‘Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s Legal Saga’ BBC News (13 June 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3958391.stm> accessed 3 April 2016 
——, ‘Profile: Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’ BBC News (16 June 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10912588> accessed 3 April 2016 
——, ‘The 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing Plot’ BBC News (11 October 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138> accessed 6 April 2016 
BBC World Service, ‘Arroyo Calls US Critics “terrorist Lovers”’ BBC News (8 February 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1809222.stm> accessed 4 January 2016 
Becker J, Campaigning for Justice: Human Rights Advocacy in Practice (Stanford University 
Press 2013) 
<https://books.google.com.au/books?id=wvzqDqkNah4C&pg=PA271&dq=philip+alston+phi
lippines+extrajudicial+killings&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UUxRVfKVIo-
NuASpsYGoAw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=philip%20alston%20philippines%20extrajudicia
l%20killings&f=false> accessed 12 May 2015 
Bello W, Creating the Third Force: U.S. Sponsored Low Intensity Conflict in the Philippines 
(The Institute for Food and Development Policy 1987) 
 259 
——, ‘A “Second Front” in the Philippines’ The Nation (18 March 2002) 
<http://www.tni.org/article/second-front-philippines> accessed 23 October 2013 
Bentham J, ‘Anarchical Fallacies. An Examination of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen Decreed by the Constituent Assembly of France’, Selected Writings on 
Utilitarianism (Wordsworth 2000) 
Bergen P, ‘Bush’s War on Terror Is over - CNN.com’ (CNN, 26 May 2013) 
<http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/24/opinion/bergen-end-of-terror-war/index.html> 
accessed 27 January 2016 
Bersamin J, ‘American Blast Victim in Davao Tagged as Terrorist’ ABS-CBN News (27 
September 2002) 
Binion G, ‘Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 509-
526 
Bodnar S and Gwinn J, ‘“Monetary Ammunition” in a Counterinsurgency’ [2010] 
Parameters 1-12 
Boeles P, ‘Annotations on Sison Asylum Case’ [1997] Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 
(Immigration Jurisprudence) 46-47 
Booth K, ‘The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking-Glass’ (2008) 1 
Critical Studies on Terrorism 65-79 
Bordadora N, ‘Being off Europe’s Terror List Elates CPP Founder Sison’ Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (13 July 2007) 
<http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/inquirerpolitics/view.php?db=1&article=2007071
3-76387> accessed 4 May 2015 
Borelli S, ‘The Rendition of Terrorism Suspects to the United States: Human Rights and the 
Limits of International Cooperation’ in Andrea Bianchi and Yasmin Naqvi  (eds), Enforcing 
International Law Norms Against Terrorism (Hart Publishing 2004) 
——, ‘The Treatment of Terrorist Suspects Captured Abroad: Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law’ in Andrea Bianchi and Yasmin Naqvi (eds), Enforcing International Law 
Norms Against Terrorism (Hart Publishing 2004) 
Bowring B and Korff D, ‘Terrorist Designation with Regard to European and International 
Law: The Case of the PMOI’ (International Conference of Jurists 2004)  
Boyle A and Chinkin C, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 
Braithwaite J and others, Anomie and Violence: Non-Truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian 
Peacebuilding (Australian National University E Press 2010) 
Briscoe CH, ‘Rescuing the Burnhams: The Unspoken SOCPAC Mission’ (2004) 17 Specia l 
Warfare 46-51 
——, ‘Wanted Dead or Alive: Psychological Operations During Balikatan 02-1’ (2004) 17 
Special Warfare 26-29 
 260 
Bruinessen M van, ‘Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State -Islam Relations in 
Indonesia’ in Ingrid Wessel (ed), Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Abera-Verlag 
1996) 
Bruinessen M van, ‘The Violent Fringes of Indonesia’s Islam’ (2002) 11 ISIM Newsletter 7 
Bruinessen M van, ‘Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia’ (2002) 10 
South East Asia Research 117-154 
Buendia RG, ‘The GRP-MILF Peace Talks: Quo Vadis?’ in Chin Kin Wah and Daljit Singh (eds), 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2004 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2004) 
Bulatlat, ‘Melo Commission a “Whitewash,” Victims’ Kin Say’ Bulatlat (7 October 2006) 
<http://bulatlat.com/main/2006/10/07/melo-commission-a-
%E2%80%98whitewash%E2%80%99-victims%E2%80%99-kin-say/> accessed 17 February 
2016 
Bunch C, ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights’ (1990) 12 
Human Rights Quarterly 486-498 
Bunte M and Ufen A, ‘The New Order and Its Legacy: Reflections on Democratization in 
Indonesia’ in Marco Bunte and Andreas Ufen (eds), Democratization in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia (Routledge 2008) 
Burke A, Beyond Security, Ethics And Violence: War Against the Other (Taylor & Francis 
2006) 
Burnham G and Merrill D, In the Presence of My Enemies (Tyndale House Publishers, Inc 
2003) 
Burns P, ‘The Post Priok Trials: Religious Principles and Legal Issues’ [1989] Indonesia 61-88 
Bush GW, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ 
Butt S, ‘Indonesian Terrorism Law and Criminal Process’ (University of Melbourne Centre 
for Islamic Law and Society 2009) Islam, Syari’ah and Governance Background Paper (ARC 
Federation Fellowship) <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1400506> accessed 29 October 
2013 
Byrnes A, ‘More Law or Less Law? The Resilience of Human Rights Law and Institutions in 
the “War on Terror”’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (eds), Fresh Perspectives on the 
‘War on Terror’ (ANU E Press 2008) 
<http://epress.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch08.html> accessed 12 July 2012 
Caballero-Anthony M, ‘Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia’ (2004) 28 Asian 
Perspective 155-189 
‘Cable 09MANILA1219 No Basis for Removal of Jose Sison’s Terrorist Designation’ 
<https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09MANILA1219&q=jose%20maria%2
0sison> 
‘Cable 09THEHAGUE309 Netherlands/Terrorism Finance: Urgent Request for Information to 
Support Sison Listing’ 
 261 
<https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09THEHAGUE309&q=jose%20maria%
20sison> accessed 4 January 2016 
‘Cable 09THEHAGUE636, Netherlands: Urgent Request for Support in EU’S Sison Case’ 
<https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09THEHAGUE636.html> accessed 4 January 2016 
Calica A and Villanueva M, ‘US: GI Medic Might Have Saved Abu Suspect’s Life’ Philippine 
Star (30 July 2002) <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/170134/us-gi-medic-might-have-
saved-abu-suspect’s-life> accessed 4 February 2016 
Cameron I, ‘European Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting’ (2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review 
225-256 
Canuday JJ, Bakwit: The Power of the Displaced (Ateneo de Manila University Press and 
Flipside Publishing 2009) 
Caouette D, ‘Persevering Revolutionaries: Armed Struggle in the 21st Century, Exploring the 
Revolution of the Communist Party of the Philippines’ (Cornell University 2004)  
Capistrano ZIMC, ‘Cafgu Files Charges vs IP Leaders’ Davao Today (26 March 2015) 
<http://davaotoday.com/main/politics/cafgu-files-charges-vs-ip-leaders/> accessed 16 July 
2015 
Capulong RT, Scope and Implications of the Supreme Court Decision in the ‘Batasan Six’ and 
Mass Leaders’ Certiorari Petitions (15 July 2007) 
Casale S, ‘Treatment in Detention’ in Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel and Nigel 
White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 
2012) 
Casino T, ‘Fast Forward’ BusinessWorld (Manila, Philippines, 7 March 2003) 
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, ‘Let Us Keep Human Life Sacred’ 
<http://cbcponline.net/v2/?p=529> accessed 10 June 2015 
Center for Lumad Advocacy and Services, Inc., ‘Fact Sheet, March 17, 2011’  
Charlesworth H, ‘Human Rights in the Wake of Terrorism’ (2003) 82 Australian Law 
Reform Commission Reform Journal 26-29 
Charlesworth H, ‘What are “Women’s Human Rights”?’ in Rebecca J Cook (ed), Human 
Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives  (University of Pennsylvania Press 
1994) 
——, ‘Human Rights in the Wake of Terrorism’ (2003) 82 Australian Law Reform 
Commission Reform Journal 26-29 
Che Man WK, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of 
Southern Thailand (Ateneo de Manila University Press 1974) 
Chehabi HE, ‘Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic Is the Islamic Republic?’ (1991) 
120 Daedalus 69-91 
 262 
Chernov Hwang J, Peaceful Islamist Mobilization in the Muslim World: What Went Right 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 
Chow JT, ‘ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11’ (2005) 45 Asian Survey 302-321 
Clarke R, ‘Retrospectivity and the Constitutional Validity of the Bali Bombing and East Timor 
Trials’ (2003) 5 Asian Law 1-32 
CNN International, ‘Airport Bomb: Islamic Group Blamed’ (6 March 2003) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/03/06/philippines.bomb/> 
accessed 9 February 2016 
Collier K, ‘“A Carnival of Crime”: The Enigma of the Abu Sayyaf’ in Patricio N Abinales and 
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo (eds), The US and the War on Terror in the Philippines (Anvil 
Publishing 2008) 
Commission on Human Rights, ‘Human Rights: A Unifying Framework: Report of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on 
Human Rights’ <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G02/110/21/PDF/G0211021.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 16 
July 2014 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, ‘Guidelines on Human Rights and the 
Fight against Terrorism’ 
<https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/HR%20and%20the%20fight%20against%20terr
orism.pdf> accessed 20 April 2016 
Conde CH, ‘Blasts at Philippine Mosques Follow Bombing at Terminal’ New York Times (4 
April 2003) <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/04/world/blasts-at-philippine-mosques-
follow-bombing-at-terminal.html> accessed 7 May 2015 
Conte A, Security in the 21st Century: The United Nations, Afghanistan, and Iraq  (Ashgate 
2005) 
Corder M, ‘Dutch Arrest Philippine Communist Leader’ USA Today (Ausgust 2007) 
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-08-29-1428978609_x.htm> accessed 
10 February 2016 
Crenshaw Hutchinson M, ‘The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism’ (1972) 16 The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 383-396 
——, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962 (University of Stanford, 
Hoover Institution Press 1978) 
Crouch HA, Political Reform in Indonesia After Soeharto (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies 2010) 
Crouch M, ‘Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia: New Problems, 
Local Politics and Court Action’ (2010) 34 Asian Studies Review 403-419 
Dalangin-Fernandez L, ‘Child Rights Groups Close Ranks to Save Lumad Schools’ 
(InterAksyon.com, 22 October 2015) <http://www.interaksyon.com/article/119308/child-
rights-groups-close-ranks-to-save-lumad-schools> accessed 23 February 2016 
 263 
Danao E, ‘Abu Sayyaf Allowed Romero to Escape after Ransom Payment’ Philippine Star (7 
September 2001) <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/132831/‘sayyaf-allowed-r-ii-escape-
after-ransom-p> accessed 9 February 2016 
Daytec-Yañgot C, ‘The Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo: A Comparison of Remedies 
Against The Menaces of State Power’ in Edre Olalia (ed), Legal Remedies for Human Rights 
Violations: Studies on the Writs of Amparo, Habeas Corpus, and Habeas Data  (National 
Union of Peoples’ Lawyers 2013) 
<https://www.academia.edu/7640459/The_Writs_of_Habeas_Corpus_and_Amparo_A_Co
mparison_of_Remedies_Against_The_Menaces_of_State_Power> accessed 15 May 2015 
De Goede M, ‘The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe’ (2008) 14 
European Journal of International Relations 161-185 
de Londras F, Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back?  (Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 
<https://www.academia.edu/460011/Detention_in_the_War_on_Terror_Can_Human_Rig
hts_Fight_Back_Cambridge_University_Press_2011_> accessed 25 June 2014 
Della-Giacoma J, ‘Indonesia’s Police: The Problem of Deadly Force’ (Lowy Interpreter, 18 
June 2013) <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/06/18/Indonesian-policing-
dilemmas-Using-less-deadly-force.aspx> accessed 15 February 2016 
Dembour M-B, Who Believes in Human Rights?: Reflections on the European Convention 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 
Dembour M-B, ‘Critiques’ in D Moeckli, S Shah and S Sivakumaran (eds), International 
human rights law (Oxford University Press 2010) <http://eprints.brighton.ac.uk/12052/> 
accessed 19 August 2014 
Dietrich F and Galtung J, ‘To End Terrorism, End State Terrorism’ (2002) 7 Journal of Futures 
Studies 151-154 
Dijk C van, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (M Nijhoff 
1981) 
Dijk C van, ‘The Indonesian General Elections 1971–92’ (1992) 20 Indonesia and the Malay 
World 48-66 
Docena H, ‘Unconventional Warfare: Are US Special Forces Engaged in an “Offensive War” 
in the Philippines?’ in Patricio N Abinales and Nathan Gilbert Quimpo (eds), The US and the 
War on Terror in the Philippines (Anvil Publishing 2008) 
Donohue L, ‘In the Name of National Security: US Counterterrorist Measures, 1960-2000’ 
(2001) 13 Terrorism and Political Violence 15-60 
Droog T, ‘Press Communique: International Campaign to Free Jose Maria Sison Launched’  
Duffy H and Kostas SA, ‘“Extraordinary Rendition”: A Challenge for the Rule of Law’ in Ana 
María Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel and Nigel White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International 
Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2012) 
 264 
Dutch Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation, ‘Facts to Action: Report on the Attacks Against 
Filipino Lawyers and Judges’ (2006) 
Duvall RD and Stohl M, ‘Governance by Terror’ in Michael Stohl (ed), The Politics of 
Terrorism (Marcel Dekker 1983) 
Dyer C, ‘There Is No War on Terror’ The Guardian (24 January 2007) 
Echeminada P, ‘Lawmaker Seeks Deeper Probe into Al -Ghozi Escape’ Philippine Star (31 
August 2003) <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/219219/lawmaker-seeks-deeper-probe-
al-ghozi-escape> accessed 21 April 2016 
Elin Yunita Kristanti and Zaky Al-Yamani, ‘Saksi: Teroris Ditembak Di Kepala Saat Jatuh’ (10 
March 2010) <http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/135252-warga-terduga-teroris-
itu-ditembak-di-kepala> accessed 16 February 2016 
Espina-Varona I, ‘Filipino Indigenous Children Face Crisis’ ABS-CBN News (6 July 2015) 
<http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/focus/07/06/15/filipino-indigenous-children-face-crisis> 
accessed 16 July 2015 
Esposito JL, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford University Press 1992) 
Executive Board, American Anthropological Association, ‘Statement on Human Rights’ 
(1947) 49 American Anthropologist 539 
Fact Finding Mission of Human Rights Now to Philippines, ‘Report on Extrajudicial Killings 
and Enforced Disappearances in the Philippines’ (Human Rights Now 2008)  
Far Eastern Economic Review, ‘Interview: Paul Wolfowitz: Of Missiles and Terrorism’ Far 
Eastern Economic Review (8 November 2001) 22 
Fealy G, ‘Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?’ (2004) 2004 Southeast 
Asian Affairs 104-121 
Fealy G, ‘Half a Century of Violent Jihad in Indonesia: A Historical and Ideological 
Comparison of Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah’ in Marika Vicziany and David Wright-
Neville (eds), Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: myths and realities (Monash University 2005) 
Fermon J and others, ‘The Case of Prof. Jose Maria Sison: Labelling Dissent as “Terrorism” 
by the EU’ 
Fermon J and Beys M, ‘Challenging the Criminalization of Jose Maria Sison at the EU Level’, 
International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines  (2013) 
<http://www.humanrightsphilippines.net/2013/07/challenging-the-criminalization-of-jose-
maria-sison-at-the-eu-level/> accessed 10 April 2015 
Flynn EJ, ‘The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and Human Rights’ (2007) 7 
Human Rights Law Review 371-384 
Foot R, ‘Collateral Damage: Human Rights Consequences of Counterterrorist Action in the 
Asia–Pacific’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 411-425 
 265 
——, ‘Human Rights and Counterterrorism in Global Governance: Reputation and 
Resistance’ (2005) 11 Global Governance 291-310 
——, ‘Torture: The Struggle over a Peremptory Norm in a Counter-Terrorist Era’ (2006) 20 
International Relations 131-151 
——, ‘The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights: Institutional Adaptation 
and Embedded Ideas’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 489-514 
Frake CO, ‘Abu Sayyaf: Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities 
among Philippine Muslims’ (2008) 100 American Anthropologist 41-54 
Friedrichs J, ‘Defining the International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle behind the 
Legal Debate on International Terrorism’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 69-
91 
Fuller GE, Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries: An Integrative View  
(Rand Corporation 1991) 
——, The Future of Political Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) 
Fuller T, ‘20 Kidnapped From Malaysian Resort Island’ New York Times (25 April 2000) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/25/news/25iht-malay.2.t_3.html> accessed 4 January 
2016 
——, ‘Philippine Armed Forces Helped Kidnapping Gang Escape, He Says : The Fighting 
Priest’ The New York Times (24 August 2001) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/24/news/24iht-a1_20.html> accessed 9 February 2016 
Gardella A, ‘The Fight Against the Financing of Terrorism between Judicial and Regulatory 
Cooperation’ in Andrea Bianchi and Yasmin Naqvi (eds), Enforcing International Law Norms 
Against Terrorism (Hart Publishing 2004) 
Gathii JT, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative 
Bibliography’ (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 26-64 
Geertz C, The Religion of Java (University of Chicago Press 1976) 
George A, Western State Terrorism (Polity Press 1991) 
Gibson D, ‘Report on Attacks against Advocates in the Philippines’ (Lawyers’ Rights Watch 
Canada 2006) 
Gilang Akbar Prambadi, ‘Polri Jelaskan Peran Dua Teroris Tulungagung’ Republika.co.id 
(Jakarta, 1 August 2013) 
GMANews.TV, ‘AFP Extends Battle Plan Linked to Extra-Judicial Killings’ (GMA News Online, 
15 August 2010) <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/198625/news/nation/afp-
extends-battle-plan-linked-to-extra-judicial-killings> accessed 23 February 2016 
——, ‘Judge Denies Amparo for 2 Alleged NPA “Amazons”’ (GMA News Online) 
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/126401/news/regions/judge-denies-amparo-
for-2-alleged-npa-amazons> accessed 23 February 2016 
 266 
Gowing PG, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-
1920 (New Day Publishers 1988) 
Gozon Jr. FEM and Orosa TJC, ‘Watching the Watchers: A Look into the Drafting of the Writ 
of Amparo’ (2008) 82 Philippine Law Journal 8-28 
Gross O, ‘The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency 
Powers and the “Norm-Exception” Dichotomy’ (1999) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1825-1868 
Gunaratna R, Inside Al-Qaeda: Gloabl Network of Terror (Columbia University Press 2002) 
Gurr T, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press 1970) 
Hafidz TS, ‘The War on Terror and the Future of Indonesian Democracy’ (IDSS, Nanyang 
Technological University 2003) Working Paper 46 
Halili and Naipospos BT, ‘From Stagnation To Pick The New Hopes: The Condition of 
Freedom of Religion/Belief in Indonesia 2014’ (Juwarti Hafsah tr, Pustaka Masyarakat 
Setara 2015) 
Hamilton-Hart N, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert Analysis, Myopia and Fantasy’ (2005) 
18 The Pacific Review 303-325 
Hampsher-Monk I, A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from 
Hobbes to Marx (Blackwell Publishing 1992) 
Harisumarto S, ‘Al Qaida Members Trained in Indonesia’ (UPI.com, 13 December 2001) 
<http://www.upi.com/Archives/2001/12/13/Al-Qaida-members-trained-in-
Indonesia/9111008219600/> accessed 24 March 2016 
Hasan N, ‘Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in 
Indonesia’ (2002) 73 Indonesia 145-169 
——, ‘Towards a Population-Centric Strategy: The Indonesian Experience’ in Roel Meijer 
(ed), Counter Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia  (Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 2012)  
Hawkins M, Making Moros: Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the 
Philippines’ Muslim South (Northern Illinois University Press 2013) 
Hayes B, ‘Terrorising the Rule of Law: The Policy and Practice of Proscription’ (Statewatch 
2005) Statewatch Analysis 
Hefner RW, ‘Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle 
Class’ [1993] Indonesia 1-35 
Heng Y-K and McDonagh K, ‘The Other War on Terror Revealed: Global Governmentality 
and the Financial Action Task Force’s Campaign against Terrorist Financing’ (2008) 34 
Review of International Studies 553-573 
Herman ES and O’Sullivan G, The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions That 
Shape Our View of Terror (Pantheon Books 1989) 
 267 
Hernandez C, ‘Institutional Response to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of the 
Philippines’ (2005) 
Hidayatullah, ‘Saksi: Tersangka Ditembak Dari Jarak Dekat’ Hidayatullah.com (11 March 
2010) <http://www.hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/read/2010/03/11/42867/saksi -
tersangka-ditembak-dari-jarak-dekat.html> accessed 16 February 2016 
Hilao-Enriquez M, ‘Statement to the Hearing of the Subcommittee for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the 110th US Congress’  
Hoffman P, ‘Human Rights and Terrorism’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 932-955 
Hogg R, ‘Executive Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia: Exploring the Shifting 
Border between Crime and Politics’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (eds), Fresh 
Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror’ (Australian National University E-Press 2008) 
Hong Kong Campaign for the Advancement of Human Rights in the Philippines, ‘Save 
Filipino Lives, TF Usig Told’ (2007) 3 FHR For Human Rights 7 
Hong Kong Mission for Human Rights and Peace in the Philippines, July 23-28, 2006, 
‘Mission Report on Extrajudicial Killings and Other Human Rights Abuses in the Philippines’ 
(2006) 
Human Rights First, ‘Densus 88 and the Asia Pivot’ (Human Rights First, 31 January 2013) 
<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/01/31/densus-88-and-the-asia-pivot> accessed 16 
February 2016 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi’ 
(Human Rights Watch 2002) 
——, ‘Hear No Evil, See No Evil: The UN Security Council’s Approach to Human Rights 
Violations in the Global Counter-Terrorism Project (Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper)’ 
<http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/un/2004/un0804/un0804.pdf> accessed 12 
July 2012 
——, ‘Scared Silent: Impunity for Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines’ (Human Rights 
Watch 2007) 
——, ‘Lives Destroyed: Attacks Against Civilians in the Phil ippines’ (2007) 
——, ‘Indonesia: Prosecuting Political Aspirations - Indonesia’s Political Prisoners’ (2010) 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/indonesia0610webwcover_0.pdf> 
accessed 29 January 2014 
——, ‘In Religion’s Name: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia’ (Human Rights 
Watch 2013) 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/indonesia0213_ForUpload_0.pdf> 
accessed 29 January 2014 
IBON Foundation, Oplan Bantay Laya: The US-Arroyo Campaign of Terror and 
Counterinsurgency in the Philippines (2010) 
 268 
Ilagan B, ‘Committee DEFEND Philippines Letter to Dutch Ambassador’ 
<http://josemariasison.org/defend-philippines-letter-to-dutch-ambassador/> accessed 10 
February 2016 
Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings, ‘Report’ (2007) 
Indybay, ‘Text of High Court Pleading Re: VFA, Balikatan’ 
<https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2002/01/27/1146051.php> accessed 30 December 
2015 
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, ‘Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases 
of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia’ (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 2013) IPAC 
Report No. 2 
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, ‘Statement of Concern’ 
<https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2479&dat=20071217&id=nVM1AAAAIBAJ&sji
d=YyUMAAAAIBAJ&pg=1480,16226816&hl=en> accessed 10 June 2015 
InterAksyon.com, ‘Dinky “Oblivious” to Lumad Kids’ Presence at Protest vs School Closures - 
Karapatan’ (InterAksyon.com, 24 June 2015) 
<http://www.interaksyon.com/article/112964/dinky-oblivious-to-lumad-kids-presence-at-
protest-vs-school-closures---karapatan> accessed 23 February 2016 
International Crisis Group, ‘Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues’ (International Crisis Group 
2000) Asia Briefing No. 2 
——, ‘Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku’ (International Crisis Group 
2000) ICG Asia Report No. 10 
——, ‘Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims’ (International Crisis Group 2001) Asia 
Briefing No. 10 
——, ‘Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims - International Crisis Group’ (International 
Crisis Group 2001) Asia Briefing No. 10 
——, ‘Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku’ (International Crisis Group 2002) Asia 
Report No. 31 
——, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia’ 
(International Crisis Group 2002) Asia Report No. 43 
——, ‘Impact of the Bali Bombings’ (International Crisis Group 2002) Asia Briefing No. 23 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B023-impact-of-
the-bali-bombings.aspx> accessed 6 April 2016 
——, ‘Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates’ 
(International Crisis Group 2002) Asia Report No. 43 
——, ‘Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process’ (2004) 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/080-southern-
philippines-backgrounder-terrorism-and-the-peace-process.aspx> accessed 27 February 
2015 
 269 
——, ‘Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi’ (International Crisis Group 2004) 
Asia Report No. 74 
——, ‘Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge’ (International Crisis Group 2007) Asia 
Report N°127 
——, ‘Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso’ (International Crisis Group 2008) Asia Briefing 
No. 75 
——, ‘The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao’ (2008) 
——, ‘Indonesia: “Christianisation” and Intolerance’ (International Crisis Group 2010) Asia 
Briefing No. 114 
——, ‘Indonesia: From Vigilatism to Terrorism in Cirebon’ (International Crisis Group 2012) 
Asia Briefing No. 132 
International Fact-Finding Mission, ‘Running Amok: Landlord Lawlessness and Impunity in 
the Philippines. Final Report of the 2-15 June 2006 International Fact-Finding Mission on 
Agrarian Reform Related Violations of Human Rights in the Philippines’ (2006)  
International Peace Mission, Basilan: The Next Afghanistan?: Report of the International 
Peace Mission to Basilan, 23-27 March 2002 (Akbayan Citizens Action Party 2002) 
International Solidarity Mission Against U.S. Armed Intervention in the Philippines, July 24-
31, 2002, ‘Statement’ <http://www.yonip.com/statement-of-the-international-solidary-
mission-ism-against-u-s-armed-intervention-in-the-philippines/> accessed 4 January 2016 
Isanga J, ‘Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Emergence of a Rule of Customary 
International Law from UN Resolutions’ (2008) 37 Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 233-257 
Jacinto A, ‘Communist Rebels Chide Aquino for Bantay-Laya Extension’ (GMA News Online, 
1 September 2010) 
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/199998/news/nation/communist-rebels-
chide-aquino-for-bantay-laya-extension> accessed 23 February 2016 
Jackson R, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism 
(Manchester University Press 2005) 
——, ‘Conclusion: Contemporary State Terrorism - towards a New Research Agenda’ in 
Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting (eds), Contemporary state terrorism: 
theory and practice (Routledge 2010) 
——, ‘The Epistemological Crisis of Counterterrorism’ (2015) 8 Critical Studies on Terrorism 
33-54 
Jackson R, Murphy E and Poynting S (eds), Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and 
Practice (Routledge 2010) 
<http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=452090> accessed 31 October 
2012 
 270 
Jackson R, Smyth MB and Gunning J (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research 
Agenda (1st edn, Routledge 2009) 
Jakarta Globe, ‘Scrutiny Grows on Densus 88 Torture Video’ The Jakarta Globe (7 March 
2013) <http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/scrutiny-grows-on-densus-88-torture-
video/> accessed 15 December 2014 
Jakarta Post, ‘Muslim Groups Want Densus 88 Dissolved over Rights Abuses’ (1 March 
2013) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/03/01/muslim-groups-want-densus-
88-dissolved-over-rights-abuses.html> accessed 12 December 2014 
Jalandoni LG, ‘Opposing Unjust Laws: NDFP Defends Sison in Peace Talks and at European 
Court’ (2004) <http://www.josemariasison.org/legalcases/related/lj_quebec_290504.html> 
accessed 5 May 2015 
Jarvis DSL (Darryl SL), International Relations and the Third Debate: Postmodernism and Its 
Critics (Greenwood Publishing Group 2002) 
Jenkins B, ‘International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare’ (Rand Corporation 1974)  
Jenkins D, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983 (Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University 1984) 
Jetschke A, Human Rights and State Security: Indonesia and the Philippines  (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2011) 
Jubair S, The Long Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (1st edn, Institute of 
Bangsamoro Studies 2007) 
Juwana H, ‘Anti-Terrorism Efforts in Indonesia’ in Victor V Ramraj and others (eds), Global 
Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Second Edition, Cambridge University Press 2012) 
Kadir S, ‘The Islamic Factor in Indonesia’s Political Transition’ (1999) 7 Asian Journal of 
Political Science 21-44 
Kahin A, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in 
Indonesia (New Press: WW Norton [distributor] 1995) 
Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas, ‘The Human Rights Situation of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines’ in Philippine UPR Watch (ed), Submissions to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) for the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of 
the Philippines during the 13th UPR Session (May-June 2012) (2012) 
——, ‘Data on Human Rights Situation of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Kannady C, Masciola P and Paradis M, ‘The “Push-Pull” of the Law of War: the Rule of Law 
and Military Commissions’ in Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel and Nigel White 
(eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Karapatan, ‘Basilan Under Seige: Report of the Fact-Finding on Human Rights Violations, 
Relief and Medical Mission, September 9-16, 2001, Basilan Province, Mindanao, 
Philippines’ (2001) 
 271 
——, ‘2005 Human Rights Report’ (2005) 
——, ‘2008 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines’ (2009)  
——, ‘2009 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines’ (2010)  
——, ‘2010 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines’ (Karapatan 
2011) <https://www.scribd.com/doc/44443589/2010-Year-End-Report-on-the-Human-
Rights-Situation-in-the-Philippines> accessed 8 April 2016 
——, ‘2014 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines’ 
(Karapatan 2015) 
——, ‘Abducted Daughters of Slain Peasant Leader Still in Military Custody’ (Karapatan.org) 
<http://www.karapatan.org/node/175> accessed 23 February 2016 
Karapatan-CARAGA, ‘Fact Sheet, May 20, 2011’ 
——, ‘Fact Sheet, February 28, 2012’ 
——, ‘Fact Sheet, June 30, 2010’ 
Karapatan-Surigao del Sur, ‘Fact Sheet, September 3, 2010’ 
——, ‘Fact Sheet, June 29, 2011’ 
——, ‘Surigao Evacuees Increase to 218 Families as 29th IB PA Refuses to Leave Mountain 
Communities’ 
KASALO-CARAGA, ‘Fact Sheet, June 13, 2010’ 
Kawagib, ‘Kawagib Moro Human Rights Calls for the Release of  Basilan Detainees’ 
MindaNews (23 July 2008) 
<http://minda2010.timonera.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4783:
kawagib-moro-human-rights-calls-for-the-release-of-basilan-detainees&catid=83:press-
releases&Itemid=247> accessed 5 February 2016 
Khosla M, ‘The TWAIL Discourse: The Emergence of a New Phase’ (2007) 9 International 
Community Law Review 291-304 
Kingsbury D, ‘Australia’s Renewal of Training Links with Kopassus: A Critique’ (Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, ANU 2004) SDSC Working Paper 387 
Klaidman D, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency  
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2012) 
Klein N, ‘Stark Message of the Mutiny: Is the Philippine Government Bombing Its Own 
People for Dollars?’ The Guradian (15 August 2003) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/Columnists/Column/0,5673,1019246,00.html> accessed 8 
May 2015 
Klinken G van, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars  
(Routledge 2007) 
 272 
Klotz A, ‘Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equal ity and U.S. Sanctions Against 
South Africa’ (1995) 49 International Organization 451-478 
——, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid  (Cornell University 
Press 1999) 
——, ‘Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti -Apartheid and 
Abolitionist Experiences’ (2002) 8 European Journal of International Relations 49-76 
Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan 
Tindak Terorisme’ (KomnasHAM 2010) 
——, ‘Laporan Pemantauhan Dan Penyelidikan Penanganan Tindak Terorisme’ 
(KomnasHAM 2011) 
——, ‘Laporan Tim Pemantauan Dugaan Penyiksaan Dalam Penanganan Peristiwa Tanah 
Runtu Dan Penyiksaan Terhadap Korban Salah Tangkap Tindak Pidana Terorisme Di Kalora, 
Poso’ (KomnasHAM 2013) 
Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan, ‘Laporan Pemantauan KontraS: 
Temuan Lapangan Dari Poso-Sulawesi Tengah’ (KontraS 2012) 
‘KomnasHAM: Penembakan Terduga Teroris Tulungagung Langgar HAM’ KOMPAS.com (4 
August 2013) 
Kowalewski D, ‘Vigilante Counterinsurgency and Human Rights in the Philippines: A 
Statistical Analysis’ (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly 246-264 
Kretzmer D and others, ‘Use of Legal Force against Suspected Terrorists’  in Ana María 
Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel and Nigel White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Krisnadhy D, ‘Densus 88 Grebek Teroris Di Cawang Dan Cikampek’ Harian Online Kabar 
Indonesia (12 May 2010) 
<http://www.kabarindonesia.com/berita.php?pil=8&jd=Densus+88+Grebek+Teroris+di+Ca
wang+dan+Cikampek&dn=20100512194418> accessed 16 February 2016 
Lacorte GA, ‘Mother of Missing Youth Files Amparo Petition’ Davao Today (9 November 
2007) <http://davaotoday.com/main/human-rights/mother-of-missing-youth-files-petition-
for-writ-of-amparo/> accessed 23 February 2016 
Lacquer W, A History of Terrorism (Transaction Publishers 1977) 
Lamb K, ‘Indonesia’s Anti-Terror Squad Slammed for Alleged Rights Abuses’ (Voice of 
America, 4 March 2013) <http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia_anti-
terror_squad_slammed_for_alleged_rights_abuses/1614729.html> accessed 15 December 
2014 
Lansford T, Watson RP and Covarrubias J (eds), America’s War on Terror (2nd edn, Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd 2013) 
Ledesma C, ‘The International Campaign to Remove Professor Jose Maria Sison from 
“Terrorist” Listings’ (2004) 
 273 
<http://www.josemariasison.org/legalcases/related/coni_quebec_290504.html> accessed 
6 May 2015 
Liddle RW, ‘Indonesia 1977: The New Order’s Second Parliamentary Election’ (1978) 18 
Asian Survey 175-185 
——, ‘The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation’ (1996) 55 The Journal of Asian 
Studies 613-634 
Lindsey T, ‘Indonesia’s New Anti-Terrorism Laws - Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t’ 
(JURIST, 30 October 2002) <http://jurist.org/forum/forumnew65.php> accessed 7 August 
2015 
Liong LS, ‘Indonesian Muslims and the State: Accommodation or Revolt?’ (1988) 10 Third 
World Quarterly 869-896 
Liwanag A, ‘Brief Review of the History of the Communist Party of the Philippines’ 
<http://www.philippinerevolution.net/statements/19881226_brief-review-of-the-history-
of-the-communist-party-of-the-philippines> accessed 28 January 2016 
Lodgaard S, Human Security: Concept and Operationalization (Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs 2000) 
Maaten J and Sanchez P, ‘Aquino Administration’s Human Rights Direction: Traversing a 
Straight Path?’ (2011) 3 Observer: A Journal on threatened Human Rights Defenders in the 
Philippines 12-15 
Macapagal-Arroyo G, ‘Sixth State of the Nation Address’ 
<http://www.gov.ph/2006/07/24/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-sixth-state-of-the-nation-
address-july-24-2006/> accessed 25 January 2016 
Mack A, The Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century  (Oxford 
University Press 2005) 
Martin C, ‘The Role of Military Courts in a Counter-Terrorism Framework: Trends in 
International Human Rights Jurisprudence and Practice’ in Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja 
Samuel and Nigel White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 
Martin GE and Tuminez AS, ‘Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines A Summary and 
Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003–2007’ (United States Institute 
of Peace 2008) Special Report 202 
Martin JR, ‘Comparing Strategies for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast 
Asia’ (2011) 12 Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 103-117 
Marty D, ‘United Nations Security Council and European Union Blacklists’ (Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe 2007) Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights Doc. 11454 <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewHTML.asp?FileID=11749&lang=en> accessed 10 February 2016 
Marx K, ‘On the Jewish Question’ in David McLellan (ed), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 
 274 
Mascarinas E, ‘Agusan “bakwits” Return Home’ MindaNews (19 November 2011) 
<http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2011/11/19/agusan-
%E2%80%98bakwits%E2%80%99-return-home/> accessed 23 February 2016 
Mathew P, ‘Black Holes, White Holes, and Worm Holes: Pre -Emptive Detention in the “War 
on Terror”’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (eds), Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on 
Terror’ (Australian National University E-Press 2008) 
——, ‘Resolution 1373-A Call to Pre-Empt Asylum Seekers’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Forced 
Migration, Human Rights and Security (Hart Publishing 2008)  
McBeth J, ‘Deep inside Indonesia’s Kill Zone’ Asia Times (31 October 2009) 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KJ31Ae01.html> accessed 15 February 
2016 
McBrien T, ‘Jakarta’s Counterproductive Counterterrorism Approach’ 
<http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/jakartas-counterproductive-counterterrorism-
approach/> accessed 4 June 2014 
McCarthy T, ‘An Invasion of Paradise’ [2000] Time 
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,996834,00.html> accessed 4 
January 2016 
McCoy AW, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of 
the Surveillance State (Ateneo de Manila University Press 2011) 
McKenna TM, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the 
Southern Philippines (University of California Press 1998) 
McKeown R, ‘Norm Regress: US Revisionism and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm’ 
(2009) 23 International Relations 5-25 
McRae D, A Few Poorly Organized Men: Interreligious Violence in Poso, Indonesia  (Brill 
2013) 
Meijer R (ed), Counter Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia  
(netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 2012) 
<http://english.wodc.nl/images/1806-volledige-tekst_tcm45-435986.pdf> accessed 4 June 
2014 
Mendez C and others, ‘Sayyaf Owns up Ferry Blast’ Philippine Star (1 March 2004) 
<http://www.philstar.com/headlines/240839/sayyaf-owns-ferry-blast> accessed 9 
February 2016 
Miller JM and McWilliams E, ETAN/WPAT: Suspend Training and Funding of Indonesian 
Police Unit Detachment 88 (29 September 2010) <http://etan.org/news/2010/09d88.htm> 
accessed 29 January 2014 
Mindanao Times, ‘Lack of Photographs May Delay Meiring’s Extradition: Official’ Mindanao 
Times (23 May 2005) 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20050505083849/http://www.mindanaotimes.com.ph/news
/story.php?id=3969> accessed 8 May 2015 
 275 
Mindanao Truth Commission, ‘Report’ (2004)  
——, ‘Report of the Independent Fact Finding Mission on the Mindanao Bombings and 
Human Rights Violations’ (2004) 
——, ‘Abridged Progress Report’ (2004)  
Mitchell C and others, ‘State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement’ in Michael 
Stohl and George A Lopez (eds), Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for 
Research (Greenwood Press 1986) 
Moeckli D, ‘Anti-Terrorism Laws, Terrorist Profiling, and the Rights to Non-Discrimination’ 
in Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel and Nigel White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: 
International Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Moles N, ‘Restricted Immigration Procedures in National Security Cases and the Rule of 
Law: An Uncomfortable Relationship’ in Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel and Nigel 
White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 
2012) 
Montesa MJ, ‘The Philippines in 2003: Troubles, None of Them New’ (2004) 44 Asian Survey 
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/224230927/fulltextPDF/74900E8D707A4E28PQ/1?a
ccountid=8330> accessed 8 May 2015 
Morada NM, ‘Philippines: Security Context and Challenges’ (2004)  
Mortimer R, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 
(Equinox Publishing 2006) 
Mossman J, Rebels in Paradise; Indonesia’s Civil War (Cape 1961) 
Muradi, ‘The 88th Densus AT: The Role and the Problem of Coordination on Counter-
Terrorism in Indonesia’ (2009) 2 Journal of Politics and Law 85-96 
Mutua M, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 42 
Harvard International Law Journal 201-245 
——, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (University of Pennsylvania Press 2002) 
——, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights: Power, Culture, and Subordination’ (2002) 8 Buffalo 
Human Rights Law Review 1-13 
Mutua M and Anghie A, ‘What Is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law) 31-40 
National Council of Churches in the Philippines, ‘Let the Tones Cry out: An Ecumenical 
Report on Human Rights in the Philippines a Call for Action’ (2007)  
National Democratic Front of the Philippines, The GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations: Major 
Written Agreements and Outstanding Issues (NDFP Human Rights Monitoring Committee 
2006) 
 276 
National Democratic Front of the Philippines International Information Office, ‘Chronology 
of the Peace Negotiations between the GRP and the NDFP: 1988-2006’ 
<http://www.ndfp.org/chronology-of-the-peace-negotiations-between-the-grp-and-the-
ndfp-1988-2006/> accessed 4 January 2016 
Nesiah V, ‘Resistance in the Age of Empire: Occupied Discourse Pending Investigation’  
(2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 903-922 
NewsDesk, ‘Education Exec Wants Tribal Schools Closed, Recommends Deployment of 
Military “Para-Teachers”’ NewsDesk.Asia (28 May 2015) <http://newsdesk.asia/education-
exec-wants-tribal-schools-closed-recommends-deployment-of-military-para-teachers/> 
accessed 18 July 2015 
Nishikawa Y, ‘Human Security in Southeast Asia: Viable Solution of Empty Slogan?’ (2009) 
40 Security Dialogue 213-236 
Nyamu CI, ‘How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimizat ion 
of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries’ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 
381-418 
Nyamu-Musembi C, ‘An Actor-Oriented Approach to Rights in Development’ (2005) 36 IDS 
Bulletin 41-51 
Nyamu-Musembi C and Musyoki S, ‘Kenyan Civil Society Perspectives on Rights, Rights-
Based Approaches to Development, and Participation’ 
Ocampo S, ‘Justice Far off in Basilan’ Philippine Star (26 November 2011) 
<http://www.philstar.com/opinion/751785/justice-far-basilan> accessed 5 February 2016 
Odysseos L, ‘Crossing the Line? Carl Schmitt on the “Spaceless Universalism” of 
Cosmopolitanism and the War on Terror’ in Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (eds), The 
International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global 
Order (Routledge 2007) 
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, ‘Highlights of the GPH-NDF Peace 
Negotiations’ <http://opapp.gov.ph/cpp-npa-ndf/highlights> accessed 4 January 2016 
Okafor OC, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL 
Perspective’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 171-191 
——, ‘Globalism, Memory and 9/11: A Critical Third World Perspective’ in Fleur Johns, 
Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja (eds), Events: The Force of International Law (Taylor & 
Francis 2010) 
Openbaar Ministerie, ‘Dutch Ministry of Justice’s Official Statement on Joma Sison’s Arrest: 
Philippine Communist Leader Apprehended to Face a Murder Charge’ GMA News Online 
(28 August 2007) <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/58132/news/nation/dutch-
ministry-of-justice-s-official-statement-on-joma-sison-s-arrest> accessed 10 February 2016 
Pahuja S, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics 
of Universality (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
 277 
Pakage J and Arnaz F, ‘We Had to Kill Kelly Kwalik, Say Indonesia Police’ The Jakarta Globe 
(17 December 2009) <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/we-had-to-kill-kelly-
kwalik-say-indonesia-police/> accessed 28 January 2014 
Palmier LH, ‘Modern Islam in Indonesia: The Muhammadiyah  After Independence’ (1954) 
27 Pacific Affairs 255-263 
Panikkar R, ‘Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?’ (1982) 30 Diogenes 75-102 
Parker T, ‘Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the 
Terrorist Movements They Oppose’ (2007) 19 Terrorism and Political Violence 155-179 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘Resolution 1597 (2008) United Nations 
Security Council and European Union Blacklists’ 
<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17618&lang=en> 
accessed 10 February 2016 
Pastoral Ecumenical Delegation to the Philippines, ‘Report of the Pastoral Ecumenical 
Delegation Visit to Eastern Visayas, July 15 to 18, 2005’ (20 July 2005)  
Pavlova E, ‘From a Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah 
According to PUPJI’ (2007) 30 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 777-800 
Pazzibugan D, ‘Military Admission: MILF, Not Pentagon Gang Real Target’ Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (Manila, Philippines, 18 February 2003) A1 
Pew Research Center Forum on Religion and Public Life, ‘Mapping the Global Muslim 
Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population’ (Pew 
Research Center 2009) 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘Message Delivered’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (Manila, Philippines, 
14 February 2003) 
Platzdasch B, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy  (Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies 2009) 
——, ‘Religious Freedom in Indonesia: The Case of the Ahmadiyah’ (Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies 2011) <http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ps22011R.pdf> 
accessed 29 January 2014 
Porcalla D, ‘SC Asked to Stop “Balikatan” Games’ Philippine Star (2 February 2002) 
<http://www.philstar.com/headlines/149153/sc-asked-stop-‘balikatan’-games> accessed 4 
February 2016 
Porretto G, ‘The European Union, Counter-Terrorism Sanctions against Individuals and 
Human Rights Protection’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (eds), Fresh Perspectives 
on the ‘War on Terror’ (Australian National University E-Press 2008) 
Poynting S and Whyte D, Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The ‘War on 
Terror’ as Terror (Routledge 2012) 
 278 
Pregent R, ‘Torture, Interrogation, Counter-Terrorism, and the Rule of Law’ in Ana María 
Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel and Nigel White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Price R, ‘A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo’ (1995) 49 International 
Organization 73-103 
——, ‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines’ (1998) 52 
International Organization 613-644 
Pringle R, Understanding Islam in Indonesia: Politics and Diversity  (University of Hawaiʻi 
Press 2010) 
Public Interest Law Center, ‘Laws, Labels, Liberation: The Case of Jose Maria Sison’ (2004) 
<http://www.josemariasison.org/legalcases/related/LLL_jmscase_290504.html> accessed 5 
May 2015 
Pue WW, ‘Protecting Constitutionalism in Treacherous Times: Why “Rights” Don’t Matter’ 
in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (eds), Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror’ (ANU 
E Press 2008) <http://epress.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch04.html> accessed 
23 July 2012 
Puno R, ‘The View from the Mountaintop (Keynote Speech at the National Consultative 
Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances – Searching for Solutions, 
Manila Hotel, July 16, 2007)’ 
<http://ca.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php?action=mnuactual_contents&ap=j5070> accessed 17 
February 2016 
——, ‘Message to the NUPL Founding Congress’ 
Quimpo NG, ‘Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: Who’s Afraid of an Islamic State?’ 
(1999) 3 Public Policy 38-62 
Quine W van O, From a Logical Point of View (2nd edn, Harper Torchbooks 1961) 
Radicati di Brozolo LG and Megliani M, ‘Freezing the Assets of International Terrorist 
Organizations’ in Andrea Bianchi and Yasmin Naqvi (eds), Enforcing International Law 
Norms Against Terrorism (Hart Publishing 2004) 
Radics G, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Balikatan Exercises in the Philippines and the US 
“War against Terrorism”’ (2004) 4 Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 115-127 
Rajagopal B, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third 
World Resistance (Cambridge University Press 2003) 
——, ‘The Role of Law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization and Global Legal Pluralism: 
Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 345-387 
Ralph J, America’s War on Terror: The State of the 9/11 Exception from Bush to Obama 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 
 279 
Ramakrishna K, ‘“Constructing” the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry’ 
(2004) IDSS Working Paper No. 71 
Ramo LV, ‘After Ramadan 11 behind Prison Bars, Basilan 73 Cry for Justice’ Bulatlat (9 
August 2011) <http://bulatlat.com/main/2011/08/09/after-11-ramadan-behind-prison-
bars-basilan-73-cry-for-justice/> accessed 5 February 2016 
Ranstorp M, ‘Mapping Terrorism Studies after 9/11: An Academic Field of Old Problems 
and New Prospects’ in Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning (eds), 
Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (1st edn, Routledge 2009) 
Rapoport DC, Société Radio-Canada and Council for Unified Research and Education, 
Assassination and Terrorism. (Canadian Broadcasting Corp 1971) 
Rawls J, ‘The Independence of Moral Theory’ in Samuel Freeman (ed), Collected Papers 
(Harvard University Press 1999) 
Reagan R, ‘National Security Study Directive No. 4-84. United States Policy Towards the 
Philippines’ 
Regalado E and Santos S, ‘Reyes, Corpus Cleared in Davao City Bombings’ Philippine Star (5 
March 2004) <http://www.philstar.com/nation/241333/reyes-corpus-cleared-davao-city-
bombings> accessed 5 February 2016 
Reisman WM, ‘Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War’ (2003) 97 American Journal of 
International Law 82-90 
 
Reisman WM, ‘Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea’ (2004) 98 American 
Journal of International Law 516-525 
Republic of Indonesia, ‘Fifth Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the 
United Nations Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 Security Council Resolution 1373 
(2001), S/2006/311’ 
Ressa M, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of 
Operations in Southeast Asia (Free Press 2003) 
Ricklefs MC, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 
Risse T, Ropp SC and Sikkink K, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and 
Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press 1999) 
Roach K, ‘Anti-Terrorism and Militant Democracy: Some Western and Eastern Responses’ in 
András Sajó (ed), Militant Democracy (Eleven International Publishing 2004) 
——, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
Rodell PA, ‘The Philippines: Playing Out Long Conflicts’ (2004) 2004 Southeast Asian Affairs 
185-204 
Rodgers J, ‘A Question of Law or Politics: The Sison Family Asylum Case’ (1998) 
<http://www.josemariasison.org/legalcases/Documents/06-
 280 
REKonAC1997/FECL56%20Question%20of%20Law%20or%20Politics.html> accessed 5 May 
2015 
Rodriguez D (ed), Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the 
Philippines (South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement and the Small 
Arms Survey 2010) 
Romaniuk P, ‘Institutions as Swords and Shields: Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Since 9/11’ 
(2010) 36 Review of International Studies 591-613 
Romany C, ‘Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in 
International Human Rights Law’ (1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 87-125 
Romero P, ‘Palace: Joma Still a Terrorist despite EU Ruling’ Philippine Star (13 July 2007) 
<http://www.philstar.com/headlines/5477/palace-joma-still-terrorist-despite-eu-ruling> 
accessed 4 May 2015 
——, ‘UN Credits RP Openness on Unsolved Killings’ Philippine Star (29 October 2007) 
<http://www.philstar.com/headlines/24241/un-credits-rp-openness-unsolved-killings> 
accessed 17 February 2016 
Romero PS, ‘Unprecedented Victories in Writ of Amparo Cases’ (20 December 2007) 
<http://archives.newsbreak-knowledge.ph/2007/12/20/unprecedented-victories-in-writ-
of-amparo-cases/> accessed 26 June 2014 
Rosand E, ‘The UN-Led Multilateral Institutional Response to Jihadist Terrorism: Is a Global 
Counterterrorism Body Needed?’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 399-427 
Rosand E, Millar A and Ipe J, ‘Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 
the Latin America and Carribean Region’ (Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 
2008) <http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/latin_america.pdf> accessed 
21 July 2014 
Roy O, The Failure of Political Islam (Harvard University Press 1994) 
Salaverria L, ‘How Habeas Data Complements Writ of Amparo’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (3 
February 2008) <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080203-
116471/How-habeas-data-complements-writ-of-amparo> accessed 15 May 2015 
Sales P, ‘“If You Can Keep Your Head When All about You Are Losing Theirs”! The Role of 
the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Campaign against Islamic Separatism in Mindanao’ [2006] 
Faculty of Arts - Papers (Archive) <http://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/1630> 
Saligumba JRL, ‘Cases against Activists Lodged after IP’s Mass Evacuation’ Davao Today (11 
July 2015) <http://davaotoday.com/main/politics/cases-against-activists-lodged-after-ips-
mass-evacuation/> accessed 18 July 2015 
San Juan Jr. E, ‘Abu Sayyaf and U.S. Intervention in the Philippines: Marginal Comments on 
the Bangsamoro Struggle for Self-Determination’ (2011) 1 The Journal of Social 
Transformation 117-136 
Santos PVM, ‘The Communist Front: Protracted People’s War and Counter-Insurgency in 
the Philippines (Overview)’ in Diana Rodriguez (ed), Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups 
 281 
and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (South-South Network for Non-State Armed 
Group Engagement and the Small Arms Survey 2010) 
Santos SM, ‘War and Peace on the Moro Front: Three Standard Bearers, Three Forms of 
Struggle, Three Tracks (Overview)’ in Diana Rodriguez (ed), Primed and Purposeful: Armed 
Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (South-South Network for Non-State 
Armed Group Engagement and the Small Arms Survey 2010) 
Santos SM and Dinampo OA, ‘Abu Sayyaf Reloaded: Rebels, Agents, Bandits, Terrorists 
(Case Study)’ in Diana Rodriguez (ed), Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human 
Security Efforts in the Philippines (South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group 
Engagement and the Small Arms Survey 2010) 
Santos SM and Santos PVM, ‘Moro National Liberation Front and Its Bangsamoro Armed 
Forces (MNLF-BAF)’ in Diana Rodriguez (ed), Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and 
Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group 
Engagement and the Small Arms Survey 2010) 
——, ‘Pentagon Gang and Other Obscure Moro Armed Groups’ in Diana Rodriguez (ed), 
Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines  (South-
South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement and the Small Arms Survey 2010) 
Santosa JC, ‘Modernization, Utopia and the Rise of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia’ (PhD, 
Boston University 1996) 
Save Our Schools Network, ‘Tribal Chieftain Recounts –“They Told Us to Burn Our School”’ 
<https://saveourschoolsnetwork.wordpress.com/2015/05/26/tribal -chieftain-recounts-
they-told-us-to-burn-our-school/> accessed 23 February 2016 
——, ‘Lumad Files Raps against DepEd Secretary Luistro’ 
<https://saveourschoolsnetwork.wordpress.com/about/> accessed 23 February 2016 
Scheinin M, ‘Combating terrorism while protecting human rights’ (10 November 2008) 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/menneskerettigheter/
combating_terrorism.html?id=535383> accessed 15 August 2014 
——, ‘Terrorism’, International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 
Schirmer DB and Shalom SR (eds), The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, 
Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance (South End Press 1987) 
Sebastian L, ‘The Indonesian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on Terror Without 
Becoming a National Security State’ in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (eds), After 
Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (World Scientific 2003) 
Sebastian LC, ‘Indonesian State Responses to September 11, the Bali Bombings and the War 
in Iraq: Sowing the Seeds for an Accommodationist Islamic Framework?’ (2003) 16 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 429-446 
Shenon P, ‘Philippine Senate Votes to Reject U.S. Bases Renewal’ The New York Times (16 
September 1991) <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/16/world/philippine-senate-votes-
to-reject-us-base-renewal.html> accessed 4 February 2016 
 282 
Sidel J, ‘The Islamist Threat in South East Asia: Much Ado About Nothing?’ (2008) 39 Asian 
Affairs 339-351 
Sidel JT, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia  (Cornell University Press 
2006) 
Sidel JT, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia: A Reassessment (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, East-West Center Washington 2007) 
Silke A, ‘Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Counter-Measures in Causing Terrorism and What 
Needs to Be Done’ in Tore Bjorgo (ed), Root causes of terrorism: Myths, reality and ways 
forwards (Routledge 2005) 
Sinclair A, International Relations Theory and International Law: A Critical Approach  
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 
Sison JM and Rosca N, Jose Maria Sison: At Home in the World : Portrait of a Revolutionary 
(First Edition, Open Hand Publishing 2004) 
Sison JM and Werning R, The Philippine Revolution: The Leader’s View (Crane Russak 1989) 
Soebardi S, ‘Kartosuwirjo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia’ (1983) 14 Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 109-133 
Spaventa E, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’ in Catherine Barnard and Steve 
Peers (eds), European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 
Stammers N, Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press 2009) 
Stockman F, ‘Cleric’s Trial Tests US Antiterror Fight’ Boston Globe (2 March 2005) 
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/404941583?accountid=8330> 
Stohl M, ‘The Superpowers and International Terrorism’ in Michael Stohl and George A 
Lopez (eds), Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research  (Greenwood 
Press 1986) 
——, ‘Expected Utility and State Terrorism’ in Tore Bjørgo (ed), Root Causes of Terrorism: 
myths, reality and ways forward (Routledge 2005) 
Susanti B, ‘National Security, Terrorism, and Human Rights in Indonesia’ (2002) 
Tan SK, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900-1972 (Filipinas Foundation 1977) 
Tanuwidjaja S, ‘Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the 
Evidence of Islam’s Political Decline’ (2010) 32 Contemporary Southeast Asia 29-49 
TAPOL Indonesia, Muslims on Trial (TAPOL Indonesian Human Rights Campaign 1987) 
Taya SL, ‘The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self -Determination 
in the Philippines’ (2007) 15 Intellectual Discourse 59-84 
<http://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/index.php/islam/article/view/61> 
 283 
Temuan KontraS, ‘Bentuk-Bentuk Pelanggaran Yang Dilakukan Oleh Kepolisan Dalam 
Operasi 22.11.22 Di Poso’ 
Tesiorna BO, ‘Duterte to US: Yes I Have Ties with Vigilante Group,  Just as You Have Ties 
with Terrorists’ CNN iReport (13 September 2011) <http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-
673129> accessed 8 May 2015 
Thacher D, ‘The Normative Case Study’ (2006) 111 American Journal of Sociology 1631-
1676 
Thakur R and Newman E, New Millenium, New Perspectives: The United Nations, Security 
and Governance (United Nations University Press 2000) 
The China Post, ‘U.S. Urged Bali Bombing Arrests: Interpreter’ The China Post (14 January 
2005) 
The Jakarta Post, ‘Hard-Liners Ambush Monas Rally’ The Jakarta Post (2 June 2008) 
——, ‘Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Asks Court to Be Fair in Judging His Guilt’ The Jakarta Post (9 
February 2016) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/09/abu-bakar-ba-asyir-
asks-court-be-fair-judging-his-guilt.html> accessed 3 April 2016 
Thontowi J, ‘The Islamic Perspective on the War on Terrorism and Current Indonesian 
Responses’ 
‘Tim Pengacara Muslim Jakarta Bantah Temui Ghazali’ Tempo (26 September 2010) 
<http://www.tempo.co/indeks/2010/09/26/> accessed 27 October 2015 
Toros H, Terrorism, Talking and Transformation : A Critical Approach / by Harmonie Toros  
(Routledge 2012) 
Torres Jr. J, Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf (Claretian Publications 2001) 
Trillanes IV A, ‘The GREENBASE Expose’ <http://www.trillanes.com.ph/publ ications/policy-
research-other-articles/the-greenbase-expose/> accessed 30 December 2015 
Tupas JM and Marfil MP, ‘GMA: Resume Attacks’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (Manila, 
Philippines, 13 February 2003) 
Turner M, ‘Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf’ 
(1995) 17 Contemporary Southeast Asia 1-19 
Turns D, ‘Classification, Administration, and Treatment of Battlefield Detainees’ in Ana 
María Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel and Nigel White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International 
Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Ugarte EF, ‘The Phenomenon of Kidnapping in the Southern Philippines An Overview’ 
(2008) 16 South East Asia Research 293-341 
——, ‘“In a Wilderness of mirrors”: the Use and Abuse of the “Abu Sayyaf” Labe l in the 
Philippines’ (2010) 18 South East Asia Research 373-413 
 284 
Umam S, ‘Radical Muslims in Indonesia: The Case of Ja’far Umar Thalib and the Laskar 
Jihad’ (2006) 6 Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies 1-26 
Umil AM, ‘Aquino’s Extension of Arroyo’s Dreaded Oplan Bantay Laya Draws Fire from 
Victims’ Kin’ Bulatlat (20 August 2010) <http://bulatlat.com/main/2010/08/20/aquinos-
extension-of-arroyos-dreaded-oplan-bantay-laya-draws-fire-from-victims%E2%80%99-
kin/> accessed 23 February 2016 
——, ‘Defend Lumad Schools, Our Beacons of Hope ’ Bulatlat (30 October 2015) 
<http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/10/30/defend-lumad-schools-our-beacons-of-hope/> 
accessed 23 February 2016 
United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report: New Dimensions of 
Human Security (UNDP 1994) 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Promoting and Protecting Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism’ 
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/news-and-events/human-rights-while-
countering-terrorism.html> accessed 11 November 2015 
United States Department of State, ‘Chapter 6 Foreign Terrorist Organizations’ (United 
States Department Of State 2015) <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239413.htm> 
accessed 28 January 2016 
United States Office of the Press Secretary, ‘President Bush, President Arroyo Hold Joint 
Press Conference’ <http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030519-6.html> accessed 28 January 
2016 
UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee, ‘Protecting Human Rights While Countering 
Terrorism’ <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/rights.html> accessed 12 January 2016 
Vermeulen BP, ‘Annotation to Rb ’S-Gravenhage (REK) 11 September 1997 (Sison III)’ 
[1997] Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht (Immigration Law) 29-34 
Villegas BM, ‘The Philippines in 1986: Democratic Reconstruction in the Post-Marcos Era’ 
(1987) 27 Asian Survey 194-205 
Vitug MD and Gloria GM, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao  (Ateneo Center 
for Social Policy and Institute for Popular Democracy 2000) 
Walley CA, ‘Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on Basilan Island’ (2004) 17 Special Warfare 
30-35 
Waluyo S, ‘Indonesia’s Predicament on Counterterrorism Policy in the Era of Democratic 
Transition’ (UNISCI 2007) UNISCI Discussion Paper No 15 
Warde I, The Price of Fear: The Truth behind the Financial War on Terror (1st edn, 
University of California Press 2008) 
Weekley K, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 1968-1993: A Story of Its Theory and 
Practice (University of the Philippines Press 2001) 
 285 
Werning R, ‘Joma Sison, a Victim of U.S. and Dutch Interests – Dutch Lawyer’ Bulatlat 
(Manila, Philippines, 3 September 2007) <http://bulatlat.com/main/2007/09/03/joma-
sison-a-victim-of-u-s-and-dutch-interests-%E2%80%93-dutch-lawyer/> accessed 27 April 
2015 
Whitaker BE, ‘Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the “War on Terror” in the Third 
World’ (2007) 28 Third World Quarterly 1017-1032 
Wilkinson P, Terrorism and the Liberal State (McMillan Press 1977) 
Wilson G, ‘Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-PHILIPPINES and The Indirect 
Approach’ (2006) 86 Military Review 2-12 
Wilson S and Kamen A, ‘“Global War on Terror” is given new name’ The Washington Post 
(25 March 2009) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html> accessed 27 January 2016 
Wise W, Indonesia’s War on Terror (United States-Indonesia Society 2005) 
Wouters C (Kees), ‘Reconciling National Security and Non-Refoulment: Exceptions, 
Exclusions, and Diplomatic Assurances’ in Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel and 
Nigel White (eds), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 
Yuvienco MFTJ, ‘Servir Y Amparar - To Serve and Protect: Thoughts on the Efficacy of the 
Writ of Amparo’ 36 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Journal 54-76 
Zarate CIT, ‘Davao Gets Beating from Terrorists’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (13 April 2003) 
A16 
——, ‘Luicito’s Amparo’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (19 November 2007) 
<http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20071119-
101722/Luicito%92s_amparo> accessed 15 June 2015 
Zulaika J, ‘Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US 
Counterterrorism’ (2012) 5 Critical Studies on Terrorism 51-68 
Zulaika J and Douglass WA, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism  
(Routledge 1996) 
Zumel-Sicat D, ‘Treasure Hunter a Player in a More Absorbing Tale (First of Three Parts)’ 
The Manila Times (29 May 2002) 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20020620012301/http://www.manilatimes.net/national/200
2/may/29/top_stories/20020529top5.html> accessed 8 May 2015 
——, ‘Treasure Hunter Had White Supremacists for Associates (Second of Three Parts)’ The 
Manila Times (30 May 2002) 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20021028074217/http://www.manilatimes.net/national/200
2/may/30/top_stories/20020530top6.html> accessed 8 May 2015 
——, ‘Spies, Terrorists Attracted to Treasure Hunters’ Circles (Conclusion)’ The Manila 
Times (31 May 2002) 
 286 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20020624062221/http://www.manilatimes.net/national/200
2/may/31/top_stories/20020531top6.html> accessed 8 May 2015 
 
 
  
 287 
Appendix 1   
 
List of Interviews 
 
Interviews conducted in Indonesia in 2013: 
 
1.  Yati Andriyani, Head of Law and Human Rights Advocacy Division, Komisi untuk Orang 
Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (KontraS), June 7, 2013, Jakarta 
 
2.  Deddy Rathi, Advocacy and Campaigns Department, Wahana Lingkungan Hidup 
Indonesia (WALHI), June 12 and 21, 2013, Jakarta 
 
3.  Yhodisman Soratha, Investigator, Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (KomnasHAM), 
June 17, 2013, Jakarta  
 
4.  Syamsul Alam, Vice Coordinator, KontraS, June 19 and 27, 2013, Jakarta 
 
5.  Taufik Andrie, Head of Research, Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), June 20, 2013, 
Jakarta 
 
6.  Hadi Purnama, Professor and Director of Human Rights Institute, University of Indonesia 
Faculty of Law, June 25, 2013, Depok 
 
7.  Zainal Abidin, Deputy Director, Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM), June 
26, 2013, Jakarta 
 
8.  Muhamad Isnur, Lawyer and Head of Research and Development Division, Lembaga 
Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Jakarta, July 1, 2013, Jakarta 
 
9.  Emelia Yanti, General Secretary, Gabungan Serikat Buruh Independen (GSBI), July 5, 
2013, Jakarta 
 
10. Muradi, Lecturer, Padjadjaran University, Bandung, July 8, 2013, Jakarta  
 
11.  Heru Susetyo, Professor, University of Indonesia Faculty of Law; and Chairperson, Pusat 
Advokasi Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia (PAHAM) Indonesia, July 12, 2013, Jakarta 
 
12.  Zely Ariane, Coordinator, National Papua Solidarity (NAPAS), July 16, 2013, Jakarta  
 
13.  Sapto Waluyo, Journalist and Executive Director, Center for Indonesian Reforms (CIR), 
July 17, 2013, Jakarta 
 
14.  Junaedi, University of Indonesia Faculty of Law, July 23, 2013, Depok 
 
15.  Widiyanto and Andiko, Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat 
dan Ekologis (HuMa), July 23, 2013, Jakarta 
 
16. Anggalia Putri Permatasari, HuMa, July 23, 2013, Jakarta 
 
17.  Sriyana, Head of Enforcement Administration Bureau, KomnasHAM, July 25, 2013, 
Jakarta  
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18.  Almuzzammil Yusuf, Member of the Indonesian House of Representatives (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat) and Chairman of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), July 25, 2013, Jakarta 
 
19.  Wirawan Adnan, Senior Lawyer and Founding Member, Tim Pengacara Muslim (TPM), 
August 16, 2013, Jakarta 
 
20.  Sandra Hamid, Indonesia Country Representative, Asia Foundation, August 20, 2013, 
Jakarta 
 
21. M. Mahendradatta, Chairperson, Tim Pengacara Muslim (TPM), August 20, 2013, 
Jakarta 
 
22. Sydney Jones, Director, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, August 22, 2013, Jakarta 
 
 
Interviews conducted in the Philippines in 2014: 
 
23. Cristina Palabay, Secretary General, Karapatan, February 3, 2014, Manila 
 
24. Edita Burgos, Campaigner and Mother of Disappearance Victim Jonas Burgos, February 
5, 2014, Manila 
 
25.  Amirah Lidasan, Spokesperson, Moro-Christian Peoples Alliance (MCPA) and President, 
Suara Bangsamoro, February 7 and 8 2014, Manila   
 
26.  Piya Macliing Malayao, Spokesperson, Kalipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan 
(KAMP a.k.a. KATRIBU), February 7 2014, Manila 
 
27.  Satur Ocampo, Former Member of the Philippine House of Representatives; and 
President, Bayan Muna, February 10 2014, Manila 
 
28.  Carlos Isagani Zarate, Member of the Philippine House of Representatives 
(representing Bayan Muna partylist) and Founding Chairman, Union of People’s Lawyers in 
Mindanao (UPLM), February 13 2014, Davao City 
 
29.  Dolphing Ogan, Chairperson, Kalumaran, February 14 2014, Davao City 
 
30.  Hanimay Suazo, Secretary General, Karapatan - South Mindanao Region, February 15 
2014, Davao City 
 
31. Joel Mahinay, Member, Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG); and Founding Member, 
UPLM, February 15 2014, Davao City 
 
32.  Sis Noemi Degala, Executive Director, Sisters Association in Mindanao (SAMIN); and 
Commissioner, Mindanao Truth Commission, February 17 2014, Davao City 
 
33.  Bai Ali Indayla, Secretary General, Kawagib – Alliance for the Advancement of Moro 
Human Rights, February 18 2014, Davao City 
 
34.  Erwin Maarte, Tribal Leader, February 22 and 27, 2014, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon 
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35.  Carl Cesar Rebuta, Associate Executive Director, Legal Rights and Natural Resources 
Center (LRC), February 27, 2014, Cagayan de Oro City 
 
36.  Roger Plana, Chairperson, Kalumbay; and Santiano Agdahan Jr, Chairperson, Kasilo, 
February 28 2014, Cagayan de Oro City 
 
37.  Rachel Pastores, Executive Director, Public Interest Law Center, March 4 2014, Manila 
 
38.  Marissa Dumajug Palo, Member of Secretariat, National Democratic Front Philippines 
(NDF) Section of the Joint Monitoring Committee, March 6, 2014, Manila 
 
39.  Jose Luis Martin “Chito” Gascon, Former Chairperson, Government of the Philippines 
(GPH) Section of the Joint Monitoring Committee, March 11, 2014, Manila 
 
40.  Jaime Arroyo GPHMC, Member of Secretariat, Government of the Philippines (GPH) 
Section of the Joint Monitoring Committee, March 11, 2014, Manila 
 
41.  Marlon Manuel, National Coordinator, Alternative Law Groups (ALG), March 13 2014, 
Manila 
 
42.  Edgardo Cabalitan and Sunshine Serrano, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines 
(TFDP), March 20 2014, Manila 
 
43. Col. Roderick Parayno, Head, Armed Forces of the Philippines-Human Rights Office 
(AFP-HRO), March 21 2014 
 
44.  Fatemah Remedios Balbin, Lawyer, March 26 2014, Manila 
 
45.  Max de Mesa, Executive Director, Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates 
(PAHRA), March 28 2014, Manila 
 
 
Interviews conducted in 2015: 
 
46.  Noor Huda Ismail, Founder, Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), Melbourne, August 21, 
2015 
 
47.  Siane Indriyani, Commissioner, KomnasHAM, September 14 and 16, 2015, Jakarta 
 
48.  Hanibal Wijayanta, Current Affairs Producer, AnTV, September 15, 2015, Jakarta 
 
49.  Slamet Hariyanto, Chairperson of Council for Law and Human Rights, Muhammadiyah – 
West Java Regional Board, September 17, 2015, Surabaya 
 
50.  M. Imdadun Rahmat, Commissioner, KomnasHAM, September 17, 2015, Surabaya 
 
51.  Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad, Lecturer, Department of International Relations, 
University of Indonesia, September 18, 2015, Depok 
  
  
 290 
Appendix 2   
 
List of Indicative Questions 
 
1.  How has post-9/11 counter-terrorism affected the human rights of people in the 
Philippines/Indonesia? (Please consider the entire period from September 11, 2001 up to 
the present.  You may focus on specific periods if you like.) 
(a) Is the impact of counter-terrorism limited to certain individuals who are suspected 
terrorists (e.g., radical Islamists associated with Jamaah Islamiya or Abu Sayaf) or are there 
impacts affecting the broader society?   
(b) What has been the effect on ordinary people?  On particular groups (e.g., Muslims, 
women, etc.)?  In particular places? 
 
2.  In the past, the following aspects of globally coordinated counter-terrorism have been 
argued to affect "sovereignty" and human rights: 
(a)  US and Australian military assistance to Philippine and Indonesian armed forces or 
police (e.g., Detachment 88 of the Indonesian Police); 
(b) extradition of suspects abroad (e.g., from the Indonesia to Australia, or from the 
Philippines to Indonesia); 
(c) US armed intervention and joint US-Philippine military exercises in Mindanao; 
(d) travel warnings issued by Western governments against Indonesia and the Philippines; 
and 
(e) terrorist blacklisting of organizations engaged in peace talks with the Philippine 
government by the US, the EU and Australia. 
- How has your organisation reacted to these issues in public discussions?  Please specify 
strategies used; positions taken in public discussions; public activities undertaken such as 
campaigns, legal cases, legislative advocacy, etc. 
- What do you think is meant by "sovereignty" in these contexts?  
- How is "sovereignty" related to respect or protection of human rights?   
- Can human rights be used to further "sovereignty"?  How? 
 
3.  In the Philippines and Indonesia, what do you think are the most pressing human rights 
issues related to counter-terrorism today? (e.g., political killings of Filipino leftist activists?)  
- What has your organisation done or does it intend to do about these issues?  Please 
specify positions taken in public discussions, public activities undertaken such as 
campaigns, legal cases, legislative advocacy, etc.   
- Have there been changes in your opinions/views about sovereignty and human rights?   
- Have there been changes in your strategies and goals? 
- Have there been changes in human rights organisations’ capacities or opportunities 
compared to past issues?  Please illustrate with concrete examples.  
 
4. Looking at the different issues you have been involved with in the past until today, in 
which issue have you been most and least successful? Which of your goals have been 
achieved or not achieved?  Why or why not? 
 
5.  Are you able to have any influence in how counter-terrorism is pursued by the 
government in your country? If so, how and when?  If not, why not? Please illustrate with 
examples. 
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6.  Are you able to influence the practice of counter-terrorism by Western governments, 
such as the US and Australia, in your country? If so, how and when?  If not, why not?  
Please illustrate with examples. 
 
7.  Are you aware of the UN General Assembly resolution adopted in 2006 providing for a 
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy? 
(a)  How is the strategy of "countering terrorism while respecting human rights" 
understood in your country?  Have human rights protections been incorporated in counter-
terrorism laws/policies?  How? 
(b) If there have been changes in counter-terrorism policies/laws, how are these changes 
translated in the practice of police or armed forces? 
(c) If human rights protections have been incorporated in counter-terrorism policies/laws, 
who monitors the compliance of counter-terrorism authorities with human rights 
laws/standards?  Are human rights organisations given any monitoring role?  And how is 
this role performed? 
  
 
 
 
